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HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DOCTRINE OF
THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

BY
DR J. A. DORNER,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GÜTTINGEN.

DIVISION FIRST,
FIRST FOUR CENTURIES.

VOLUME II.

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THIRD EPOCH.

FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICEA TO THAT OF
CONSTANTINOPLE, A.D. 381.

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FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH.

CHAPTER SECOND.

MONARCHIANISM OF THE EBIONITICAL FORM.

INTRODUCTION.

The Two Forms of Monarchianism.

TOWARDS the end of the second century, in harmony with the New Testament, the doctrinal development, which had started with the historical, and had passed gradually from lower to higher ground, arrived preliminarily at its goal. Nothing short of attributing to Christ true divinity was able to satisfy minds conscious of having attained absolute reconciliation through Him. We find, too, that at a far earlier date, probably through the influence of the teachings of the Apostles, the conviction that Christ had introduced the absolutely perfect religion, and that everything, both in its rise and continuance, is essentially and originally conditioned by Christianity, had found an expression in the general doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ, and of His second coming to judgment. During the second half of the second century, the mind of the Church advanced unconcernedly onwards towards the goal which the necessity of the case had fixed, until it finally landed, and that with clearly defined consciousness, in the inner sphere of the supramundane divine itself, and traced back the roots of the Logos who appeared in Christ, to the ultimate ground of all

things, that is, to the very essence of God Himself. At this point, however, a great shock was experienced: the course taken by the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ seemed to be adverse to the reigning doctrine of God. A reaction, therefore, took place on the part of the doctrine of the unity of God,—a doctrine which had always been taken for granted,—and Christology was at first refused that resting-place in the eternal divine essence which it undoubtedly needed. Nor was this any longer a conflict with tendencies outside of the Church, but within its own bosom. For the unity of God, which the rational and religious mind universally regards as an unassailable certainty (with which conviction Christians had hitherto unhesitatingly deemed themselves to be in harmony), appeared on reflection to be so irreconcilable with the distinctive principle of Christianity, that one or the other must needs give way. Had the new Christian principle given way, a relapse of humanity into its ante-Christian state would inevitably have followed; and it could have made but little difference whether the place of Christianity were taken by a pantheistic doctrine of the unity of the All, moulded after a Greek type, or by an abstract deistic monotheism, moulded after a Jewish type. On the other hand, did the Christian principle firmly maintain its position, as might be expected from the life and vigour it displayed, and were the monarchy of God sacrificed to it, a relapse into polytheism would be inevitable. In either case, the certain conviction of faith, that Christianity, as the revelation of the inmost essence of God, was the perfect religion, would have received a deadly blow. For a long time already, a storm had been brewing in the sphere of the unity of God, which threatened to spend its force against the course taken by the development of Christology; and no sooner had the doctrine of the Logos led to the distinct and conscious equalization of the Son with the Father, and to Christology directly touching the very apex of theology, than the storm began to burst.

The reaction against the hitherto received Christology could only originate, it is true, with a defective, partially ante-Christian conception of God. For, although it cannot be denied that the conception of the attributes of God had already undergone many a change during the Gnostic movements, and that love had been recognised as a determination of God alongside of the physical

determinations, and also alongside of righteousness and sanctity; still the doctrine of the inner nature of God had not been with certainty transformed by the Christian principle. And yet all depended on this latter. Christology gave thereto a mighty impulse; and this impulse governed, in the first instance, the further course taken by the matter, till, about the middle of the third and during the progress of the fourth century, the Church withdrew its attention from the development of Christology, and, taking its Christology for granted, applied itself mainly to the attainment of the true conception of God,—that is, to the task of conciliating the doctrine of the higher nature of Christ, and subsequently that of the Holy Spirit, with the idea of God, —and to the clear and conscious exposition of the Trinity as the properly Christian conception of God, in opposition to heathenism on the one hand, and Judaism on the other.

From the end of the second century, then, we may say, Christology demanded that the previously prevailing conception of God should undergo a transformation in consonance with the divine revelation in Christ. We find, as a general rule, that whilst, on the one hand, the old is the fulcrum or stay for the development of the Christian principle, on the other hand, this development itself is unable to make way save as the truth embodied in previous systems is incorporated with Christianity;—otherwise humanity relapses irrecoverably from Christianity into its ante-Christian condition. And the same process of conciliation between nature and grace—that is, between the ante-Christian and the Christian—we find accomplished again in the remarkable stadium to which our attention is now to be devoted. There were not lacking men who, though opposed in other respects, were agreed in their dread of any approach to an undermining of the unity of God (compare Origen in John. T. ii. 2,—*τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχόμενους ταρασσόν, εὐλαβούμενους δύο ἀναγορεύσαι θεούς*; Tertullian adv. Prax. 3,—“*Simplices quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ, quæ major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus Diis seculi ad unicum et verum Deum transfert, expavescunt ad οἰκονομίαν. Monarchiam, inquit, tenemus*”); and because they paid sole regard to this one point, they were designated Monarchians. The Judaizing Christians, indeed, are no longer deserving of much notice in this connection. The rigid

conception of God entertained by unbelieving Jews had not entirely escaped the corrosive power of Gnosticism; the principles of Hellenism and Judaism had approximated to each other, in consequence of their return into their pantheistic ground; the old Ebionites, who denied Christ's supernatural birth, whose number even at an earlier period seems never to have been large, and who appear to have been in part more closely connected with the synagogue than with the Christian Church, have now passed away, as far as their importance is concerned. At the very moment, however, when the Christology of the Church had arrived at the above mentioned theological problem, but, though seeking, had not found the solution, old and new elements broke loose; consolidated themselves, as at the time when Ebionism and Docetism prevailed, into opposed heresies,—to wit, into Patripassianism, which was a higher form of Docetism, and into a new form of Ebionism, which had passed through, and therefore received a colouring from, Gnosticism. As has been remarked, Christology still constituted the moving principle; and the two heresies just mentioned were Christological, and not Trinitarian, like Sabellianism and Arianism proper. And as the two earlier Christological heresies found a new prop in the doctrine of the unity of God, which now became a factor of the movement; so, in conjunction with the opposition raised against them by the Church, did they prepare the way for, and introduce, the century which in a doctrinal point of view may be properly termed, the Trinitarian century. But what we found occurring in the case of Cerinthus,—to wit, that when the Docetism and Ebionism, confusedly combined in his system, were separated, the principle of Ebionism logically led to Docetism, and *vice versâ*,—occurs again at this higher stage. The Alogi (see Epiph. Hær. 51; Irenæus 3, c. 11, 9; compare Heinen de Alogis, 1829), opposed to Cerinthus on the one side, and to the Montanists on the other, appear, from the indefiniteness which they sought to maintain in reference to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and of the Logos, and from the latitudinarian and regressive movement which they initiated, to form the point of departure for the two possible forms of Monarchianism (Note 1 in the Appendix). The Ebionite Theodotus is expressly termed an ἀπόσπασμα ἐκ τῆς ἀλόγου αἱρέσεως. That the Alogi accepted the supernatural birth of Christ, we may with certainty conclude

from the position they assumed towards the Synoptics, which they made the basis of their operations against the Gospel of John. On this point, moreover, Epiphanius brings no charge against them. Nor is it at all probable that they denied the divinity of Christ, notwithstanding their rejection of the Gospel of John; nay, even although they may have taken up a position, not merely of indifference, but of actual antagonism, to the developed dogma of the Logos (see Epiphanius' Hær. 51, 28; Anaceph. ed. Pet. 2, 144). For such a denial would by no means have been excused by Epiphanius; he would then rather have justly classed them with the Ebionites: whereas he does the very contrary. They had no intention, therefore, of denying divinity to Christ; but still it is not likely that they willingly traced it back to the Holy Spirit, as a being distinct from God; for to have assumed that, would have been incompatible with their relation both to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost and to Montanism. Even supposing they did the *ἀεὶ Θεὸς λόγος παρεξέβαλον, τὸν ἀπὸ Πατρός* (Anaceph. 2, 144, 5), it is improbable that they admitted the existence of distinctions in God,—for the purpose of avoiding which, they contented themselves with simply saying that Christ was a man who had in Himself the deity of the Father, instead of adopting the doctrine of the Logos, by which His divinity was more distinctly defined. Naturally enough, when their aim was to preserve the true humanity of Christ, as it decidedly was (see Note 1, Appendix), the doctrine of the pre-existence of the higher nature of Christ became converted into the doctrine of the predestination (*πρόγνωσις*, *prædestinatio*) of this peculiar union of God with a man.¹

Such a doctrine evidently left undetermined, whether the divine in Christ was personal, or a mere force. According, therefore, as the mind was more under the sway of religion, or of the practical understanding, this Monarchianism necessarily took a patripassian or an Ebionitic turn. Let us now consider these two tendencies.

¹ The passage from Origen's Comm. in Ep. Tit. T. iv., in Pamph. Apolog. p. 22,—“qui dicunt . . . quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit deitatem,”—probably relates to the Alogi. If so, the heresies which are there enumerated before and after, form a regular and orderly series. To the “Deitas Patris,” *πατρικὴ θεότης*, would then be opposed the *πατρικὸς Θεὸς λόγος*, required by Epiphanius; see Hær. 51, 28.

I. EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM ; OR, THE REVIVAL OF
EBIONISM IN A HIGHER FORM.

The revivification of Ebionism, which we have now to consider, differed from the old in two respects :—in that, *firstly*, it allowed the supernatural birth of Christ ; and, *secondly*, perceived the impossibility of the belief in the unique and exceptional character of Christ standing its ground, or even of allowing the reality of His human development, unless the divine element which distinguished Him were confessed to have influenced it from the very beginning. This form of Ebionism is in advance also of that abstract, ethical point of view, which attaches worth to a moral development only so far as it springs from human power. There is no reason for doubting what Eusebius mentions having found in an old writing (H. E. 5, 28), that Theodotus the Tanner, of Byzantium, arrived at his thesis—Christ was *ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος*, although born of the Virgin (Tertull. de præscript. 53), after a denial of Christ, and that his heresy was meant to serve as a cloak to his apostasy. But this ground alone, even though, as is not improbable, he added higher predicates to Christ, should prevent us regarding him as a worthy representative of the higher form of Ebionism which was now reviving into existence. It is quite certain that neither the Alogi, with whom he was connected (see above), nor the school which sprang from him, held Christ to be merely an ordinary man ; for then they would not have deserved even the name of heretics (Note 2).¹ We will direct our attention a little longer to this school.

It is probable that in the Theodotians a school was found for a speculative, or, more precisely expressed, for a pantheistic form of Ebionism connected with Gnosticism. The fundamental features of this view, as laid down by Theodotus the Money-changer (Theodoret, Hær. fab. 2, 6), or by the Theodotus whom Clemens Alexandr. mentions (with Neander, I hold the two to be one and the same person), are the following :—During the second half of the second century, we find, in general, that the hypostases and mythical Æon-world of Gnosticism, which were formerly kept apart, began to be confounded with each other ; and the same thing is particularly observable

¹ See the Inquiry into the true idea of Heresy, contained in Note U, Appendix, Vol. I. Transl.

in the Theodotians, in so far as they assert even the Logos to be absolutely identical with the Father (Exc. Theod. 19). The image of this Logos, whom they take pleasure in designating High Priest (compare 27), or Melchizedek (Note 3; see Theodoret's *Hær.* Fab. 2, 6), was borne by Christ (*ibid.*), as, indeed, by all elect souls. No one individual, however, can be said to be identical with that eternal idea; not even Christ contained all its fulness, but was merely one word of the Word (*λόγον λόγος*, 19); one ray of the divine was in His soul, and that He shares with all elect souls. The presence of the Redeemer in the world was but a shadow of the glory He has with the Father. Both the elder and the younger Theodotus (Exc. 60) readily appealed to Luke i. 35. They considered the words, "The Holy Spirit will come upon thee, and the power of the Most High will overshadow thee," to refer to the body of the Lord, and to the formative power of God, which moulded it in the womb of the Virgin. In this case, also, they meant to exclude the indwelling or incarnation of the *πνεῦμα* or *λόγος*. To the Logos who was in identity with the Father there attached, it is true, from eternity the *περιγραφή*, but He had no personal existence (*οὐσία*). He was the Father's countenance, or His circumscription (*Umschriebenheit*) and form; and this is the meaning of the word Son, as applied to God apart from the incarnation (10, 19); Sonship is, as it were, a determination of the Father Himself, the element of finitude in Him. The Father Himself is the Son, so far as He turns His countenance towards us,—in which alone we are able to know Him (10, 23). But the Logos has by no means an exclusive relation to Christ. In becoming incarnate,—and we must not suppose there to have been only one incarnation, for the Son was incarnate also in the prophets (19),—this Son, that is, God, not merely assumed flesh, but also personality (*οὐσία*), out of the subject (man). The personality, however, held the position of servant; for it was capable of suffering, and was subject to the active, supreme cause (19).

It is scarcely possible not to perceive the after-influence of the system of the elder Theodotus in this form of Ebionism. In a variety of ways he affirmed, in opposition to the Church, that Christ was, after all, a true man; and whatever other divine attributes he may have given to Him, rested solely on the basis of His full human personality. Such also was the position of

the younger Theodotus (Note 4). Now, although, like the Gnostic Ebionism which consolidated itself into definite forms towards the end of the second century, after the elder Ebionism had died out, Theodotus found little difficulty in attributing to Christ, or to His elect and predestined soul, a divine substance, the Ebionitic character of his views shows itself at once in his supposition, that the Redeemer merely awakened the soul out of sleep and kindled the divine spark, which lies at all events in the elect (3); and in his not leaving to Christ even the dignity of being an unique incarnation of the Word. The elect differ from each other only in the measure in which the one approaches nearer to the τέλος προκοπῆς—that is, to the idea of the true man, created in the image of God—than the other. Accordingly, this form of Ebionism also was at last compelled to agree with the elder Theodotus when he says (Tertull. de præscr. 53),—"Christ is raised above other men nulla alia nisi sola justitiæ auctoritate." An exactly similar position was occupied somewhat later than Theodotus the Elder, according to Eusebius (see 5, 28) and Theodoret (see Hær. fab. 2, 4), by Artemon; with the single difference that he had probably cast off the Gnostic element (compare Note 3, and take in conjunction therewith Hær. fab. 2, 5, at the commencement). Devoted to Hellenic philosophy (Euseb. 5, 28), and, as it appears, dealing arbitrarily with the Old and New Testament records, he and his school believed themselves warranted in describing it as an innovation to designate Christ, God;—an assertion, the opposite of which we have clearly enough shown to be true, and the drift and nature of which is perfectly plain from his pretence of having the Apostles on his side. The further assertion, that his doctrine had prevailed in Rome till the time of Zephyrinus, does not accord very well with the reception given to Praxeas there; with the exclusion of the elder Theodotus by Victor, prior to Zephyrinus; with the intimate relation existing between Irenæus and the Romish Church; nor, lastly, with the remarks made above respecting the dogmatical views of the Romish Church subsequent to Clement's day. In fact, he himself recedes from this position to the extent of granting, what he could not deny, that in ancient hymns deity had already been attributed to Christ; but he pretends that, in a doctrinal form, his ideas had held a place side by side therewith, or had even had

the predominance. Taking it, however, to be a fact, as history unquestionably teaches, that there was little doctrinal development of the faith in Rome during the second century, this is in itself a refutation of his affirmation; for if we deny the existence of doctrinal development in general, we must deny also the existence of a doctrinal Ebionism. It is, of course, plain that a faith as yet doctrinally undeveloped might tolerate many principles which a keener eye would have condemned; but it does not therefore follow, that the faith itself was identical with such principles; although it agreed with the interest of the Artemonites to maintain the fairness of such a conclusion. For the rest, Artemon does allow that Christ was supernaturally born of the Virgin, and that He was exalted above the prophets by His virtue (Theodoret's Hær. fab. 2, 4). In the matter of Monarchianism, therefore, he was at one with his predecessors; but he was scientifically in advance of them, his views having acquired clearness and definiteness. Like them, he clung to the sinlessness and the supernatural birth; but, instead of misusing the words, *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, as did the Theodotians, who, notwithstanding their adhesion to the formula of the Church, really attributed nothing distinctive to Christ, he entirely avoids such lofty expressions; at the same time, however, he acknowledges the more distinctly that, on account of His sinlessness, an unique dignity appertained to Christ. The divinity which he concedes to Christ is His virtue, which raised Him above the most distinguished of the human race; and that Artemon did not take a merely empirical view of this virtue by representing it as the sole work of Christ's human freedom, is very evident, partly from the comparison with the prophets, who were prophets because they participated in the Divine Spirit, and partly from his assigning to Christ a rank above the prophets, both in consideration of His supernatural birth and of the superior measure of His virtue.¹

¹ Καὶ Ἀρτέμιον δὲ τις τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ὅλον Θεὸν παραπλησίως ἡμῖν ἰδέσθαι, αὐτὸν εἰρηκῶς εἶναι τοῦ παντός ποιητήν· τὸν δὲ κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶπε ψιλόν, ἐκ παρθένου γεγεννημένον, τῶν δὲ προφητῶν ἀρετῇ κρείττονα. Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἔλεγε κεκηρυχέναι, παρερμηνεύων τῶν θείων γραφῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοὺς δὲ μετ' ἐκείνους θεολογῆσαι τὸν Χριστὸν, οὐκ ὄντα Θεόν. Artemon's party extended far into the second century, and even Paul of Samosata is classed with it by the teachers of the Church,—for example, by Theodoret, Hær. fab. 2, 8.

Paul of Samosata¹ gave the completest development to this higher form of Ebionism (about 270 after Christ). Many points of his system, indeed, are but a repetition of what had been taught before; and the early writers regularly described him as an adherent of Artemon. He did away with the songs of praise to Christ, under the pretence of their being of modern origin;—a mode of procedure resembling that of Artemon in one respect, but in another respect in glaring contradiction to him; for Artemon had maintained (see Schleiermacher's *Z. Theol.* 2, 490), that a *θεολογεῖν* of Christ was discoverable solely in old hymns, and not in strictly doctrinal productions (to which the author of the Little Labyrinth already gave a fitting reply: *Euseb.* 5, 20). Like Artemon, with whom the ancients constantly class him, he starts with the unity of God, denies the existence of a *σοφία*, or *λόγος*, distinct from the Father (*ἐννόστατος*), and represents the Logos in God as merely that which intelligence or reason is in the human heart. In this sense he took the passage, "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me." He advances, therefore, no further than that *ταυτότης* of the Logos with the Father, which the younger Theodotus so decidedly taught in opposition to the doctrine of the Church (*Exc. Theod.* 19). Up to this time, the Church had found no better way of describing the distinction between the divine in Christ and God, than the, as we have seen, unsatisfactory one of assigning the divine reason or *σοφία* to the Son. Paul further resembles his predecessors in laying the main stress on the human personality of Christ; but he carries it out more fully. His Christ is from beneath (*κάτωθεν*, *Euseb.* 7, 30; *Theodoret*, *Hær. fab.* 2, 8): *ἐφωράθη τὸν Χριστὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγων, θείας χάριτος διαφερόντως ἡξωμένον*. *Euseb.* 7, 27,—*Τούτου δὲ (Παύλου) ταπεινὰ καὶ χαμᾶι πετῇ περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διδασκαλίαν φρονήσαντος, ὡς κοινοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γενομένου*, etc. *C.* 30,—*Τὸν μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ* (so say the Bishops in their Synodal Epistle) *οὐ βούλεται συνομολογεῖν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατεληλυθέναι—λέγει Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν κάτωθεν*. They term Him *ἐξορκησάμενον τὸ μυστήριον* (whereas even he

¹ Compare *Euseb.* 7, 27-30; Hahn's "*Bibliothek der Symbole u. s. w.*," pp. 91-97, 129 f.; *Epiph. Hær.* 65; *Theodoret, Hær. fab.* 2, 8; Ehrlich's "*de erroribus Pauli Samos.*" Lips. 1745; Schwab's "*de Pauli Sam. vita atque doctrina*," Diss. inaug. 1839.

had previously had faith in Christ as Lord and God : Euseb. ed. Heinichen) *καὶ ἐμπομπεύοντα τῇ μιαιρᾷ αἰρέσει τοῦ Ἀρτεμῆ* (compare Euseb. 5, 28, at the commencement). The Logos, that is, the activity of God which breathed through Him from above, did not dwell in Him as a person, but merely as a quality or power (*οὐκ οὐσιωδῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιότητα*) ; and although he does not appear to have questioned the supernatural birth of Christ (in opposition to the indefinite expression of Euseb. 7, 27, we may adduce the distinct declaration of Athanasius c. Apoll. 2, 3, that he taught, *Θεὸν ἐκ παρθένου*), he laid no particular stress on it ; and the utmost he could have meant by it was, that Christ continued permanently the subject of divine influence, and that His humanity was predestined to, and therefore also prepared for, this abiding union with the divine power. What is peculiar to him, however, is his endeavour to establish the Sonship or deity of Christ, on the ground of the divine power which dwelt in Him, after the analogy of the prophets, but in a fuller measure (according to the *Contestatio Cleri Constantinop. quod Nestor. ejusd. sit sentent. cum Paulo Samos. Mansi Coll. 4, 1108*, Paul's doctrine was—*ἵνα ὡς ὁ ἐκ Δαβὶδ χρισθεὶς ἀλλότριος ἢ τῆς σοφίας, μήτε ἡ σοφία ἐν ἄλλῃ οὕτως ἐνοικῇ* : compare Baur l. c. 1, 296), urging that it was the animating principle of His human development, which, having attained its goal, constituted Him, for its excellence, worthy of the name of Son of God. (Compare the above passage from Theodoret, Hær. fab. 2, 8 ; Athan. de Syn. c. 26,—*ὑστερον αὐτὸν μετὰ τὴν ἐν-αυθρώπησιν ἐκ προκοπῆς τεθεοποιῆσθαι, τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γεγενῆσθαι* : c. 45,—*ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γέγονε Θεός*. *Fragm. Ep. Synod. in Leontius c. Nest. et Eutychn.*, he taught *συνάφειαν πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν κατὰ μάθησιν καὶ μετουσίαν* ; Epiph. Hær. 65,—*ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέπνευσεν ἄνωθεν ὁ λόγος*.) As of a like tendency, I am inclined to take the passage in Epiph. 65, 1,—*ἐλθὼν ὁ λόγος ἐνήργησε μόνος καὶ ἀνῆλθε πρὸς τὸν πατέρα* ; but I doubt whether it teaches a separation of the divine from this man, similar to that which Sabellians taught, as Baur affirms (l. c. p. 305). For the only idea justificatory thereof—to wit, that after His perfection Christ was possessed of deity in Himself, in the way above mentioned, and that He therefore needed no longer the influence of the Logos—can scarcely have been entertained by him, seeing that it would have still further weakened the, in other respects,

feeble proof of the deification of Christ. At what moment he considered the deity of Christ to have commenced, whether after His resurrection or after His baptism, we are not informed (Note 5). If God-manhood did not pertain to Him originally, it became His through the medium of His *προκοπή*, of His perfect human development, for the sake of which Paul represents Him as deified. This deification is annexed as an external consequence; but it cannot have been anything more than a quality, a thing of rank and of dignity, not of essence (Theodoret l. c.). The divine in the Son, or Christ, continues by itself impersonal (*ἀναιρεῖ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ* [of the eternal Son] *ὑπόστασιν, φάσκει μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ Θεῷ*, Epiph. Hær. 65, 1). When, to his doctrine, "God is one person with the Logos, *ἐν πρόσωπον* (Epiph. l. c.), even as man is one with his reason," the objection was raised,—“The doctrine of the Church requires one God, but several *πρόσωπα* of the same;” he replied, that as he also held Christ to be a person (namely, as a man), his faith too (compare Epiph. l. c. 7) had several *πρόσωπα*; God and Christ stand over against each other as *ὁμοούσιοι*, that is, probably, as alike personal (see Note 4). A vexatious dialectical procedure of this kind could, of course, deceive no one; but it had the effect of rendering the word *ὁμοούσιος*, so employed and referred to personality in general, suspicious for a time (according to Athanasius de Syn. Ar. et Sel. c. 45, fears were entertained that, if Paul’s view were adopted, a human personality must be admitted into the Trinity), until the fourth century stamped it with the seal of Church authority (Note 6). If the word *οὐσία* be taken in the sense of substance or essence (Wesen), Paul teaches an *ἐτεροουσία* of the Son and the Father; in their inmost centre, as to their personality, they continue apart; and the personality of the Son is conceived as merely finite, although *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπέπνευσεν ἄνωθεν ὁ λόγος* (compare Pauli Serm. ad Sabian.,—*αἱ διάφοροι φύσεις καὶ τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα ἓνα καὶ μόνον ἐνώσεως ἔχουσι τρόπον, τὴν κατὰ θέλησιν σύμβασιν*).

This Christology is remarkable for combining within itself such varied elements; and, indeed, as Epiphanius already (Hær. 65, 9) seems to hint, Paul’s aim in its construction apparently was to attain a point of view from which principles, otherwise antagonistic, would be seen to form part of a higher unity: hence

also, until recent times, many were uncertain in what class Paul ought to be placed. We have no longer here to do with the old Ebionism, and its abstract dualistic conception of God; Paul taught, on the contrary, that the power of the divine Logos, in its highest energy, had appeared in this man;—not, however, in a docetical manner, as the Gnostic Christology represented, but permanently. His conception of it, indeed, was such as to enable him to trace out a truly human, free development for Christ, in a more complete manner than the Church teachers of his day; yet at the same time he never supposed a time when the man Jesus, who rose by gradual progress from a lower position up to deification, had been without the Logos. He tried also to assert for Christ Sonship and deity; on the condition, it is true, that it should grow out of the humanity. In consequence, the deity thus claimed for Christ was neither selfless, nor involved a double personality. Further, the Logos who dwelt in Christ was not something subordinate, but a truly divine power, yea, God Himself in His activity. He formed as large a conception of this activity as appeared compatible with the requirements of a free human development. In this respect, he occupied a far higher position than the Patripassians and Sabellians; for they were by no means able to give so perfect a representation of the humanity of Christ. On the other hand, he was essentially one with them in his unitarian conception of God; indeed, he harmonized so completely with them, that we can easily explain how he should have been frequently classed with Sabellians. Epiphanius also charges him with the *συναλιφή* of the Logos and the Father; for he denies the pre-existence of the Logos and His possession of an independent hypostasis. On the other hand, he did not conceive God to be motionless and inert, or far removed from the world; but taught that the one God, who is in Himself Logos and Pneuma, and for whose unity he pleads, as did the Sabellians, in opposition to the Church, revealed Himself, became the *λόγος προφορικὸς*, and is present in His revelation. Indeed, he might himself have laid down a kind of œconomic Trinity; and probably he meant to do something of the sort, when, in referring to the Son, he maintained that he also taught the existence of two hypostases, Father and Son. But even if Schleiermacher's supposition were correct, that he regarded the soul in general as essentially divine, we should be

scarcely warranted in attributing to him the idea of a self-diremption of God, into the inner Logos and the λόγος προφορικὸς; in the sense, namely, that God placed Himself over against Himself in humanity (that is, God on earth), specially in the perfect man; and that, out of the independent freedom with which He had, as it were, enfranchised Himself in man, He returns back to Himself through the ethical exercise of that freedom, in the first instance, in Christ. For Paul did not hold the world or humanity to be the λόγος ἐνεργός. And even when he says,—“The Logos dwelt in Christ as in a temple; He was in Him what the inner man is in us,”—he merely bordered on, without actually proceeding to, the recognition of the hypostasis of the Logos; for he conceived the inner man rather as a simple attribute or quality. Because, however, he regarded the free human and the divine personalities as mutually exclusive magnitudes, we are justified in saying,—So far as Paul saw in Christ a manifestation of the Father (Epiph. l. c. 5), and with the Sabellians appealed to John xiv. 9; and, further, so far as he held this person, in its ideal development, to be determined by the ἐνέργεια of God,—in so far was he on the point of passing over into Sabellianism, and under the necessity of suspending the ἐνέργεια of the human aspect, of reducing it to a purely passive condition. So far, however, he was unable to go. For his fundamental Christological tendency plainly was to lay chief stress on the humanity; and therefore, notwithstanding some inconsistencies, his theory continued to be Ebionitical, an incarnation of God to be an utter impossibility, and the divine to occupy a place merely on the surface of the kernel of the strictly human personality of Christ. In this sense, we may say that Paul considered the humanity to form the inmost centre and proper substance of the person of Christ; and that the divine, on the contrary, touched merely the actuality of the man Jesus, that is, His phænomenal aspect.

Looking back from the point at which we now stand to the commencement of the series here terminated, we have a spectacle before us which will often be re-enacted,—the spectacle, namely, that a system whose basis was originally pantheistic, is necessitated, in consequence of the accession of the subjective, personal principle, either to become deistic, or to throw aside its error and accept the truth. For Judaistic and deistic it cer-

tainly is, to represent the essence of God and of man as necessarily foreign to each other, and as only coming into contact with each other through the medium of the divine power which dwells in Christ, as in a temple (Contest. cleri Const., etc., l. c., *ἐν Χριστῷ (ἣν ἡ σοφία) ὡς ἐν ναῷ Θεοῦ*; and Paul frequently employs the expression,—in Christ *σοφία ἐνοικεῖ*; compare Neander 2, 1036). This, therefore, is again simply the inner relation of the heathenish and the Jewish principle, as we found it existing in the days of the older Ebionism and Docetism: they form two extremes, which unavoidably tend to a false union; that is, they ceaselessly pass over the one into the other, when they fail to find a true union in Christianity.

CHAPTER THIRD.

II. MONARCHIANISM OF THE PATRIPASSIAN FORM.

A FAR mightier tendency than the Ebionism just considered—mightier, because more amicably related to the interests of religion—was Patripassianism, which, after undergoing a process of refinement and development, attained its most perfect form and expression in Sabellianism. After making many unconnected beginnings during the course of the second century, even prior to the time of Praxeas, this system attained sudden ripeness and wide diffusion even in the Church;—first, under the imperfect form of Patripassianism, shortly before the end of the second century; and again, after some links of development had intervened, soon after the middle of the third century.

Relatively to those beginnings, we may remark in the outset, that Justin Martyr makes us acquainted, in his Dial. c. Tryph. 128, with men who are very like the later Sabellians. One and the same divine *δύναμις*, say they, undivided and unseparated from the Father, as the light on earth from the light of the sun in heaven, has appeared under different names and forms, as Messenger, Shechinah, Man, and Word; and these appearances are the appearances of the Father. When He wills, say they, He causes His power to go forth; and when He wills, He calls it back into Himself. Those who held such views

must, of course, have regarded all revelation as something momentary and abrupt: no such thing as a knowledge of permanent forms of divine revelation, and of their connection with each other is attainable; everything remains theophany. We find, however, even here, the characteristic feature, that the divine *δύναμις* in itself is asserted to be absolutely identical with the Father, and that the element of limitation, of distinction from God the Father, is supposed to owe its existence to the entrance into the world of finitude, to be the effect of the *οἰκονομία*, or of revelation; whereas the divine substance in itself resists and excludes all distinctions. But if we ask, what is the fundamental philosophical view which lies at the basis of such a theory of the revelation of God; and if, in this behoof, we apply the above propositions to creation in general, and not merely to the Old Testament account (an application which they themselves justify us in making, in that they trace back the origin of the angels also to that divine *δύναμις*, in which the Father as it were spreads Himself out),—we shall arrive most surely at our goal by taking our stand on their favourite image, and saying:—God is like the sun, which diffuses itself through, and as it were expands itself to the boundaries of, the sphere of light; and as the sun draws back every evening, at setting, the rays in which it appeared to us, so God draws Himself back into Himself. I would just hint with a word also, that the Pseudo-Clementines, with their Monas, which dilates itself to a Dyas, and again returns into itself, and perhaps also the gnosticizing Gospel of the Egyptians, may be placed under the same category.¹ Whether the influence of the stoical cosmology or theology should also be taken into consideration as a further factor, is doubtful, notwithstanding that common or similar expressions, like *συστολή* and *διαστολή*, *ἐκστασις*, suggest such a course. More importance ought probably to be attached to the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which began to come into vogue, even before the end of the second century, specially through Celsus. For it does teach that God eternally mediates Himself with Himself through the world, that the divine life flows through

¹ Baur, l. c. p. 274, refers the Gospel of the Egyptians to this connection with a positiveness which I am unable to share; for we know only of a sexual Dyas (*Geschlechtedyas*) which becomes a Monas. Compare Grabe's "Spicilegium" 1, 35.

a circuit, and that God proceeds forth from Himself and becomes a Son to Himself in the world. Related thereto, and unquestionably not without considerable influence on Neo-Platonism, was finally Gnosticism, between which, with its pantheistic fundamental view and the principle of Sabellianism, the affinity was all the greater, the more it turned from its ethnicizing phantastic theosophy to the more sober doctrine of the unity of the *Alleinheitslehre*—a doctrine essentially involved in it from the beginning,—or the more fully it obeyed the injunction of Irenæus, to reduce its endless hypostases to momenta of the conception of God. The connection of Sabellianism with Gnosticism, apart from the pantheistic basis common to both, is specially noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the older patripassian form of Sabellianism, which did not shrink from attributing change and suffering to God, directs our attention to the transformation already experienced by the rigid Jewish conception of God at the hand of Gnosticism. Secondly, the older patripassian form of Sabellianism was guided, not so much by a philosophical or cosmological, as by a religious interest (not till a later period did it become religio-historical or religio-philosophical); and even in this aspect, the transition from Gnosticism to it was effected by one of the most noted Gnostics, Marcion.¹ This religious interest manifested itself particularly in the opposition consciously raised by it to every form of Subordinationism, and in its disposition to put Christ on a level with God; nor did it object merely to Ebionitical Monarchianism, but also to those doctrines of the Church which subordinate the Son to the Father (compare Origen in Matth. T. xvii. § 14, Neander 2, 994 f.). It is of far more consequence, however, to note the stadium at which the doctrine of the Church itself stood, when this tendency broke out. Here we refer not merely to the indeterminateness which prevailed, and which did not quite exclude Sabellian principles; for example, when the presbyter says, in Irenæus, “*Mensura Patris filius*;” or when Clemens Alexandrinus says, with the younger Theodotus, “The Son is the countenance of the Father;” or when Melito says, *Θεὸς πέποιθεν ὑπὸ δεξιᾶς ἰσραηλῆτιδος* (compare Routh 1, 116). Still more positive countenance was given by

¹ So far as I know, Neander was the first to direct attention to this fact. (See above.)

two circumstances. Firstly: From the days of the Apostles down to Justin, the Church had, as we have seen, laid prime stress on the hypostatic pre-existence of the higher nature of Christ; and Justin, in connection therewith, had not even avoided subordinatian elements. He himself, however, firmly believed the Logos to be of one substance with the Father; and during the course of the history of the doctrine of the Logos, this constantly assumed a more definite shape, until, in the second half of the second century, the Church was concerned not so much to distinguish the Son from, as to establish His unity with, the Father. Inadequate momenta, which had been intended to aid in establishing the divine hypostasis of Christ, but which intertwined Him immediately with the world, were then cast aside, and the Son was introduced into the inmost adytum of the divine essence itself, as the reason and wisdom of God. Had the matter rested there (a thing to which the teachers of the Church were certainly opposed), Sabellianism would have found a home in the Church, and the impossibility of distinguishing the Son from the Father would have become a manifest fact. For if the divine Trias, which the faith of the Church had long held to be a settled thing, meant nothing more than that reason and spirit (*λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα*) are in God, Monarchianism would have had no reason for its opposition. Moreover, inasmuch as the Church most decidedly maintained that there was only one God, Sabellianism was the more justified in, as it were, asking the doctrine of the Church, whether a merely œconomic Trinity would not meet the wants of the Christian mind; and in the then position of the doctrine of an immanent Trinity, it could with certainty reckon on receiving, in many cases, an affirmative reply. Secondly: The revival of Ebionism must have caused the Church to cling more firmly to the doctrine of the essential equality of the Son; and fear both of it, and of the Arianism which now began to raise its head,¹ must have prevented it from insisting too strongly on the distinction between the divine in Christ and the Father. And, in fact, it is quite possible that the ever-

¹ Compare Recognit. Pseudoclement. (see Vol. I. 216 and Note BBBB). On the other hand, after what has been advanced above (Vol. I. 192 ff.), it is not improbable that a class of Ebionites also (of course a higher class, to which one scarcely ought to apply the name) approximated to Patripassianism.

strengthened tendency to affirm, even as regards the soul, the completeness of the humanity of Christ in opposition to Docetism (Note 7),—a tendency unquestionably little favourable to any form of Sabellianism,—was, in many respects, restrained by the necessity of combating Ebionism; for Ebionism postulated above all, for the integrity of the humanity of Christ, a complete and free personality.

The weakest side of the newer form of Ebionism, in the eyes of simple-minded Christians, was its inability to lay any stress on the death of Christ and His atoning work. (It was otherwise, perhaps, with those alone who are mentioned in the note on the last page.) Some, indeed, are said to have done so (Orig. Comm. in Joh. T. xxxii. 9), but it was mere inconsistency; and the *ἱερὸν καὶ σωτήριον χρῆμα*, which, according to them, *ὁ σταυρωθεὶς τῷ κόσμῳ ἐπιδεδῆκεν*, can scarcely be connected, otherwise than arbitrarily and magically, with an Ebionitic Christology. In this respect especially, the patripassian view was far more satisfactory:—the more explicable, therefore, is the great impression made by Praxeas, its earliest representative, and a confessor, during his first stay in Rome. The heresy which Praxeas introduced, Victorinus endeavoured to strengthen (*corroborare curavit*), says Tertullian in the passage from his “*de præscr. hæc.*” 53. This was, without doubt, the Roman Bishop Victor, who excommunicated Theodotus. The excitement which then prevailed precisely in Rome, on account of the revival of Ebionism, would appear therefore to have favoured the introduction of views of a directly opposite character, of which Praxeas, coming from Asia, was the advocate and representative. When we remember that a certain predominance had hitherto always been given to the Father over the Son, we shall confess the admission of the idea, that in Christ the Father had appeared, had actually manifested Himself in His person, to have been an unheard of but a mighty step. The inmost nature of God is disclosed,—a completely new period is inaugurated. We thus enter into fellowship with the Most High God, who is God alone; and no middle being has been able to redeem us. It cannot have been the idea of the mere abstract unity of God that led Patripassians to the view they advocated; on the contrary, that Jewish momentum, in itself, would have absolutely excluded the possibility of change and suffering in God. But it was also

the consciousness of entering into immediate fellowship with the Most High God, who as such is the one God, in consequence of His completely clothing Himself with our humanity, sharing the distress of finitude, and the sufferings which fall solely to the lot of our nature,—that constituted a second and equally important momentum of Patripassianism. On the one hand, Praxeas and Marcion are thus brought into closer proximity, the former turning out to be the Church's continuation of the latter; on the other hand, a new explanation is given of the warfare they waged in common with Montanism, and it is seen to have been the natural result of their essential principles.

Montanism threatened the Church with a new form of legality, incompatible with the revelation of the inmost nature of God vouchsafed to men in Christianity. The doctrine of the Trinity by no means furnishes a sufficient explanation of the opposition raised by Praxeas to Montanism; for, in the first place, there are too few traces of an old Montanistic doctrine of the Trinity, and Tertullian had arrived at his doctrine of the Trinity prior to embracing Montanism; and, in the second place, if, as some affirm, it were certain that the Montanistic doctrine of the Trinity was *œconomical*, that is, in principle Sabellian, it would be difficult to explain Praxeas' opposition thereto.

Praxeas, says Tertullian (see *Adv. Prax.* 20), treats the words, "I and the Father are one; He that seeth Me, seeth the Father," as though they formed the entire Bible (Note 8); and in the Old Testament, appeals most readily to the passages which testify to the unity of God (c. 18). This, says Tertullian, is right enough in opposing polytheism; but we are not thereby shut out from understanding, by the one God, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. But what are the teachings of Praxeas concerning the Christian idea of God, which, even in the general baptismal formula, takes a Trinitarian form? One and the same, says he, is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (c. 2). Now, as he absolutely refuses to admit of distinctions in the simple divine essence (c. 12, the "*unitas simplex*," the "*unicus et singularis Deus*"), what significance can he attach to that triplicity? The question of the Holy Spirit we must leave untouched, for we do not know what Praxeas said regarding Him; but we know that he denied the pre-existence of the Son, and proposed to apply the designation to the Incarnate One alone.

It was not a mere power of the Most High that was active in the formation of Christ, but the power of the Most High is the Most High Himself (c. 26); He descended into Mary. Had Praxeas and his school brought the Trinitarian names into connection with the different revelations, the word Father also would have stood to him for a form of the revelation of the one God, and this one God he would then have distinguished, as the Monas, not only from the Son, but even from the Father. We do not find, however, that he did anything of the kind; on the contrary, it is probable that he identified the Father with the Monas.¹ The distinction, therefore, that he draws between God in general and Christ, is the following,—“The Father is the Spirit, that is, God, that is, Christ: the Son is the Flesh, that is, the man, that is, Jesus. The higher element in the person of Jesus is God Himself, or the Father; in Jesus, however, He entered into finitude and became man. In the one person of Christ, Praxeas distinguished the part that was born, to wit, the flesh, and God, who is in Himself unalterable. The Father proceeded forth from Himself, and returned back into Himself (c. 23). In this way, the incarnation is reduced to a mere theophany; not even the eternal continuance of this person is ensured, especially as Praxeas taught nothing concerning a soul of Christ. The man, the “caro,” must have been conceived as impersonal, as a mere garment, or as an organ whose office it is to present the Father visibly to the world.”²

Had Praxeas gone no further, his system would have differed little from the old Docetism,—for example, from that of Marcion. But he conceived the appearance of the Most High God to be at all events one of long continuance, a permanent one: like Noetus, he represents Jesus as having been actually born of Mary, as growing, hungering, thirsting, suffering, and dying. To the assumption of so permanent and peculiar an union of God with human nature, Praxeas was undoubtedly impelled by a regard to the religious nature of man, which feels that in Christ, God did enter into the most intimate fellowship with our nature. Such a fellowship would not have been established, had not He

¹ C. 16: “Patrem in vulvam Mariæ deducunt.” C. 27: Out of the “virtus Altissimi” which overshadowed Mary, “Patrem faciunt.” Compare c. 23, 2.

² C. 23: “Tolerabilius erat, duos divisos, quam unum Deum versipellem prædicare.”

participated in all the acts and sufferings of the man Jesus, and had He assumed human nature merely externally as a garment. For this reason, Schleiermacher (l. c. p. 497) had no right to throw doubt on the statement frequently made by Tertullian and others, to the effect that Praxeas and his school represented God Himself, or the Father, as sympathetically suffering with us. Tertullian's expression, "*Patrem crucifixit*," must, of course, perhaps be taken rhetorically; for he distinguished between the "*caro*" and the Father, and therefore also, that which could befall the former alone, from that which might also touch the latter. But that he in some way or other held the Father to have participated in the sufferings of Christ, cannot be doubted.¹ He and his school believed themselves the rather warranted in doing so, as even the recognised teachers of the Church were accustomed to say,—The Son, or even God, suffered; Christ, the Son of God, died.² But they tried to make their meaning more intelligible by the formula, "*compassus est pater filio*" (c. 29). For fear of directly blaspheming the Father, Tertullian supposes, they adopted this milder form of expression, and granted that the Father and Son are two. It is scarcely likely, however, that Praxeas and his school meant, in adopting the formula, to grant that there were two (*duos*) subjects; for this would have thoroughly clashed with their theory. Their meaning probably was,—The sufferings affected, it is true, in the first instance, merely the body, through which God is Son; for the human substance alone was mortal (c. 30). But the sufferings of the flesh could not remain indifferent and foreign to the higher part of this person; on the contrary, the higher part, or the Father, sympathized in the sufferings (*compassus est*). We do not find Praxeas ever alluding to a human soul of Christ; and therefore it was impossible for him to avoid representing the *ipse-Deus*, the *αὐτόθεος*, as taking part in the sufferings of Christ. With this was

¹ In c. 2, where Tertullian professes to give an account of the doctrine of Praxeas, we read, "*Itaque post tempus pater natus, Pater passus:*" c. 16, —"*Ipsium credunt Patrem et visum et congressum et operatum et sitim et esuriam passum.*"

² Ergo inquis, et nos eadem ratione Patrem mortuum dicentes, qua vos Filium, non blasphemamus in Dominum Deum, non enim ex divina sed ex humana substantia mortuum dicimus:" c. 30; compare Melito in Routh 1, 116.

connected his attributing a passible aspect to the nature of the Father, his assuming in the Father Himself that momentum of finitude, which others—as, for example, his opponent Tertullian—assumed in the Son, even prior to His incarnation. Tertullian was quite right in drawing the conclusion,—Sympathy is, after all, suffering; suffering, that is, with another. Either the Father is incapable of suffering, and then He is incapable of sympathy; or, if He be capable of sympathy, He is also capable of suffering. And, in fact, a mere suffering of the body, especially as nothing is said of the existence of a human soul, would be spiritless, and without significance relatively to redemption.

If we ask further, how Praxeas found it possible to transfer passibility to God, a reply is offered to us by his doctrine, that the divine had determined itself in itself as finite, had set forth out of itself the momentum of finitude (the “caro”); or rather, inasmuch as this would lead to a docetical, heavenly humanity, the Father took up this finite momentum, that is, flesh, into His essence, out of Mary, fully appropriated it and identified Himself with it, so that He really became man; and “caro,” with all its liability to suffering, is, not something foreign to Him, but a momentum of Himself. This incorporation of humanity with His substance evidently presupposes, however, that the Father was in one aspect susceptible to the finite, to the passible; and it is this aspect which is manifested in the incarnation. So we understand it, when Tertullian finds it necessary, in opposition to Praxeas, to assure his readers, “caro non deus est” (c. 27); and when he gives a long refutation and exposition of the above mentioned theory, which at this period was not an uncommon one, namely, that God had, as it were, transformed Himself into “caro;” in consequence whereof, Christ’s flesh participated in the divine essence, and it was possible to term His sufferings divine sufferings (Note 9). None the less, however, was God the Father present in this “caro,” even as to His unchangeableness: the distinction between “caro” and “spiritus,” that is, “Deus,” is a real one; for, without renouncing Himself, God, as it were, gave Himself another form of being (Andersseyn) in the “caro” of Christ; but inasmuch as it is God Himself who gave Himself this other form of existence, the two aspects meet in the person of Christ, and do not stand over against each other as foreign. Whether this were the theory of Praxeas or not, we

must allow that Tertullian was justified in charging him with great inconsequence. For either he was in earnest in asserting the Father, the *αὐτόθεος*, to be an absolutely simple Being; and then he could not attribute to Him a capability and an incapability of suffering at one and the same time, but must have reduced the incarnation to a process, which merely transitorily affected His unchangeable essence, and must have represented Christ as an organ through which the omnipresent, unchangeable Father appears differently from elsewhere, although the incarnation was not on His part, that is, objectively, a peculiar deed.¹ Or else, if he were in earnest in saying that God took finitude upon Himself in Christ, he must have allowed the existence of much more determinate distinctions in God, and have renounced on the one hand his doctrine of the abstract unity of God, and on the other hand his complaints against the doctrine of the Church.² This, too, was the point to which Tertullian endeavoured to drive him. With great insight he shows him how the incarnation must either be reduced to a mere semblance; how, consequently, it must be attributed to the subjective manner of consideration, when He, who in Himself is unchangeable, appears in Christ and Christianity differently from elsewhere; and how humanity would thus relapse in

¹ C. 11: "Veracem Deum credens scio, illum non aliter, quam disposuit, pronuntiasset, nec aliter disposuisse, quam pronuntiavit. Tu porro eum mendacem efficias et fallacem et deceptorem fidei hujus, si cum ipse esset sibi filius, alii dabat filii personam" (that is, if God in Christ seemed to be another, appeared as another, than the Father, and yet was in reality merely an appearance of the Father). Compare c. 23.

² What does it mean, says Tertullian, when the Son is said to pray to the Father, if there is no distinction between Father and Son? (c. 23). What is the resurrection of the Son, and His anointing (c. 28), or the curse which Christ was made for us? or the desertion of the Son, when He cried out, My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? (c. 30). It is a blasphemy to say that the Father became a curse for us.—In fact, the fellowship which God holds with man in Christ is reduced to a mere semblance, if full justice be not done to the distinction between the Father and the Son:—we see this most clearly in connection with the work of atonement. If God continue in simple identity with Himself, the process of reconciliation is a mere subjective play and appearance. At this point the affinity between Patripassianism and the entire Sabellian tendency on the one hand, and Docetism on the other, shows itself, as was hinted above, with peculiar distinctness.

its ante-Christian condition : or that he must go forwards (c. 4, 2, 6, 30 ; Apolog. 21), admit the existence of objective distinctions in God, reject the abstract simplicity of the divine nature ; and then it would be possible for him to regard the divine Son as really and truly participating in finitude. This he expresses in the following way (c. 13),—"Through the appearance of Christ, the name of God has been more perfectly revealed. The difference between the worshippers of one God and of many gods (*plurimæ divinitatis*) is fixed by Christianity ; for if we really meant that there are three Gods and three Lords, when we teach that there are Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we, the sons of light, should have extinguished the torches which light us to the martyr's death. But also between Christianity and Judaism (c. 31) there is no other difference than this, that the Jews believe monotheism to be incompatible with reckoning the Son, and after the Son the Spirit, to the one God. But what would be the work of Christianity, and the substance of the New Testament, which sets a limit to the law and the prophets with John, if Father, Son, and Spirit, believed in as three, do not constitute the one God ?"

By several teachers of the Church a connection is supposed to have existed between Praxeas and Hermogenes, the well-known defender of the eternity of matter (compare Philostr. *de Hæres.* c. 54 f. ; see Leopold's "*Hermogenis de origine mundi sententia*," 1844, pp. 22 f. 28 ff.). As he does not appear to have called in question the deity of Christ (Tertull. *adv. Hermog.* 1), although he probably doubted His pre-existence as a divine hypostasis and His participation in the creation of the world, he belongs without doubt to the class now under consideration. With this agrees the further circumstance, that, according to Theodoret, he did not hold the humanity of Christ to be eternal, but, like two Galatian heretics, Seleucus and Hermias, represented Him as laying aside His body in the sun ; in proof of which theory, they appealed to Ps. xix. 4. His opinion was perhaps the following :—that Christ laid aside the gross material element ; whereas the soul, which (in his view) appertained to matter, might have continued Christ's (compare Theodoret's *Hær. fab.* 1, 19). It is worthy of remark, that, with his view of matter, he was able to attribute a soul also to Christ,—without *πνεῦμα*, it is true :—*πνεῦμα*, however, was

involved in the divine substance of Christ. That the doctrine of a matter, independent of God, might very well suit this class of Monarchians, we shall see below.

In Asia, patripassian views appear to have already existed a considerable period ; at all events, the names of several representatives thereof have been handed down to us. So Epigonos and Cleomenes (see Theodoret's Hær. fab. 3, 3). But we have more precise information regarding Noetus, who, according to Hippolytus (c. Noetum, ed. Fabric. T. 1, 235 ff., of the Greek text, T. 2, 5 ff.) and Theodoret l. c., as also according to John of Damascus, was a native of Smyrna ; according to Epiph. (Hær. 57), of Ephesus.

Noetus also aimed at conciliating the true and perfect deity of Christ with the unity of God,¹ by saying, "Christ Himself is the Father." For the Father is God (Fabr. T. 2, 7), but Christ, who Himself was God, suffered ; inasmuch, then, as we know but one God and no other, to wit, the Father, I must necessarily attribute suffering to this God (*τοῦτον ὑπὸ πάθος φέρειν*). The Father is Himself the Son ; the Son was born, suffered, and raised Himself from the dead. This explains, says he, why in the New Testament the resurrection of Christ is at one time treated as the work of the Father, at another time as the work of the Son. The meaning of this, again, is undoubtedly that the Father, God in Himself, is not the Son, apart from the incarnation ; and that the existence of a Son began with the incarnation ; whereas the Church terms the Logos *ἄσαρκος*, Son : so, for example, Justin, Tertullian, and others.² The Father, therefore, constituted Himself His own Son in Christ. Besides the passages in Praxeas, Noetus appealed to Baruch iii. 35, Isa. xlv. 14, in proof of the unity of God ; on the other hand, to Rom. ix. 5, 1 Cor. viii. 6, which put Christ on a level with the Most High God, in proof of His identity with the Father. The fate of finitude, of suffering, and the like, Noetus probably transferred to God, much more decidedly than even Praxeas : moreover, he does

¹ According to Hippolytus c. Noët., he said to his opponents, *τί οὐ κακὸν ποιῶ δοξάζων τὸν Χριστὸν ;* according to Epiphanius, *τί γὰρ κακὸν πεποίηκα ; ἵνα Θεὸν δοξάζω, ἵνα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον, γεννηθέντα, ἀποθανόντα.* To judge from the reply of the presbyters and from the nature of the case, Noetus considered the two to be indissolubly connected.

² From this point of view Hippolytus c. Noetum 15, must be estimated.

not appear even to have distinguished so clearly between the *σὰρξ* and the God in Christ, as did Praxeas; but rather to have regarded God Himself as one nature, which, in one aspect, is incapable of suffering, in another aspect, capable of suffering, mortal, and so forth;—thus, like Praxeas, after blotting out the distinction between Father and Son, importing a distinction into the very essence of God. It deserves, however, acknowledgment and remark, that Noetus had already completed the system of Patripassianism, and had stripped it of that ethnic appearance of rendering God's *φύσις* immediately finite, which it had in the hands of Praxeas. For, in the passage to be immediately quoted from Theodoret, the *ἐθέλειν* plays a great rôle relatively to the passible aspect of God's being, recognised by Noetus. Everything finite, all change and suffering, affects God solely through the medium of His will; which, if it continues the same and is in itself absolute (for example, as the will of love), is a sufficient guarantee of the unchangeableness of the divine being. To be invisible, ungenerated, immortal, and impassible, belongs, on the contrary, to the divine essence in itself; at the same time, however, in the view of Noetus, this His essence cannot be a check on His will, but remains subject thereto, and on that account can be made passible, mortal, and so forth. It would be interesting to ascertain Noetus' precise doctrine of redemption, in order to see whether his conception of this will of God, on which he lays such great stress, as opposed to the divine *nature*, or to the physical categories of the idea of God, is an ethical one; or whether he regarded it as mere unconditioned, perfect power, which, being destitute of determinations in itself, is not raised above caprice. All that we certainly know, however, is that, in the view of Noetus, the eternal God put Himself, by His will, into the condition of passibility and visibility; such is his estimate of the significance of the appearance of Christ. I am not inclined, therefore, with Schleiermacher (Theol. Nachlass 2, 506 f.), to charge Theodoret with error in saying, *ἐνα φασὶν εἶναι Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν· ἀφανὴ μὲν, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, φαινόμενον δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν βούληται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁράτον εἶναι καὶ ὁρώμενον, καὶ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον· ἀγέννητον μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, γεννητὸν δὲ ὅτε ἐκ τῆς παρθένου γεννηθῆναι ἠθέλησεν ἀπαθὴ καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν παθῆναι καὶ θνήσκον· ἀπαθὴς γὰρ ὢν, φησι, τὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ*

πάθος ἐθελήσας ὑπέμεινεν. For Hippolytus, Epiphanius, and Theodoret agree too decidedly in representing Noetus as attributing suffering to God. Moreover, by introducing the element of will, he refined the representation; and in the very act of apparently undermining the unchangeableness of God (by making the divine nature, which is in itself impassible, unbegotten, immortal, dependent on the divine will), he gave it a new hold, in the potency of the same will. Besides the passages which those Fathers cite, and which, if not correct, they must have forged, the view just mentioned is specially favoured by the circumstance, that on the minds of Hippolytus and Epiphanius, who made use of independent sources of information, the theory of Noetus left the same impression,—the impression, to wit, that, to be consistent, he ought to have assumed an essential connection between the humanity of Christ and the deity; be it either by Christ's bringing humanity with Him down from heaven, or by God's converting Himself into humanity: and this impression evidently arose from the circumstance that on his principles finitude was constituted a determination of the divine essence (Note 10). What further distinguishes Noetus from Praxeas is, not that he attributes a human soul to Christ,—for that is done rather by his opponent Hippolytus (c. Noët. 17),—but that he already brings under consideration the other revelations of God. He of course believed that it was one and the same divine nature which manifested itself in the repeated and multiform revelations; and to this one nature, which, like Praxeas, he designates Father, he must have attributed the capability of being finite, visible, passible. This general possibility became an actuality, in and through the various revelations of God. Here the horizon widens, and the task presented itself, of pointing out the distinction between the revelation in Christ and all other revelations. To define this difference was the more necessary, as, from the absence of distinctions in the divine nature, we should naturally conclude that its revelations would be uniform and identical; and that, consequently, notwithstanding the purpose to exalt Christ to the highest rank, there could have been nothing in Him, as a revelation, which had not been substantially contained in all other revelations. Noetus, however, did nothing of importance towards the settling of this question. On the contrary, although he broke the ground for a comparison of the

Christian revelation with others, he did not advance beyond the affirmation, that, when God wills, He is invisible, and when He wills, He manifests Himself,—as though his sole task had been to show that the unchangeableness of God was not such as to exclude a revelation like that in Christ, seeing that related revelations had already been made. In this way, Christianity is plainly assigned a place again amongst mere theophanies; nor, as a matter of fact, do we find Noetus expressing any opinion as to the duration of the Person of Christ. Quite as suspicious a feature of his system is, that it sets no limits whatever to the revelations of God. In each of them, it is true, He Himself is present; but ever new revelations might appear necessary, unless it were proved that the full idea of a theophany had attained realization in Christ, and that God had manifested Himself once for all in the God-man. Thus viewed, the objection raised by the Noetians to the doctrine of the Church, that it afforded no protection against an endless polytheism, might have been justly retaliated; for the Church might have objected, that the Noetians came to no end with their endless theophanies.

To the class of men who shared the tendency of Noetus, belong further Beron and his associates (Note 11). "Recently," says Hippolytus (Fragm. 5, Fabr. 1, 228), "Beron and some others made their appearance; who quitted the sect of Valentinus in order to involve themselves in deeper error. They say,—The flesh appropriated by the Logos worked like works with the deity (*ταντουργός*), in virtue of its assumption (*πρόσληψις*), and the deity had the like capability of suffering with the flesh, in virtue of its *κένωσις*; thus teaching that the two aspects were changed, commingled, poured together, and converted into each other." Hippolytus answers,—If both, to wit, the flesh and deity, suffered and worked in the like manner, then all distinction between deity and flesh must have vanished, and they cannot have retained their respective natures (Fragm. 6). What conception can they form, then, of the one Christ, who is at one and the same time God and man by nature? What sort of existence can they attribute to Him, if, as they say, He became man by the conversion of deity into humanity; and if, on the other hand, He became God through the conversion of the flesh? For the mutation of the one into the other (*μετάπτωσις*) is the entire destruction of both.

However confused this theory may at first sight appear,

light is thrown upon it when we commence our examination with the point which Hippolytus mentions second; and when we assume, as the first and eighth Fragments justify us in doing, that two things, which, according to the representation of Hippolytus, would seem to have been uttered, as it were, in one breath, were actually separated by an interval of time. Hippolytus was led to the view he took by Beron's presupposition of the essential equality of the two natures. But if we take the *κένωσις*, which Beron must have posited as the first, for our point of departure, we are led into the following course of thought:—God has subjected Himself to the determination of finitude or of humanity; He entered into the limitation and circumscription of humanity; His self-emptying was real and objective (see *Fragm. 1*); and the result thereof was, that God posited Himself as an actual man. The *περιγραφή* is thus taken up into God Himself; the limitation did not affect the humanity alone, but in positing Himself as a man, God subjected Himself to limitation. The man thus originated, as we may conclude from the second part of the first Fragment, is related to God in Himself, that is, to the complete idea of the divine, as the lesser to the greater; and does not correspond to the latter. At this point, however, commences the opposed development. The humanity, which arose in such a manner, is not foreign to the highest, to the divine; but, conformably to its origin, carries the divine within itself, as its inner essence; consequently, the development of this humanity is its deification. We can now understand the proposition, on which Beron and his school laid such great stress, that Hippolytus derived their entire error from it (*Fragm. 8, Fabr. 1, 229 f.*). They maintain, says he, that the divine activity, which in reality did but manifest itself *through* the medium of the flesh in miracles, became the very activity of the flesh itself (*ἰδίαν γενέσθαι τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν θεῖαν ἐνέργειαν*, compare *Bibl. Max. iii. 261, c. 7*). At the same time, we see that the eternal duration of the humanity of Christ is thereby secured,—a thing which always remained doubtful with the other men of this tendency. One might, indeed, here also imagine that God must restore Himself to the state in which He was prior to the transformation, after the revelation had been accomplished; but such a supposition would involve the disappearance of the humanity. Whereas the deve-

lopment of the humanity, which the divine potency constituted its own, is itself the return or restoration of God to Himself, for it is deification; consequently, to teach the laying aside of the humanity was forbidden on the same ground as that urged by the teachers of the Church.

This theory is very far removed from Ebionism; but it is equally remarkable as indicating that Patripassianism, which had originally put the humanity of Christ surprisingly into the background, as compared with His divine nature, had arrived at a stadium when it found it needful to lay special stress thereon. No allusion, it is true, is made to a human soul; but the doctrine that the divine had gained *ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν* by the *κένωσις*, and indeed the entire course taken by this Christology, secured for the humanity of Christ a dignity and importance such as the doctrine of the Church was as yet far from attributing to it.

Hippolytus answered Beron as follows:—"God is unchangeable. The Logos, in the aspect in which He is identical with the Father, was not, in any respect whatever, rendered identical with the flesh through the *κένωσις*; but what He was prior to assuming the flesh, that He continued,—to wit, independent of all circumscription (*περιγραφὴ*). Through the whole-some act of incarnation, He introduced into the flesh the activity of His own deity; but this activity was neither circumscribed by the flesh, in consequence of the *κένωσις*, nor did it grow *φυσικῶς* out of the flesh, as it grew out of the deity (Fragm. 1, 11). What the divine was prior to the incarnation, that it was afterwards,—to wit, unbounded as to its essence, incomprehensible, impassible, incomparable, unchanged, unconverted, mighty in itself, abiding in its own natural existence, and working according to its own nature. So also, what the flesh was as to essence and operation, that it continued to be even after it had been most intimately united with the deity. Thus the Incarnate One worked both after a divine and after a human manner. So far as He worked after a divine manner, the divine activity shone through the flesh. For the nature of the deity was by no means transmuted, as though it had become essentially flesh, that is, flesh of deity; but the flesh remained what it was, that is, weak flesh, in accordance with the word of the Lord, 'The spirit is willing, the flesh is weak.' In the flesh, He performed

and suffered that which pertained to the flesh. The abasement of the deity was solely a thing for us; that is, it had no objective reality. Moreover, the distinction between deity and humanity is not a merely quantitative, comparative one (*κατὰ σύγκρισιν*); otherwise, we should have to describe one and the same being as both greater and less than Himself. But beings of the like essence alone can be compared with each other; not those of unlike essence. Between God, the Creator of the universe, and the creature, between the unbounded and the bounded, between illimitedness and limitedness, no comparison can be instituted. God never falls out of Himself (*μένει ἀνέκπτωτος*); never did He enter on an existence outside of Himself (*ἔξω γέγονε*); and yet the incarnation was a reality, and God truly revealed Himself in it." By way of illustration, he employs the relation of a thought to its representation in word, through the medium of the tongue, or in signs written by the hand (Fragm. 3). Thought is the self-moved energy of the soul, which flows forth, according to its nature, in a continual stream (as did the energy of Christ out of the deity). When I mould thoughts into words, or delineate them in signs, employing the tongue as an instrument, or written signs, which in themselves are foreign to the thing represented, the thoughts themselves remain unchanged. Although they attain to actuality by means of something unlike themselves, they are not changed, but simply revealed and perceived. It is true, I employ my tongue and letters for the manifestation of my thoughts; and yet the thoughts do not belong to the words or signs, but to me the speaker; and I give expression to them as mine in both ways, just as they flow out of my rational soul. The tongue is merely the organ. Now, as the power, whose essence is rational, whilst continuing unaltered in itself, expresses itself by means of the bodily tongue; so, if two things utterly incomparable may be compared, by means of the supernatural *σωμάτων*, was the almighty, all-creating activity of the entire deity manifested without change through the holy flesh of Christ, in all that He worked after a divine manner; but the deity itself remained essentially exempt from *περιγραφή*, although it shone through a nature essentially limited. God is equal to Himself, and has nothing unequal to Himself.¹ But for our redemption's sake, and in order to constitute the universe a sharer in unchangeable-

¹ Gott ist sich selbst gleich und hat nichts sich Ungleiches.

ness, the Creator of the universe appropriated to Himself out of the Virgin, without conversion (*τροπή*), a rational soul and a sensitive body, became man, and worked nothing divine without the body (*γυμνὸν σώματος*), and nothing human without the participation of the deity (*ἁμοῖρον θεότητος*), in that He preserved for Himself a new and fitting method of working after the manner of both, whilst leaving the nature of each unaltered.

We have no original information to the effect that Beron taught that Christ had a human soul; but we need not be surprised at Hippolytus' not making this a charge against him, for the human soul of Christ plays but an impersonal rôle in Hippolytus' own system: indeed, his favourite name for the humanity of Christ is that of a garment; and when he alludes to the soul of Christ, it is not so much on its own account, as because he meant to postulate the existence of two complete natures, and the human nature would not be complete without the soul. But, what is of still more importance, Beron is unquestionably in this aspect superior to Hippolytus, although he does not give any special prominence to the human soul. For the fundamental aim of his system was to show, that that which is otherwise attributed to the deity alone, working through human nature, must also be attributed to the human nature itself, and be regarded as its own activity.¹ Beron's aim was not an eternal or heavenly humanity, although he did not consider it incompatible with the eternal nature of God that He should be passible; but he believed that God first became passible when He posited Himself as a man in Christ, by the act of *κένωσις*.² But as he held that an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, a limited personality (*περὶ ἡρώδης*), was thus brought into being, so also did he conceive the act of incarnation to introduce limits into God Himself:—that is, by His own act, a limitation and circumscription was introduced into God, which had not previously existed. In Christ, therefore, God was self-emptied, and had acquired an *ἰδία*

¹ *πισθίτης ἰδίαν γενέσθαι τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν θείαν ἐνέργειαν*. This, like the doctrine of the *μεταποίησις σαρκὸς* in God, reminds us of Paul of Samosata. The point of departure, of course, in consequence of Beron's doctrine of the *κένωσις*, is quite different; and, for this reason, everything stands, from the very outset, in a different light. Beron, moreover, appears to have paid less regard to the ethical and the intellectual than to the *θαύματα*.

² Another view was soon afterwards taken by the Manichæans, with their "Jesus patibilis."

περιγραφῇ. It is self-evident that, even though Beron spoke of the Logos, as we may perhaps conclude from the fifth Fragment (Fabr. 1, 228 ; *Βήρων τις, μεθ' ἐτέρων τινῶν τὴν Βαλεντίνου φαντασίαν ἀφέντες, χεῖροσι κακῶς κατεπάρησαν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν προσληφθεῖσαν τῷ λόγῳ σάρκα γενέσθαι ταυτουργὸν τῇ θεότητι, διὰ τὴν πρόσληψιν τὴν θεότητα δὲ γενέσθαι ταυτοπαθὴ τῇ σαρκὶ διὰ κένωσιν, τροπὴν ὁμοῦ καὶ φύρσιν καὶ σύγχυσιν, καὶ τὴν εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀμφοτέρων μεταβολὴν δογματίζοντες*), he cannot have attributed to Him an hypostasis or περιγραφῇ of His own, apart from the incarnation. Apart from the incarnation, he could only speak of the Logos as perhaps Sabellius may have done (Ang. Mai. l. c. T. 7, 170 ff.), and as Noetus (Hipp. c. Noët. 15) did (see Appendix, Note 16). The more Beron felt himself compelled to attribute objective significance to the κένωσις, the more necessary was it undoubtedly for him to distinguish, from the time of the incarnation, between the divine which became man and subjected itself to circumscription and passibility, and God, so far as He did not enter into the περιγραφῇ; for it could never be his intention to maintain that the absolute God existed solely and entirely in this κένωσις, subsequently to the incarnation. But inasmuch as he represented the divine in Christ as acquiring a περιγραφῇ of its own through the incarnation, it is the more certain that he did not attribute to Him a περιγραφῇ previously.¹ The divine element which thus subjected itself to the fate of finitude, might, indeed, appear as an ἀποκοπή of the original divine; nay, even, as though plunged and lost in Lethe, through the κένωσις which it voluntarily underwent; but, even after the transformation, it continued to

¹ Gregor. Thaum. speaks (see Ang. Mai 7, 170) of men who introduce an ἀποκοπή into the essence of God, through the σῶμα of Christ, and who, through the body, ἀνθρωπίνως περιγράφουσι τὴν γέννησιν τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς. Quite as objectionable as it, says he, to attribute progress and πάθη to the deity, as to separate the progressing and suffering body (i.e., the humanity) from the deity (that is, from the non-emptied, unchangeable deity); as though the body were ἰδιαζόντως ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, that is, in the language of Beron, as though all ἐνέργεια, even the divine, were ἰδίᾳ τῆς σαρκὸς or οὐσιωδῶς ἐκφυομένη out of it (Fragm. 2). Because Beron did not believe in the existence of a Logos, prior to the incarnation, who possessed a περιγραφῇ of His own, it was in his power to designate the deity which set itself forth as man, the πατρικὴ θεότης; and for this reason, we have a right to class him as above.

constitute the inmost essence of the humanity, and manifested itself ever more and more fully in the development of the man Jesus, until he was at last transmuted into God.¹ Here, therefore, we find a course exactly similar to that taken by the theory of Paul of Samosata, though starting from a completely opposite theological point of view. The Ebionitical element, which sinks back to the category of *power*, and which would be involved in the ἀποκοπή, does not, however, like the ἀποκοπή itself, make its appearance in the Fragments of Beron; indeed, it is scarcely likely that he, on the whole, shared this tendency to Ebionism. On the contrary, he may have been influenced by the double desire, neither to represent the humanity of Christ as impersonal, on the one hand, nor the natures outside of each other as a double personality, on the other.

Similar, if indeed not more than similar, to Beron, both in name and in views, was Beryll of Bostra. We have nothing certain regarding him, save a passage in Eusebius, which has given rise to the most varied combinations.² The views entertained concerning him diverge as far as possible from each other. Furthest removed from each other are those of Schleiermacher and Baur. The former (l. c. 519-533) reckons him amongst the Patripassians, and maintains, not that he transferred sufferings into God, but that he believed the objective substance of God to have undergone an alteration, a limitation (ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφῇ), through the incarnation; the latter (l. c. 284-292) classes him with the Artemonites or Neo-Ebionites. A middle course between these two is taken by Neander (2, 1018-20); (similarly also Rossel, the writer of a review of Baur's "Trin. und Menschwerdung" in the Berl. Jahrbücher, 1844, Nos. 41-45.) The idea of a real indwelling of God Himself he does not venture on attributing to him, but considers that he occupied a middle position between Ebionism and Patripassianism, in that

¹ L. c., Fragm. 3; μεταβολῇ θεότητος γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ σαρκὸς μεταποιήσαι Θεός.

² Euseb. H. E. 6, 33; Ἦναι τινὰ τῆς πίστεως παρισφίρειν ἐπειράτο, τὸν Σωτῆρα καὶ Κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν ταλμῶν μὴ προῦφιστάναι κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίαν περιγραφῇν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας, μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμπολιτινομένην αὐτῷ μόνῃ τὴν πατρικὴν. The passage quoted from Socrates, in Note 7, indicates that the discussions relative to the soul of Christ played a great rôle at the Synod which was convened on his account. Compare Euseb. 6, 20.

he taught that the man Jesus was irradiated by a divine power. According to Rossel's further exposition, the humanity of Jesus is the personal element; but alongside thereof are also patripassian elements. This view, however, renders the theory self-contradictory, and introduces into it elements so heterogeneous, that they could not continue in combination. According to Neander, on the contrary, that irradiation which by the incarnation became an hypostatization of divine power, was the personific element. Even at an earlier period, the opinion was expressed by Mosheim ("de rebus Christianis ante Constantinum Commentarii," p. 699 ff.), that Beryll did not conceive the entire essence of the Father to have passed over into Christ, on the one hand; nor, on the other hand, merely a divine power, which would have been decidedly Ebionitic; but the purest, most glorious, wisest possible soul, taken out of, and therefore perfectly like, the nature of the Father. Such an idea would have been Arian. Against both Neander and Mosheim, however, is the text of Eusebius, which says, not that a power or soul of the Father, or deity of the Father, but *the* (τῇ) deity of the Father, dwelt in Him. Ullmann (see his "Comm. de Beryllo Bostreno ejusque doctrina," Hamb. 1835; and compare "Theol. Studien und Kritiken," 1836, pp. 1073 f.) is of opinion that Beryll did not view the divine in Christ merely ebionitically, as a simple power, but conceived it also to be possessed of consciousness or of personality; thus approximating to Schleiermacher's position. On the other hand, however, he represents him not merely denying that the incarnation posited a distinction in God Himself, but also as maintaining that the circumscriptive, personific human element (das unschreibende personbildende Menschliche) constituted the personality of Christ; which is scarcely reconcilable with the recognition of the personal existence of the divine in Christ, and involves the assumption of a double personality—an assumption, to which both Ebionites, Patripassians, and Sabellians were most thoroughly opposed. Baur also tries to show that Beryll assumed a twofold personality, after the manner of Nestorius. His words are (l. c. p. 289),—"The expression ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι, although it involves the idea of indwelling, implies, at the same time, that a free relation existed between the Redeemer and the Father, even as a citizen stands connected with other citizens equal to himself

in the place where he lives." I think, however, that the knot, which Ullmann leaves behind, can be untied. We must either start with the humanity as the primary, the personific element; and then Beryll must be acknowledged to have been Ebionitical: or, we must take our start with the deity, as the personific, or, more historically expressed, as the active, the hegemonical element, the element which formed the *σύστασις* (Hippol. c. Noët. 15). Those who took this latter view of the matter naturally denied that the Son of God had an hypostatical, or an in any way circumscribed pre-existence. He first became circumscribed when He became incarnate. There is, however, an ambiguity in this latter supposition, the clearing up and removal of which throws an important light upon the whole; namely, the circumscription of the Son resulted either from the self-determination of God, or from the activity of the human nature. In the latter case, the divine aspect occupied a purely passive and receptive position; it was subjected to circumscription, to limitation: if, however, it were inactive, nay more, passive, we cannot allow that God and man were united in the highest way, to wit, personally and consciously; for such an union requires that the divine stand in an active, hegemonical relation to the human aspect. If the divine aspect were passive, we must assume the existence in Christ of a higher principle, of a power, which, however, was by no means all-determining; in other words, we must go over to Ebionism. In this way, Ullmann appears to have glided over from the initiatory Patripassianism to the ultimate Ebionism of Beryll. But—and this leads us to the second case—it was not necessary that Patripassianism should pay this price for the personality of Christ, although we by no means intend to deny that many may have taken this course. Those are chiefly chargeable therewith who conceived God, after an ethnic manner, to be immediately capable of suffering; or who resorted to the idea of an *ἀποκοπή* of God in Christ, in order not to be compelled to represent the entire Father as swallowed up and absorbed by Christ, at all events for the period of his development as a child: those are least chargeable therewith, who, like Noëtus, set the *ἐθέλειν*, the divine will, in opposition to the ethnic principle, and represented everything as dependent thereon. Indeed, Patripassians might also have said,—The conscious, personal God willed to exist in the form of an actual

finite being; He consequently either produced the limited humanity out of Himself,—which would be a Docetical idea, and incompatible with their recognition of the birth from the Virgin; or, and this is the only possible alternative, God so perfectly appropriated the body, which sprung from Mary, and took it up into His own essence, that the unity of the person was complete, and the Father, or the fatherly deity, possessed the finitude and the passibleness of this man as its own. To this might be added (as we have found Beron doing) the *κένωσις*, and, on the basis thereof, have been taught the doctrine of a conversion of God into a man born of Mary, which man, however, owed his rise out of the elements in Mary to the afore-mentioned divine conversion. Finally, Fock, in his *Diss. de Christolog. Berylli Bostr.* 1843, decides—and, as it appears to me, justly—both against Baur, with his imputation of Ebionism, and Neander and Mosheim, with their attempt to weaken the force of the words, *τὴν πατρικὴν θεότητα ἐμπολιτευομένην ἐν αὐτῷ*, which leads to a kind of Arianism. For the reason assigned, he is also opposed to Ullmann; he therefore substantially adopts Schleiermacher's view, and classes Beryll with the Patripassians, putting him even on the same level with Praxeas. He is above all averse to granting that Beryll attributed a human soul to Christ, as do Baur and Ullmann (Neander and Rossel ought consistently to do the same); justly urging, that unless Beryll had given occasion thereto, the Synod which was held on his account would not have proceeded so “*ex abrupto*,” to the consideration and affirmation of the human soul of Christ (see Notes 7 and 30). He fails, however, to answer the important objection, why Beryll was never reproached with the denial of the human soul of Christ. For we have shown above, that what he says regarding the absence of a soul of Christ in the systems even of Irenæus and other teachers of the Church, is historically inaccurate. Further, Ullmann's objection, that the idea of the assumption of a mere body would be too coarse, Fock sets aside by an appeal to Apollinaris. Nay more, he hints that much may be urged in favour of the opinion, that they regarded the divine subject as the Ego and the intelligence, in brief, as the Spirit in Christ; if, indeed, it be not quite maintainable. On the other hand, however, not content with characterizing (after Schleiermacher's example) the strictly patripassian element, to wit, the

subjection of the Father to suffering, as an idea too coarse to be entertained by this entire series of thinkers, and in particular by Beryll,—a notion which, after what has been advanced above, is by itself untenable; he will not even concede, with Schleiermacher, that Beryll believed in the existence of a circumscription in the divine nature itself, subsequent to the incarnation. He is rather of Baur's opinion, that we must then read, *κατ' ἰδίαν τῆς οὐσίας περιγραφὴν*, instead of *κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν*. His judgment, accordingly, appears to be,—Beryll merely maintained that, subsequently to the incarnation, the Redeemer existed in the circumscribed form of an individual; whereas, previously, He had been neither hypostatical nor circumscribed, but absolutely identical with the Father. The circumscription was not therefore in Him, but He in the circumscription. Here again, however, we come upon the ambiguity cleared up above. If the Father had not posited circumscription as an objective determination of His own being, He could only have existed in circumscription so far as His entire being was embraced and bounded by finitude. But on this supposition, the finite would be the active element; and, as we have shown, Beryll must then be described as an Ebionite. As Fock, however, by no means intends to class Beryll amongst Ebionites, his only alternative is to return to Schleiermacher's view, and to accept the *περιγραφὴ* as an objective determination of the divine nature itself, with the following proviso—this determination and circumscription was not the effect of the action of the human nature on the divine (a notion which, besides being essentially Ebionitic, had been already given up as untenable by Noetus), but the work of the divine will. From what we know of the man as a whole, this must be assumed to have been his view, even should the sense of the words of Eusebius be, "The Redeemer exists since the incarnation in the circumscription of an individual being (*οὐσίας*)."¹ It is more than questionable, however, whether this is the true sense of the words. In the *first* place, this use of *οὐσία* is not the usual one, and is particularly unsuitable here, because the idea of individuality is already expressed in the words *ἰδία περιγραφὴ*, as whose object we may very appropriately take the substance (*οὐσία*) which is circumscribed. The article is not absolutely indispensable; for the connection itself, as we shall directly see, indicates clearly what sort of an *οὐσία*

is meant. *Secondly*, In the text of Eusebius, nothing is directly said of circumscription by means of the incarnation. We first arrive at that idea in the way of deduction. Eusebius rather says, the Redeemer did not exist *κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν*. How, then, can we translate as though Beryll maintained that Christ had not pre-existed in the circumscription of an individual being? for the Church itself did not assert such a pre-existence, and the denial thereof would therefore have been no ground of reproach. Eusebius blames him because he denied that the general substance (*οὐσία*) of God had been distinguished into Father and Son; which is figuratively expressed by saying, he attributes to the Redeemer no circumscription of the divine substance peculiar to Himself. If we adopt the rendering, "not in the special circumscription of an hypostasis," it is true, indeed, that *οὐσία*, at an earlier period, and down to the fourth century, was used as equivalent to *ὑπόστασις*; but then a new difficulty arises, to wit, we shall be certainly compelled to complete the sense by supplying the thought,—“but since the incarnation, the Lord and Redeemer exists in the particular circumscription of an hypostasis.” That, however, would be equivalent to saying, that Eusebius conceived the divine hypostasis to be of precisely the same nature, or identical, with that which was posited by the human circumscription; which is hard to believe. For such a human circumscription brings merely limitation, finitude; whereas the idea of a divine hypostasis, besides the negative element, demands in particular a positive, special, independent divine existence. Eusebius, therefore, cannot have meant to say,—The hypostasis which Beryll denies to the Saviour, prior to the incarnation, he represents Him as acquiring subsequently; for that is not true. Beryll was not of opinion that the incarnation introduced a special and distinct hypostasis into the divine substance; but that one and the same hypostasis or personality of the Father, continued to be the subject, the inner personality, of the circumscription effected by finitude. If, then, the translation, “hypostasis,” is inadmissible, we must necessarily take the word *οὐσία* in its usual sense; and then the entire passage may be rendered,—The Redeemer did not pre-exist in a circumscribed form of being of His own (in virtue of a distinction in the fatherly deity); but after the incarnation a peculiar circumscription was introduced into this substance;—

naturally, as Beryll was not an Ebionite, in consequence of the Father's own act. *Οὐσίας περιγραφή* is, as it were, one conception—circumscription of essence; the absence of the article cannot, therefore, turn the scale.

It appears to me, therefore, that the following ideas are contained in the words of Eusebius:—I. Beryll believed that the *πατρική θεότης* was in Jesus, but not an *ἰδία θεότης* (Note 12). What the latter denotes, will be clear from the foregoing observations. II. Our Lord and Redeemer did not exist, prior to His incarnation (*ἐπιδημία*), in the form of a circumscription of substance of His own (*κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν*); that is, He did not pre-exist as an independent being: consequently, it could only be the divine itself, the fatherly deity, that was in Christ. III. But when Eusebius says, that, according to Beryll, the Lord did not exist prior to the incarnation in the form of an independent *περιγραφὴ*, he gives us therewith to understand, that, subsequently to the *ἐπιδημία*, the case was different. From that event onwards, the Redeemer, who had previously been identified with the *πατρική θεότης*, and destitute of an hypostasis, became, at all events, a circumscribed being, possessed of an independent existence—in the sense, indeed, that the fatherly deity acquired a different determination in Him.* Now, if the incarnation introduced limitation and circumscription into the *πατρική θεότης*, Beryll should unquestionably be classed amongst those who import finitude into God Himself. Not, however, by any means as though the humanity were a limit imposed from without, by which the *πατρική θεότης* was reduced to a passive condition. After what has been advanced above, on the contrary, it must be plain that, as Beryll did not adopt the opinion of the Ebionites, he, and other men of his age, must have traced the limit up to the appropriative act of God itself, and have conceived the divine as determining itself to finitude, as positing itself human. It would seem, therefore, that, as in the view of Beron—of whom, be it remarked, we are very distinctly reminded by some of the expressions here employed—so also, in the view of Beryll, the acquirement of an *ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφὴ* by the Redeemer, and the rise of the humanity, was one and the same act; nay more, the Father's position of finitude and limitation in Himself was one and the same act with His self-abnegation. But although the *πατρική θεότης* thus circumscribed itself, that is, posited

itself as finite and human, it did not absolutely cease to exist as divine. On the contrary, as its inmost soul and motive power, the divine was naturalized, yea, was at home in the human circumscription and nature; for the union between the two was not merely momentary, but essential and most intimate,—the latter, in fact, owing its very rise to the *πατρικὴ θεότης*, so far as it had given itself the determination of *ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφή*.

If this were Beryll's idea, we can easily understand that Origen should have had greater influence on it than, for example, Hippolytus, and that that teacher's doctrine of the soul should have been able to bring about that crisis in Beryll's views, which, after the hints given above, we may probably assume to have taken place. Hitherto, namely, Beryll had treated the question of the humanity of Christ rather lightly than otherwise; the teachers of the Church, as, for example, Hippolytus, held a too impersonal view of the humanity, treating it as the mere organ or *στολὴ* of the divine. Patripassianism was at first marked by the same feature; in its first forms, it conceded no place to the human soul of Christ. But the more decided the advances made towards conceiving passibility, and even finitude in general (*περιγραφή*), as a determination of God, and the greater were the importance and worth attached to the finitude and the humanity, although merely as an aspect of the divine itself. For this, a welcome connecting link was found in the Church's doctrine of the *κένωσις*. This plainly involved an approximation to Ebionism, whatever abhorrence Beryll might inwardly feel for that system. In this state of mind, Beryll must have welcomed the theory laid before him by Origen, in which the free human soul of Christ held so important a place; and as coming from the Church, it must have appeared to him a new thing, nay more, as a development of that which he himself aimed at, in laying greater stress on the humanity. On the other hand, however, the more decided the prominence given to the human factor, the more Beryll's theory assumed unintentionally a predominantly Ebionitic character; and on this ground also we can understand why he would willingly accept from Origen the idea of the pre-existent divine hypostasis of Christ, offering as it did that counterpoise which his own theory lacked. To this course he might be led by several considerations. *Firstly*, Origen did not overthrow the *μοναρχία* of God, but

protected it by a species of subordinatianism, growing out of Sabellian principles. *Secondly*, Beryll's own Monarchianism,—and Monarchianism was, without doubt, originally one of his points of departure,—had gradually assumed such a form, that he himself could not have avoided attributing to God a certain objective circumscription; that is, he must himself have admitted a distinction into his idea of God (Note 13). It could, therefore, be no great step for him to acknowledge this distinction, properly modified, to have eternally existed in the divine nature, especially as God Himself, and not the temporal world, was represented as the ground thereof (compare c. Celsum, 8, 12). From the view just given, it will be clear, on the one hand, why in the Synodal Epistle reference was made to the human soul of Christ; for it undoubtedly played a part in the conferences with Beryll; and, on the other hand, why he was not charged with denying the human soul of Christ. By raising the humanity to the rank of a determination of God Himself, Beryll secured it such a degree of relative independence and significance, that, with his general tendency of mind, he must already have been on the way towards the assumption of the existence of a human soul of Christ. This becomes still clearer when we compare the related system of Beron, who, on the ground of that divine *κένωσις* which constituted humanity a determination of God's own essence, and of the immanence and hegemony of the divine principle, was able to represent all its activity and its deification as proceeding from the humanity itself. From our exposition, it is also plain why doubts could be entertained whether Beryll held the circumscription to have been the work of the human or of the divine aspect. For the human aspect unquestionably was essentially connected therewith; it formed a circumscription. It was, however, merely the means employed by God for constituting circumscription a determination of Himself, and not in any sense the original cause. To have supposed the latter, would have been Ebionitic. And now at last we are in a position to mediate between Baur and Schleiermacher. Neander was right in his surmise, that Beryll held a kind of middle position between the Artemonites and the Patripassians; though I consider it should be argued on different grounds. We must, in the first instance, direct attention to the consideration, that the assumption of finitude into the fatherly deity, forming

as it did one act with the *κένωσις* of God, reduced the divine to the position of an active potency of the humanity itself; the latter consequently gained considerably in importance, and deity pertained as truly to its substance as it pertained to the substance of deity. It was therefore possible for it to develop itself out of itself. So far the system bears a certain resemblance to Ebionism. On the other hand, however, this person and its development owed their existence entirely to the fatherly deity, which became man; and therefore, when the person attained completion, its actual deity was not a mere title, nor a mere moral unity with God, but the realization of its own inner essence. Accordingly, the starting-point and the conclusion of this theory bear rather an anti-Ebionitical than an Ebionitical character. It may be said to occupy a middle position between Ebionism and the early Patripassianism: neither treating the human as a mere selfless accident, on the one hand, nor viewing the divine in Christ after the type of the indwelling of the Spirit in the prophets, on the other hand; but aiming to combine both in inward, essential, and abiding unity. At the same time, it did not teach that this unity was the result of an influx of personific, divine power into the humanity. But though Beron and Beryll aided decidedly in advancing Patripassianism to a higher position, their theory undoubtedly involved new difficulties; and these difficulties, in turn, further explain Beryll's adoption of Origen's views. For the question still remained, Did the entire Father, the entire *πατρική θεότης*, abase itself when God became man, and subjected Himself to a human development; or merely one part or one aspect of its substance? In the former case, we should come upon the monstrous idea, that the Father had no longer an existence save in the man Jesus; and that in him, in virtue of the *κένωσις* which had taken place, He existed at first as the mere potency of true humanity: consequently, during the continuance of the Redeemer's development, the world in general had no actual God. In the second case, we should arrive at Ebionism, that is, in its new Hellenic form. As Beryll declined being classed with the Ebionites, he would naturally welcome the loophole offered by the Church, and thenceforth regard the divine in the Redeemer, not as mere portion or segment, but as an aspect or particular mode of existence, of the *entire* divine substance.

In the line of Monarchians, Beryll forms the connecting link between the older ones,—the Patripassians, who allowed of absolutely no *πρόσωπον* side by side with the *πατρικὴ θεότης*,—and Sabellius, who not merely recognised in Christ a distinct *πρόσωπον*, a distinct *περιγραφή*, but, by advancing onwards to the Holy Spirit, was able to construe a species of trinity. His system was the bridge between the two, firstly, because it described the being of God in Christ as a *περιγραφή* in God Himself; secondly, because it assumed a peculiar relation of God to this man; and, lastly, seeing that the relation referred to could only be grounded in the divine essence, because Beryll necessarily regarded it as a determination of God Himself, conformably to which He had both the will and the power to posit Himself as a man. Whether Beryll understood this in a patripassian sense, as a self-subjection of the divine nature to passibility; or in Beron's sense, as a conversion (*τροπή*) of God into the man Jesus; or in a more Sabellian sense, as the non-passive activity of God in the circumscription of the *πρόσωπον* of Christ (which unquestionably interweaves God with finitude, if He not merely acted upon, but really dwelt in, Christ; see above, page 38); he is certainly akin to both, in so far as he attributes to the *περιγραφή*, or limitation and finitude, a relation to God's own substance, whilst at the same time denying to it, as indeed to distinction in general, any, save perhaps an ideal, reality in God, apart from the incarnation.

All these theories, although it cannot be doubted that their authors were stirred by religious motives, necessarily strike at the very root of religion in general, and of Christianity in particular. If the Father Himself is immediately the revealer—if there is no distinction in Him, no Son through whom, as through His image, He reveals Himself, first in Himself and for Himself, and then also in the world—then the object of revelation is lost, and its idea is destroyed. For if the Father, as the final ground, Himself comes forth in revelation; and if, in order that the revelation may be complete, nothing can be left behind in the ground; then did the Father, that is, God, pass over into, and really become, the world; and there is consequently nothing left but the world. This is the ethnical, pantheistic feature of Patripassianism and Sabellianism. The final result is, to do away altogether with revelation; for, on the supposition referred to,

that which was to be made manifest by revelation no longer exists. Noetus escaped this danger; for, in the absolute will of God, which at one time decrees the assumption of visibility and passibility, and at another time the return to invisibility and impassibility, he had that potence, which, in that it has power over itself, is unalterable, and can neither succumb to the world, nor tolerate God's passing over into it. But, not having laid firm hold of the eternal ethical principle in God, which is the only basis of an abiding incarnation, the incarnation recognised by him is but a momentary thing, originating and grounded in a particular act of will. Consistency, therefore, required him to treat Christ's person and appearance as transitory (although it is scarcely likely that he actually taught it); unless he were prepared to suppose that the Father did not again return into that unalterableness which his Monarchianism compelled him to regard as the true essence of God.

SECTION II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SON, AND THE REVIVAL OF MONARCH-
IANISM IN THE FORM OF SABELLIANISM AND SUBORDINA-
TIANISM.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CONFUTATION OF THE NEW FORM OF EBIONISM AND
PATRIPASSIANISM BY THE CHURCH.*I. The Struggle with the New Form of Ebionism.*

When the Theodotians and Artemonites tried to surround their innovation with the nimbus of antiquity, and to represent it as the doctrine of the Apostles and the doctrine of the Church down to the days of Victor, an old work, attributed, after the example of Photius, to the Roman presbyter Caius (Cod. 48), answered them drily, but yet correctly,—“One might perhaps believe them, if the Holy Scriptures, above all else, did not stand in the way.¹ But there exist also works of brethren, reaching up to a time earlier than Victor, written against heresies, and addressed to heathens; as, for example, those of Justin, Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, and many others; in all of which Christ is designated God (*ἐν οἷς ἅπασι θεολογεῖται ὁ Χριστός*). For who is not acquainted with the writings of Irenæus and Melito, and the rest, who proclaim Christ as God and as man? How many psalms and hymns, moreover, have been composed by believing brethren, from the beginning to the present time, which glorify the Logos of God, the Christ, by lauding Him as

¹ Older writers, like Eusebius (H. E. 5, 28), Nicephorus (4, 21), and Theodoret (Hær. fab. 2, 5), were not acquainted with the name of the author of the work. It bore, however, the title of “The Little Labyrinth.”

God?" And how many more witnesses the author might have cited against them, we have already shown. In fact, the assertion of the Artemonites, that theirs was the primitive Christian doctrine, was so baseless, that the only witnesses to whom they could at all appeal, namely, the older and proper Ebionites, would have been held in horror by them; partly because of their Jewish tastes, which sorely clashed with their own classical culture (Euseb. H. E. 5, 28); and partly because these newer Ebionites coincided with the Church in recognising the supernatural birth of Christ. Complaints were made of their arbitrary treatment of the Scriptures, of the erasures and alterations they made in their copies of the Biblical text: they were charged with swerving from and throwing it into confusion; with paying more attention to Aristotle and Euclid, to syllogistic forms and geometry, than to the investigation of the contents of the Sacred Scriptures. The Church felt that theirs was a foreign, a worldly spirit: "They speak like men who are of the earth, and know not Him who is from above." Their minds were open to worldly science, but not to religion: their system, therefore, did not grow out of an interest in religion, in Christianity; but their views and their copies of the Scripture were cut and shaped in agreement with principles foreign to Christianity. We are not informed that they employed dogmatical arguments in defending and establishing their own views, and in combating the prevailing doctrine: for this reason, it was only just that they should neither attain wide diffusion, nor be greatly regarded by the Church. Much as Tertullian wrote about the Trinity and Christology, he passes over this heresy, although contemporary, in perfect silence: he does not appear to have been at all acquainted with it;¹ on the contrary, he speaks as though in his day the divinity of the Person of Christ were already accepted as beyond all doubt.² Not till

¹ The only mention made of it is in the catalogue of heresies at the close of the work, "*de præscr. Hær.*" (c. 53), which is of doubtful genuineness.

² *De carne Christi* 1: *Examinemus corporalem substantiam Domini, de spiritali enim certum est.* "*Spiritualis substantia*" is equivalent, with Tertullian, to "*divina substantia.*" Compare *Apol.* 21; *de orat.* 1; *adv. Marc.* 1, 19; 3, 6. 16; 4, 21; *adv. Prax.* 26.—"*Spiritus*" with him by no means denotes merely the Holy Spirit; but he applies the term also to the divine nature. Compare Tertullian, ed. Semler, 1825, T. vi. 572; and John iv. 24; *Rom.* i. 4; 2 *Cor.* iii. 17. See Note QQ, page 391, Vol. I.

the second half of the third century did this tendency find a vigorous representative in Paul of Samosata. In his hands it excited far more attention ; for the state of the Church, when he appeared, was far more favourable to the introduction of his theory, than at the time when the monarchian heresies were rife. At the present time (as we have shown in the introductory remarks to this third chapter), the mind of the Church was powerfully occupied with the question of the equalization of the Logos with the Father, and of the expulsion of subordination elements from the conception of the Son. The patripassian form of Monarchianism must, therefore, have worn a greater appearance of affinity to the doctrine of the Church ; and it was really a consequence of the continuous and necessary struggle carried on with this heresy, in the persons of the men who from time to time attempted its revival, that the Church took so strong a turn in the opposite direction, that is, towards the assertion of the distinction between Christ and God, and that a door was thus opened not merely to preludes of Arianism, but even to Ebionitical teachings. For this reason, the struggle with Paul shall be narrated at a later period.

II. *The Struggle with Patripassianism.*

During the period of the development of the doctrine of the Church, which extended from the end of the second to the middle of the third century, the part played by Ebionism is scarcely worthy of notice ; but the case was somewhat different with Docetism. There was a closer affinity between it and Patripassianism, and that, not merely at the commencement in the hands of Marcion, but even later also, in those of Beryll : indeed, one may in a certain sense say, that Patripassianism was the continuation of Docetism, under a more orthodox garb. At the same time, we must be careful to remember, that the *principle* of Docetism had already been negated by the mind of the Church ; and Tertullian did but, as it were, collect together the manifold and rank forms of Docetism, in order to pronounce on them the final judgment of the Church. The reasons assigned by Tertullian for his condemnatory judgment may be taken as the expression of the general view, to which the Church had been led in the course of the struggle. But the after effects of the Docetical error

were far from being rooted out by that condemnation. All that it really did, was to lighten the labour of the Church; for the future, all that was needed was to bring to light the Docetical root of an opinion, and the Church at once, unhesitatingly gave the required decision.

The Docetical aspect of Gnosticism is discussed by Tertullian, particularly in the work, "de carne (or humanity) Christi." Marcion, says he, denies both the birth and the flesh of Christ, in order that the one may not testify to the other; for the one stands or falls with the other. "Thou hast cut away portions of the Gospel, cries Tertullian, in which, according to a letter of thine, and the confession of thy followers, thou thyself didst formerly believe. Thou showest thus, that the faith rejected by thee is the older; and that thy present faith is of yesterday." Marcion did not intend to deny the sufferings of Christ; but how absurd to leave the sufferings and death standing, and to deny the birth and the human body! "Thou leavest the crucifixion untouched; but how could God suffer without human flesh? Or was His suffering a mere show? If so, He might as easily have consented to the show of birth and childhood, and there is therefore no need for thee to deny them." (Compare above, Epoch Second, Section First.) Apelles attributed to Christ a solid body, but supposed it to be compounded of sidereal elements. What, then, are we to understand by His mother and His brethren in the Gospel, if, though He had a human body, He was never born? Christ must then be classed with the appearances of angels, who also, according to Tertullian, gave themselves solid bodies, though they were never born. But the cause of the appearance in the two cases is a different one. No angel ever appeared with a view to being crucified, to dying, and to being raised to life again. Christ, however, having been sent to die, must needs also be born, in order that He might be able to die (*de carne Christi* 6). This is the "*mutuum debitum*" between "*nativitas*" and "*mortalitas*," that whatever dies must be born, and whatever is born must die. Why do we everywhere discover in His body the signs of its earthly origin? Nowhere did men regard it with astonishment; nothing of heavenly brilliance clung to it, that it should be despised and derided. Tertullian saw the dualistic element which lay in this tendency; and acutely shows, not only that

Apelles must needs abide by a "*caro peccatrix*," if the prince of matter (*præses igneus*) is the prince of the world, and if the world be a "*delictum*;" for the world is one: but also, that he cannot represent our earthly world as made partaker of redemption, if he hold that the exaltation of Christ involved the annihilation and dissolution of the humanity He had assumed. According to another theory, the soul of Christ gave rise to His body; the soul became flesh; His flesh, therefore, was not like that of other men, for, as it was derived from the "*anima*," it was *soulical* flesh (*caro animalis*). These latter teach that He did not need to assume our flesh, inasmuch as He only came to redeem our soul. "Why, then, did His soul become that which He had no need to redeem, to wit, flesh; nay more, flesh of a different kind from ours, and which therefore cannot serve us? Nay more, if His soul were made flesh (*carnea facta*), it was not such a soul as ours; but was converted into a fleshly soul, such as neither required redemption, nor could aid in the work of redemption. They say, His soul became a body, in order that we might see it born, die, and rise again; and in order that the soul might look upon and recognise itself (that is, probably, its own history, or the momenta of the inner process through which it itself passes) in Christ, as the symbol of this inner history.¹ But the body of Christ concealed His soul; how, then, can the soul have been manifested in it? For that purpose, they must surely devise another body, capable of making the invisible visible." This argument plainly cannot hold its ground. The following, however, may:—"They have reduced the soul itself to flesh; what, then, remains to be revealed? Furthermore, the main point is not, that the soul should know itself through Christ (as though it were already perfect in itself, and only lacked the consciousness of its perfection), but that it should know Christ in itself. The soul is not in danger because it has not perfect self-knowledge, but because it has not the knowledge of Christ." At the same time, therefore, he protests against a theory of redemption which requires merely a process of knowledge, and not a real and religious transformation through Christ; which confounds religion with a theoretical process; and which, consequently, has no need of the humanity of Christ,

¹ C. 11: Not the "*effigies animæ*" was given by or in Christ, says Tertullian, but its "*salus*."

save as its history is the symbol of a spiritual truth. This passage is in other respects remarkable, as showing that Tertullian attributed to Christ a true human soul. (C. 10: "*Ut animam salvam faceret in se ipso, suscepit animam Christus, quia salva non esset, nisi per ipsum, dum in ipso.*") Others endeavour to show that one of the pure, heavenly natures, which Christ (that is, the eternal Christ) is supposed to have assumed, might supply an organ qualifying Him for historical activity;—an organ which matter and weak human nature appeared to refuse. They say accordingly,—"*Angelum gestavit ut satellitem fortem, cum quo salutem hominis operaretur.*" In support of which, they appealed to passages where Christ is designated an angel. Tertullian, however, simply replied,—An angel is often a messenger, an ambassador. At the same time, Isaiah does not say that an angel or a messenger redeemed them, but the Lord Himself. It would, therefore, involve a shortening of the work of redemption, to represent an angel as the Redeemer. It is true, they say,—Christ, in the angel. But that is superfluous, or too much. If He redeemed through the angel, what part did the angel take; and vice versâ? But it is also too little. For the angels did not need to be redeemed: to men, not to them, was redemption promised; and men would then come short. How could He further be made lower than the angels, if He were an angel and not a man? The Valentinians, lastly, invent a kind of spiritual body. They suppose that Christ stood amongst the angels invested with an earthly body, and was not born of the Spirit, nor of God, but of the will of the man.¹ Consequently His body was of God, of the Spirit. "Were it of the earth," say they, "how could He be unperishable? Why was His body not dissolved into earth, if it was like ours? Or if we Christians are so entirely like Him, even in relation to the body, why do not we, like Him, rise again, and ascend into heaven, without undergoing corruption? If we attribute flesh at all to Christ, we must attribute to Him sinful flesh, and must suppose that He then annihilated it, and laid it aside." To this Tertullian replies,—We say that neither did He lay aside His flesh, nor was His flesh sinful in essence. Unquestionably He assumed our flesh, in which dwell sin and guilt, and that not merely in ap-

¹ Undoubtedly with reference to the ancient reading *ὁ ἐκ γεννηθέν*, instead of *ὁ ἐκ γεννηθέντων*, John i. 10.

pearance ; but had Christ therefore "*caro peccatrix* ?" No ; He made our flesh His own by the act of assumption ; and by making it His own, He made it sinless." In proof that to the reality of the flesh, generation from the seed of a man was not necessary, he reminds them of Adam. As, in his case, earth was converted into flesh, even so was the Word of God able to pass over into the material of the same flesh, without the intervention of the seed of a man. "*Vacabat viri semen apud habentem Dei semen.*" Converting his defence into an attack, he goes on to say,—“They believe that He died (c. 15), and yet they represent that which died as having been born of the unperishable. They desire a man united with God (*hominem Deo mixtum*), and yet they deny the man : for a man who has not our body, a body taken from human nature, is a mere appearance. “*Caro ex hominis carne erat sumenda* ;” therefore He cannot have given Himself a body out of Himself. This the Valentinians themselves also, strictly speaking, grant ; for they confess that He was born of the Virgin. And what can this mean, if He did not receive from the Virgin the body which He bore when He came forth out of her womb ? It would then be much simpler to say,—He received a body of a spiritual kind, apart from Mary. “*Sine causa eo se intulit, unde nihil extulit. Sed non sine cause descendit in vulvam, ergo ex illa accepit.*” Though this line of argumentation goes back merely to the fact of Christ’s birth, which was recognised even by his opponents, Tertullian did not fail at the same time to recognise the idea which was connected therewith.

Without doubt, says he, the seed of a man was not necessary to the Person of Christ : had He been entirely, and in every respect, like us—entirely and solely the Son of man—He would not have been the Son of God. But He lacked nothing that was necessary to constitute Him entirely one of us. To this the seed of a man was not necessary, as Adam proves. On the other hand, however, a mere creation (as in Adam’s case), or self-generation, or self-conception, was not enough ; but He must needs stand in blood-relationship to the already existent race. To Mary must belong, not indeed that which she conceived, but what she bore ; she must communicate to it her own blood. It was necessary that Christ should be the fruit, and not merely the guest, of her womb. Whoso denies that He was

a blossom and fruit of the royal stem of David, denies not merely the root to the branch, and to the blossom, and to the fruit; but also the fruit to its root; in order that the root may not be able to claim the glory of Him who was destined to be its blossom and fruit. In this case, it is necessary to go back through all the members (of the human race) to the beginning. All participate in this blossom and fruit, and its nature is no other than Adam's; for, indeed, He is the second Adam. Accordingly, we must either say, that men have the same spirit-like flesh as the second Adam, or else that the body of Christ, not having sprung from a spiritual stem, was not a spiritual body. Tertullian was not satisfied without declaring, in the strongest terms, his conviction of the reality of the connection between Christ and our race. "*Adhæsit utero, avulsus est; ex utero est per illum nervum umbilicarem adnexus origini vulvæ.*" He asserts a *concaratio*, a *convisceratio* of Christ with our race. *Ex humana matrice* did He derive the *substantia* for His *caro* (c. 17). That is the new birth which He was appointed to bring: a man was born in God (in Deo); and in this man, God also was born; for He assumed the flesh of the old stem without the old seed, in order that, in the power of the new seed, that is, of the Spirit, He might recreate the old flesh, after having atoned it, by the exclusion of the old impurity. At the same time, that entire new birth (*novitas*) was formed out of the old material, as is the case with all, in such a manner, namely, that, by a wise arrangement, the Lord was born of a virgin. "*In virginem adhuc Evam irrepserat verbum ædificatorium mortis. In virginem æque introducendum erat Dei verbum extructorium vitæ.*"

Nor must we overlook the circumstance, that, when distinguishing between conception and birth, Tertullian designates the former alone, not the latter, virginal. After the birth, the womb of Mary was no longer that of a virgin, but was in all respects like that of any other mother; thus bearing witness to the reality of the human body of Christ, which broke loose from her. "*Virgo Mariæ et non virgo; peperit enim quæ ex sua carne; non peperit, quæ non ex viri semine. Virgo, quantum a viro, non virgo quantum a partu. Si virgo concepit (if she conceived as a virgin) in partu suo nupsit, ipsâ patefacti corporis lege.*" Hence the Apostle says, "*Non ex virgine sed ex muliere editum filium Dei*" (Gal. iv.).

His opponents, however, appealed especially to two considerations, and these Tertullian then proceeds to examine more carefully (c. 3, 4). These considerations were,—1. It is impossible for God to be born and become flesh; 2. It would be unworthy of Him. Marcion, in particular, raised both these objections; but they really lay at the basis of all Docetical and dualistic Christologies. Had He been born, and had He truly assumed a man, He would have ceased, thinks Marcion, to be God, losing what He was in that He became what He previously was not. “*Converti enim in aliud finis est pristini.*” Tertullian answers,—The fixed, immoveable being of God runs no risk. It is true everything which stands far from God, and God from it, is subject to the law, that if its nature undergo an alteration, it can no longer remain the same as it was before. But God differs from man precisely in this respect, that of Him the contrary holds good; that is, He is able to convert Himself into whatever He wills, and yet to remain what He is. In order to understand his meaning, we must take into consideration his doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly the mode in which he defines the distinction between the Son and the Father; and to this point we shall immediately direct attention. Tertullian demands, and that on religious grounds, that in recognising the unchangeableness of God, we shall not deny the possibility of His undergoing any process whatever, but merely such a process as purely finite creatures undergo, change in whose nature involves the loss of that which they had previously been. This latter thought is unquestionably, to some extent, akin to certain features of Patripassianism, though expressed in a trinitarian form. All depends on the will of God: was it His will to be born? For, if He willed it, nothing could prevent it, not even His nature. And that He willed it, is clear; for otherwise He would not have chosen to appear as a man. Who thinks of denying, when he sees a man, that he has been born? If the thing itself, the being man, has been displeasing to God, He would not have been disposed to assume the semblance of a man. If any one object,—He was satisfied with His self-consciousness; I answer,—It was better even for His own self-consciousness, that He should really be what He willed to seem to be.

He enters into a still more detailed examination of the second objection (c. 4). The Valentinians ask,—“*Ergo Dei filius in*

tantum humilitatis exhaustus?" Apelles assures, "*carnem habere ignominiam*;" Marcion (compare "*de carne Christi*" 4; "*adversus Marc.*" 3, 10), "*aspernatus est Christus carnem illam, ut terrenam et stercorebus infersam.*" Marcion he meets with the apt reply,—He is ever preaching up the "*lenitas dei*," and the "*benignitas dei*," and will not hear of the stern God, who is distant from the world. And yet, when this God really descends to the world, he complains that it is unworthy of God, that it is a "*pusillitas*." But what you blame as unworthy of God, the Son of God has in Himself, in that He unites God and man; for He has God in Himself, in His power, and man in His weaknesses (*pusillitatibus*). The entire disgrace of my God, as you term it, is the sanctuary of that grace which is the salvation of men. "*Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret. Ex æquo agebat Deus cum homine ut homo ex æquo agere cum Deo posset.*" If God despised man, why did He not also despise the appearance of a man? why did He assume the image (*simulacrum*) thereof? "*Nullius rei dedignandæ imago dignanda est.*" If He played the part of a man, why did He not play it throughout, but omit, for example, its beginning, birth? Because a true birth was unworthy of God! In that case, declaim against those holy, awe-inspiring works of nature; draw thy sword against everything that thou art; cast down the origin of the body and of the soul; call the womb of thy mother a cloaca; and become the foe and persecutor of the workshop, wherein that great being, man, is brought forth (*adv. Marc. 3, 10; de carne Chr. 4*)! How canst thou still continue to love any one? Thou dost not love thyself; for thou hatest man, who is subject to birth. And yet see to it, whether thou art displeasing to thyself, or whether thou wast originated in any other way. Christ, at all events, loves the man, who is in impurity, and is doubled up in his mother's womb, who is born in a manner which the modesty of woman counts holy, with whom his mother plays at her breast. For the sake of this man, He descended from on high; He humbled Himself even unto death, the death of the cross. So much did He, without doubt, love him, whom He has dearly bought. But if He loved him, surely He must also love his birth and his flesh. For nothing can be really loved, unless we love that through which it is what it is. Or take away birth, and still show me a man. Take away flesh, and

show me him whom God redeems. If this constitutes the man whom God bought, because He loved him, thou convertest that which God did into something of which He should be ashamed. But if Christ be the Creator of nature, He acts rightly in loving His possession. By the transformation of birth, by a heavenly new-birth, He restored the flesh from all its sufferings; He illuminated the blind, renewed the palsied, awakened the dead to life,—and yet He ought to be ashamed of having been born into the flesh! (“de carne Christi” 4).

In the last instance, however, it is invariably the atonement which leads Tertullian to attach so much importance to the reality of the humanity of Christ. A Docetical Christ would have been a vain pretence, a lie: he therefore exhorts his opponents to believe (“de carne Christi” 5) that God would rather become man than lie, appearing to be what He was not, not willing to be what He is. If His human personality were a mere appearance, so also were His human acts and works; and, therefore, the sufferings of Christ deserve no faith. The murderers of Christ are thus excused; for in reality He suffered nothing at their hands, and the entire work of Christ is overthrown. “Totum christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi negatur, quam tam impressæ apostolus demandat, utique veram, summum eam fundamentum Evangelii constituens (adv. Marc. 3, 8). Nonne vere crucifixus est Deus? vere mortuus et crucifixus?” “Did a mere phantom suffer, “quod vacabat a sensu passionum Dei?” Then is our faith a lie, and our hope a phantom. Oh, spare the only hope of the entire world! Why dost thou destroy the necessary reproach of the faith? Whatever is unworthy of God, is for my benefit: willing am I to be shameless and blessed as a fool, and I require the material thereto. God’s Son was crucified; I am not ashamed (to avow it), for it is worthy of shame: and the Son of God died; it deserves all faith, because it is foolish. He was laid in the grave, and rose again: it is quite certain, because it was impossible (“de carne Christi” 5).¹

¹ Those whose nerves are too weak to bear the utterances of such a *πληροφορία* of faith, will find a tonic in the preceding chapter, where he speaks of the divine folly, which confounds and puts to shame the wisdom of the world, and where the ethical nature of God, love, is made the standard of the truly reasonable.

So rich had been the development of Tertullian's intellect, relatively to the truth of the humanity of Christ. No preceding writer can compare with him in this respect; no one plunges into the act of incarnation with such love and admiration, and at the same time with such penetration; no one took the same pleasure, as much speculative as religious, in conjoining the most glaring contradictions, the furthest extremes, in Christ, in order that he might behold in His complete *concernation* and *convisceration* (*concernatio et convisceratio*) with our race, on the one hand, the magnitude of the divine love, and, on the other hand, the exaltation of mankind. To the reality of the incarnation he considered it to belong, as did also Origen (Hom. in Lucam 14), that Mary, after the birth of Jesus, should no longer be a virgin, but a mother (Gal. iv.).

But also as regards the divine aspect, he did not remain inactive. In narrating the course taken by the doctrine of the Logos, we have found, as might have been anticipated from the circumstance of the point of departure being the Person of the historical Christ, that in the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Son, which had been clearly laid down almost at the commencement of the process, there was strictly included the momentum, that the Son possessed a personality of His own, independent of the Father; gradually, however, the efforts made to exclude subordination elements from the conception of the Son, and to exhibit Him as a participator in deity, led to His personality being no longer so strictly distinguished from that of the Father, as it was in the incarnation. Clemens Alexandrinus, in particular, furnished us an example of this; but it appeared still more distinctly in his predecessors. The definition of the Son, as a mere attribute, was a constant temptation to dissipate His hypostasis. For if the Son is the Wisdom of the Father (Ratio, *λόγος, σοφία*), or His power (virtus, verbum), either the Father by Himself is without wisdom and power, or the Father and Son are identical, even as a man is identical with His reason and His will. That the Fathers desired to establish a deeper distinction between the Father and the Son, than that between a subject and its attributes, could not indeed be denied; for they gave these attributes again the form of a subject in the Son; and they supposed themselves to have hit upon that deeper distinction, which Christology required, when they had declared that a divine sub-

ject, and not a mere divine power, dwelt in Christ. But still they fell very far short of supplying that which was necessary actually to establish and secure the personality of the Son.

Tertullian entered on this inheritance; and his opposition to the gnostic doctrine of the *Æons*, which wore to him a mythological and pantheistic appearance, must have strengthened his antipathy to the introduction of distinct and separate forms into the inner sphere of the divine nature, and his tendency to give the unity the predominance over the distinctions. "Valentine," says he (*adv. Prax.* 8), "rends his *æons*, his *probolas* loose from the Father, and sets them at such a distance from Him, that they no longer know Him. But our Son knows the Father, and is in the bosom of Him, whom He reveals. For who knows what is in God, save the Spirit who is in Him? Ever was the Word with the Father and in God." This, however, is but one aspect of the matter. If we are minded thoroughly to understand Tertullian's peculiar doctrine of the Trinity, we must remember that his strong realism would naturally lead him to insist much more vehemently on the reality of the incarnation of the Son, than did Clement. As he gazed on the incarnate Logos, he felt certainly convinced of His personality. For it was not a mere impersonal power, but a divine subject, that had become man in Christ (*Note 14*). When, therefore, Patripassianism arose, which he justly deemed tainted with Docetism (*adv. Prax.* 11, 23), and brought to light the consequences of neglecting the distinction between the Father and Son, his realistic principles naturally impelled him to assert more strongly, that the divine which had appeared in Christ was a distinct subject; whilst at the same time he avoided infringing on the essential equality of Father and Son, which he recognised along with his predecessors, and in which he saw the true element of Patripassianism. These, then, are the factors out of which we must endeavour to construct and understand Tertullian's remarkable doctrine of God.

The following is the mode in which he endeavoured to reconcile the equality of the Father and Son, with the Son's possession of a distinct personality. To two Gods he objects as strongly as the Monarchians (*adv. Prax.* 13); he desires but one God. Consequently, a double or triple hypostasis seems an impossibility; in which case, the personality of the Father must be con-

cluded to be that of the Son also, and the distinction between the two to be a mere name. This he would be ready to concede, but for that "*dispensatio, quam Œconomiam vocamus.*" But if the distinctions relate solely to God's revelations, to His manifestations of Himself, we arrive merely at different works of God, and not at distinctions in the divine being. The Trinity is thus reduced to a mere name or appearance, and denotes, strictly speaking, simply one and the same God engaged in different works; which works themselves, considered in relation to God and not merely in relation to man, must be pronounced to be momenta of one and the same work. Against such a view Tertullian protests (*adv. Prax.* 13). How, then, can he secure objective and real distinctions in God Himself? By regarding the deeds of God as modes of the divine being, by bringing the divine essence into greater nearness to the world, by attributing finitude and growth to God Himself in one aspect of His being, and by representing to himself the fellowship of man with God as more intimate than it was commonly held to be. Human souls he deemed to be of divine substance; humanity he held to have been from the beginning an object of the love of God, and destined to be exalted and transferred into the divine nature, through Christ. Again, he believed that it was involved in the eternal idea of humanity from the very beginning, that its history, and the history of the Son of God, should be interwoven with each other; and that, consequently, the Son of God was eternally related to and incorporated with humanity. When God created Adam out of the earth, He looked on the image of the future Incarnate One; and, creating Adam in His likeness, God created him in His own likeness. (*De resurr. carn.* 6:—*Quodcunque limus exprimebatur Christus cogitabatur homo futurus. Id utique, quod finxit, ad imaginem Dei finxit illum, scilicet Christi. Ita limus ille jam tunc imaginem induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus erat, sed et pignus.*)

But let us enter into details. "Seeing that the Patripassians," says he (*adv. Prax.* 5), "regard the two as one, so that one and the same stands both for Father and Son, we must investigate the entire question concerning the Son, whether He is, who He is, and how He is. According to some, His genesis is referred to in the Hebrew text (*Gen.* i. 1), 'In the beginning, God made

for Himself a Son.' Supposing, however, that this be not certain, I am influenced by other considerations, derived from the inner nature (dispositione) of God, which He had before the creation of the world till the generation of the Son. For God was before all things; He was solitary; He was world, place, and everything to Himself. Solitary, because nothing besides Himself had outward reality; and yet, again, not solitary even then, for with Him was His Reason which He had in Himself. For God is a rational being: Reason existed in Him earlier (than the world); and so everything is from Him. This Reason is His intelligence (sensus), designated Logos amongst the Greeks, —a term which is usually not quite appropriately translated 'Word' (sermo). For, strictly speaking, we cannot say that the Word was in the beginning with God; for Reason in God is older than Word, inasmuch as Word subsists through Reason, Reason is its substance, and it is the revelation of Reason." In these words, Tertullian would appear entirely to deny the existence of a distinction between Father and Son, in the inmost sphere of the divine being; for Reason, which he unquestionably conceived to be something substantial (corpus in his language, although spiritus), is the Father Himself: Word, on the contrary, which, as spoken being, contains, at all events, the first beginning of a distinction, he refuses to admit into the inmost divine sphere, treating it as the secondary, which the primary precedes, as the beginning (of that which is distinct from God in Himself), not as that which is prior to all beginnings. And plainly, those who translated Logos by "Word," and represented the Word as existing in the beginning, and not as first constituting the beginning by its own rise, were far more decidedly than Tertullian on the way to introduce the Word itself into the inner nature of God, and to give it a place alongside of the Father, however imperfect might be the result. And, as though with the feeling that he was just on the point of quitting the path trodden by the Church, he proceeds to say, as it were retracing his steps,—“Yet that lack of precision (namely, to represent the Word as equally eternal with Reason, or to identify the two) is of little consequence; for, even if God had not yet sent forth the Word from Himself (miserat), He had it within Himself, with and in His reason, quietly meditating and ordering what He designed shortly to express in word. Consider thyself a

copy of God, a rational being, animated by divine substance. Dost thou not see that, when thou quietly, through thy reason, communest with thyself, the same thing takes place in thee ? Thy reason takes up a position over against thee, by means of words, at every movement of thought, at every pulsation of thine intelligence. Whatever thou thinkest or perceivest, becomes a word in thee, and in the word is thy reason itself. In thy soul thou must speak, thou canst not avoid it ; and when thou speakest, the word in thee becomes another than thyself, as it were one who speaks with thee ; in the which, notwithstanding, there dwells the same reason, which enables thee to speak when thou speakest. Thus there is, as it were, another than thyself, a second, the word in thee, through which thou speakest when thinking, and through which thou thinkest when speaking. After the same manner also, God, in virtue of His reason, quietly thinking and ordering, made the reason, word, which, in speaking, He set in motion. If thou art a copy of God, how much more perfect must this take place in the Archetype ! for He, even when He keeps silence, has Reason in Himself, and in Reason the Word. So far, therefore, it is true, that, even before the creation of the universe, God was not alone, seeing that He had in Himself Reason, and in Reason the Word, which, by an inner act, He constituted a Second, another self." Tertullian endeavours thus to give fixity to that eternal distinction in God, which, so long as the Logos was deemed equivalent to Reason, continued a completely precarious and uncertain thing, by inweaving the word, to wit, the objectification of reason, with reason itself. This interesting passage sets further before us an effort to show how there may be a duality in God, from the necessity, immanent in all active, spiritual beings, to effect a self-diremption into word and thinking reason. Spirit, in order to be actually rational spirit, must not merely think, but must also have an object which is thought,—the object for the subject. That which is thought, again, must, on the one hand, be itself rational, or else it is not a thought of reason ; on the other hand, as something thought, it must be different from the thinking reason. Only in that it is fixed as other than the reason, can it be termed thought, and can reason be said to have accomplished its thinking activity ; but this other thing is fixed in and by means of a word,—be the word even

inner and quiet. It is clear, therefore, that Tertullian was already on the traces of those who, at a later period, tried to show that the Trinity is the eternal process of the divine self-consciousness, confronting itself with itself. But from what has been advanced, it is equally clear, that Tertullian did not keep God's thought of the world and His thought of Himself apart; or, rather, he still puts the self-consciousness of God quite into the background. If the thought of God, which He sets over against Himself, and in which He sets Himself over against Himself, is not God Himself, but the world, then *either* no distinction is effected in God's being itself,—namely, when the world is clearly distinguished from God, and the pretended foundation laid for the Trinity turns out to be a mere distinction between the God who thinks the world and the world thought by God; or—and to this alternative Tertullian necessarily inclined—that which is thought is God Himself, in alterity; though, at the same time, owing to the circumstance of its being also immediately the world, or the principle of the world, there is the danger of confounding the mundane with the trinitarian process;—in which case, it is evident that an immanent Trinity can never be arrived at. Further, it cannot be regarded as an accident that Tertullian, in this entire section, never speaks of Father and Son, but solely of God, who is eternally “*rationalis*” and “*tacite cogitando*” Himself in Himself, constitutes Himself “*sermonalis*.” Herein is decidedly involved, what he also expressly confesses, namely, that there is no place for a real, hypostatic Sonship in the inner, eternal essence of God: all that he has tried to point out, is the existence in God of an eternally active potency of Sonship. God is the Thinking One; the Word in God is His thought absolutely, in fixed objective form, though still confined to the inward sphere. As the thought of God, He is the sum of the thoughts of the world, or the idea of the world; and had Tertullian rested here, he would have had no alternative but to follow the example of heathen philosophers, and call the world the Son of God, so far as it is the external realization of the idea of the world: plainly, however, an hypostasis of the Son would then be out of the question. For, on the one hand, the eternal idea of the world was not conceived in hypostatical separation from, but in unity with, God; and, on the other hand, the realization of this idea is so

characterized by discription, that it no longer represents a real unity, to which the predicate personal could be applied.

Here, however, we must take into consideration, that when Tertullian taught that the inner Word was the thought of God absolutely, under the impulse of His Christian consciousness, he treated, though not clearly and definitely, *God Himself*, and not merely the world, as the content of the divine thought. Not that he represented God as placing Himself, so to speak, over against Himself, even apart from the world and the idea of the world; for that would have involved an actual inner, and not merely a potential, Sonship: but he viewed God, considered as the object of His own thought, solely in and with the idea of the world. We are now in a position to understand the further course of his entire theory.

In the first place, the heathen opinion, that the world is immediately the Son of God, is set aside; for, on the contrary, God, as the object of His own thought, is *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the Son of God, *so soon as He attains positive reality in the actual world*. In the first instance, He has a mere ideal existence in the inner essence of God, like the world-idea itself; but in this world-idea is involved that when it arrives at actuality, it will still have, in that actuality, the God who was incorporated with its idea, to wit, the Word, and in the manifestation of the Word, the archetype become a reality, God amongst men, the Head of humanity, with a view to whose future realization God created Adam. And because the manifestation of God Himself is thus interwoven with the idea of the world, and all the divine thoughts necessarily become realities, not only is the world a progressive actualization of the thought to which God gives objective existence over against Himself; but this same historical process through which the world passes, involves in itself, and requires for its own completeness, that the Word (the thought) of God, so far as God Himself is its subject-matter, should have its history and actuality in the world; and that, abandoning its hidden, tranquil, ideal existence, it should progressively manifest itself, until, standing in the midst of humanity as the Son of God, it give full objective reality over against God, to all that the divine thought embraced within itself, that is, therefore, to God Himself who is its subject-matter. Thus, in the actuality of the God-man, of the Son, an adjustment (*Angleichung*, a squaring

up) takes place between God as thinking, on the one side, who now for the first time can in the full sense be termed Father, and, on the other side, the thought of God, whose inmost substance is God Himself;—primarily, it is true, in the form of a conception, a potency; but in due time as actual Son and God-man, possessed, like the Father, of objective existence and personality.¹

The only difficulty yet remaining, is to account for Tertullian's not representing the Word as having first attained realization in the man Jesus, who formed the top-stone of that history, whose mission it was to subject the entire Word to Himself; and why, on the contrary, he taught that the procession of the Word from God, or, as he terms it, the generation of the Son, took place prior to the creation of the world. The key to the matter is contained in the account given above. God, objectively realized amongst men in Christ, is the climax of the idea of the world, is that goal, that final aim which gives unity to the world, and completion to the Word, that is, to the self-objectification of God. Now the absolute aim, even prior to its full realization at the end, must be more than a mere conception, it must be a real mundane potency. Hence Tertullian represents God as first of all giving utterance to this potency, when the time came for the world assuming a real shape; and thus the pre-mundane Son of God entered on an actual, though still imperfect existence, and the one God became Father and Son. But that world-potency, although endowed with power, spirit, and wisdom (*sermo fultus, structus virtute, spiritu, sapientia*), was not as such sufficient to itself: it manifests, indeed, a certain reality, energy, for the Son creates the world; but He creates it with an eye to its idea, or to its future form as the God-man; and therefore this first appearance of the Son in the form of a person was not a renunciation of the goal, that is, of the incarnation, but the means and preparation thereto. And during the entire period from the creation onwards, Tertullian represents the Son as governed by the thought, that something was still lacking to His full idea, until the incarnation had taken place; and that it behoved Him to prepare the way for this incarnation. He prepared, He trained Himself, for the incarnation. For this reason, He appeared so frequently to the patriarchs, to Moses and others;

¹ See Note and Appendix II. for the German of this passage.—TR.

as it were testing Himself, in sympathy with the sufferings and tears of men, and in loving intercourse with them (adv. Marc. 2, 27; adv. Prax. 14, 16). The Son of God, says he, revealed Himself from the beginning. "*Ipse enim et ad humana semper colloquia descendit, ab Adam usque ad Patriarchas et Prophetas—ordinem suum præstruens ab initio semper, quem erat persecuturus in finem. Ita semper ediscebat, et Deus in terris cum hominibus conversari non alius potuit (such seems to be the right reading) quam sermo qui erat caro futurus.*" These His revelations from the beginning stand, therefore, in the closest relation to His incarnation; in the former, the Son of God had already an eye to the latter. He then proceeds to say,—"*Ediscebat (scil. quæ erat persecuturus), ut nobis fidem sterneret ut facilius crederemus, filium Dei descendisse in seculum, si et retro tale quid gestum cognosceremus. Sic etiam adfectus humanos sciebat jam tunc, suscepturus etiam ipsas substantias hominis, carnem et animam; interrogans Adam quasi nesciens: ubi es Adam? pœnitens, quod hominem fecisset, quasi non præsciens, etc., cf. c. 30.*" The heretics who blame such things as unworthy of God, and misuse them for the degradation of the Creator, do not know that they pertained to the Son, who was destined one day to take upon Himself hunger, thirst, tears, birth, yea, even death itself. (Compare the "*de carne Christi*" 6.) But the Son reveals Himself more fully first in the flesh (adv. Prax. 14).

"With wisdom or reason," says he (adv. Prax. 6), "God first impregnated His works, to wit, ideally, in the depths of His Spirit" ("*in sensu,*" equivalent to Augustine's "*memoria*"); "afterwards, however, thou shalt know it, as it stands in its distinctness alongside of Him, for it says, '*When He created the heavens, I was by Him.*' Now, when God willed to bring into visible existence that which He had ordered within Himself, as it were in inward dialogue with reason, with wisdom, according to its various forms and substances, He first put forth the Word itself (*ipsum primum protulit sermonem*), which was the vehicle of reason and wisdom, in order that the universe might be created by the same by which it had been conceived, nay more, by which, regarded ideally in God (*quantum in Dei sensu*), it had already been made. For one thing still failed the universe of things, to wit, an appearance *coram in suis*

speciebus atque substantiis." C. 7: "Tunc igitur etiam ipse Sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit, sonum et vocem, cum dicit Deus; Fiat lux! Hæc est nativitas perfecta Sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit, conditus ab eo primum *ad cogitatum*, in nomine Sophiæ dehinc generatus ad effectum. Ex inde *eum parem sibi* efficiens, de quo procedendo filius factus est primogenitus, ut ante omnia genitus, Unigenitus, ut *solus ex Deo genitus*, proprie de vulva cordis ipsius. Sermo in Sophiæ et in rationis et in omnis divini animi et spiritus nomine filius *factus est* Dei, de quo prodeundo generatus est." We must have the Sermo as substantivum, "in re, per substantiæ proprietatem ut res et persona quædam videro possit, et ita capiat, secundus a Deo constitutus duos efficere, Patrem et Filium, Deum et Sermonem." Now this Word, which was found in the form of God, did not deem it robbery to be equal with God. It appeared at the end of the times, in order to reveal, or to accomplish fully, what was in the Father's mind. The Father works ideally (*sensu agit*); the Son's office was to give external, real existence to all that the Father inwardly thought (*in sensu sentit*, c. 14). In Him is set before us the principle of objectivity (c. 15, fin.).

But of this the Son is *capable*, not merely because in the Word also dwelt reason, wisdom, and power,—"*totus animus Dei*,"—but also, and principally, because He has in Himself the momentum of finitude, is in one aspect connected with the world. For this reason, He was able to work in the world, to constitute it a reality, and finally, to appear as the First-born within its limits. The Father is only the Infinite One: division, limit, finitude, lie outside of Him; His relation thereto is solely that of the thinker. And even when finitude is the object of His thought, as it unquestionably is, in the idea of the world, He thinks it as a finitude united again with Himself (in Christ and the Holy Spirit eternally). For in the entire divine world-idea cogitated by the Father, is contained also the union of the world with, its eternal return into, God. But the Son superintends the course of the world through time; He leads it, hovering over it, as the archetype and principle wherein it subsists, until He enter into it in complete actuality.

From this it naturally follows, that Tertullian must have regarded the Son as eternally destined to become incarnate, and as capable of appearing in the flesh. The Father is not only

not seen, but He cannot make Himself visible; He is "inaccessibilis," He alone has immortality, unchangeableness: no man can see God and live. The nature of the Son was, from the beginning, otherwise constituted; it was capable of appearing. He would not have become visible at the end of the days, had He not been visible from the beginning. To Him we must ascribe "mortalitas," "accessibilitas;" and this is, in Tertullian's view, so important a distinction, that he deduces from it the existence of a duality in God, of a "Deus invisibilis et invisus," and a "Deus visibilis et visus" (adv. Prax. 14, 15). "It is true, the Son also is invisible," says he, linking on again to Irenæus, "so far as He is the Word and Spirit of God; and, prior to the incarnation, He was visible merely in visions, enigmas, and similitudes.¹ As Spirit, the Word cannot be seen, 'nisi imaginaria forma.' All religion, therefore, was symbolical and shadowy prior to the coming of Christ; for in the flesh the Son became for the first time visible, from face to face. His body, it is true, veiled His glory, and it could not be beheld save by those who were exalted above their usual consciousness.² This, however, happened to the three selected Apostles on the mountain; this happened afterwards to Paul; and at His second coming the Lord will be seen by all (adv. Prax. c. 14, 15). Nevertheless, the incarnate Word entered into visible existence through the incarnation; and now we have an actual person, whom we have seen, and heard, and handled."

We see, accordingly, that Tertullian recognises a threefold filiation:—1. The eternal, inward one, which is shut up in God.

¹ Moses alone appears to have been an exception; for to him the promise was given,—With him will I speak face to face, visibly, with others by dreams and in a glass darkly. But even this promise was not fulfilled till a later period, on the mount of transfiguration (Matt. xvii.). During his earthly life, like the prophets and patriarchs, he did not see Him face to face, but merely in a glass and in enigmas, so that he knew that God's face was nigh at hand.

² At this point Tertullian's view shows traces of montanistic influences: in the place of the process through which men are conducted from a mere historical to a saving faith, which knows Christ in truth, he sets ecstasy; he fails to carry out the beautiful beginnings of an objective, historical accomplishment of the work of redemption, which he had made, in his teachings, relative to Christ's connection with our race; and even partially retraced his steps, so far, namely, as he now represented the body merely as a veiling, and not also as a revealing, of the Logos.

This he designates Sonship, not in itself, but solely with reference to the second and third stages : strictly speaking, its name is *Sermo* or *Sophia*. This is the real potency of Sonship, which was eternally in God, though it had not yet assumed an independent form; impersonal, but already a personific principle, and, as it were, eternally on the point of breaking forth from its inner divine root into an existence alongside of God, which, though not yet including the world, included the real potency of the world, as also the potency of God-manhood. 2. This coming forth to the creation of the world: Tertullian designates it, in particular, the "generatio of the Son," of the "*secunda persona*" (*adv. Prax.* c. 6). It would be eternal if he had taught an eternal creation; but as it is, it is to be conceived as occurring in time.¹ 3. Finally, the third stage is that in which the Son became man, and stood over against God in the form of a visible personality.

This doctrine of the distinction between the God who cannot, and the God who can, become visible; the God who is generated, and the God who is ungenerated, he employs in the most various ways against the *Patripassians*. Both cannot be predicated of one and the same being, as though they were but two aspects; consequently, we cannot rest in the abstract unity, the "*singularitas Dei*." In accordance herewith, those passages of the New Testament are explained, which speak of beholding God, and of divine appearances. This he confirms by means of passages from the New Testament, which refer to the distinction between the Father and the Son. He asks,—What meaning can *Monarchians* attach to the prayers of Christ to the Father, to His sending, to His cry, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" All the finitude, all the passibility, which the *Patripassians* attributed to God in general, or to the Father, he transfers to the Son; without, however, entirely denying the passibility of God, as might at first sight have been expected. That same religious interest, which found so inadequate an ex-

¹ *Adv. Hermog.* 3. Here he denies that God had been always *Dominus*, and therefore that the world, or something in it, has existed eternally. "Non ideo pater et iudex semper, quia Deus semper. Nam nec pater potuit esse ante filium, nec iudex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum ei delictum et filius non fuit, quod iudicem et qui patrem dominum (al. Deum) faceret." *Conf. Novatian de Trin.* 31.

pression in Patripassianism, and which led to the work of atonement being regarded as God's sympathy with, and participation in, the sufferings intended for us, moved Tertullian, when he spoke without bias, to make use of such terms as "crucifixus, passus, mortuus est Deus."¹

We find him, however, at the same time giving expression to thoughts apparently of an opposite character, which must have strengthened the opposition raised against Patripassianism. He had, it is true, partially ensured the unchangeableness and impassibility of God by the view he took of the idea of the Father; but to have represented the Son as mere finitude, visibility, and passibility, would have been Ebionitical. Consequently, it was necessary to distinguish two aspects of the Son, —one eternal, invisible; the other visible, and subject to the process of finitude. The former he terms, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the divine aspect, or God in the Son; and, accordingly, he is able to say, towards the end of his work against Praxeas (c. 27 ff.), without inconsistency, though differently from before (see the "de carne Christi" 3),—God is immutable; consequently He undergoes no process, no conversion: and that which he had previously treated as an objection of Marcion's against the orthodox doctrine—"transfiguratio interemptio est pristini"—he now himself adopts in reference to the divine, that is, to the unalterable, in God Himself. This unalterableness was unquestionably endangered by Patripassianism; for, according to it, the Father, to wit, the final ground, Himself comes forth and subjects Himself to change and finitude;—unless it went on to distinguish more plainly between God as He is in Himself, and God as He is turned towards the finite; in other words, unless it accepted the distinction laid down by Tertullian in his doctrine of the Son. In accordance therewith, Tertullian was able to say,—

¹ For example, "de carne Christi" 5. Special prominence is given to that aspect of the Son on which He is turned towards finitude, in the passage above adduced, adv. Prax. 16:—The Son not merely created the world, but is the One who, throughout its entire history, has accomplished the divine work in and for it; He has been the judge, the revealer. The passage concludes with the following words,—Such things "hæretici reprehendunt, quasi Deo indigna, ignorantes, hæc in Filium competisse, qui etiam passiones humanas et sitim et esuriem et lachrymas et ipsam nativitatem ipsamque mortem erat subiturus, propter hoc minoratus a Patre modicum citra angelos."

"The Word of God also abides eternally, *perseverando in sua forma*." But defective is it, that he supposes himself able to bring this immoveable, unalterable One, the Son of God, immediately, and without any connecting link of thought, into union with the human in Christ. And the consequence thereof is, that he converts the incarnation into a being and dwelling in the flesh, or into a being clothed with flesh. (Adv. Prax. 27: Quem (sc. Sermone) si non capit transfigurari, consequens est, ut sic caro factus intelligatur (Joh. i. 14) dum fit (al. sit) in carne et manifestetur.) To this point he allows himself to be driven by his fear of the theory of conversion; as though the incarnation of the Word were not itself a condition of its abiding in its nature, and as though he had not elsewhere usually taught that the Word was eternally destined to become incarnate, and that the full realization of Sonship was only possible through the incarnation.¹ "There would be no longer two substances," he proceeds to say, "but one, a kind of mixture of spirit and flesh, as electrum is a mixture 'ex auro et argento,' if He had been converted into flesh. He would be neither God nor man; for He would have ceased, through the conversion, to be that which He was; and He would not be man, for He who was Sermo could not be truly man. He would, therefore, be neither the one nor the other, but a third something. On the contrary, '*videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum, in una persona Deum et hominem Jesum. Et adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiæ, ut et spiritus res egerit in illo, i.e., virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit.*'" Both substances remain "in statu suo (that is, immoveable) distincte agentes. Neque caro spiritus fit, nec spiritus caro. In uno plane esse possunt: ex his Jesus constitit ex carne homo, ex spiritu Deus." As he refused to allow the Patristians to say, "compassus est Pater Filio," because sympathy is a suffering, whereas the Father is impassible; so also does he affirm the latter of the Son, "ex ea conditione qua Deus est." And yet, precisely at this point, the idea of sympathy, as something ethical, might have led him to the recognition of a suffering and a participation in finitude, which involved no curtailment of God's infinitude; that is, to the idea of a participation, grounded in an act of love, that is, in a "virtus." The finite, it is true,

¹ Compare the passage cited from the "de resurr. carnis," page 60.

could not drag Him into suffering ; nor could His nature, His φύσις, in itself be liable to suffering, as the heathenish and, in part also, the patripassian conception of God represents. At the same time, however, His φύσις could not be a limit to His love and the manifestation thereof, but love, as the inmost essence of God, must have power over His φύσις ; and if the will of the former be seriously to sympathize with, and truly to participate in, finitude, the latter may not throw any hindrance in the way.

To the above declaration, that the "Spiritus" worked in Him the "virtutes" and the "signa," and the flesh suffered (a formula which we often meet with at a later period, and which we find also in Hippolytus, but which, if it be not supplemented, destroys the unity of the person in both aspects), he adds, forgetting the doctrine of the participation of the Son in finitude and suffering, which he had elsewhere laid down,—“If the distinction utriusque substantiæ ceased to exist, in a third being perhaps, then would have done et spiritus carnalia, et caro spiritalia ex translatione ;” as though the work of redemption were anything apart from the participation of the divine in the human, and as though he himself had not also regarded it in all other cases as a work accomplished in common by both “substantiæ.” He had opposed to the Patripassians the capability of the Son to make Himself visible,—that is, surely, to become finite and passible,—with the design of proving it to be necessary that the Father, to whom absolutely no suffering and no process can be attributed, should be another than the Son : now, however, he makes no allusion to this distinction, and retains only the difference, that the Son was born and begotten of the Father, and the Father unbegotten. Without doubt he meant, in any case, to recognise in the Son an aspect turned towards, and accessible to, finitude ; but so far was he from having conciliated this with his conception of the divine nature, that he again denies it entirely to the *divine* nature, even of the Son. In that case, however, the sufferings of Christ were merely finite sufferings, and the incarnation was simply the origin of a man. For the Word either had or bore the man Jesus as His garment ; but the Son of God was not really the Son of man. Still, it would be unfair to judge him solely from this chapter, in which polemical zeal caused him to forget himself, and to strike into a path which his living conception of God would not permit

him further to pursue. At other times (for example, in the chapter immediately following), he shows himself to be penetrated by the conviction, that the entire "*novitas*" of the "*nativitas*" rested upon the circumstance, that the human was taken into the divine, and that the divine transported itself into the human, with its *being* and not merely with its activity, without being swallowed up therein. We shall find that the anxiety to ward off a pagan conception of God drove Hippolytus and others to cling very firmly to the pure eternity and immoveability of the divine essence, after the manner of the later Jews; instead of representing God as standing in that more positive relation to finitude, which was required by the idea of the incarnation. Tertullian saw with particular clearness the importance of insisting on a distinction of the Son from the Father; for, according to Patripassianism, there was either no divine self-consciousness, apart from Christ, but the Father was solely and entirely in Christ, and the rest of the world destitute of a personal God;¹ or else the Father must be held to have been in Christ merely as a power, and not with His entire personality;—in which latter case, Patripassianism would have been already on the point of passing over into Ebionism. The reason why Tertullian was so undecided and vacillating in his teachings regarding that which distinguishes and unites Father and Son, was, probably, apart from the undoubted difficulty of the question, that he had not advanced so far as clearly to deduce from ethical principles (which alone suffice in this connection), how far it was possible, or not, for the Word to participate in finitude and sufferings. At first he attributed finitude to the Word or Son immediately, physically, and not ethically,—that is, not as the result of a loving act of will (see pp. 68 f.); and the deeper ground of this course is to be found in his above noticed supposition, that the Son was directly connected and interwoven with the world, in so far as He became a person for the first time, at, and for the

¹ Adv. Prax. 16:—"How could the almighty God, the invisable, the unapproachable One, who grasps the entire world in His hand like a nest, in quo omnis locus, non ipse in loco, qui universitatis extrema linea est, ille altissimus in paradiso deambulare, quærens Adam, et arcam post introitum Noe claudere, etc.? Scilicet et hæc nec de Filio Dei credenda, fortasse non credenda de patre, licet scripta, quem illi in vulvam Mariæ deducunt, et in Pilati tribunæ imponunt, et in monumentis Joseph recludunt."

sake of, the creation of the world. And if we trace the matter to its final roots, we shall find that the fault lay in his doctrine of the Trinity. He recognised no act of self-objectification, by which God's self-knowledge was mediated prior to any creation; but what He knew, what He thought, though not merely the world, was still only God so far as He passes over into the world.

If, then, we can concede him merely a partial victory over Patripassianism, to the extent, namely, to which he showed that the Son must be distinguished from the Father, in Himself and not merely in Christ,—the latter was allowed even by Patripassians (adv. Prax. 27: *Filius carnem esse, i.e. hominem, i.e. Jesum, patrem autem Spiritum, i.e. Deum, i.e. Christum*),—how do his views stand related to the monarchy of God? How does he reconcile the duality, and subsequently the triplicity, of the persons, to which he is led by the divine revelations, with that unity of God which he maintained inviolate?

He preserves the unity, in the *first* place, by asserting the equality of the nature of the persons, nay, even the identity of their substance. The Son is designated "*Filius Dei*" and "*Deus ex unitate substantiæ. Nam et Deus Spiritus*" (Apol. 21). An Arian Subordinationism was, therefore, foreign to his mind; at that price he did not desire to purchase the unity of God. All, Father, Son, and Spirit, are one, because all are of one through the unity of their substance (adv. Prax. 2, 4). According to Tertullian, all have one essence,—that is, one power, one reason and wisdom. But that which gives rise to a plurality in God is the "*ordo*" (adv. Prax. 19), the "*œconomia*," which has not merely subjective, but also objective significance (c. 11). The words in which Tertullian here gave expression to his meaning are remarkable;—he says, Difference and number are not in God, so far as He is conceived in His eternal, immoveable being (in statu), but merely so far as He is regarded in motion (in gradu; as it were, whilst passing on from one form or stage of revelation to another). "*Œconomix sacramentum unitatem in trinitatem disponit,—tres non statu, sed gradu. Unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formæ et species in nomine Patris, Filii et Spiritus sancti deputantur*" (adv. Prax. 2). That is, we are to understand by the Trinity, not merely a threefold work, a threefold activity, but a movement of God Himself. When a ray proceeds forth from the sun, it

is a part of the whole (*portio ex summa*); but the sun will be in the ray, for the ray is a ray of the sun, and does not break loose from the substance thereof, but merely dilates itself. So is Spirit of Spirit, God of God, like a light kindled at a light. Entire and unaffected remains the ground of a substance (*matrix materiæ*), even though thou shouldst make use of its kind for several branches; so is that which springs from God,—God and God's Son are both one. Thus did Spirit constitute another of Spirit, God another of God, not in point of number, but of form (*modulo alterum, non numero, gradu non statu, et a matrīce non recessit, sed excessit*). That ray of God, having entered into a virgin, and made itself flesh in her womb, was born as a man united with God (Apol. 21). "I do not desire two suns," he goes on to say (adv. Prax. 13), employing the same image, "but Christ I can call God, as does Paul in Rom. ix. 5. Even a ray of the sun, considered by itself, I call Sun: for example, when I say, 'There is sun;' but I do not, therefore, at once designate the sun, from which the ray proceeds, Ray. Two forms of existence, of one and the same substance (*species, formæ, effigies, moduli unius et indivisæ substantiæ*), I acknowledge, as of the sun, so of God, when I view Him in connection with the *œconomia*."

In the *second* place, he retains firm hold of the unity, through the intimate connection which he recognises as existing between the different persons. He does not regard them as three men, merely united by one generic idea, between whom there may otherwise be infinite differences; but they are physically and ethically so one, that they may be constantly termed one God. (Adv. Prax. 4: *Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de substantia Patris, nihil facientem sine Patris voluntate*.) Every originator, says he, is in a sense a father; everything originated is therefore a son. "*Nec frutex tamen a radice, nec fluvius a fonte, nec radius a sole discernitur, sicut nec a Deo Sermo. Radix et frutex duæ res sunt, sed conjunctæ, duæ species indivisæ, duæ formæ cohærentes. Et tertius a radice fructus e frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus ex Flumine, et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens et Monarchiæ nihil obstrepit et Œconomix statum protegit* (adv. Prax. 8). *Alium patrem, alium filium dico, sed non diversum, separatum;*" "*distinctio*," he affirms,

and "distributio," but not "diversitas" and "divisio." "Modulo," that is, through a different mode of existence, each is different from the other two; but they are equal to each other, as in existence, so also in this, that as the Father constitutes the Son a Son, so the Son constitutes the Father a Father:—the Father does not constitute Himself His own Son, as the Patripassians teach. (Adv. Prax. c. 10: *vanissimi isti Monarchiani ipse se, inquit (Pater) Filium sibi fecit. Atquin Pater Filium facit, et Patrem Filius.*) According to Tertullian, God was not Pater, but merely Deus, prior to the existence of the Son. "Et qui ex alterutro fiunt, a semetipsis sibi fieri nullo modo possunt, ut Pater se sibi Filium faciat et Filius se sibi Patrem præstet; quæ instituit Deus, ipse etiam custodit. Habeat necesse est Pater Filium, ut Pater sit, et Filius Patrem, ut Filius sit. Aliud est autem habere, aliud esse.) And, indeed, the true element in the Valentinian Æons (*probolæ*), is that the Word is produced from God and made His Son. "Hæc erit probola veritatis, unitatis custos" (c. 8). Connecting the two together, we arrive at an unity, which is not an abstract "singularitas," but admits of distinctions, an "unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem," which is confirmed instead of being destroyed thereby (c. 3). The "unitas irrationaliter collecta hæresim facit," the "trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituit."

This trinitarian conception of God is opposed, on the one hand, to Heathenism, which clings to a multiplicity, without reducing it to unity (c. 13); and to Judaism, on the other hand (c. 31). The belief of the Jews in one God, is of such a nature as not to admit of the Son, and after Him, of the Spirit, being reckoned to God. For what difference would there be between us and them,—what would become of the work of the Gospel and of the substance of the New Covenant, which does not suffer the law and the prophets to extend farther than John the Baptist,—if from his day onwards the Three in whom we believe, Father, Son, and Spirit, do not constitute one God? The novelty of the Christian religion consists in the fact, that God willed to be believed in as One after a new fashion, to wit, through the Son and the Spirit; so that now He who was formerly merely proclaimed by Son and Spirit, but was not known, is known in mundane actuality, in His persons.

This view undoubtedly includes a speculative element, to

which the later doctrine of the Church was long in attaining, viz., the conception of the Three Persons as inwardly connected (as *consertos*, *cohærentes*). But the type of development to which he subjects the Trinity takes again a turn unfavourable to the doctrine of the Trinity, and thus he reaped the fruit of that immediate interweaving of the Son with the world, to which allusion has been made above. He shows, it is true, that there was a necessity for the objectification of the *reason* in the *Word*, which was its vehicle; but he does not explain why this objectification should be limited to a triplicity;—for, so far as we can see, new branches might be continually produced. Because he did not posit the Trinity as an actuality even of the inner essence of God, but merely as a possibility, he found himself, like the Patripassians, unable to say,—God is a Trinity, and cannot be conceived of otherwise;—all he could say was,—God wills to be a Trinity, really indeed, but still only in the world. Hence also this Trinity is threatened with extinction, so soon as the world is perfected and returns into God, and the Son shall have given up all to the Father. Indeed, he goes so far (*adv. Prax.* 4) as to say,—“The Monarchy continues so truly unshaken, although the Trinity is imported into it, that the kingdom will actually be given up again to the Father by the Son. The Trinity, however, appears thus to be reduced to a mere movement of God in history, unless he meant perhaps to say, that the ever-abiding and essentially existent unity undergoes discription in the world, and in the forms of the divine existence in the world; the sole end thereof, however, being that the divine persons, who are rendered distinct in the course of history, and also continue permanently distinguished, may afterwards be reduced to a more complete unity.” He says further,—The *CEconomia*, or the trinitarian existence of God, is posited “in tot nominibus, in *quot Deus voluit*” (c. 4): a formula which is thoroughly patripassian; but the corrective thereof was concealed, not only in Tertullian’s doctrine of the necessary objectivity of the “*Sermo*,” but also partially in his doctrine, that not merely a single potency of God, of which there might be an infinite number, but “*totus animus Dei*,” was in the “*Sermo*,” that in the revelation of Christ, therefore, the inmost essence of God was declared to the world,—the “*Filius*” having been born, “*de vulva Patris*,” out of the heart of the Father (c. 5). Lastly, owing to the somewhat physical

character of his view of God, he applies inappropriate physical categories to the Son,—such, for example, as that of the part and whole : which, however, should be set rather to the account of his mode of expression, than of his mode of thought. “*Portio totius cessura erat in Filii nomen.*” The Son is “*substantiva res, ut portio aliqua totius* (c. 26). *Pater tota substantia est : Filius vero derivatio totius et portio*” (c. 9) ; from which might logically be deduced a still stronger Subordinationism than that which is involved in the doctrine of the later generation of the Word to personal existence, to wit, an Ebionitical view of Christ. It may undoubtedly be replied,—“*Portio,*” in Tertullian’s usage, is also a designation of equality (cf. *Index Latinit. Tert., ed. Semler, s. h. v.*) ; that he considered the entire sun to be in the rays ; that the Son knows the Father entirely, and also His generation ; and, even more, that Tertullian, describing the relation between the Father and Son in a quantitative manner, gives an opposite view, when he says,—The sun expands itself in the rays ; or the Son is the river, the Father the fountain-head. Too much stress, however, must not be laid on this aspect of the images ; but it must be acknowledged that he leaves the Son in a certain dependence on the Father, although he represented Him as equal in essence, as most intimately conjoined with the Father ; and as, indeed, constituting the Father, Father. Tertullian refers Christ’s words, “The Father is greater than I,” neither to the humanity, nor to the state of self-abasement, but to the Son in Himself. It would be, indeed, totally opposed to Tertullian’s meaning, to regard the Son as a mere partial revelation of God : from Ebionism or Arianism he must be pronounced free ; for his total view of the Son rather implies that he regarded Him and the Spirit as different modes of the existence of the one God, who dwelt in His entirety in each of them. The more evident is it, however, that the term “*portio*” was badly chosen ; and that, by giving occasion to the use of physical categories, it really disguised Tertullian’s proper meaning.

Notwithstanding the important defects of his system, the fulness of Tertullian’s Christian consciousness, and the vigour of his mind, unquestionably lent him a very great influence on the development of doctrine in the Church, and enabled him to give a new turn to the tendency which had prevailed since the time of Justin Martyr.

At that time, it is true, the hypostasis of the Logos was exalted to the rank of pure divinity; but the price paid was an increasing obscurity of the hypostatical distinction. Tertullian, now provoked by Praxeas, struck into the opposite path, and laid again energetic hold on the neglected momentum of the hypostatic pre-existence of the Logos; with the feeling that Patripassianism was threatening to substitute an ethnic for the Christian conception of God. The positive doctrine laid down by him may have its weak points; but it has also, as we have seen, both religiously and speculatively considered, its excellences; and as regards the latter, he pursued a course of his own, independent of Irenæus and others. As the point of most importance, and which gave a direction to the course of the subsequent development, may be mentioned in this connection his doctrine of the "Filiatio." Inasmuch as the Father also is reason, the word Logos no longer satisfied Tertullian as a designation of the hypostasis of the divine in Christ, although it accurately expressed the *nature* thereof, its true divinity (and herein we see the man who clearly discerned the true tendency and work of his age). The other meaning, also, which was attached to the Logos by the Church, to wit, "Word," expressed, not His hypostasis, but at the utmost the objectification of reason; that is, it contained the hint of an hypostasis, but not the hypostasis itself. And Tertullian not merely clearly saw the inadequacy of existing terms, but endeavoured to find better ones. The new point which he brought to light, and which constituted an epoch in the future history of Christology, was *his designation of the personal element in the higher nature of Christ by the name Son*; and his endeavour to lay bare more fully the genesis of the Sonship, and its relation to the divine essence, with which, so long as he was merely termed Logos, He was too completely identified. This was undoubtedly an important stroke; and, as we shall see, it met with the approbation of the Church. The age of Logology was now succeeded, in consequence of his labours, by the age of Sonship. Not that Logology was by any means set aside; but it was reduced to its proper, that is, to a lower rank, because of its inability adequately to convey and to preserve the Christian thought: and, indeed, we find that John, though he began with the Logos, ended with the term *μονογενής*. The New Test-

ment expression, "Son of God," had, it is true, naturally been often enough employed at an earlier period, but without a determinate, dogmatic idea being connected therewith; very frequently it served merely to designate the entire Christ, or even His official dignity. Justin Martyr applied it also to the hypostatic Logos, but not constantly. Henceforth, however, whereas Logos marks in the first instance the impersonal nature, the word "Son" is employed, in a specifically dogmatic sense, to express the personality of the Logos and His possession of an objective existence of His own, distinct from that of the Father. On the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, this new turn had an important influence, although much that was transitory was connected with it. But even on Christology had the development of the idea of Sonship a favourable influence, owing to its suggesting and giving occasion to the attempt to view the revelation in Christ, not as something external and foreign to the divine in Christ, but as the full exhibition of the entire idea of Sonship, which lay originally in the Son.

Closely related to, and dependent on, Tertullian, though giving a superficial version of his master's system, was Novatian. He says ("De Trinitate" 29, 30),—"Because God alone is termed good by Christ, it does not follow that He also was not good. In Christ alone dwelt the Holy Spirit, entirely and perfectly, "*nec in aliqua mensura aut portione mutilatus, sed cum tota sua redundantia cumulate distributus et missus; ut ex illo delibationem quandam gratiarum ceteri consequi possint, totius sancti Spiritus fonte in Christo remanente, ut ex illo donorum atque operum venæ ducerentur, spiritu sancto in Christo affluenter habitante.*" Christ is God and Lord. The unity is not thereby affected. God the Father is the Orderer and Creator of the universe, but unoriginated, invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, the one God, to whose majesty, greatness, and power nothing can be compared, much less preferred. But out of Him has a Son been born, the Word; not like a sound which strikes the air, or a tone of the voice, but in the substance of a power produced by God. As to the time, Novatian employs the words,—The Father brought forth the Son *quando voluit* (c. 31). Nevertheless, he says,—He was always in the Father, and the Father was never without Son; but the "always" he does not use in the absolute sense. Because the procession of the Son took place before

time and the world began, time cannot be applied thereto. And in so far we may, or rather must, speak of an "always." Strictly speaking, however, He who has no origin must, in some way, precede Him of whom He is the source and origin. He had no intention of representing the Son as a creature; but still the Father is really to him the *One God*. The Son, it is true, knows the Father, and the secret of His own birth, which no apostle, nor prophet, nor any creature knows. He is God, but God born. "We will not have two unbegotten ones," says he; "consequently, not two Gods." Clearly, therefore, he regards the Father alone as "*sensu eminenti*" God, and the one God; whereas Tertullian had endeavoured to show that the unity constituted out of triplicity was the more perfect. The Father is alone "*omnium rerum principium et caput*." The Son is the "*Unigenitus et Primogenitus*" of the Father; but, notwithstanding His birth from the Father and not from another,—notwithstanding that He also is God, He showed the unity of God by subjecting Himself to the Father "*in morigera obedientia*," and by being "*minister voluntatis paternæ*." He was born in order to be God and Lord, for the Father has subjected all things to Him. But the time comes when the Son "*auctoritatem divinitatis rursus ad Patrem remittit*." So that it follows from all, that the Father is the one true and eternal God, "*a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa etiam in filium tradita et directa rursum per substantiæ communionem ad Patrem revolvitur. Gradatim, reciproco meatu illa majestas atque divinitas ad Patrem, qui dederat eam, rursus ab ipso illo filio missa revertitur et retorquetur*;" and the Father is the principle of all things, even of the Son; the Son is God of all the rest, and accordingly Mediator between God and man (c. 31). In what has been just adduced we can scarcely fail to discover a Subordinationism even still stronger than that of Tertullian. Both asserted the unity of the substance of the Father and the Son; both viewed Christ during the period of His mediatorship as God; both take up a position of antagonism to the Monarchians; but neither was able to confute them. The Monarchians were unable to establish the existence of distinctions in God; but Tertullian and Novatian, though they acknowledge and start with the distinctions, do not assert the divinity of Christ so clearly as the Monarchians. The reason whereof was, that the

former had not really transcended the point of view of the latter. As the Patripassians rested satisfied with the work of revelation, so their two opponents felt the need of the Trinity solely for the work of redemption. Relatively thereto, they believed it necessary that the Son should have an hypostasis, but not otherwise. And as the revelation was not eternal, there remained a point "a parte ante," in respect of which the antagonists were essentially at one with each other. Prior to His generation for the creation of the world, the Son had not a personal existence in God. In this respect, both parties were agreed; nay, they were even further agreed, with the exception of some opposed elements in Tertullian's system, that the existence of the Son or the time of His origin, depended on the *will* of the Father. And so, as soon as a mediator ceases to be necessary, the personality, or, at all events, the deity (*auctoritas divina*), of the Son will be endangered. The Trinity then threatens to sink down to a mere œconomy, as in the systems of those whom they opposed. Irreconcilable, indeed, therewith was the Christian consciousness, which regarded Christ not as a transient revelation, not as a mere power; from which, however, all that follows is, that from the Christian consciousness must proceed the impulse to ever fresh efforts to secure for the doctrine of the Trinity a more satisfactory form, and to point out eternal and not mere arbitrary, both as to number and existence, distinctions in the nature of God Himself. This would require, it is true, that the two Persons, Father and Son, should renounce that exclusiveness towards each other attributed to them in the systems of these teachers of the Church. If the Son must again give up His deity or power, in order that the Father may possess it entirely; or if Christ be the ruler of the world *in the stead* of the Father, and no way be found of allowing both, together with the Holy Spirit, to participate in the entire work, each in His own way, then must the unity of God be purchased with the subordination or the merely momentary existence of the hypostases. We have already hinted that this relation of exclusiveness arose from the obscurity introduced by the application of physical categories; for in the *φύσεις*, not only qualities, but even individuality of being is characterized by exclusiveness. This physical exclusiveness is only a feeble reflection of the fixed, ineffaceable limits and distinctions which rule in the domain of spirit. But in the domain

of spirit, exclusiveness is not necessary to the maintenance of distinctions, as in the finite, material world. There, on the contrary, as Tertullian already vaguely felt, distinctions confirm unity; for an unity evolved out of distinctions is more compact and self-sufficient. This we may learn even from a comparison of organic with inorganic nature. In the domain of spirit, the unity is not an abstract identity or continuity, but one that posits and confirms distinctions.

As belonging to the same African school, we might further mention Cyprian. His sphere was the practical, and he produced nothing new in the domain of Christology; but as a prince of the Church, whose mind was bent above all things on the attainment of unity, and who left aside everything that was singular or still unfixed, we may fairly regard him as the truest representative of the doctrine regarding the Person of Christ, generally held about the middle of the third century. With his distinct and individual character, he may be taken as the embodiment of the Christological Symbolum of his age. For this reason, however, it will be more fitting first to listen to the voice of a man who took an active part in the dogmatical struggle of the period,—to wit, Hippolytus, of the Oriental Church, who combated Patripassianism in its very home.

As has been already remarked by others, Hippolytus has hitherto been unjustly neglected by writers on the history of dogmas,—a course, in excuse for which may be pleaded the possible doubts as to the genuineness of several of the works attributed to him, but which is not thereby justified. (Note 15.)

What arguments he advanced against the Patripassianism of Noetus, we shall see below. Beron, however, who undoubtedly spoke of the Logos as the manifested aspect of the Father (see page 29), he answered to the following effect:—So far are we from being able to assume a conversion of the Deity into a man, or a *κένωσις*, by which that which was identical (*ταυτόν*) with the Father became identical with humanity, that we cannot even predicate movement, much less change and conversion, of God. The divine will (Fragm. 1), by which God created and moves all things, remains itself unmoved. For the infinite in no way admits of the idea of motion, seeing that there exists neither place to which, nor anything about which, it might move. To that which is infinite and immoveable in its essence

movement would be already conversion. The Son of God, therefore, in becoming incarnate, underwent no conversion of any kind, but merely assumed circumscription by the natural flesh, for our sake; He himself, however, remaining without flesh (*δίχα σαρκός*) and apart from all circumscription. So impossible is it that a conversion of deity into humanity, or of humanity into deity, should take place, that God and man cannot even be compared with each other. They are *ἐτεροφυνεῖς*. Between the Creator of the universe and the creature, between the infinite and the finite (*τῷ ἀπείρῳ, τὸ περατὸν*), between the unlimited and the limited, no sort of comparison can be instituted; for they are not merely relatively but essentially (*φυσικῶς*) different. What the divine was before, that it remained after the incarnation, essentially infinite, unlimited, impassible, incomparable, unchangeable, and immoveable (*ἀναλλοίωτον, ἄτρεπτον*), possessed of all power in itself, and so forth. To the ethnic changeableness of God, which was connected with pantheistic elements, is here therefore opposed His absolute immoveableness. But where God's *ἄπειρον, ἄτρεπτον*, is treated as it is by Hippolytus,—where even permission, in its distinction from act and operation, is excluded from God, on the ground of His unchangeableness, as we shall shortly see,—there the world is kept impersonal, and God alone is, strictly speaking, allowed to have reality. It appears, therefore, that Hippolytus, in the fundamental idea of his theology, is chargeable with approximating in another way to pantheism, through raising a too hasty opposition to Patripassianism. It may be well indeed to say, that God cannot suffer through finitude (*Fragm. 3: οὐ πέφυκε περιγράφεσθαι γενητῇ φύσει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγένητον*), even though it grew into one whole together with Him, by means of the conception which seizes hold on all understanding (*περιγράφουσιν σύλληψιν*).¹ But it is not good to take the love of the Son, its power, and the unity of the Person of Christ so little into account, as to maintain that the divine, in its immoveableness, infinitude, and so forth, and the human, as being of a totally different substance, cannot be at all compared with each other. Not only is there a forgetfulness of the doctrine of the divine image; but with such premises the doctrine of Christ

¹ “. . . wenn sie auch mit ihm zu einem Ganzen zusammenwuchs durch die allen Verstand gefangennehmende Empfängnis.”

can only assume an imperfect form. It will, nevertheless, be instructive to examine the Christological theory of Hippolytus more carefully.

Let us examine, first, what he teaches regarding the *divine aspect* of the Person of Christ; secondly, his view of the incarnation; and, thirdly, his conception of the union of the divine and human in Christ.

I. Patripassians of the school of Noetus, who appealed to the same passages as Praxeas,—to wit, Exod. iii. 6, xx. 3; Baruch iii. 36; Isa. xlv. 5; Rom. ix. 5; John xiv. 9,—arrived at the conclusion that Christ was the Father Himself; that He was the Son, was born, suffered, and raised Himself from the dead. In reply, he urged that, in order to withstand Theodotus, who looked only at the humanity of Christ, we must not look solely at His deity, and attribute to Him the entire deity (c. Noet. 3, 11). Both are equally one-sided (*μονόκωλον*). “Who will deny that God is one? But shall we, therefore, at once set aside the œconomy,” which introduced distinctions into Him? If Christ be God, say they, and God is one, the sufferings which befell Christ must be attributed to the Father also. But the one God, in whom we are compelled to believe, is, on the contrary, unbegotten, *ἀπαθής, ἀθάνατος*, and doeth all things as and when He wills (c. 8). This self-identity of God is held so firmly by Hippolytus, that he is unwilling to admit even of the distinction of willing and not-willing in God (Fabr. ii. 45). The *Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ* also is *ἀπαθής*, and solely through the flesh is He passible. It was not, therefore, as in the case of Tertullian, the desire to constitute God a participator in finitude that led Hippolytus to the distinction of the Son (*υἱός*, frequently *παῖς Θεοῦ*), but partly the passages of Scripture, which distinguish the Son from the Father, and partly the need of retaining firm hold of the personal indwelling of God in Christ as the unity of God. How, then, does he accomplish the task? He says (c. 10),—“Whilst God was still alone, and had nothing with Himself that was contemporary, He willed to create the world. Thinking, willing, and uttering the idea of the world, He created the world; and soon that which was created was with Him, as He had willed it. It is enough for us to know that nothing was contemporary with God; nothing was besides Himself. But He, although existing alone, existed in plurality (*πολὸς ἦν*); for He

was neither without the Logos nor the Sophia (*ἄλογος, ἄσοφος*), without power or counsel: all was in Him, and He was Himself the All (*τὸ πᾶν*). When it was His will, He showed His Logos as He willed, at the times afore appointed by Him, and through Him created all things, creating all things through the Word, through Wisdom ordering all things in beauty. As the Prince of that which then came into existence, as the counsellor and master-workman, He brought forth the Logos. The Logos, whom He bore in Himself, He made visible. This was His own intellect (*νοῦς*), invisible at first to the growing world, and at an earlier period visible only to Himself. In that He uttered the first word, and produced light out of light, He sent forth for creation its Lord (*προῆκε τῇ κτίσει τὸν κύριον*), to the end that the world, seeing Him through His manifestation, might be delivered. And so there stood another alongside of God" (c. 11). "I have no intention of teaching," he goes on to say, "two Gods, but merely two *πρόσωπα*, the preservation of the *οἰκονομία* (c. 11, 14), Light of light, water from the fountain, a ray from the sun. For He is one force out of the whole; but the Father is the whole" (c. 11). Christ in His divine aspect is *παντοκράτωρ* (c. 6); everything is made by Him; He alone is of the Father (c. 11). Paul ventures to say, "He is God over all;" and justly, for He Himself declared that all things were given up to Him (c. 6). As, according to John xvii. 22, we are not to be one with each other and with God in Christ as to our personality (*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν*, *Persönlichkeit*), but as regards *δύναμις* and *διάθεσις τῆς ὁμοφρονίας* (that is, without doubt, so far as there dwells in us the like divine power, and as we are animated by the same disposition); so did He confess that He was in the Father *δυνάμει, διαθέσει*. For the Son (*ὁ Παῖς*) is the one understanding of the Father. Coming forth into the world, God's *νοῦς* is set before men as the Son of God (*παῖς Θεοῦ*; compare also "de Chr. et Antichr." c. 3,—*ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ παῖς, ὁ πάλαι λόγος*). Do we, then, teach a plurality of Gods, which have come into existence in the course of time? By no means. All runs back again into one. The Logos is the Father's *νοῦς, σοφία, λόγος* itself, one and the same *δύναμις* with that of the Father (*μία δύναμις πατρῶα*, c. 8, 6, 11). As regards the *δύναμις*, it is one God. But as regards the *œconomy*, its manifestation is threefold (*ἐπιδειξίς*, c. 8). The

œconomy, because it is an harmonious one (*οἰκονομία συμφωνίας*), leads back to one God, for God is one. He who commands is the Father; He who obeys is the Son; He who enlightens is the Holy Ghost. The Father is over all, the Son is through all, the Holy Ghost is in all (Eph. iv. 6); and it is impossible for us to assume one God, unless we really believe in Father, Son, and Spirit. The Jews boasted of the Father; but they never got as far as thankfulness (that is, they never had a childlike spirit, a real Father), for they did not recognise the Son. The disciples knew the Son; but not in the Holy Ghost, and therefore they denied Him (c. 14).

Consequently, besides the equality of substance and the sameness of will and thought, it is their common origin from the Father, and the identity of the work with which the three *πρόσωπα* are occupied, each in its own way, that is to preserve the unity of the deity, notwithstanding the plurality of the *πρόσωπα*. The Father wills or speaks; the Son accomplishes; the Holy Spirit enables the mind to apprehend Christ's work, and gives the necessary enlightenment (*συνερίζει, φανεροῦν*, c. 14). Two different things are therefore connected, but not united. The greater the stress laid on the latter point, that is, on the identity of their work, the more is the basis withdrawn on which the three hypostases rest: the triplicity then relates, not to God's inmost essence, but merely to His manifestations, to His work. Hippolytus has, on this ground, been charged with Sabellianism, but unjustly.¹ For he claims divine worship for each of the three, and must therefore have conceived them to be hypostatical (c. 13; compare Theoph. 10). On the other hand, the more he insists on the triplicity of the *πρόσωπα*, and, in particular, as regards the second *πρόσωπον*, assigns the precise moment, when the Understanding or Word of God was begotten as His Son, and was set into the world as an *ἕτερος* over against God, the more distinctly do we perceive that he has but one means of guarding the unity of God, to wit, Subordinationism. The power of unity is in the Father, from whom everything, even the *οἰκονομία*, proceeds, and to whom, as the *πᾶν*, the Son is related as a mere ray to the sun, or as a part of the whole. He has, it is true, subjected all things to the Son, but not Himself; on the contrary, He commands, whereas the

¹ For example, by Hänel.

Son obeys; nay more, He called the Son, His own *voûs*, to an hypostatical existence alongside of Himself, *because He willed*, and just *when He willed*. A clear line of demarcation separates this doctrine of the Son from Arianism; for, according to it, the Son is equal in substance to the Father, and is not a creature, but begotten by God prior to all creation. But though eternal as to His essence, He was not eternal as to His personality. His essence was the divine understanding, the divine wisdom, the divine power itself; the theologumena of the divine Word and the divine Wisdom were united in Him; but because the Father Himself cannot be without power and wisdom (*ἄλογος, ἄσοφος*), Hippolytus, like Tertullian, ends with identifying, at all events, the eternal aspect, or the essence, of the Son with the Father; although, on the other hand, he broke the first ground for an eternal distinction of the Father from the Son, by teaching that the Father carried Him in Himself prior to His generation. This thought, however, if the potency of the Son in God was the *voûs*, the *σοφία*, of which, be it remembered, the Father could not be conceived destitute, could not be further followed out, without encroachment on the Father; unless the divine *voûs* were represented as in some way doubling itself, and, whilst abiding in the Father, to use Tertullian's expression, as objectifying itself in the Word. Wisdom and power, however, are not, in his view, hypostatical, but predicates of the Father Himself: they become hypostases outside of God, in the world. We may therefore briefly say,—With one foot, Hippolytus, like all the Church teachers of his time, still stood on the ground of his patripassian opponents; and yet built up a subordinationian system, as it were, on Sabellian foundations.

Not distinctions which exist merely for the mind of the beholder, but real and objective ones, were sought. Eternal distinctions of essence, however, were not arrived at. The wisdom and word of Omnipotence, considered as an activity or as an attribute, must appertain also to the Father: hence the Son, who is the Wisdom of the Father, is constantly on the point of going back out of His hypostasis, which He owes solely to the will, not to the essence, of the Father, into His essence, which is undistinguishably one with the essence of the Father, whose hypostasis alone is fixed and established.

Hippolytus gave more definite expression to this temporality

of the Sonship than even Tertullian. The Only-begotten One, says he, was indeed perfect Logos prior to the incarnation, but not yet perfect Son.¹ Who was in heaven, save the Logos without humanity, who was sent in order to show that He who was on earth is also in heaven? The Logos took the name which was customary amongst the children of men, the expression of tender love (c. 15); and from the very beginning (for example, by Daniel), although He was not yet man, allowed Himself to be called Son of man, because He was destined to become man, and to be set forth as a perfect Son (c. 4). (Note 16.) His Sonship, therefore, was a growing one, and first attained completion at the incarnation. With the Sonship, however, was connected His personality, which, out of consideration for the redemption in Christ (c. 10) indeed, he represented the Logos as attaining, even prior to the incarnation; but which he must have been inclined to derive from finitude, if the only place he had for it was one outside of the divine sphere. If God is absolutely *ἀρρεπτος* (2, 45), immoveable (c. Ber. Fragm. 1), and if the divine Logos, notwithstanding, first became an hypostasis or Son in time, the hypostatical in Him cannot have pertained to God. The essence of the Logos, indeed, cannot by any means be described as a creature and finite; but His personality certainly:—the *latter*, so far as it began in time, and gradually advanced from imperfection to perfection; the *former*, in so far as not the essence of God is conceived to be trinitarian, but His understanding is held to have been constituted by Him into an independent hypostasis, as and when He willed (see above, and c. Noet. c. 16). This birth of the Son, who *out of the Logos of the Father*, and in the Father, was constituted Son, is, like His birth in the flesh, a mystery; the result and product of which is before our eyes in Christ, without our being able to understand the process. The understanding thereof is reserved for the saints, who shall behold the face of God. And a still greater mystery than the incarnation is the birth of the Son out of God, which took place (Ps. cx. 3) before the morning star (c. 16). So much only he held to be certain, that the Logos continued one with the Father even after He had become a *Person* or a *Son* (*ἀχώριστος τοῦ Πατρὸς*; c. Noet. c.

¹ C. 15:—Οὗτος γὰρ ἄσαρκος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὁ Λόγος τέλειος ἦν υἱός, καίτοι τέλειος ὢν Λόγος μονογενής, etc., c. 4.

18; Theophan. c. 7), and fulfilled all things notwithstanding His hypostasis (Fabr. 2, 45). He is ἀπερίγραπτος, ἀκατάληπτος (Theophan. 2). He terms Him μονογενὴς Θεοῦ λόγος (2, 29), λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸ πάντων γεγεννημένος (de Christo et Antichr. c. 11), or πρὸ αἰώνων μονογενὴς (de Charism. T. 1, 246). In his commentary on Genesis (Fabr. 2, 29), he appears to go even still further. The words of Christ,—namely, John xvii. 5, “Father, glorify Me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was,”—he explains in the following manner,—αἰεὶ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ θεοπροπέει, τῷ ἰδίῳ συνυπάρχων γεννήτορι πρὸ παντὸς αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς; which reminds us of Irenæus. This passage cannot indeed prove that Hippolytus recognised the existence of the distinction of Father and Son in the eternal divine essence; for it would clash with all that we have hitherto advanced: but it does show that the apparently Arian elements in his system were there, so to speak, against his will. That there ever was a time when the Son as yet existed not, it would have been impossible for him to affirm, if for no other reason, because he believed that time began with the world, and that the world was created by the Son, who was not a creature, but a Son. At the very same time, however, he unsuspectingly lays down the proposition, that the Logos was not eternally a person (that is, Son), and represents His actual Sonship, His hypostatical existence, as following upon His substantial existence in the Father, as the Father’s power and wisdom; or, what is to the same purpose in his eyes, he taught that the Father was at first alone, in company solely with a plurality of attributes, and that when He willed He set the Son over against Himself (c. Noet. 10). The *bringing forth* of the Logos to light (δεικνύναι, ib.), who was eternally present in the divine essence, but visible only to the Father, was, in the view of Hippolytus, *His bringing forth*, or generation¹ (γεννᾶν), as the hypostasis of the Son, so that He henceforth stood over against the Father as an ἕτερος (c. 10, 11).

This hypostasis of the Son is not merely the Creator of the

¹ I have tried here to render into English the play between the German words *zeigen* and *zeugen*; to show, and to beget. They might be otherwise translated—“the *producing*” (i.e., to view) of the Logos, was His “*production*” (i.e., generation).—TR.

world (πάντων δημιουργός, Theoph. 2; c. Noet. 10), but also the Lord, King, and Judge of all heavenly and earthly things, and things under the earth (de Chr. et Antichr. 26). He keeps visible and invisible things together, and in a good condition (2, 29). The Logos or Son is the principle of all revelation; the Word spake (l. c. 31) and dwelt in the prophets; in that He became His own messenger in them, He spake concerning Himself (ἐν τούτοις πολιτευόμενος), showing the Word which was destined to appear among men (c. Noet. 11). As Hippolytus did not deem the prophets in particular, to whom Moses belonged (1, 246), to have been themselves active at the moment of revelation (compare "de Chr. et Antichr." 2,—ὀργάνων δίκην ἠνωμένον ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς αἰεὶ τὸν λόγον, ὡς πλήκτρον, δι' οὗ κινούμενοι ἀπὸ γράμματος ταῦτα ἄπερ ἤθελεν ὁ Θεός; c. 12, where he terms the prophets "Christ's eyes;" and c. 2, where he terms them "our eyes"), he was able to say that Christ sojourned already in them; and, as he appears to have done after the example of Theodoret (Fabr. 1, 267), to distinguish three forms of the παρουσία of Christ, of which the *first* was undoubtedly His walking *with* the prophets, or His appearance to them (compare on Gen. iii. 8, Fabr. 2, 22); the *second*, His walking *in* the prophets, when they became, as it were, forms under which He, for a time, manifested Himself; the *third*, the incarnation, when He perfectly and permanently assumed humanity, and lived a thoroughly human life. This third he again distinguishes, in the usual manner, into the advent of the Redeemer in humiliation, and His advent in glory (de Chr. et Antichr. 44).

II. We confine our attention, in the first instance, to the incarnation. The Father sent the immortal Son and Logos into the world; and He, entering into man and begetting us anew to immortality of the soul and of the body, breathed into us the breath of true life, and clothed us with an imperishable panoply (Theoph. 8). What the holy Virgin conceived was the Logos, the First-born of God, who descended upon her from heaven; and a man, who was formed in her womb as her first-born, in order that the first-born Logos of God might exhibit Himself in union with a first-born man (1, 267). Both substances, the divine and human, must He receive, as it were, as a pledge of His ability to appear in the character of Mediator, both of the two natures and of God and man (1, 266). The protoplast Adam, the

Logos sought out in the Virgin ; the spiritual Adam sought out the earthly in the mother. He became a helper of vanquished man, by becoming like him (1, 269). The act of incarnation itself Hippolytus describes as follows :—The only-begotten Logos of God, God of God, humbled Himself, voluntarily abasing Himself to that which He was not, and invested Himself with this dishonourable flesh of ours (2, 29, *κεκένωκεν ἑαυτὸν καθελὼν ἐξελοντῆς ἑαυτὸν εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν, καὶ τὴν ἄδοξον ταύτην σάρκα ἡμπέσχετο*). At the same time, as the Logos of God, the glory of God belonged essentially and inalienably to Him, even after the act of incarnation. But His humanity participated also, to a certain extent, in this glory. He gives the following explanation of the passage Isa. xix. 1, “Behold, the Lord cometh on a light cloud :”—The Lord is the Logos ; the light cloud is the purest of all tents, enthroned in which our Lord Jesus Christ entered into life (1, 271). And on Ps. xxviii. 1, he remarks,—“The ark of imperishable wood was the Redeemer. For His incorruptible tabernacle, which was unaffected by the rottenness of sin, was thus signified. The Lord was sinless, was of the wood which knows no corruption, as to His humanity ; that is, He was inwardly out of the Virgin and the Holy Spirit, and outwardly out of the Logos of God, covered as with the purest gold” (1, 268). We find in other writers also a reference of the ark of the covenant to the humanity of Christ (for example, Iren. Fragm. p. 342, Ed. Mass.). But whereas Irenæus gives the image the application,—the ark was inwardly gilt, and outwardly covered with gold ; and in like manner the body of Christ was inwardly adorned with the Logos, and outwardly guarded by the Holy Ghost,—Hippolytus here takes Christ’s humanity as corresponding to the wood of the ark, that is, as the inner portion, surrounded by the uncircumscribed Logos, and as having been, as it were, fitted for union with the Logos, by the purifying and glorifying power of the Holy Ghost. On Gen. xlix. 11 (Fabr. 2, 24), “In wine washeth he his garments,”—he remarks, “Through the Holy Ghost and the word of truth, He will purify His flesh.” Akin to this is another passage, which sets the incarnation in a still more determinate relation to the Logos. Prov. ix. 1 ff. he explains (1, 282) as follows :—“Christ, the wisdom and power of God the Father, built for Himself a house, to wit, He took the *σάρκα* from

the Virgin for a temple. 'She set up seven pillars;'—these, according to Isaiah, are the seven powers of the Holy Ghost, which descended on Christ. 'She mixed wine in her cup;' that is, the Redeemer united His deity, the pure wine, with the flesh, in the Virgin, and was born of her as God and man, without commixture. 'She spread her table;' that is, she communicated the knowledge of the Holy Trias." Doubts may be entertained as to the genuineness of the next sentence, which explains the table to signify the Holy Eucharist, in which the precious, sacred body of Christ is daily sacrificed on the mystical divine table, in commemoration. In another simile, borrowed from weaving, he depicts the various factors which worked together in the Person of Christ as follows:—When as yet the Logos of God in Himself was destitute of flesh, He took upon Himself holy flesh out of the holy Virgin, and wove for Himself, as it were, a bridal garment in His sufferings on the cross (through His death of love, the glory which encompasses Him and His redeemed ones). The sufferings which He endured on the cross were the loom; the warp was the power of the Holy Ghost; the woof was His holy flesh which was woven in with the Spirit; the weaving thread is the loving grace of Christ, which binds in one that which was dissevered; the Logos was the shuttle; the master weavers were the patriarchs and prophets, who wove for Christ His precious robe, His coat without seam; through them the Logos passed like a shuttle, weaving by them what the Father willed. These artificial allegories, which are very much to the taste of Hippolytus, show that he conceived the Logos to be the properly moving principle, as of all revelations, so also of the incarnation; and although he assigns to the Holy Spirit His work in connection therewith, he really represents the Logos as building for Himself His own tabernacle. Indeed, he says,—"He raised His own body from the dead by the power of the Father" (*ἐξωργώνει τὸν ναὸν αὐτοῦ*, 2, 27). Nevertheless, he insists, and repeatedly asserts, that the material, consecrated by the Holy Ghost, for the temple in which Christ was to be enthroned, was taken from the Virgin. He would not have been a Mediator had He not, in the man Jesus, assumed a man of our race. He lived through human conditions (c. Noet. 18; de Chr. et Antichr. 26, 46), the entire human stadium, and for this reason He is the arbitrator: He descended also into Hades, be-

cause it was His will to be counted among the dead (de Chr. et Antichr. 26 and 1, 269). "Let us believe, dear brothers," says he (c. Noet. 17), "that God the Word descended from heaven into the holy Virgin Mary; that He became flesh, assuming from her also a human, that is, a rational, soul (compare also the Fragment in Ang. Mai's Coll. Nov. 7, 12; c. Beron. Fragm. 8, in Fabr. 1, 229 f.); that, in short, having become all that man is, with the exception of sin, He saves the fallen, and is able to confer immortality on those who believe in His name. Born of the Virgin and the Holy Ghost, He exhibited a new man, in that His heavenly nature was constituted of that which was of the Father as Logos; and, as far as concerns the earthly, He took a body from the old Adam, through the medium of the Virgin. He now, coming forth into the world, revealed Himself as God in a body; came forth as a perfect man."

III. But since Hippolytus, as we know, laid great stress on the unalterableness of God, and also represents the Son, who remains inseparable from the Father (the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father), as participating therein, even whilst He sojourned among men (c. Noet. 4), the question arises,—*How did He reconcile the incarnation therewith?* The idea of a humanity, possessed by the Logos already in heaven, must be rejected; there was a time when the Logos was not man (c. Noet. 4). Humanity exists in heaven, only since the paternal Logos presented a perfect man as a gift to God. Accordingly, He became what He was not before, without losing the divine essence and glory, which He had from the beginning (2, 29), consequently without conversion (c. Beron. Fragm. 1, in Fabr. 1, 225 f.; c. Noet. 17). But from this he deduces, further, that the incarnation did not affect His being, but solely His Having or Dwelling. It is frequently supposed that Hippolytus conceived the divine and the human to have stood in a very intimate relation to each other: as, for example, when he says (c. Beron. 1, 230),—*μηδὲν θεῖον γυμνὸν σώματος ἐνεργήσας, μηδὲ ἀνθρώπινον ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμοιβὸν θεότητος*; or when he reckons the incarnation necessary to the perfection of the divine Sonship. But he does not carry these ideas out. Consistently with the mode of thought to which he mainly adhered, Hippolytus cannot properly say,—The Logos *became* or *was* man; but merely that He wore a man

as a garment, or dwelt in him as in a temple. *Στολή, ἔνδυμα, νὰς* (de Chr. et Antichr. 11, 4; Theophan. 4, in Genes. xlix. 11; Fabr. 2, 24), are also standing expressions of his; and when he lays stress on Christ's having a human soul, it is merely for the sake of the completeness of the human nature, and has not at all the effect of freeing the humanity of Christ from its total dependence on the Logos. As we have seen, Hippolytus did not conceive the freedom of man to involve his being an independent agent; for that would have led to the recognition of the distinction between divine volition and divine permission, of the possibility of change in God. He was far, therefore, from supposing himself to be curtailing the human aspect of the Person of Christ, when he denied it a free human Ego and treated it as a selfless organ.¹ He gave the following account of the relation between the two natures during their conjunction:—The *δύναμις πατρῶα*² which dwelt in Him worked all that was an expression of power, the miracles, the resurrection, and the like; whereas to His humanity appertained weakness and suffering. By His weakness He was to prove Himself man (2, 45; c. Noet. 15); by His glory He exhibited Himself as God (c. Noet. 18; compare Fabr. 2, 28; 1, 218; and Theoph. 7).

The work against Beron is simply a fuller development of these ideas. Through His health-bringing incarnation (*σάρκωσις*), the Logos introduced into the flesh the activity of His own deity;—not that His deity was bounded by the flesh; and

¹ To this connection belongs the well-known passage, c. Noet. 15. After the words adduced above (*οὔτε γὰρ ἄσαρκος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὁ λόγος*, etc.), he proceeds to say:—*So οὐθ' ἡ σὰρξ καθ' ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάναι ἠδύνατο διὰ τὸ ἐν Λόγῳ τὴν αὐτάσιν ἔχειν*.—*Σύστασις*, be it observed, is not yet equivalent to personality. The sense is,—it had its subsistence in the Logos; He was the connective and vehicular force. This is thoroughly unobjectionable: he does not thus necessarily pronounce the humanity of Christ impersonal; although, in view of what has preceded and what remains to be adduced, there can be no doubt that Hippolytus would have defended the impersonality, had the question been agitated at the period at which he lived.

² C. Noet. 6. 8. 10. 16. Beryll says, *δύναμις πατρική*. The above phrase employed by his contemporary, Hippolytus, shows how little right Baur has to bring it forward in proof of Beryll's Ebionism. To Beryll's other expression also, *δύναμις πατρική ἱεραπολιτευομένη*, κ.τ.λ., parallels may be found in the writings of Hippolytus (see c. Noet. 4; de charism. 1, 246). For the incarnation, he employs also the term *ἐπιδημία*. Fabr. 2, 29.

still less that it grew out of the essence of the humanity (Fragm. 1, 226). That which is revealed *through* the flesh, can by no means be described as belonging to the flesh. In proof of which, he brings forward the illustration above mentioned, of the thought which is expressed by the tongue, but which neither springs from nor belongs to it, nor to the hand that records it (Fragm. 8; Fabr. 1, 229 f.; compare Fabr. 2, 29). For our salvation, and in order to give the universe a share in unchangeableness, the Creator of the universe incorporated with Himself a rational soul and a sensitive body (compare c. Noet. 17), drawn from the holy Mary, who was ever a virgin,¹ by an immaculate conception, without conversion. He thus became a man, who, being as to nature foreign to sin, was at once God and Word. For, as to His deity, He worked what was divine through His holy flesh, that is, such things as did not appertain to the nature of the flesh. As to His humanity, He suffered what was human, that is, such things as did not appertain to the nature of the deity, borne up by the deity (*ἀνοχῇ τῆς θεότητος*; compare c. Noet. 15, in note 1, page 95); working nothing divine, without the body (*γυμνὸν σώματος*), and doing nothing human, without participation in deity (*ἄμοιρον θεότητος*, Frasm. 8; Fabr. 1, 229 f.).

But if that which the divine nature worked pertained in no sense to the human, as its property; and if the latter was the mere passive organ of the former, wherein did the appearance of the Logos in Christ differ from His walking in the prophets? The distinction has already been mentioned: in Christ the union between the Logos and a man was not merely momentary, but permanent. By itself, the circumstance, that in the case of Christ the Logos first prepared for Himself a man, whereas, in the case of the prophets, the man was begotten by men, cannot constitute a difference; for Adam also was prepared by the hands of the Logos, and Hippolytus must consequently have put him on a level with Christ, had he regarded him as a prophet. If, then, the only difference were that between a momentary and a permanent indwelling of the Logos, the distinction

¹ This predicate probably signifies merely, that Mary remained, even after the birth of Jesus, *δίχα ὁμιλίας ἀνδρός*. With this supposition accord well the words of Theoph. (c. 3),—"The Baptist made the unfruitful fruitful; Jesus made the Virgin unfruitful."

between Christ and the prophets would manifestly be merely quantitative. Christ would in reality have been nothing more than a longer continuing theophany. We might thus account for the title of his discourse, *εἰς τὰ ἅγια θεοφάνεια* = *ἐπιφάνεια*; as also for his saying therein (c. 7),—He appeared, He did not become manifest (*ἐπεφάνη, οὐκ ἐφάνη*). The last-mentioned words, however, refer to His self-abasement, in that at His baptism He took the appearance of subordination, He who had been always in the bosom of the Father; and assumed a human body for a garment, and therewith concealed His deity, in order to elude the snares of Satan. And the word *θεοφάνεια* had also, in the following century (see, for example, the "Theophania" of Eusebius, recently edited by Cramer), a wider signification, which included the incarnation of Christ. In the third century, too, the Feast of Epiphany bore also the name of Theophany. But as to the question, whether Hippolytus teaches a merely quantitative distinction between Christ's working and appearance in Jesus and in the prophets,—it cannot be denied, that so long as the humanity of Christ is merely regarded as a garment or a temple, so long as the Logos merely has, or is the vehicle of humanity, without *being* man; and, *vice versâ*, so long as the humanity of Christ cannot be termed divine,—so long is there no incarnation, but merely theophanies; so long is that immanent union of the divine and human not logically demonstrated, which faith feels to be the essentially new element in Christianity. (Note 17.)

In reality, however, the very permanency of the indwelling of the Logos in this man, shows that we have to do with something more than a theophany. If it be certain that the Logos remains eternally clothed with humanity (c. Noet. 4), that He no longer works apart from it, its relation cannot be merely the accidental one of a garment or of a covering, but it must be intimately and essentially united with the Logos Himself. Hippolytus also felt this (see, for example, c. Noet. 15, compare note p. 89, and note 1, p. 95); and when he gives free and unbiassed expression to his Christian intuitions, he goes far beyond the meagre category of a garment;¹ nay, even

¹ Contra Beron, he says,—The union of the two natures is an *ἀβήκτος* and *ἀβήκτος*; the Logos had reserved for Himself a new and fitting method of so working what was divine and what was human, without that confu-

beyond the merely organic comparison, according to which the humanity was related to the deity, as the tongue or the hand is to thought. For he aimed at showing that in Christ humanity had been renovated, and the first perfect man presented to God. *"Ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐγγενήθη ἀναπλάσσων δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀδάμ.* Man, formed of the earth, and bound with the bonds of death, He drew forth out of the lowest Hades—He who descended from above and bore aloft into higher regions that which was below: the herald, who brought the joyous message to the dead, became the Saviour of souls, the resurrection of the buried. The Logos became a helper to vanquished humanity; in the Virgin He sought out the Adam of the first creation, who was formed of the dust of the ground; He, the eternally living One, sought out him who, through disobedience, had fallen a prey to death. He who was nobly born desired, by His own obedience, to put the bondsman on the footing of a free man; He transformed him who was dissolved into dust, and had become the food of the serpent, into a diamond; He set forth Him who hung on the cross as the Lord of the conqueror, and was found as a conqueror through the wood of the cross (1, 269). Through death He vanquished death. In Adv. Jud. 3, Fabr. 2, 2, we read,—“For that which I have not robbed, says the Logos in Ps. lxxviii. (Hebr. lxxix.), that is, for the sin of Adam, which I did not commit, I suffered death.” In i. 266, again,—“On His arms, stretched out on the cross, He bore the sins of Gentiles and Jews, and nailed them, along with Himself, to the cross.” In the de Antichr. 61,—“His holy hands, which were extended on the cross, are the wings of the eagle in the Apocalypse of John, which delivered the woman in the desert. He spreads out the right and the left, inviting all who will believe in Him, and He covers them as a hen covereth her chickens.” Again, in de Antichr. 11,—“Out of His side spring two fountains, one of water, the other

sion of the natures which he condemns in his opponent, that nothing divine took place without the body, and that the humanity in its activity participated in the divine (Fragm. 1, 8). This connects itself with the principle laid down above, that not even divine activity ever became the property of the humanity, by the following link:—It participated in the divine at every moment solely in consequence of communication of fellowship with the Logos.

of blood, wherein the nations are washed and purified; and humanity forms, as it were, the bridal garment with which He is clothed." The humanity which belongs to Him is the Church (c. 59), the parturient woman (c. 61). *Out of her heart she will not cease to bring forth the Logos*, who is persecuted in the world by unbelievers." "She bears a Son," we read further, "who will feed all nations; to wit, ever bringing forth the man-child, the perfect Christ, the child of God (who is preached as God and man), the Church instructs all nations." In this passage, Christ is described as the inmost essence, as it were, the heart of the humanity renewed by God, and the incarnation as a continuous thing: and so we find him elsewhere not shrinking from the other view of Christ, as the sun with which the woman, the Church, is clothed, as with a garment. If the latter signifies that Christ, through his own person, wedded humanity with immortality, and that the Logos, descending into it from above, and encompassing it from without, transformed it, and set a perfect humanity before the Father in Himself (Theoph. 6, Fragm. on Ps. xxiv. 7, Fabr. 1, 268; c. Beron 2, 226 f.), the former, essentially connected as it is therewith, describes Him as the inmost vital principle and true substance of the humanity, as the principle of the birth of the divine-human life, which is ever continuing, and which diffuses itself through all nations. Theoph. c. 6,—*"Christ caused Himself to be baptized; and He renewed the old man, and entrusted to him again the sceptre of sonship. Immediately were the heavens opened above Him, for the visible and the invisible were reconciled; the heavenly hosts were filled with joy; on earth all sicknesses were healed; the mystery was revealed; and enmity was turned to friendship."*¹ Before His baptism, He stood like a bridegroom about to enter the heavenly bridal chamber, and the gates opened themselves to Him and to the Holy Ghost, which hovered down-

¹ Similarly c. Beron, Fragm. 2: The God of the universe became man, in order that, by suffering through suffering flesh, He might deliver our entire race from the death to which it was sold; that, doing wonders by His impassible deity, He might lead men through the flesh to His immortal and blessed life, and might establish in immoveableness the holy ordinances of heavenly rational beings. The work of His *συνάγωγαις* was *ἡ τῶν ὅλων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*. (Similarly in de Chr. et. Antichr. 26.) The latter passage is like Origen:—The God of the universe became man *ἵνα τὰ κατ' οὐρανοῦς ἁγία τάγματα τῶν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν στομίῃσιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπου*.

wards, and to the Father's voice, 'Thou art My beloved Son,' which rang through the universe." C. 2,—“The Creator of the universe (the Son) descended like rain, and divided Himself like a stream, which is without limits, and rejoiced the city of God.” C. 7,—“He who was called the Son of Joseph, was the Only-begotten One as to His divine essence, He hungered, who fed thousands; He was weary, who by His labours relieved the weary; He had not where to lay His head, and yet all things were in His hand; He suffered, and healed all by His sufferings; He suffered Himself to be beaten, and made the world free.” C. 8,—“The immortal Logos came into the world in order to beget mortals again to immortality. When man becomes immortal, he becomes also God. But if he becomes God by being born again of water and the Spirit, he will be also a fellow-heir with Christ after the resurrection.” These passages should suffice to show, that when he had to do with the practical, and wished to set forth the glory of Christianity, Hippolytus was by no means chary in the use of terms which declare the existence of the most intimate vital union between the divine and the human in the Person of Christ, and through Him between God and humanity in general,—expressions which stretch far beyond the strictly scientific results at which he arrived. The two are combined, in that he not seldom refers to the mystery which, after all inquiry, still encompasses the union of the divine essence with human nature.

In his first two books against the Jews, Cyprian lays down the principal momenta of the idea of the Person of Christ, as far as they had become clear down to his day, with scriptural proofs, as follows:—The entire Scriptures refer to Christ, and He is the key to their understanding; not till we believe in Christ can we understand them. Then we see that the old covenant was destined to give place to a new one, circumcision to baptism, the old temple to Christ, who is to be the house and temple of God, the old priesthood to the new eternal Priest (B. 1). This Christ is the First-born and the Wisdom of God, through which all things were made (Prov. viii. ix.; Col. i.; John xvii.); the Word of God (*Sermo Dei*, John i.); the arm and hand of God (Isa. l. lix.; Ps. xcvi.). He is the *Mal'ach Jehovah*, the messenger of God, and God Himself (Rom. ix. 5, where *Θεός*, which Tertullian read, is not adduced).

But, besides being Son of God from the beginning, He must needs be born the second time in the flesh (*cum a principio filius dei fuisset, generari denuo habebat secundum carnem*); and the distinguishing feature of His birth (*das Ausgezeichnete, signum*) was to be His being born of a virgin, God and man, the Son of God and the Son of man at the same time (*Num. xxiv.; Jer. xvii.; Isa. lxi.; Luke i. 35; 1 Cor. xv.*), *ex utroque genere concretus, ut mediator esse posset* (2, 10). At His first advent, the Scriptures declared that He would be humbled and slain; He is termed the Lamb of God, and was presignified in the paschal festival; Isaiah (liii.) and Jeremiah foretold His sufferings. But He became the precious stone laid in the foundations of Zion (*Isa. lviii.*), which shall grow to a mountain, to which all the heathen and the righteous shall come. He is the Bridegroom of the Church, which spiritually bears Him sons without number. For all power and might rest in His sufferings on the cross, and in the sign of the cross. This sign is redemption to all. After His death He was not to remain in the nether world, but to rise again on the third day (*ab inferis*). And then He received all power from the Father, and His might is everlasting (*Dan. vii.; Apoc. i.; Matt. xxviii.*). No one can come to the Father but by Him. He will come again as Judge, and be King eternally in His kingdom. All these titles, given to Christ, remind us of the ancient hymns, a specimen of which, from Clemens Alexandrinus, was given in the first volume (see page 182). At the same time, this collocation of Cyprian's sets clearly before us the essential features of the Christological portion of the Apostles' Creed.

We will now subjoin a few passages, in which he not merely repeats passages of Scripture, but develops more carefully his own idea of Christ. We find, indeed, no precise scientific definitions; but still we gain a picture of that which Christ was to him. Special attention must be paid hereby to Cyprian's doctrine of the death of Christ and of the Eucharist. In his fifty-sixth letter (ed. Basil. 1558, Epp. L. 4, 6), he says,—“How can the servant be unwilling to suffer, when his Lord suffered before him? how can he refuse to suffer for his sins, when He suffered for us, who knew no sin? The Son of God suffered in order to make us sons of God; and yet the children of men will not suffer in order to continue children of God.” In the

“De Idol. vanit.,” ed. c. Sep. 122 f., he says,—“The Word and the Son of God, whom all the prophets proclaimed as the enlightener and teacher of the human race, was sent as the steward of grace. He was the power of God—His reason, wisdom, glory; He entered into the Virgin,—He, a holy spiritual being, clothed Himself in flesh.¹ God constantly unites Himself with man (*semper Deus cum homine miscetur*). This our God, this Christ it was, who, as mediator between two, put on man, in order to lead him to the Father. What man is, Christ was resolved to be, in order that man might be what Christ is. The Jews also know of His advent:—but, it is true, only of His advent in glory. He must needs suffer, however, not that He might taste, but overcome death; and that, after the accomplishment of His sufferings, He might ascend up on high, to exhibit the power of the divine majesty, and to set the man whom He loved, whom He took upon Himself, whom He redeemed, as a victor on the throne, at the right hand of the Father. We follow Him as our guide, as the Prince of light and Saviour, who promises heaven and the Father to those who seek and believe. What Christ is, we Christians shall be, if we have followed Christ.” (Compare also Serm. 1, de Eleemos.) But especially does he regard Him as the revelation of pure love. In Sermo 3, “de bono patientiæ,” we read,—“We shall become perfect sons of the Father, if the long-suffering of God the Father abide in us, and if the divine image, lost in Adam, shines out of our actions. What a glory to be like God; what blessedness to have, in His virtue, something which is worthy of being compared with the divine! And this it is which Christ has not merely taught us by words, but fulfilled by deeds. As He said regarding Himself, He descended to do the Father’s will; and therefore, amongst the other marvels of virtue on which He stamped the seal of divine majesty, He proved the long-suffering of God by the patience which He manifested. Descending from His heavenly glory to the earth, the Son of God did not count it a shame to take upon Himself the flesh of man, in order that, though Himself free from sin, He might bear the

¹ “Carne spiritus sanctus induitur.” See my remarks on the other reading—“(hic)—carnem spiritu sancto cooperante induitur,”—vol. i. page 991;—where also the necessary explanation is given of the expression “Spiritus sanctus.”

sins of others. Laying aside for the time His immortality, He undertook even to be mortal, that He might die, the innocent for the salvation of the guilty.”¹ Concerning the Eucharist, he says in the fifty-fourth Epistle (Ep. 2, l. c.), that he who is called upon to shed his blood as a confessor, ought previously to partake of the cup of communion in the Church. In the sixty-third Letter (Ep. 3), after mentioning the prophecies in the Old Testament relative to the Eucharist, and referring in particular Proverbs ix., where Wisdom is spoken of, which prepares her table and mingles her wine, to the Eucharist, as Hippolytus had done, he says, that “its blessing consists in the removal of all care, the awakening out of worldly sleep to the understanding of God, the forgetting of worldly conversation, the becoming drunk with divine wisdom, and the recovering from the intoxication of the world.” Then he goes on to say (p. 39),—“As Christ bore us all, nay, as He bore even our sins, so are we to regard the water which is mixed with the sacramental wine as the people, the wine as the blood of Christ. But as the water is mingled with the wine in the cup, even so is Christ adunated with His people (adunatur), and believers are married and united with Him, in whom they believe. This marriage and union of the water and the wine in the cup of the Lord is of such a nature, that it can no more be dissolved and broken up. For this reason, the Church, the people of the faithful and persevering, can no more be separated from Christ, but must ever remain firm in the embrace of the divine love. Wherefore, no wine without water, nor water without wine; even as Christ is not without us, nor we without Christ. When both commingle and interpenetrate as in marriage, the spiritual and heavenly sacrament is accomplished. As, further, in the Eucharist many grains go to make the one bread, so is the people of Christians set before us as united: in Christ, the heavenly bread, we know ourselves to be one body, with which our race is connected and united.

As an antagonist of the Monarchians, Origen was more triumphant than either Tertullian or Hippolytus, mainly from the importance of his own positive teachings, and not merely because of the arguments he adduced against them. As he not merely brought a section to a close, but was the starting-point of the

¹ Compare the beautiful further treatment of the same subject, page 188, l. c.

new development and the new struggles, which took place till the Council of Nice, we shall, for this reason, accord him the special attention which he deserves.

TRANSITION TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

ORIGEN.

However different may have been the opinions entertained in all ages regarding the great Alexandrian Church teacher Origen, he cannot be denied the honour of having combined hearty love to the Church and its theology, with high scientific culture. He felt, as no one had felt before him, and as few have felt after him, the greatness and importance of the Trinitarian and Christological questions: with the candour of a noble and pure soul, he recognised the element of truth in preceding tendencies of the most different kind; and his richly endowed mind possessed resources and elasticity enough to overcome the difficulties which he thus threw in his own way, to combine views apparently antagonistic, and to make them subserve the progress of the Church. He did justice to the truth in Ebionism, by asserting the completeness of the humanity of Christ, in a manner unlike that of any preceding teacher; not contenting himself with the mere general recognition of the old canon in vogue even as early as the second century,—to wit, “it was necessary that Christ should assume the first-fruits of the whole of human nature, because He could only save that which He assumed,”—but assigning to each part of human nature an essential significance, relatively both to the purpose of redemption and to the possibility and reality of the incarnation. He allowed also the right of the other monarchian tendency, which denied to the higher nature of Christ any special hypostasis, in order to avoid the introduction of a schism into the divine nature, by endeavouring most carefully to preserve the unity of the Most High God. But he did this quite differently from Clemens Alexandrinus, who left the hypostasis of the Logos so far in the background, that he gave aid and countenance to Sabellianism. Origen, on the contrary, concurred with Tertullian and Novatian in the West, and with Hippolytus in the East, in asserting the particular hypostasis of the Son; his labours too in this direction bear a

far more realistic stamp, and recognise more distinctly the basis of the faith of the Church. He made it his aim, so to connect the actual deity of the Son, conceived as a person, with the perfect humanity of Christ, as neither to give a low representation of the Son of God, nor an unworthy (for example, ethnic or polytheistic) one of God, that neither the loftiness of the Son of God might curtail the full truth of the man Jesus, nor the completeness of the humanity infringe on the deity (*de princip. L. 2, c. 6, cf. in Levit. hom. 13, 4*). This endeavour to exhibit the truth held by the Church, as the force which holds together the scattered elements of truth contained in the various heresies, and to show that these different and partial momenta, each of which becomes an untruth as soon as it aims to be the whole, are organic, and, in their proper place, essential, parts of the fully developed system of Christian doctrine, reveals not merely the liberality and greatness, the comprehensive and systematic character, of his mind, but also the love which had enabled him, notwithstanding his varied culture, to strike his roots deeply into the doctrine of the Church, and to take it and its spirit as the regulative of his Christian gnosis, and the goal and soul of his efforts.

All this is seen in his system on a grand scale; but it appeared expressly also in the man. However many ideas of a questionable character, and needing continuous agitation and discussion, he may have thrown out; however many ideas he may have laid down, either tentatively or positively; he never forgot—and herein consists his churchly character—the difference between that which was certainly believed by the Church and his own theological speculations; nor failed to demand unconditional recognition for the latter, whilst content that the former should be simply examined and tested. It is such an equilibrium of the fixed and the alterable as this that renders progress possible in the Church. This he takes as his point of departure in the doctrinal work "*de principiis*" (§ 1), when he remarks,—“All who believe in Christ are convinced that grace and truth were revealed through Him, and are to be found in the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments.” But he did not rest satisfied with this general recognition of the material and formal aspect of the Christian principle. For, though this very general norm was enough in itself to distin-

guish Christians from those who are not Christians, it was insufficient relatively to (heretical) divergencies within the Church itself; that is, it was insufficient relatively to such as, whilst professing to recognise, at the same time diverged so considerably on, essential points of doctrine as really to violate that fundamental principle, and to reduce their recognition thereof to a mere seeming. For this reason, he endeavoured to lay down a standard, and to draw a clear line separating the heretical from the orthodox. This plumb-line is, in his view, the "*ecclesiastica prædicatio*," also designated by him "*ecclesiastica et apostolica traditio*," which had been uninterruptedly the common property of the Church, and had combined within itself the "*elementa ac fundamenta*" of Christian truth, its public and necessary principles. It may be regarded, indeed, as an imperfection, that he treats these "*fundamenta*," that is, the Church's rule of faith, rather as a distinct authority alongside of the first-mentioned principle, than as a necessary development therefrom; but still he throws a clearer light on the common faith of the Church of his age, by setting specially before us the "*Regula Fidei*" of the period, or the summary of the fundamental and essential doctrines of Christianity, as an objective authority. This "*Summa Fidei*," agreeing substantially as it does with the "*Regula Fidei*," laid down by Novatian, Tertullian, and Irenæus,¹ teaches, in harmony with all the older formulæ, alongside of the unity of God, the deity of the Son; alongside of the pre-existence of the Son, His incarnation in the Virgin, and the essential features of His history—His sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, and second coming to judgment. But whereas Irenæus, in his two "*Regulæ Fidei*," which are substantially identical with each other and with that laid down by Tertullian in his "*de vel. virginum*" 1, as also Novatian, rested satisfied with these most general elements, which had not yet been determinately distinguished from the baptismal formula and the Apostolic Creed (which had gradually grown out of the baptismal formula), and recognised

¹ Compare Hahn's "*Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der apostolisch-katholischen Kirche*," 1842, pp. 63-78; Iren. *adv. Hæres.* 1, 10; 1, 3, 4, 2; Tertull. *de veland. virgin.* 1; *adv. Prax.* 2; *de præscr. hæres.* 13; Novatian *de Trin.* c. 1, 9, 29; Cyprian's "*Ep. ad Magnum*" and the "*Libri adv. Jud.*"

as *doctrinal*—we find, on the contrary, that the two other formulæ of Tertullian (see note), and that of Origen, were constructed with a view not merely to give immediate expression to the faith of the Church, but also to set forth this faith in the form of *dogma*, as the summary of those fundamental doctrines which are the norm of all doctrine, and shut out that which is heretical. Even as it is, the arrangement was still mainly determined by the baptismal formula of Matt. xxviii., and by the Apostolic Creed. The *Regula Fidei* also is trinitarian, and in its Christology specifies the chief momenta of the history of Christ. But that the doctrine of the Church was passing through a further development, we see plainly, when we find Tertullian placing alongside of the doctrine of the unity of God the “*œconomia*,” by which that unity became a trinity; or when he not merely mentions the “*Filius Dei*” in general, and more distinctly affirms the actuality of His incarnation, but also describes more particularly His relation to the Father:—“*Unicum quidem Deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione, quam οἰκονομίαν dicimus, ut unici Dei sit et Filius, sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, etc.*” (adv. Prax. 2);—“*Unum Deum esse, nec alium præter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerat per Verbum suum primo omnium emissum; id Verbum Filium ejus appellatum, in nomine Dei varie visum Patriarchis—postremo delatum ex Spiritu Patris Dei et virtute in virginem Mariam, carnem factum in utero ejus et ex ea natum egisse Jesum Christum etc.*” (de præscr. hæ. 13).¹ Origen lays down the “*certa linea et manifesta regula*,” which had formed the substance of the “*ecclesiastica prædication*” in relation to the Son, from the days of the Apostles, and by which, therefore, he also aimed to be guided, in the following terms:—“*Species eorum, quæ per prædicationem apostolicam manifeste traduntur, istæ sunt. Primo, quod unus Deus est.—Deinde, quia Jesus Christus, ipse qui venit, ante omnem creaturam natus ex Patre est.*”² Qui cum in omnium conditione

¹ In adv. Prax. is subjoined:—“*Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decurrissse, etiam ante priores quosque hæreticos, nedum ante Praxeam hæternum, etc.*” and in the “*de præscr. hæ.*” (c. 12) the above is described as a rule to which the Church holds in order to guard its truth against the assaults of heretics.

² That Origen had a good right to lay this down as the doctrine of the

Patri ministrasset (per ipsum enim omnia facta sunt), novissimis temporibus se ipsum exinaniens homo factus incarnatus est, cum Deus esset, et homo factus mansit quod erat, Deus. Corpus assumpsit nostro corpori simile, eo solo differens, quod natum ex virgine et spiritu sancto est. Et quoniam hic Jesus Christus natus et passus est in veritate, et non per phantasiam communem hanc mortem sustinuit, vere mortuus, vere enim a mortuis resurrexit et assumptus est. Deinde honore ac dignitate Patri ac Filio sociatum tradiderunt Spiritum sanctum." That these words really express the collective, objective faith of the Church in his day, is clear,—if further evidence, besides his own testimony, which deserves perfect credit on the ground of his travels, his learning, and his honesty, be required,—from the abstinence, which induced him to leave his own doctrine of the generation of the Son and of the human soul of Christ entirely unnoticed, where his object was, not to set forth his own views, but the views held by the Church at large. But let us now pass on to the review of his own doctrine.

Tertullian had distinguished between God in Himself, who is immoveable (in statu), and therefore without distinctions, and God in movement (in gradu); assigning the Trinity to the latter. But in this way the Son was not merely ethically, but also as to His essence and origin, interwoven with finitude, if not with time; in this way, further, he approximated too closely both to the Valentinian *προβολαῖς* (prolationibus) and to the very Theopaschitism which he himself combated under the form of Patripassianism. The final result was the subordination of the Son to a degree which was incompatible with his own general view of the actual God, who had come near to us in Christ. Now, Origen denies every kind of physical emanation, of suffering, and of changeableness of God—not merely of the Father,

Church from the days of the Apostles, and of the second century, even during that portion of it when the development of the doctrine of the Logos endangered the hypostasis and the pre-existence of the Son, is clear not only from what is advanced above, but also from the testimony of Celsus. To the period from the close of the first century until Athenagoras and Irenæus, the words of Origen apply, after what we have demonstrated above, almost still more directly; for the hypostatic pre-existence of the Son was recognised as distinctly during the age of the Apostolic Fathers and Justin, as in the New Testament writings themselves.

but also of the Son;¹ though with no intention of thus laying hands on the *οἰκονομία*. Herein we see the Alexandrian. His Trinity does not belong to the sphere of growth, not to that of the *γενητὰ*, but to the sphere of eternity. In his view, the Son was an eternal hypostasis, and God a trinity "in statu," and not first "in gradu." At the same time, it is to be remarked, that he does not regard the three hypostases as lifeless magnitudes, existing alongside of each other, without motion or activity; but represents the Trinity as an eternal process in God. Clement's doctrine of the *Logos*, who is co-eternal with God (in this respect, indeed, scarcely any longer hypostatical), on the one hand; and that of Tertullian and others, of the hypostatical *Son*, who is generated by a movement out of God Himself, on the other hand; he combines, by asserting in agreement with the latter, the procession of an hypostasis out of God Himself, and, in agreement with Clement, assigning that procession to eternity. And, indeed, consistency required this course to be adopted, if the Son, being divine as to His essence, were acknowledged to be identical with the eternal divine essence, and the divine were at the same time, with Hippolytus, defined to be unchangeable as to its essence. To this antagonism, therefore, to the patripassian conception of God; to the connection with Clement; and, finally, to the realistic doctrinal tradition of the Church, which had always tacitly assumed the divine aspect of the Son to be hypostatical, and which, since Tertullian, had been compelled to insist more strongly than

¹ C. Cels. 4, 16. In Rom. vii. 13:—"Inseparabilis a patre est per naturam et immortalitatem." C. Cels. 4, 5:—Καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὅλων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει συγκαταβαίνει τῷ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον, καὶ ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν λόγος, Θεὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν, ἔρχεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἐξ ἑδρος γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ καταλείπει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἔδραν. C. 14:—Μένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀτρέπτος συγκαταβαίνει. The subject is Θεός, with special reference to the Logos (compare c. 16).—6, 62:—Εἰ δ' ἀνυγνώκει (Celsus, who charged Christians, because of their doctrine of the incarnation, with representing God as mutable) τὰς τῶν προφητῶν λέξεις—οὐ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ (Ps. ci. 28; Heb. Vers. cii.)—ἐγὼ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἡλλοίωμαι (Mal. iii. 6), ἴωρα δὲ, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν φησιν εἶναι μεταβολὴν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, οὐτ' ἔργῳ οὐτ' ἐπινοίᾳ. De Princip. 1, 2, 6:—"Observandum est, ne quis incurrat in illas absurdas fabulas eorum, qui prolationes quasdam sibi ipsis depingunt, ut divinam naturam in partes vocent, et Deum Patrem, quantum in se est dividant, eum hoc de incorporea natura vel leviter suspicari non solum extremæ impietatis sit, verum etiam ultimæ insipientiæ." Compare § 10, 4, 28.

ever on this point,—we may be said to owe the rise, at the present juncture in the history of the Church, of that most important principle, the *eternal generation of the Son*. But, in conjunction with more external causes, we must not overlook the inner soul of the entire historical process, which, though, it is true, ever present, here more plainly manifested itself, as the leading impulse. This soul was the conviction which possessed the Christian world, that in Christ it had attained to unity, not with a middle being and secondary God, but with God Himself—an unity, the archetype of which is set before us in the incarnation of Christ. This conviction,—call it mystical if we will; but whether mystical or not, it contained the kernel of Christianity,—never permitted the Church to regard the subordination of the Son as an end in itself, and as an independent dogma (as did Arianism). On the contrary, subordination was merely taught by the Church for a time; and during that time it was an auxiliary doctrine, whose object was to show that the truth in the general and ante-Christian conception of God, to wit, the divine unity, was not violated by the new conception of God set forth in Christianity. It must by no means, however, be regarded as indicative of a disposition to give up the elements which go to constitute the Christian trinitarian conception of God, and to reintroduce ante-Christian conceptions of God, as, for example, Arians, and on the whole Sabellians also, did (compare, for example, Tertull. adv. Prax. 13, 31). The work of transforming the ante-Christian conceptions of God, which the Church of the first centuries executed to the utmost of its ability, was greatly expedited by this proposition of Origen. The divine in Christ was removed into the eternal divine sphere, without therefore being represented as a mere power. Light cannot exist without giving light; it is never without brightness: even so, the Father cannot be conceived without the Son. (Note 18.) There never was a time when the Son was not.¹ If it was a

¹ De princ. 1, 2, 2, 4; Anaceph. § 28 (de princ. 4, 28); c. Celsum 8, 12; in Joann. T. i. 32; Fragm. ad Hebr. from the Apology of Pamphilus in de la Rue's ed. iv. 697a, ad Rom. 1, 5. The expression *ὅτι ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, which at a later period became a watchword, is frequently discussed by Origen in these passages, but most decidedly rejected by him. Compare Note 18; Hom. in Jerem. ix. 4; *ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν σοφία ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ. "Ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ σοφία ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου. Εἰ οὖν ὁ σωτὴρ αἰεὶ γινώσκειται, etc.* The

good thing for God to have a Son, why should He not have had this good eternally,—why should He have robbed Himself of it? These thoughts, recurring as they do frequently in the works of Origen, show us that he was already on the point of stabilitating the position of the Son in the divine sphere, by representing Him as involved in the eternal idea of God Himself (compare *Anaceph.* 4, 28). That Origen found it easier to give utterance to this eternity of the Son than others before him had done, because of his doctrine that creation also should be conceived as eternal, and that God never was without dominion and omnipotence, ought not to be denied: but it is equally perverse to derive his doctrine of the eternity of the Son from it, or even to identify the two.¹ Against the co-ordination or identification of the Son and the world, speaks already, that though he represents the world as existing always, he at the same time, and for that very reason, leaves it within the limits of time and subject to change, whereas the Son exists eternally above it, as an hypostasis with the Father. The eternal wisdom, which eternally hypostatizes itself as the Son, contains within itself, it is true, the logical seeds of all things, the world in the form of a conception; but the generation of the Son was not *eo ipso* the position of the world as an actuality. Neither in His inner wisdom and reason, nor in the wisdom which eternally became hypostatical in the Son, had the Father an object of His omnipotence and dominion; but He first became almighty through the Son, who realized the idea of the world.² It is thus put beyond all doubt, that Origen ex-

fragment ad Hebr. runs as follows:—"Lux æterna quid aliud est sentiendum, quam Deus Pater, qui nunquam fuit, quando lux quidem esset, splendor vero ei non adesset? Neque enim lux sine splendore suo unquam intelligi potest. Quod si verum est, nunquam est, quando Filius non Filius fuit—non erat quando non erat."

¹ As Baur does, in his altogether very free account of Origen's system (pp. 208 ff.). Origen was certainly acquainted with the doctrine that the world is the son of God, which some seek to fasten on him as a speculative ornament; for his books against Celsus show this. But he gave it up as ethnic to Celsus, and despised such ornaments. The truth he perceived it to contain, took the form in his mind, that the will, or the almighty love and the wisdom, of the Logos, are the constant medium through which the world is sustained.

² De princ. 1, 2, 10: "Per Filium enim omnipotens est Pater."

alted the Son above the sphere of creatures (in Joh. T. xiii. 25); and that the eternity of the Son is one thing, and His so-called eternal creation of the successive worlds a totally different thing. Hermogenes also taught that the world was eternal; but he did not, therefore, teach the eternal generation of the Son;—on the contrary, by means of the former, he dispensed with the necessity of the latter.¹ Origen proceeds in a different manner, because he attached an independent significance to the eternity of the Son. It was not merely because of the world, that he needed and laid down the doctrine; in other words, his aim in teaching the eternal generation of the Son, was, not simply to be able to conceive the creation of the world, which fell to the lot of the Son, as eternal. In general, the ground on which Origen claimed a Son, was not identical with that to which he traced back the existence of the world. A world exists because otherwise God would not be an almighty Ruler; the Son exists because Light, to wit, the Father, cannot be without brightness. For this reason, he was easily able to show that his doctrine of the eternal creation of the world did not infringe on the dignity of the Son.² The correct view will therefore be the following: Not for the sake of the doctrine of the eternal creation of the world, did he posit the eternal generation of the Son; but his conception of God was such as to require that both world and Son, although the conception of each stood otherwise equally firm, should be eternally posited, though without the violation of their logical relation; for, even on the supposition of the world's being eternal, he still deemed it to remain a creature, whereas he did not intend to represent the Son as an object of omnipotence,—as a creature. God, namely, Origen supposes, must be recognised as mutable, as needing progress from a defective to a more perfect condition; He would be deprived of His self-identity; if on the one hand the Son were not His image, and on the other hand, if the world were not, through the creative Son, the object of His dominion. When, however, we find Origen regarding it as an advantage for God to have not merely a world, but an eternal image of Himself,

¹ As also Baur, p. 210, is unable to comprehend why Origen should posit an hypostatical Son alongside of an eternal world, it being in his view unnecessary.

² De princip. 1, 2, 10.

which the world cannot be (that image was rather destined to be the archetype of the world, and the world to be its copy), we must attribute it to the afore-mentioned Christian impulse, felt by the Church, to transform the conception of God, which had prevailed prior to the advent of Christ (Note 19). Had he been content with the ethnical idea of God, he would naturally have regarded the world as a satisfactory substitute for that image, which he deemed a divine good. But he refuses to hear anything of a natural God-manhood of our race, in any other sense than that of a susceptibility to union with God. In reply to the observation of Celsus,—*εἰ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ θεϊάν πρόνοιαν γεγονώς, υἱός ἐστι Θεοῦ, τί ἂν σὺ ἄλλου διαφέρῃς* (that is, thou agreeest with us heathens),—he remarks (c. Celsum 1, 57),—“Many indeed have pretended to be sons of God,—as, for example, Judas Gal., Theudas, Dositheus, Simon Magus; but their work perished, their school is extinguished. Christians, on the contrary, who are freed from fear, Paul calls indeed sons of God; but each of them *πολλῷ καὶ μακρῷ διαφέρει παντὸς τοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν χρηματίζοντος υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅστις ὡσπερὶ πηγὴ τις καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει.*” As he justly held physical participation in the Logos to be something meagre, because immediate, and not truly spiritual or ethical, he was necessitated to assume for the world the existence of an ethical mediator, in order that it might really participate in divine life; and for God Himself, the existence of an eternal perfect image of His ethical perfection, such as the world could not be, and whose place it could not supply. For, even apart from sin, Origen held it to lie in the essence of a rational creature, that it should connect itself, by free efforts, with the ethical perfection of God; and as such a conjunction must be preceded by a process in time, it follows that, prior to the termination thereof, even if nothing else hindered, the world would not supply to God that absolute ethical image of Himself, which notwithstanding He ought eternally to possess. It must accordingly be conceded, that Origen’s doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son owed its origin, in the last instance, to the transformation of the conception of God brought about by the ethical appearance of Christ; although, as in all the great productions of the mind of man, other causes co-operated. These words of Origen

gave expression to that which lay in the heart of the Church—to its inmost intent—to that *μυστική παράδοσις* of the Church, which existed, not as a formulated doctrine, but as an intuition of faith. That he had found the word which the Church had sought, and that he thus met its unconscious yearnings, is evident from the results which followed on its utterance. The Church recognised it as its own; and whereas the other fruits of his labours were subjected to a criticism in many respects unjust, this determination inmoveably held its ground. His doctrine of the eternity of creation, with much else, found no recognition; it served merely the purpose of a ferment: his doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, on the contrary, attained, through its own weight, the position of a corner stone in the doctrinal edifice of the Church,—it was applied even as a plummet to further doctrinal works, and became a standard for the judgment of other parts of Origen's own system, which did not appear to harmonize with it.

Origen, however, was not content simply to regard the generation of the Son as an eternal act, which, being accomplished, was accomplished once for all. Tertullian, for example, still held it to be a single divine act, and naturally, therefore, treated it as a revelation, which had become an hypostasis, as a *προβολή* of God; and, consequently, either as an emanation or as dependent on the will of the Father (de princ. 4, 28). Such a view not merely involved the introduction of mutability into God, contrary to Origen's conviction, but even the Son was not thereby brought into close connection with the divine essence. He would owe His existence to a single isolated, and not to an eternal, movement in God, essential to the very conception of the divine essence; for otherwise a single divine act would not have sufficed. Moreover, on the supposition that He originated in a single isolated act, the Son would be shut out too much from the essence and sphere of the Father; would be too independent, if it were meant to represent Him as God and not as creature; would be too far removed from the Father. Accordingly, we find Tertullian inclined to represent the Son as returning out of His independence into God at the close of the *οικονομία*; and then it is difficult to see how His distinction from the Father can be preserved. Origen, on the contrary, in this connection also anxious to exclude both mutability and dead

torpor, teaches that in God there is an unchangeably active vitality; in other words, that the generation of the Son is an eternally completed, and yet an eternally continued, act. On the ground of the same conception of God (which aimed at combining, in a higher form, the rigid Jewish and the mutable heathenish conceptions), he was able to describe the eternal creation of the world also as a continuous act: nor did he take a different view of the work of the Holy Spirit in believers.¹ The Son was not generated once for all, but is continuously generated by God in the eternal to-day.²

He thus conceives the persons of the Trinity in most intimate union with each other. The Son is the stream, of which the Father is the source (in Joann. T. vi. 29). He employs both this old image and also that of light, which cannot but shine, not with the intention of favouring emanatistic ideas, but in order to set clearly forth the inseparable connection existing between Father and Son (*ἀχώριστός ἐστι τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ πατήρ*, in Matt. xiii. 19; contra Celsus 4, 14, 16; in Joann. T. ii. 1, xix. 1: His *θεοτέρα φύσις* is *ἡνωμένη τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ τοῦ πατρὸς φύσει*). Giving the former simile a different turn, he says (in Jerem. hom. 18, 9),—The three sources (of salvation) are Father, Son, and Spirit; whoso thirsts not for all three

¹ Hom. in Jerem. ix. 4; de princ. 1, 2, 2; Anaceph. § 28. In the first-mentioned passage he says:—*Μακάριος ὁ αἰεὶ γεννώμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπαξ ἐρῶ τὸν δίκαιον γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γεννᾶσθαι καθ' ἐκάστην πράξιν ἀγαθὴν, ἐν ᾗ γεννᾷ τὸν δίκαιον ὁ Θεός.* This takes place also in the Redeemer, *ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατήρ τὸν υἱόν, καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατήρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν*—*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης οὐχὶ ἀπαξ γεννύνηται καὶ οὐχὶ (i.e., οὐκ ἔτι) γεννᾶται· ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος, ἐπὶ τοσούτον γεννᾶται τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, τοῦ Θεοῦ.* For this reason, also, it is said, *πρὸ δὲ πάντων βουνῶν γεννᾷ με, not γεγέννηκέ με, καὶ αἰεὶ γεννᾶται ὁ σωτὴρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς.* In Joann. T. i. 32: *Σαθῶς, ἡ εὐγένεια παρίσταται τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὅτε· τὸ υἱὸς μου εἶ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε, λέγεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ᾧ αἰεὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σήμερον· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἐσπέρα Θεοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡγοῦμαι ὅτι οὐδὲ πρῶτα, ἀλλ' ὁ συμπαρακτείνων τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ καὶ αἰδίδῳ αὐτοῦ ζῶν, ἢ οὕτως εἶπω, χρόνος ἡμέρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ σήμερον, ἐν ᾗ γεγέννηται ὁ υἱὸς· ἀρχῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ οὕτως οὐχὲν εὐρισκομένης, ὥς οὐδὲ τῆς ἡμέρας.*

² The German runs—"Der Sohn ist nicht gezeugt, sondern wird gezeugt von Gott in dem ewigen Heute." The distinction between "ist" and "wird" can scarcely here be rendered without paraphrase into English.—
TR.

cannot find God. The Jews thirst after the Father, but despise the Son, and therefore they have not the Father. Heretics desire the Son, but not the Father, who is the lawgiver; or not the Spirit, who moved the prophets; and so they are without the Son and without the Father. On this ground he attributes all glory and all divine attributes, in common, to the Son and to the Father. That which is in God is in Christ Jesus (in Jerem. hom. viii. 2; πάντα γὰρ, ὅσα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοιαῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός ἐστι σοφία—δύναμις—δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ, etc., in Joann. T. xx. 29, 30). When Celsus asked the Christian of the second century, Why do you honour a second God, in addition to the true one? Origen answered, He is one with God; and God, in generating Him, gave over all things into His hand (c. Cels. 8, 12, 13). Not *alongside of*, but *in* God, do we worship the Son (ib. c. 12). In particular, the Son *knows* all that the Father knows, for the Son is the truth, and the truth is an indivisible whole; if but one part failed, the entire knowledge of the Son would be defective (in Joann. T. i. 27);—ἐὰν δέ τις ζητῇ, εἰ πᾶν ὅτιποτε ἐγνωσμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς—ἐπίσταται ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν, καὶ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ δοξάζειν τὸν πατέρα ἀποφαίνηται τινα γνωσκόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀγνοεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἐπιστατέον, αὐτὸν (because He is the ἀλήθεια, and ἀλήθεια is ὁλόκληρος) οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀγνοεῖ (ν?) ἵνα μὴ σκάξῃ λείπουσα ἡ ἀλήθεια οἷς οὐ γινώσκει. Or let some one point me out an object of knowledge which is not included in, but lies out beyond, the domain of truth. The case is the same relatively to the *will*. The Son is not merely the executor of the divine will, as though He worked outside of God, but *the same will* that is in the Father is an almighty and holy will in the Son.

In short, the Father possesses in the Son an absolute image of Himself.¹ "For no one, I believe, embraces the entire glory of the Father in Himself in copy, save the Son. He not only

¹ In Joh. T. xiii. 36,—ὥστε εἶναι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ θελήματι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀπαράλλακτον τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς εἰς τὸ μετέστι εἶναι δύο θελήματα, ἀλλ' ἐν θέλημα. Hence Christ said, "I and the Father are one;" therefore, "He that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father also." All the deeds of men are imperfect, but not those of the Son; He accomplishes the entire will of the Father, for τὸ θέλειν τοῦ Θεοῦ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἅπερ βούλεται τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ· μόνος δὲ ὁ υἱὸς πᾶν τὸ θέλημα ποιεῖ χωρῆσαι τοῦ πατρὸς· διόπερ καὶ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ. C. Cels. 8, 12; in Johann. T. xxxii. 18; compare Note 19.

participates in wisdom, truth, reason, but is wisdom, truth, reason itself,¹ and all the wise are wise through their participation in Him." There can therefore be no doubt that Origen meant to attribute deity seriously, and not merely figuratively, to the Son. But as he maintained the eternity of the hypostasis of the Son so decidedly in opposition to the Monarchians,² he must needs consider how to reconcile the true element in the ante-Christian conception of God, to wit, the divine unity, with his Trinitarianism. We have seen already that he endeavoured to secure this unity by bringing the Son, through the doctrine of the eternal generation, into closer proximity to the *essence* of the Father; in other words, he effected an adjustment between the disparate elements of Tertullian's system, with its temporal and almost mundane personality of the Son, on the one hand, and the eternity of His essence, on the other, by teaching that the generation or the personality of the Son was coeternal with the divine essence, and thus removing it out beyond the sphere of the world. In his view, both eternity and generation constitute the Father and the hypostasis (not merely the substance) of the Son, one essence. No less also the afore-mentioned common attributes of intelligence and volition, which can only appertain to an hypostasis. But precisely at the point at which enough seemed to have been done, a new danger arose. If Father and Son have absolutely everything in common, how are they distinguished the one from the other? Monarchianism

¹ *Αὐτοσοφία, αὐτοαλήθεια, αὐτόλογος.* C. Cels. 3, 41; Exh. ad Martyr. 47; in Joh. T. i. 11.

² He speaks against them, for example, in Joh. T. ii. 2, 6, 18, x. 21; C. Cels. 4, 5, 8, 12; in Matt. xvii. 14;—*Οὐ νομιστίον εἶναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τὰ ψῆδην φρονοῦντας περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαντασίαι τοῦ δοξάζειν αὐτόν (Χριστόν)· ὅποιοι εἰσιν οἱ συγχέοντες πατὴρ καὶ υἱοῦ ἔννοιαν, καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἵνα δίδόντες εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τῇ ἐκτινοίᾳ μόνῃ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαιροῦντες τὸ ἐν ὑποκείμενον.* On John ii. 2, see page 101. Still more explicitly in Joh. T. x. 21: *they say μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνοντες ἀμφοτέρους κατὰ τινας ἐκτινοίας διαφόρους, οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν, λέγεσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν.* The proof of their theory, drawn from the circumstance that the resurrection of Christ is now attributed to the Father and then to the Son, does not stand scrutiny; for both were active, the Son through the Father. For the rest, it is necessary to oppose to them the passages which prove the distinction between the Father and the Son, amongst which he reckons those which speak in a lower way of the latter.

appears to him as objectionable as Polytheism; and therefore, not merely interest for the unity of God, but even for the Son's own hypostasis, would seem to necessitate Origen to the adoption of determinations, fitted to secure both the one and the other.

This is the origin of the peculiar form of Subordinationism which we find in Origen's system. He endeavoured to secure the unity of the essence of God, by means of the opposed principles of the equality and the subordination of the Son. The latter was intended to leave a place for an independent hypostasis of the Son; the former for His deity.

Let us now submit this form of Subordinationism to a more careful examination. Above all, we must here refer to his well-known distinction between *θεός* and *ὁ Θεός* (in Joann. ii. 2, 3). The Son has, indeed, actual *θεότης*; He is *θεός*, *ἕτερος τὴν ἰδιότητα*: but He is not originally *θεός*; the Father alone is the source of His deity.¹ For this reason the Father alone is *αὐτόθεος*; He alone is the *μέγιστος ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεός* (c. Cels. 8, 14). The conception which the Father has of Himself is greater than that which the Son has of Himself. But the knowledge of the Son is not thereby made imperfect. No one who, like Origen (in Joh. T. i. 27, see above), knows that truth constitutes an indivisible, organic whole, could style the Son *αὐτοσοφία*, *αὐτοαλήθεια*, if he did not attribute to Him absolute knowledge of the Father; and, indeed, otherwise He would not be the Father's perfect image or mirror. His meaning rather was:—The Father has one self-consciousness, the Son another; the Father is the ultimate principle (*ἀρχή*), not the Son; in His self-consciousness, therefore, the Son cannot, like the Father, appear to Himself as the Last, although, nay because, the Son really knows the Father as the final principle. The Father, therefore, is higher (*κρείττων*); He is both the first beginning and the final goal of all things. Although, therefore, the Son is the representative of the Father to those who are still to be saved, is their God, and, so to speak, their Father, as the goal at which they are preliminarily to arrive, because He alone is the way to the Father; and although it is accordingly natural enough for these to direct

¹ In Joh. T. ii. 3, 6, 18, xiii. 25; c. Cels. 8, 14; in Joh. T. ii. 3. The Father alone is *πηγὴ θεότητος*: in so far, He alone is to be worshipped; the Son and the Spirit are only to be worshipped in Him.

their prayers to the Son, it should be otherwise with the redeemed. Christ continues to be their Mediator; but they pray to the Father through the Son, not, however, to the Son Himself.¹ Still more: it is the duty of a mediator to bring men to the Father, who is the first and the last. Christ, therefore, does not keep Christians near Himself, because otherwise they would not attain to direct participation in the Highest; for the Father alone, and not the Son, is the Highest. Christians rise above the Son also to the Father, the *μὲν* or the *ἐν* (Note 20). Not that they become higher than the Son, or that the Son is lowered through the completion of His work; but His work itself would remain incomplete if He did not lead them *out beyond Himself* to the final source and goal, even to the Father. Naturally, too; for if the Most High God is not also in Christ, if He be merely the leader to the goal, or a means, those who arrive at full age must go out beyond Him, and, what is more, through Him: the only question then is, whether He can, strictly speaking, be the Mediator, the personal mediation of God and man, if the absolute and final aim be not in Him also, as it is in the Father. Origen himself often enough elsewhere treats Him as an end in Himself (for example, c. Cels. 6, 68); thus showing how far he was from considering the subordination of the Son to be an end in itself, and that, on the contrary, he intended thereby to show, on the one hand, that the Son had an hypostasis of His own, and, on the other hand, that the Most High God is in the last instance only One, to wit, the Father. But the passage in Joh. T. xiii. 3 is specially fitted to unfold the real sense in which he used the above expressions. His intention was neither to give a Docetical account of Christ's

¹ Compare, respecting the knowledge of the Son, in Joh. T. i. 27; Anaceph. § 35. The apparent contradiction between these two passages Origen reconciled as follows:—The Son has true knowledge in its totality; He knows the Father also truly. But His knowledge of the Most High God is never *Being*, as in the case of the Father. In so far as He knows that He Himself and His knowledge have their ground in the Father, His knowledge is less perfect. For His knowledge of the Highest Being is never an immediate self-consciousness, but a mediate, reflective knowledge. Solely in this respect, however, is it less perfect. In every other respect higher knowledge is inconceivable (in Joh. T. xxxii. 17); His exaltation affected merely His humanity: *ὁ λόγος, ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν θεός, οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ ὑπερυψωθῆναι* (de princ. 1, 2, 10).

significance, as though all depended on the difference of the point of view ; nor an Ebionitical, as though Christ could ever be surpassed : on the contrary, as the soul is dead, nay more, is nothing, without the Logos, even so the Church owes all that it has continually to Christ. It receives from Him, not merely the forgiveness of sin, but He is the *πηγή ζωτικού πόματος* ; so that the inner sense freely opens itself, and man attains to the highest of all, to the knowledge of the Father (*τῆς διανοίας ἀλλομένης, καὶ τάχιστα διῷπταμένης ἀκολουθῶς τῷ εὐκινήτῳ τούτῳ ὕδατι φέροντος αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἄλλεσθαι καὶ πηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνώτερον* (that is, probably, to the Father and the knowledge of Him) *ἐπὶ τὴν αἰώνιον ζωὴν*).

But if the divine unity is to be secured by the Father's being the Most High God, and not the Son ; and if the former is, notwithstanding, one only, the hypostasis of the Son would seem to be entirely excluded from the sphere of the divine, and to be relegated to the sphere of the creature. How is it consistent therewith to represent the unity of God, notwithstanding the hypostasis of the Son, as secured by the fact of the Son having all that the Father hath ?¹ There appears here to be so glaring a contradiction in the system of Origen, that we can easily understand why, from of old, the most different opinions have been formed of it. In order to make him self-consistent, Maran has taken all pains, as far as possible, to deny the subordination ; but his labour has been in vain. The orthodox opponents of Origen, on the contrary, and his Arian friends, have left the other aspect of his system out of sight, and have interpreted everything as much as possible in a subordinationist spirit. By recent writers the question has been put in the following form :—Does Origen derive the eternal generation of the Son from the *essence*, or from the *will*, of God ? (Note 21.)

It is true, that mode of securing for the Son at once equality of essence with, and at the same time hypostatical distinction from God, which consists in regarding Him as a "portio" of the entire Deity, was not open to Origen. He justly persisted in maintaining that the category of part and whole is not applicable to God ; that God is an indivisible unity ; that we cannot allow of a greater and a less in Him, because wherever He is

¹ Compare the passages quoted page 115 f.

at all, He is entirely and indivisibly (de princ. 1, 1, 6;—"Non ergo aut corpus aliquod aut in corpore esse putandus est Deus, sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino in se adjunctionis admittens; utine majus aliquid et inferius in se habere credatur, sed ut sit ex omni parte *μονὰς* et ut ita dicam *ἐνὰς* et mens ac fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturæ vel mentis est." C. Cels. 1, 23;—*Θεὸς οὐδὲ μέρος, οὐδὲ ὅλον, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν ἐστίν.* Compare c. 21, 4; 14, 6, 62). Accordingly, one may fairly say, that Origen's conception of God was such as to render it difficult for him to recognise the presence of the divine essence in the second hypostasis. In his eyes, as in Tertullian's, the Father is originally the entire Deity; nay more, not merely originally, but permanently: and He cannot constitute a *part* of Himself, His Son. There appears, therefore, to be no place for the Son save that of a creature. The case, however, does not stand thus. Instead of resorting to a quantitative division (through which the Father, who is originally the entire God, constitutes Himself one portion, another portion the Son, and a third the Spirit; on which supposition the Son, strictly speaking, would not have what the Father has, and either the nature of the Father would be changed, or, if He still continued to be the whole even after the generation of the Son, the hypostasis of the Son would be continually endangered), Origen adopts a different view of the mode of existence of the divine as a whole. This is one of the most important and luminous features of Origen's system. He saw that finite things are characterized by a certain exclusiveness: he who makes something external his property, by that act withdraws it from others; and so far as another is in possession, I am not in possession. But in the sphere of the spiritual and divine the case is otherwise. The art or science of any man is not lessened by its being in the possession of others; and as it is with wisdom, so is it also with goodness, with ethical perfection. They are indivisible, it is true, in the sense that no one can truly possess any portion thereof without possessing the principle of the whole; but this does not imply that only one individual can possess them. On the contrary, their nature is, to be *principially*¹

¹ I shall occasionally take the liberty of rendering the German word *principiell* (adj.) by the fresh-coined English adjective *principial*, instead of by the phrase "in principle," "as to principle."—Tr.

indivisible and yet communicable; that is, they can be entirely possessed by more than one subject at the same time. Applied to the case before us, this means,—Though he held a division of God to be impossible, he did not consider a duplication—“*duæ positiones*” (Lev. hom. 13, 14)—or even a multiplication of the divine perfections, that is, their existence in several hypostases, to be impossible. (De princ. 1, 1, 9:—“*Intelligenda est ergo virtus Dei, qua viget, qua omnia visibilia et invisibilia vel continet vel gubernat, etc. Hujus ergo totius virtutis tantæ et tam immensæ vapor et ut ita dicam vigor ipse in propria substantia effectus, quamvis ex ipsa virtute velut voluntas e mente procedat, tamen et ipsa voluntas Dei nihilominus Dei virtus efficitur. Efficitur ergo virtus altera in suâ proprietate altera in suâ proprietate subsistens,—vapor quidam primæ et ingenitæ virtutis Dei, hoc quidem, quod est, inde trahens, non est autem, quando non fuerit.*”) He is thus able to attribute the entire fulness of the deity, and not merely one part thereof, to the Son, and consequently brings out more completely that inner or intensive equality of the Son with the Father, which Tertullian also aimed at when he asserted that the entire sun is in the ray. Tertullian, however, did not succeed like Origen; for in single passages, he described the distinction between the Father and the Son as a distinction between whole and part; in other, and these more standard, passages, however, it is true, he represents the entire divine essence as fixed under a determinate “*forma, species, modulus,*” though the genesis and being of these formæ are directly interwoven with the world and history. But this new idea of a duplication, or multiplication, of the fulness of the deity in several hypostases, brought also new difficulties. There appears to be a danger of putting the world on a level with the Son, inasmuch as the world also is susceptible of spiritual, ethical perfections, which may be termed divine. And as Origen’s wish was to assign to the Son a distinctive position, which the world cannot share with Him, all depends on finding a principle of limitation. Such a limitation is set forth in his remarks “in Joh. T. xxxii. 18.” It was not fitting that the Father should lack the good of having a perfect image of Himself; but it was only possible for one, not for many, fully to reflect the perfect glory of the Father in an image, and He who was this full reflection was the Son. The Son, moreover, is the medium through

which the divine essence is communicated to all who participate therein. The indivisible unity and unchangeableness of God do not admit of the multiplicity and mutability of the world, being directly grounded in Him, that is, in the Father.¹ Equally impossible is it to conceive the world as existing independently, or as an atomistic multiplicity without unity. For this reason, the Son is the middle between God and the world;—in Him is, (1.) the *idea of the world*, or its eternal ideal unity; (2.) the *principle* of the actual world,—not, indeed, of an infinite multiplicity of objects, but still of the countless multiplication of freedom in many subjects, completely resembling each other. Therewith is given the *possibility* of an infinitely manifold world; freedom hypostatized in countless Egos is its *real* potency. (3.) And lastly, when the individual beings, through their freedom, diverge infinitely from each other, the Word, or the Logos, continues to be their common, connecting principle. He is the substance which runs through the whole world, its heart or reason, present alike in every man and in the entire world. The Son is the truth, the life, the resurrection of the creatures, He is the One, who lies at the basis of their manifoldness, however numerous may be His names, and various the modes in which He is regarded.² And however far freedom may go astray, however wide a field of action may be allowed it, as rational it is indissolubly connected with the Logos, who constantly manifests and maintains Himself, as the overarching (*übergreifend*), omnipresent, and all-dominating power, in the development of the world.

What we have adduced, shows that he considered the Logos to be the only perfect divine image, the archetype of the world, and the real ground of its being, of its continuance, and of its participation in the divine, in rationality, and in goodness. The Holy Spirit is, at the utmost, the only other being whom Origen would put on the same level as the Son: this latter doctrine, however, was but little developed by him. Relatively to the

¹ Ritter l. c. 294:—"He could not hesitate to maintain that God must not be conceived as the ground of a multiplicity of mutable things; for the ground of a multiplicity is itself a multiplicity of grounds, and the ground of a change is grounded after a mutable manner."

² In Joann. i. 22; hom. in Jerem. 8, 2; de princ. 4, 28 (compare the painstaking work of Thomasius on Origen, p. 130).

world and revelation, Origen is unable to find expressions strong enough to glorify and exalt the Son, the First-born of creation, above all creatures, on the one hand; and profoundly to subordinate them to Him, on the other. And so certainly as he not merely recognised man's need of being united with the Most High God, but believed also that Christ alone met that need; even so certainly must the Son be the vehicle and communicator of veritably divine nature (de princ. 1, 2, 4, 6;—the likeness borne by the Son contains "*naturæ et substantiæ Patris et Filii unitatem.*" In Levit. hom. 13, 4; in Num. 12, 1).

When Origen has in view the Most High God and His unity, he seems to lay down contradictory principles, and completely to forget what he had previously taught; but it only needs a deeper consideration of his conception of God, to free him from a reproach so unworthy of a systematical theologian, and to show that, and why, it was no contradiction for him, on the one hand, to attribute an equal divine essence to the Son; and, on the other hand, to subordinate Him so decidedly to the Father, as even to allow himself the use of an expression such as—The Son, as to His *οὐσία*, is other than the Father.¹

He regards the Father, as the *ἕνς* or *μονὰς* in absolute indivisibility and wholeness, infinitely exalted above all that is multifold and divided. Properly speaking, He is not truth and wisdom, spirit and reason, but infinitely higher than all these, out beyond being and substance (*οὐσία*).² In short, He is the utterly unutterable, incomprehensible One, or the Absolute. All truth, goodness, power, is derived from Him; but He is not adequately described by all these names. He is the Father of wisdom and of all good; but will, reason, wisdom, cannot, strictly speaking, be attributed to Him without an admixture of sensuous impurity.

The Father alone can be this one, supra-substantial being. If, however, we wish catachrestically to apply to Him the ex-

¹ De orat. c. 15. The Son is *ἕτερος τοῦ πατρὸς κατ' οὐσίαν* and *καθ' ὑπόστασιν*. This may signify (compare in Joh. T. i. 23, p. 26),—In abiding objective reality, not merely momentary being or subjective seeming. (The more precise definition of this objective being different from the Father, is his *ἰδίᾳ οὐσίᾳ περιγραφή*, here termed *ὑπόστασις*. But even so, the Son continues subordinated.)

² C. Cels. 7, 38,—*ἡλικιότης τοῦ καὶ οὐσίης*; de princ. 1, 1, 6; see above; in Joh. ii. 18, xiii. 21, 23.

pression *οὐσία*, then we must say that the essence of the Father is other than that of the Son. For the supra-essential as such cannot communicate itself, because it would thus renounce its abstract unity, simplicity. The Son is not supra-substantial, supra-essential (*überseyend, überwesentlich*), but is through and through *ἐνέργεια*: the Father is the primary principle, in Himself purely ideal, shut up in Himself. Though the Son is the Father's perfect image, and has coeternally attracted to Himself all divine perfections (c. Cels. 8, 14), that in which these perfections inhere, which is their vehicle, can never become His: the Father alone remains the primal causality. When the Son makes Himself the object of reflection, He cannot regard Himself as the original, as the primal *ἀρχή*; otherwise He would be the Father, and not the Father's image, to which the Father must hold the relation of archetype. The Son may, indeed, be the archetype of the world, and thus imitate, in the lower sphere, the relation subsisting between the Father and Himself; but He can never Himself be the absolute archetype. Hence Origen was compelled to say, that the Son, in this respect, could not be compared with the Father; that the primal cause could only be one. This is the explanation of the comparison frequently made by him,—The Father is exalted above the Son, as the Son is above the world. Specially significant in this connection is the remark adduced above,—The self-consciousness of the Father is higher than that of the Son. For it implies, that the Father by no means beholds Himself in the Son, but that the self-consciousness of each is distinct. In the Son, the Father does not recognise Himself, but a derived being; and His knowledge of Himself is perfect independently of the Son. The duplication of which we spoke above is not a complete self-objectification of God;—not only because the Son is merely the reflex, the image, in which, though the Father represents Himself, His knowledge of Himself is not supposed to depend on, or to be mediated by, the Son; but *it is merely the fulness of the deity, the divine δόξα that is duplicated*. Light cannot do otherwise than shine, the living God cannot do otherwise than reveal Himself in an objective, adequate image; but still the Father abides ever in the ground, and the ground does not come forth in His revelation. The Father does, however, completely embody His fulness and glory in the image of Himself.

This will enable us to understand why, and how far, Origen subordinated the Son. He had no intention whatever of denying to Him the fulness of veritable divine powers, that is, divine essence;¹ but he did not consider Him to be the primary ground. In the Son, therefore, is indeed the entire fulness of God—He proceeded forth from the divine essence: but He is God in a derived sense; the Father alone is the eternal ground of His being, and therefore also of the duplication of the divine power, goodness and wisdom, which exists in Him. From this we see clearly, that Origen approximated pretty nearly to principles laid down by the teachers of the Church many centuries after his time. For when they represented the Father,—as substantially they always did,—as the Monas, and not merely as a member of the Trinity, but as the whole, as the *ῥίζα πάσης θεότητος*, it is identical with Origen's designation of the Father, as the sole *πηγή πάσης θεότητος*, and the Son as the *πηγή θεότητος* for the world.² In fact, all that Origen meant in teaching the subordination of the Son, was to preserve strictly to God the original causal relation referred to above. So far from the Son's co-essentiality with God being thus excluded, such an equality of essence is required, when the causal relation appears in its absolute perfection as in the case of the Word, the perfect image of God. And, on the other hand, this equality of essence, if we limit it, with Origen, to the possession by the image of the fulness of divine perfections, does not exclude the subordination involved in the image being, not the original, but that which is grounded. On the contrary, this image, as being the most perfect possible effect, directs attention very surely to the most perfect possible cause, and in so far leads us out beyond itself.

¹ De princ. 1, 2, 4:—He is Son, not by adoption, but by nature. Compare the fragment from Pamphilus in de la Rue's Ed. vol. iv. 99. He cannot change to a less perfect condition, nor be exalted to a more perfect, ib. § 10, and in Joh. T. xxxii. 17; in Lev. hom. 13, 4: there is one will and one substance in the Father and the Son, but there are two "positiones," two distinct persons.—In the fragment of Pamphil. ad Hebr. (de la Rue, iv. 697b) it is said, after Sapientia vii. 25:—"Vapor est (filius) virtutis Dei et aporrhoea gloriæ Omnipotentis purissima." As the "vapor de substantia aliqua corporea procedit, sic etiam ipse ut quidam vapor exoritur de virtute ipsius Dei. Sic et Sapientia ex eo procedens ex ipsa Dei substantia generatur."

² See note 1, page 117.

But notwithstanding His subordination, the Son belongs as truly to the divine sphere, or the divine being, as brightness does to light.

We may regard it, therefore, as proved, that in the system of Origen these two aspects do not contradict each other, that neither the one nor the other can be put aside, because both are equally rooted in his conception of God, and both are necessary to its full expression. He knows God as the living God, revealed in Christ, and communicating His divine, above all, His spiritual nature, His wisdom and ethical perfection. But, on the other hand, he refuses to allow that the divine ground passes entirely over into that which is grounded; for such an admission would have led him back to Patripassianism, which he had rejected, or to a kind of Pantheism. For this reason, he distinguishes between the communicable and the incommunicable in God, *terming both, however, divine essence*. The incommunicable in God, which he imagines to be the highest portion of the divine nature, is His primary, superessential, self-occluded being; the communicable is the fulness of His perfections, especially His spiritual essence. For it must be remembered, that, for example, moral unity with God is not, in his view, a mere external relation of resemblance, but implies a real participation in the ethical essence of God: so also as respects wisdom. Hence, when he attributes to the Son likeness, nay more, identity (*ταυτότης*), of will with the Father, it means far more than is commonly supposed.¹ The incommunicable the Father cannot communicate even to the Son; but, more closely examined, this reduces itself entirely to the momentum of *grounding* (*Begründen*), to the fact, that the Father is the primal *ἀρχή*, the Absolute. In the communicable, the world participates solely through the Son, in whom all of the divine that can be communicated has assumed an hypostatic form. We can understand, therefore, how he could say, at one time, that the Son, as the divine image, the unity of the nature or substance of the Father and of the Son, was set forth (de princ. 1, 2, 6); or (as in Joann. T. x. 21) could allow that Father and Son are one *ἐν οὐσίᾳ*, but not *τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ* or *τῇ ὑποστάσει* (compare Selecta in Ps.

¹ The Son is the expression of the entire will of the Father Himself, embodied in a person. Anac. § 28; in Joh. T. xiii. 36; c. Cels. 8, 12; de princ. 1, 2, 6; and the fragment from Pamphilus in de la Rue, iv. 99.

cxix. and note p. 125); and yet, at another time, say, The Son is not one with the Father as to substance. The former, when his attention was directed to the essence of the Son, which is derived from the Father, as a stream from its source, as a light from light; which is an outflow of the divine essence. The latter, when his eye was fixed on the essence of the Father, and that which distinguishes Him from the Son. If, for example, he regarded the momentum of grounding, as that which distinguishes the Father from the Son, or saw in the ἀρχὴ the essence of the Father (as he perhaps does once, catachrestically; see de orat. 15, and note 2 p. 123), he could scarcely avoid maintaining, that, in this respect, the Son cannot in any sense be put on a level with the Father. In the same manner, also, he says regarding the world, that it is of a different essence from the Son, in so far as it is in no respect the ground of His existence.¹ We can now also more definitely answer the question, whether Origen conceived the Son to have been posited by the will of the Father, as the world was posited by the will of the Son; or whether the relation between Father and Son was in this respect a more essential one.

It was impossible for Origen, when he spoke with precision, to say, that the Son was posited by the simple will of the Father; for he did not allow that either the will, or any other aspect of the simple essence of God, could undertake anything in particular by itself. It is true, the ground of the will, as of all the rest, is the supra-substantial Father; but the will itself belongs to the ἐνέργεια of the divine essence, to the fulness of its δόξα, which is hypostatized in the Son. For this reason, he could not properly say either of the wisdom or of the will, the power, the holiness of God,—The Son was posited by the Father's will or wisdom; he must rather say,—The Son is *out of* the will of the Father, or He *is* the expressed will and wisdom

¹ We need not resort even to this expedient relatively to the passage adduced by Baur, in Joh. T. xx. 16. For his protestation here against the generation from the essence of the Father does not refer to the eternal generation of the Son, as a glance at the passage will show, but to the incarnation; and his opponents were such as Beron. Baur might more easily have made use of in Joh. T. ii. 18, διότι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ, because, whereas the Father is light itself, the Son is the light in the darkness. But this passage also is cleared up by the remarks made above. Compare note 1, page 134.

of the Father. His doctrine of the eternity of the Son would thus be explained and established from a new point of view. And in point of fact this was his opinion. He styles the Son the Soul of God the Father,¹ that is, the principle of actuality, the *ἐνέργεια*. Nay more, he frequently describes the Son in His relation to the Father, who is, it is true, the first principle, though by Himself He dwells in pure ideality, as the "*voluntas ex Patre (mente) procedens*." In Origen's view, there existed in God no actual will prior to the Son; the Son Himself was first this will. If, then, the Son is not posited by the will of the Father, but is Himself the existence of that entire divine fulness κατ' ἐνέργειαν, which is in the Father in the form of principle, a fresh proof is given that the mode in which Origen conceives Him connected with the will of the Father, instead of robbing Him of His divine essence, as many fancy, ensures it to Him afresh. Nor is the world, like the Son, the divine will; but is posited by the will of the Father, that is, by the Son. The world was the object of the divine omnipotence and predestination, but not the Son (ad Rom. i. 5); for, on the contrary, as we have seen, the Father is first almighty through the Son. It is also further clear, that Origen could not at all shrink from the use of emanatistic expressions, although he endeavoured to rid them of their sensuous, temporal elements. The Son is not, like the world, a work and creature of the paternal will, but the ethical and intellectual emanation of God, the reflection of the Father's glory, which can no more be lacking than brightness to light. He is, therefore, eternally equal with the Father, and necessarily involved in His essence, though He, the hypostatical image, is not the originating principle of His own existence, but the Father who logically precedes all ἐνέργεια (Note 22). From this, it is evident that Origen already approximated to the doctrine of an immanent relation between Father and Son. The Son is the form and image of God, eternally assuming an independent existence (μορφή Θεοῦ; see note 1 p. 127); the hypostatical realization of His fulness (δόξα); so far is He from being related to the Father, as something merely posited, that He eternally draws into Himself (in Joh. T. ii. 2; c. Cels. 8, 14), and exhibits, the deity of the Father. But the

¹ De princ. 2, 8, 4, 5.

existence of the Son presupposes, of course, not merely His having been once for all generated and grounded by the Father, but also that He continues to be united with the Father, and to behold the depths of the divine being (without which He would not be God's image). Separated from the Father, the Son could no longer be God (in Joh. T. ii. 2). Again, the Father is not merely the inner substance, the material or content which acquires shape in the Son, but remains something for and in Himself; for, though the generation of the image is a duplication of God's mode of existence, it is not a mere transformation of the archetype into the image. Such a transformation would be annihilation. The Father is, in his view, not simply divine *ἕλη*, but a self-contemplative subject, who passes over into the Son with the fulness of His essence, but not as the primary ground (*βάθος*). Origen did not regard the Father as identical with the void Neo-Platonic *Ὀν*, the mere *ἀπειρον*;¹ but as the most positive of all beings, as the highest, unmixed unity, without any distinction, neither blind nor motionless, but knowing and contemplating Himself (in Joh. xxxii. 18), eternally generating the Son, who is the causative principle of the many, and the connective principle of the manifold.

Leaving aside for the time, the question, whether this conception of God, which involves the apparently contradictory determinations laid down by Origen, be a sufficient one or not, let us consider the *relation of the Son to the world*. He stands to the world in a more direct relation than the Father. As we have seen, He is the truth and the soul of the world; in Him is all true reality, for only the rational can be said to have true reality.² Through Him, therefore, the true spiritual substance of the universe, the world, this infinite *ζῶον*, is an organism; He is the *ἡγεμονικόν*, the reason in every soul. This substantial relation of the Son to the world, embraces not merely men, but also angels—nay, the whole universe, which can only have true reality so far as it also participates in spirituality, in

¹ Whether in other respects he was quite free from the abstract *Ὀν*, we shall see further on.

² We must understand it in Origen's sense, when he assigns to the Son the kingdom of the rational. As rational, the world belongs to Him; to the Father, so far as it points to a first cause. Compare Huet, "*Origeniana*" l. c. 135.

the Logos. At first sight, this wears the look of Pantheism. But he attributes to the world a relatively independent existence, as is clear from the one circumstance, of his representing freedom as the principle which posits the multiplicity of objects. The Son, therefore, does not continue alone possessed of being, but brings into existence an infinite number of subjects, of Egos, all alike free relatively to each other, and essentially connected, in common, with Him. No less again is the Son related in various ways to the different beings ;—which cannot be said regarding the Father. Nor is it a mere result of our mode of apprehension, that one and the same Logos wears a different appearance to each different class, or each separate subject ; but He in Himself is related to the many, He has objectively different modes of existence for different beings, without therefore ceasing to be the one Logos.¹ With all rational creatures, whatever paths they may take in the exercise of their freedom, He is present : He is wedded indissolubly to men as to angels, to Christ as to Paul. This he deduces even from the omnipresence of the Logos ;² but He is different in different beings. To this may perhaps be referred the thought, which repeatedly occurs :—What Paul says regarding himself, that he had become all things to all men, has held true in a much more divine manner of the Logos in all ages, for He became an angel to angels, and a man to men. Origen, however, by no means rests satisfied with this natural participation in the Logos. Even the last-mentioned thought implicitly attributes to the Logos a new form of existence, besides the immanent one *in* subjects. This is His objective appearance *alongside* of His creatures, particularly men. In His goodness and loving-kindness, He shows Himself to every one, according to his ability to apprehend Him. These differences of form also are not mere subjective seeming ; but He appears objectively in the forms which are necessary for

¹ De princ. i. 1, 68 ; in Joh. T. i. 22 ; c. Cels. 4, 16 ;—*Εἰσι γὰρ διάφοροι οἶονεῖ τοῦ λόγου μορφαι, καθὼς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀγομένων φαίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἀνάλογον τῇ ἕξει τοῦ εἰσαγομένου, ἢ ἐπ' ὀλίγον προκόπτοντος ἢ ἐπὶ πλείον.* Christ is objectively all *ἀναβαθμοὶ* up to the Holiest of all ; He unites in Himself all the stages, all the momenta of truth : and to each one He gives to see that of Himself, for which he has an eye.

² Ana. § 29. Although He is omnipresent, He is not “*similiter in universis.*” *Plenius enim et clarius et ut ita dicam apertius in Archangelis est, quam in aliis sanctis viris, etc.*”

His rational creatures; and though these forms are inadequate to, or even partially conceal, Him, and in so far may be described as a mere seeming, they nevertheless serve the purpose of bringing Him objectively near to men. This is the self-abasement to which the Logos consented, concealing so much of His divine brightness as men were unable to bear, and objectively revealing and setting before men so much as sufficed to enable them to rise by its means to the vision of His higher form, of his deity (*προηγούμενη φύσις, μορφή*).

For our purpose, however, Origen's doctrine of the condescension of the Logos to men, who occupy perhaps the lowest position in the ranks of the classes of rational beings,¹ is of the greatest importance. As is well known, Origen considered the human race to consist of souls, which, during their pre-existence, fell away from the Logos, through sin: the consequence of this apostasy was, that the lower powers of the *ψυχή* broke loose from their unity with the *πνεῦμα* (that is, the Logos), and made themselves falsely independent of the Logos, in whom alone it was possible for them to occupy their true position—the position, to wit, of integrant, but still subordinate, momenta of the true personality, which are fired as it were by the *πνεῦμα*. In consequence of this their first fall, men walk in bodies, forgetful of their origin, forgetful of the Logos. But the Logos could not forget them; and in order to remind them of Himself, the only true good, in order to enable them to approach Him, He assumed the form of man, in the state to which sin had reduced it—He took upon Himself a mortal body—He lived a truly human life, though without sin—He delivered men from the curse of sin and death, partly by doctrine and example, but mainly by His death—and He perfectly re-established the union of souls with Himself, and, through Himself, with the Father (in Joh. T. i. 23–29).

At this point, however, we must halt and ask:—How far

¹ These classes he represents, however, not as different races, but as stages within one and the same race of rational beings. Here also he is led by the thought, that reason is one, like truth. Hence he believed that the more perfect men become angels, even as, under the impulse of love, angels may become men. The essential feature of all is, not the body, but the spirit; and the spirit is of the same nature, essentially alike in all, though they may occupy different stages.

did the Logos participate in the incarnation? Did He really enter into fellowship with mutable, suffering men? Both the idea of the incarnation and His work, which consisted not merely in teaching, but in divine-human deeds and sufferings, required that He should do so. His union with Christ must have been different from His union with men generally; the history of the man Christ, must in a certain sense have been His own history. Otherwise, the incarnation would have been really nothing new; inasmuch as the Logos was previously everywhere present. The new feature would be mere subjective seeming, if the Logos had not entered into a relation to this man, which had objective significance for Himself. But if the history of this man were in any sense the history of the Logos, the danger to which Patripassianism succumbed again reappears. In that case, it might appear advisable to adopt the expedient of saying,—The Logos remained, even in Christ, unchangeably what He had been previously and universally. Then, however, His appearance was a mere theophany, not an incarnation; the new element was at the utmost an act of manifestation, not a being and living of the Logos, in new unity with humanity.

Origen felt the difficulties attending both courses. In the *Anaceph.* (§ 30 f. p. 191), he lays down the principle,—that two errors are to be avoided: firstly, that of keeping this divine element entirely or partially outside of Christ; secondly, the opposite error, of conceiving the deity so shut in by the humanity, as to be itself restricted and made finite through the limits of the body, deprived of its universality, rent asunder from the Father, and subjected to change and suffering.¹ In the solution of this problem, he was aided to some extent by the spiritual conception he had formed of the divine. As the divine cannot be divided, nor enclosed in space, but remains everywhere entire and identical with itself, no danger can be involved in saying even that the entire deity of the Son was in Christ. Those

¹ L. c.: Non ita sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis ejus majestas intra brevissimi corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne Verbum Dei et sapientia ejus ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a Patre divulsa sit, vel intra corporis ejus coercita et conscripta brevitatem, nec usquam præterea putetur operata. The two dangers to be avoided are rather—ut neque aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur, et nulla penitus a paterna substantia, quæ ubique est, facta esse putetur divisio.

who suppose that a true incarnation would have been an unworthy coarctation of the Son of God within the limits of the body, and who therefore maintain that merely a part of the deity of the Son dwelt in Christ, whilst the other part was elsewhere or everywhere, do not understand the nature of an incorporeal and invisible substance; they fear that if it entered fully into the humanity of Christ, it would entirely lose its infinitude, and yet, by their division, they make it a corporeal and finite thing.

But should it even be premised, that no danger to the deity of Christ is involved in the supposition of its dwelling undividedly in His humanity, nothing more is thereby done than to show the general possibility of a *punctual* (punktuell) presence of the Logos, the possibility of His dwelling entirely and fully in the humanity of Christ, without either an Ebionitical attenuation of the divine, or a Docetical dissipation of the human. That such a presence, however, was not an incarnation, was not in reality more than a theophany, Origen must have felt; and all the more deeply, as he himself, when combating Patripassianism, could not often enough repeat,—The Son remained what He was, in that He became what He was not.¹ The incarnate Logos was like the sun, whose rays continue pure whatever may be the nature of the place on which they shine (c. Cels. 6, 73). The wisdom of God, which is His Only-begotten Son, is unchangeable in all things. In Him is the entire sum of essential good, which, as such, can undergo no change or alteration (de princ. 1, 2, 10). Even during His self-abasement, He lost no part of His *εὐδαιμονία*; He continued blessed, even whilst He was labouring and suffering for our salvation. Unchangeable in essence (*οὐσία*), God descended to men in providence and activity (*προνοία καὶ οἰκονομία*) on their behalf.

It could not, therefore, escape him, that if the simple divine nature continued entirely by and in itself, and so also the human, no such a thing as an incarnation took place. Hence, we find a number of passages, in which, starting with the idea of the Logos, whom on other grounds he represented as more closely related to the world, its multiplicity and finitude, he evinces an inclination to bring the Son into the intimate union with the finite, required by the Christian consciousness. Accordingly, he

¹ For other passages bearing on the unchangeableness of the Logos even during the incarnation, see in Joh. T. xxxiii. 17, and note 1, page 108.

says (in Joh. T. ii. 18), the Son is different from the Father; for the latter is the light which is unapproachable by, and exalted above all conflict with, darkness. The Son, on the contrary, is the light which shines in the darkness, which battles with, suffers persecution from, but is not overcome by, the darkness.¹ Elsewhere he says,—“He left father and mother, that is, God the Father and the heavenly Jerusalem, His kingdom, and descended to us.”² From this it would seem that His incarnation involved a renunciation of His glory. So also, when Origen endeavours to exhibit the entire depth of His participation in our sufferings, he is frequently more concerned to assert that He notwithstanding retained His deity, that is, His love, unchanged, than that His blessedness and glory remained untouched. At such times, he does not shrink from the employment of those paradoxes and apparent contradictions, than which nothing is dearer to faith, because they alone seem to furnish an explanation of that actual contradiction which gnaws at the heart of a world created for God, and yet lying in destruction. “Christ,” says he, “is both Priest and Sacrifice. He committed no sin, but He became sin for us through the flesh, in order that He might carry our sins and nail them to the cross. He who is immortal, dies; He who is incapable of suffering, suffers; He who is invisible, reveals

¹ Also de princ. i. 2, 8, may be referred to this connection: “Ut autem plenius intelligatur, quomodo Salvator figura est substantiæ vel subsistentiæ Dei, utamur etiam exemplo.” After remarking,—this comparison may be incomplete, but it is merely intended to show us how the Son of God, who was in the form of God, intended by means of His very self-abasement to reveal to us the fulness of deity,—he goes on to say,—Verbi causa, si facta esset aliqua statua talis, quæ magnitudine sui universum orbem terræ teneret, et pro sui immensitate considerari a nullo posset: fieret autem alia statua, membrorum habitu ac vultus lineamentis, specie ac materia per omnia similis absque magnitudinis immensitate, pro eo, ut qui illam immensam considerare atque intueri non possent, hanc videntes illam se vidisse confiterentur pro eo—quod omnia—prorsus indiscreta servaret: tali quadam similitudine exinaniens se filius Dei, de æqualitate patris et viam nobis cognitionis ejus ostendens figura expressa substantiæ ejus efficitur.—Filius Dei brevissimæ insertus humani corporis formæ ex operum virtutisque similitudine patris in se immensam ac invisibilem magnitudinem designabat.

² In Jerem. hom. 10, 7: “Ἴδε μοι τὸν ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχοντα, ὄντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἴδε αὐτοῦ τὸν οἶκον ὑπερουράνιον—ἴδε αὐτοῦ οἶκον ὄντα τὸν Θεόν. Καταλείπει τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ τὴν μητέρα, τὴν ἀνω Ἱερουσαλήμ, καὶ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸν περιγίγιον τόπον. Παρίδωκεν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἐχθρῶν.

Himself. By coming to become sin for us, He intensified and awakened evil. For through His love He made Himself visible in the flesh and displeasing to men, so that they killed Him" (in Lev. Hom. 3, 1). In Hom. Jerem. 8, 8 we read,—“Let our discourse be bold, and let us say,—The divine which entered into the world, humbled (emptied) itself, in order that the world might be filled by its emptiness. But though it had emptied itself, its emptiness was still wisdom. For divine folly is wiser than men. Had I been the first to make use of this word, ‘divine folly,’ how would my accusers have assailed me! But Paul himself terms apostolic wisdom divine folly. For, as compared with the supra-celestial, supra-mundane wisdom, that which became man (*τὸ ἐπιδημήσαν*) was mere divine folly, but yet wiser than men,—wiser not merely than the foolish, but also than the wise. It did not need the wisdom of God to put to nought the foolishness of the world; the weakness and the folly of God were sufficient. And so my Redeemer and Lord took upon Himself all contradictions (*ἐναντία*), in order, by means of contradictions (for example, the humiliation of the Son of God, His *κένωμα*), to solve contradictions; in order that we might be made strong through the weakness of Jesus, wise through His divine folly, and, prepared in such a way, might rise to the wisdom and power of God Himself, that is, to Jesus Christ.” What he means here is not, that merely one part or one power of the Logos became man, but the entire person of the Son. Nor again does he mean that, strictly speaking, the entire fulness of the glory of the divine Son became man, and was merely not recognised by the folly of the world;—that, consequently, His self-abasement was mere subjective seeming, which must then be recognised as such by faith. No; the incarnate One Himself was humbled, was emptied of His glory. One thing unquestionably was not given up, to wit, love, which retains its majesty even in the midst of humiliation, and that most certainly, when the humiliation, though voluntary, is still not a mere show. To this connection belongs also the remarkable passage from the Hom. in Jerem. i. 8, where he says,—“We cannot, indeed, say of Wisdom in itself, that it was ignorant, and acquired knowledge by learning; but it is certainly true of Wisdom as it was in the flesh; for Christ must needs learn to stammer and speak like a child with children (men).” Compare also de princ. 2, 6, 1.

These passages show that Origen was not so completely absorbed in his antagonism to Patripassianism, as to mistake the essentially Christian elements, which it concealed under coarser forms. The more pressing, therefore, became the question, how both interests were to be reconciled:—On the one hand, there was the unchangeableness of the Son of God, which, taken by itself, reduces the incarnation to a mere theophany; on the other hand, there was the not merely apparent, but living and genuine, union of the divine with the human nature, which threatened to mix up foreign elements with the conception of God, especially when we take into consideration that the union must embrace also the flesh of Christ. This now is the point at which a view can be gained of Origen's doctrine of the *human soul* of Christ in its full significance.

With the body, the divine nature could not directly unite itself, without subjecting itself, in a manner unworthy of God, to mutability and suffering. In order, therefore, not to be compelled to transfer sufferings to God, and yet, at the same time, to be able to maintain the possibility of a true union with humanity, we must note that the Logos assumed the soul of Christ directly; the body, however, indirectly, through the medium of the soul. But, having secured in the soul of Christ a means of carrying the incarnation through, even to the flesh, the importance he attached to that soul enabled him to assume the existence of a far more intimate relation between the Son and the humanity than Hippolytus, for example, had ventured to concede, and felt himself, consequently, able satisfactorily to meet the true aspect of the yearnings of Patripassianism. The perfect soul of Christ was as thoroughly able to participate in all the pains and woes of humanity, as to be completely united with the Son of God;—thus also did it give Him a share in the sufferings and works endured and performed by it, in His power.

Never before Origen had the human soul of Christ been seen to have so profound and integrating a bearing on the intellection of the incarnation of God. But, though we may grant that his system—laying, as it did, so great stress on freedom of choice, and concentrating therein, to a certain extent, the essence of human nature—was, in the highest degree, such as to necessitate the postulation, in particular, of the union of

the Logos with a human soul, as unconditionally requisite to the full truth of the incarnation; whereas all the Fathers who preceded him evidently attached chief importance to the body, appearing frequently to see in it the real essence of humanity; it cannot be denied, that the very ground which powerfully impelled him to the development of the doctrine of a true human soul, was, in another aspect, the source of great difficulties. For, if all souls must be deemed originally equal, on the ground that it would have been an act of partiality in God not to make the worth of each dependent on the use to which it put its freedom, it would appear that the incarnation must, in the first instance, have been a purely tentative thing, and that the union could not, from the beginning, have related to the inmost centre of the human soul,—to wit, its freedom. It was not permissible for the assumptive divine activity to penetrate at once so completely to the inmost centre of human nature as to leave it no longer free. In that case, however, an opening would have been left for sin and apostasy, and the tendency to incarnation which had been initiated would have been arrested. Nay more, if freedom of choice permanently belongs to the essence of human nature, it would appear impossible for the God-man ever to constitute an unity, and necessary that He should ever continue a double personality. And, even supposing this unity were finally to be in some way brought to pass, the incarnation must apparently be attributed rather to human merit than to divine grace; for the God-man was at the first a man like others, and the union with the deity was the reward of His virtue, as the Ebionites teach. These difficulties his clear eye discerned quite well. Let us now see how he endeavoured to overcome them.

In order to set them aside, he goes back to his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Christ's soul also must be of like nature with ours:¹ however exalted Christ may have been above other men, however distinguished and unique was His appearance (so that even His body must have participated in the glory of the soul, although usually concealed), He could not have enjoyed this exceptional position from the very beginning, but must have attained it as the reward of His virtue.

¹ De princ. 2, 8, 4. In general, as in Tertullian, so also in Origen, we find the expression: Christ had two natures, He was a σύνθετον πρᾶγμα (c. Cels. 2, 9, 24, 31). He first employed the term, θείανθρωπος.

Now, had He earned this distinction on earth, the birth of Christ would have been in no respect peculiar, it would not have been an incarnation: His *soul* would have entered into the present world as one still accessible to sin; nay more, if it were David's seed, it must have been stained with sin.¹ Like all souls, however, it pre-existed from the beginning of the world. By its decision for the good, and by its virtue, it was fitted for unflinchingly carrying out all the will and all the saving revelations of the Word and Wisdom. The Logos dwelt in an unique manner in this soul. At the commencement of creation, it is true, He was united with all souls; but this one alone clung to Him so closely, faithfully, and unchangeably, that it became one spirit with Him. (De princ. 2, 6, 3: Cum pro liberi arbitrii facultate varietas unumquemque ac diversitas habuisset animorum, ut alius ardentiore, alius tenuiore, et exiliore erga autorem suum amore teneretur, illa anima—(Jesu) ab initio creaturæ et deinceps inseparabiliter ei et indissociabiliter inhærens, utpote sapientiæ et verbo Dei et veritati et luci veræ, et tota totum recipiens, atque in ejus lucem splendoremque ipsa cedens, facta est cum ipso principaliter unus spiritus.) Hence the Son of God did not dwell in this soul merely as He dwelt in the souls of Peter and Paul; for neither of them was free from sin. But the soul which was in Jesus had chosen the good ere it knew the evil. Connected with the Word of God by an unspotted alliance, it alone was incapable of sin, and precisely because of its capability of entirely and perfectly receiving the Son of God. (De princ. 2, 6, 5: "Verum quoniam boni malique eligendi facultas omnibus præsto est, hæc anima, quæ Christi est, ita elegit diligere justitiam, ut pro immensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhæreret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscinderet et quod in arbitrio erat positum longi usus affectu jam versum sit in naturam.") Wisdom, truth, and life, it had made completely part of itself; it was the box of the precious ointment, the Apostles have the smell; in it was the entire fire of the Logos, and by His glow and heat it was pervaded in love as iron heated in the furnace; the Apostles

¹ Ad. Rom. 1, 5. Even so, if sin had been the substance of our nature, Christ also would have been sinful, de princ. 4, 37.

had the warmth which streamed forth from it.¹ Hence also, both the reason and mode of its entrance into this world were, of necessity, completely different from other men. The *reason* was not punishment or chastisement for sins, committed during its pre-temporal existence; nor the practice of, and establishment in, good; but love to men. Having continued unchangeably in the Logos, even after men had fallen, and being united with Him by the tenderest love, this soul willingly became the organ by means of which He appeared on earth, and wrought out human redemption. The self-abasement of which the Apostle speaks (Phil. ii.) is not seldom referred by Origen, as it would seem, to this soul of Christ, which gave up its glory, although not its connection with the Logos,² and entered into the fates and sufferings of the finite, into the condition which is the consequence of sin, but without being touched by the least breath of sin; for, even prior to its entrance into the world, it had become incapable of sin, through its perfect love to the Logos (Note 23). In dignity, it is true, it is inferior to the Only-begotten One, for it was created; but it, the most blessed and most exalted of all souls, was so distinguished, that it stood in the midst between God and the rest of mankind. Hence, also, the mission of accomplishing the work of redemption mainly devolved on it (ad. Rom. T. iii. 8). But, precisely for this reason, its mode of entrance into this world could not be

¹ De princ. 2, 6, 6. The image of glowing iron, so frequently repeated at a later period, is here carried out by Origen in the following way:—*"Ferri metallum capax est frigoris et caloris. Si ergo massa aliqua ferri semper in igne sit posita, omnibus suis poris omnibusque venis ignem recipiens—si neque ignis ab ea cesset aliquando, neque ipsa ab igne separetur, num quidnam dicemus hanc, quæ natura quidem ferri massa est, in igne positam et indesinenter ardentem posse frigus aliquando recipere? Quinimo magis—eam totam ignem effectam dicimus, quoniam nec aliud in ea nisi ignis cernitur: sed et si qui(s) contingere atque attrahere tentaverit, non ferri sed ignis vim sentiet. Hoc ergo modo etiam illa anima, quæ, quasi ferrum in igne, sic semper in verbo,—sapientia,—Deo posita est, omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit, Deus est, et ideo nec convertibilis aut mutabilis dici potest, quæ inconvertibilitatem ex Verbi Dei unitate indesinenter ignita possedit. Ad omnes denique sanctos calor aliquis Verbi Dei putandus est pervenisse; in hac autem anima ipse ignis divinus substantialiter requievisse credendus est, ex quo ad cæteros calor aliquis venerit."*

² Anaceph. §. 32. cll. 31.

the usual one. It was in God and in the Pleroma; thence it went forth at the bidding of the Father, and took from Mary the Virgin a true human body; and because, in the strict sense, those spirits alone can be designated men who have a mortal body (for those who have no body ought rather to be termed angels), we may fairly say, that Christ then first became man, although it be true that His soul, with which the Logos had been ever united, had the same nature as all other souls,—consequently, the same nature as the souls of men.

According to Origen, therefore, the incarnation was not accomplished in one act, but had a history, progressed from one stage to another, and fell into three main acts;—and this is a point of deep significance. The first two acts were played out ere time commenced; the third commenced with the earthly life of Christ. The first was the original and essential union into which the Logos entered with this soul, and which subsisted from the very commencement of its existence. But as this first union with the soul of Jesus was simply that which subsisted between the Logos and all souls, at the moment of their creation (otherwise, Origen's view of the divine righteousness would be violated, *de princ.* 2, 6, 3), it was not by itself any mark of distinction. Strictly speaking, it constituted merely the *presupposition* of the incarnation, and declared that human nature was susceptible thereto. To the actual realization of the incarnation, it was necessary that the union established, in the first instance, by the Logos, should be affirmed by the soul of Christ. It actually did decide for the Logos, and that with such sincerity and love, that it was completely taken up into the Logos, or even, as many passages teach, into His essence; in other words, the incarnation was perfectly accomplished as far as affects the soul. For, whereas previously the bond was dissoluble, by this second act an indestructible union was founded between the soul and the entire Logos. Origen did not intend thereby to shut out freedom; but to represent the freedom as one which can no longer choose the evil, as one that is bound and perfected by love (compare *ad. Rom. L. v. 10*). Equally far also is this perfect love, which includes freedom of choice as a momentum of itself, and no longer leaves it to occupy an isolated position (Note 24), from shutting out the incarnation from further progress: on the

contrary, this perfect love in the soul of Christ is itself the living principle and motive of the assumption of a human body. The idea of incarnation, so far as it is the work of condescending love, arrived with this third act at its extreme limit; for, in order to be able to suffer and die on men's behalf, the Logos became flesh, by means of the soul of Jesus: even then, however, further development was not rendered impossible, but the movement now began to take a reverse direction. At first, the Logos learned to stammer in the man Jesus; the child Jesus had a truly human development, and participated thoroughly in human weakness, so far as it was not marked by sin. But this self-abasement of the Logos in the soul which had descended to earth, was intended to promote the glorification of humanity, primarily in this same man. Even on earth, the glory of His higher nature was communicated to the body (c. Cels. 3, 41), as the transfiguration proves: usually, however, it was not permitted to appear, but remained concealed, or was revealed as men needed it (c. Cels. 6, 77; 4, 16; Tract. in Matth. xxxv. 100; hom. in Gen. viii. 8; in Joh. T. i. 34; ad Rom. L. i. 4). In His miracles was displayed the divine power of His entire person; His death is not to be conceived as mere passive suffering, but also as the work of His free will: His resurrection also was effected, not by the Father alone, but also by Himself (in Joh. T. x. 21). Finally, the entire Person of Christ, even His body, ascended up to heaven and was glorified. In reward for its condescension and love, His soul was then exalted, and admitted to a participation in the divine omniscience; which was not the case on earth (Tract. in Matth. xxx. 55). Its glory communicated itself also to the body of Christ. When He ascended into heaven, He took with Him His earthly body; and the heavenly powers were filled with amazement when they beheld humanity coming in Him into their midst. Elias and Enoch did not, strictly speaking, ascend to heaven; Christ, however, as He was the first-born from the dead, was also the first to raise flesh into heaven (Fragm. in Ps. xv.). And now there is no longer any difference between His humanity and His deity, the former having passed over into, and been entirely blended with, the latter.¹

¹ c. Cels. 3, 41:—Τὸ θνητὸν αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπινον ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν τῇ πρὸς ἐκείνους οὐ μόνον κοινωνίᾳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνάσει καὶ ἀνακράσει τὰ μέγιστα

These expressions are so strong, that at an early period Origen was suspected of holding the humanity to be a transient phenomena of the Logos.¹ It is inaccurate, indeed, to charge him with teaching that Christ laid aside His humanity: so far from that, he rather conceived it to have been constituted, as it were, a momentum of the Logos Himself, and regarded its passage into deity as its perfection. All human weakness was removed; divine power and glory took its place.

At the same time, we here come upon a defect which, on closer examination, we find running through Origen's entire system, and which leaves unsettled difficulties at all the chief points.

It is true he believed human nature to be destined for the divine, and incapable of attaining its truth, save in union therewith. But this divine is, strictly speaking, something which transcends human nature; and human nature must be exalted above itself, that is, must change its nature, in order to fulfil its destiny. Its ideal lies immediately in God, not in God's idea of man, of which unity with Him is an essential constituent. In order, therefore, to reach its goal, humanity must cease to be humanity, must pass into another substance, to wit, the divine, and be swallowed up by it. Accordingly, his theory exposed him to the danger of representing the perfection of humanity as the termination of its existence. The reverse aspect thereof is, that when he attributes independence to the man, he is compelled to exclude the action of God; as we find from his not regarding the decision for the Logos formed by the soul of Christ as the decision of the Logos Himself. At this point, therefore, the view he takes of Christ is really Ebionitical, notwithstanding its relating to His pre-temporal existence. It is an important defect of Origen's Christology, that when it aims to assert the full truth of the humanity of Christ, it does not entirely avoid Ebionism; and, on the other hand, when it sets forth the deity of Christ in its victorious, all-conquering might,

*Φαμεν προσειληφέναι, καὶ τῆς ἰκεῖνου θεότητος κοινοῦνηνκότα εἰς θεὸν μεταβα-
βηκέναι. Ἐὰν δὲ τις προσέσπῃ καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ ταῦθ' ἡμῶν
λεγόντων, ἰπιστησάτω τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων λεγομένοις περὶ τῆς τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ
ἀποίου ὕλης, ποιότητος ἀμφισκομένης ὁποῖας ὁ δημιουργὸς βούλεται αὐτῇ περι-
τιθῆναι, καὶ πολλάκις τὰς μὲν προτέρας ἀποτιθεμένης, κρείττονας δὲ καὶ διαφό-
ρους ἀναλαμβάνουσας. Tract. in Matth. xxxiv. 70.*

¹ Compare Huet's "Origeniana," in de La Rue's Ed. iv. 152.

it approximates too closely to Docetism, by representing the humanity as absorbed in the deity. An exactly similar fault characterizes also his doctrine of the Trinity. The common root of both defects is his peculiar conception of God. We have found that Origen's doctrine of the Son follows necessarily and clearly from his conception of God, according to which, the Son, who, at one and the same time, is eternally generated, and is being eternally generated (*der ewig gezeugte und gezeugtwerdende*), possesses all that is communicable of the divine essence (that is, volition and knowledge); and further, that he denies to the Son solely that which appears to him absolutely incommunicable, indivisible, and inconceivable in different hypostases, save on the condition of denying the unity of the ultimate, ungenerated, and generating ground. The consequence thereof was, that, contrary to his soteriological principles, the Son was shut out from the inmost sphere of the divine, and reduced to the rank of something secondary, almost to the rank of a creature. That which the Son did not possess, is represented as the inmost, the highest part of God; this the highest part of God, therefore, is incommunicable, exclusive. Here we come again upon the false idea of God, which teaches that something physical, the physical category of the Absolute, and not love and goodness, not His spiritual attributes, are the highest, the inmost, the proper being of God. Origen had not yet succeeded in entirely breaking loose from the *ᾠ* of Hellenic philosophy; and the direct result thereof was the impossibility of the Son's being one with the Most High God. His primary and predominant tendency to set the essence of the Son, as far as possible, on an equality with that of the Father, fails because of this rigid *ᾠ*, this dark remnant of the old heathenish view of the world, which transfers the inmost constituent of the conception of God to the sphere of the natural, where all things are characterized by exclusiveness. Everything would have assumed an entirely different position, had he regarded love and the spiritual attributes as constituting the inmost essence of God; for therein the Son might participate. Aseity, on the contrary, instead of being described as the inmost essence of God; in which it was impossible for the Son to participate, would then have denoted simply that which was distinctive of the Father, whilst the *entire divine nature* would have been recognised as belonging in common to

the Father and to the Son. Origen, however, puts the matter as follows:—The Son could only participate in the inmost and highest part of the divine nature, so far as He entirely lost Himself in the One, Indivisible God, and ceased to be any longer Son; but so far as there is a difference between Him and the Father, the latter sets forth the entire and inmost divine essence, whereas the former remains excluded from this sphere.

We remark, therefore, in Origen a phænomenon which frequently reappeared at a later period, especially in the Mystics,—namely, because the divine, in its dissociation from all multiplicity, singularity, or determination, was conceived to be the Highest, whereas man in general, and the Christian in particular, demands that the very divine itself, and not merely a derivative divine, be accessible to him; he was compelled to speak of a going out beyond the image of God, to wit, the Son, into the depths of the divine nature, into the essence of the Father,—the effect of which naturally was, to threaten both the mediatorship of the Logos, and the historical significance of Christ. It is false, indeed, to regard it in Origen's sense as a mere subjective seeming;¹ he had, at all events, no *intention* of modalistically dissolving the hypostasis of the Logos and His history in the divine Monas; but still he by no means completely extricated himself from this error, for, according to his teaching, the inmost essence of the Most High God scarcely penetrates to the essence of the Son. In the Son, we know the Father solely according to His *δόξα*, and to the divine substance thereunto appertaining, not according to His inmost essence. The world represents to him, as in another form to Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, a divine hierarchy, all the members of which are rational in themselves, but in different degrees; and the higher stage, by stretching out its hand in aid of the lower, leads it out beyond itself to a higher. Those who cannot lay hold on Christ's external appearance are retained in connection with the Logos, by means of rational beings in whom He dwells more perfectly. The second class lays hold on the outward appearance of Christ, but does not understand the highest and alone true element in Him, into which His own humanity passed, after enjoying for a moment an individual existence. The third class is led on through the humanity of Christ to His pure deity, and then

¹ As notwithstanding Baur does, l. c. p. 219.

knows Him no longer after the flesh. But even to be united with the Logos is not the highest attainment; for, inasmuch as He Himself is not in Himself the Highest, He directs us beyond Himself to the Most High God, the Father, to whom we are to enter into a relation of contemplation (*θέα*), as intimate as that of the Logos. Origen forgets not, indeed, to remark that perfect Christians owe their attainment of this highest stage to the Logos, that is, not merely to the eternal, but to the incarnate, Logos; and that there is no way to this height, save the way through the God-man and the Logos. In particular did he regard the death of Christ as the eternally operative means of reconciliation, which continues to be a necessary preliminary to the attainment of the highest stage,—a circumstance which leads us to form a favourable estimate of the depth of his Christian consciousness. His endeavours to exalt the sacrifice of Christ to an absolutely universal significance, to strip it of the limits of time and space, and to represent it as having been presented in heaven, were not dictated by a wish to dissipate His historical death, but rather, on the contrary, by a desire to set it forth as the central event of history and of the universe, as the point in which heaven and earth meet, and God and the world are reconciled. For this reason, though the sacrifice of Christ was presented on earth, he places it in heaven, and teaches that even the pious who lived prior to His advent, were counted among the reconciled, for its sake;—indeed, he represents the entire world as participating in its blessing. But if in Christ by Himself and in the Logos, we do not merely not possess the entire God (for even the Church does not suppose that), but not even the Most High God, then is merely a porch of heaven, and not heaven itself, come down to us, and thus we see clearly that the revelation of the highest in Christ can only be viewed as a modalistic shining into Him. At this same point, we are not less instructively reminded also of the essential connection between Modalism and Subordinationism. For when Modalism endeavours to conceive the revelation in Christ as a permanent, fixed thing, and not as a mere theophany, it falls into Subordinationism; and so, on the other hand, all Subordinationism unavoidably represents the truly divine as merely shining into the Son. Neither of them, consequently, possesses in Christ the absolute religion, and both are impelled to aspire beyond this

revelation to a fanciedly higher and deeper mystery. This mystery is, it is true, empty enough; but its influence is pernicious, because it weakens the conviction that in Christ we possess the highest; it reduces His revelation from the rank of an absolute to that of a relative one; and it may turn away the eye from the mysterious treasures which are contained in Christ Himself, and which demand to be revealed to our consciousness (Note 25.)

The statement just given may show us that the attempt made by Origen, with a clear insight into the nature of his task, to free the momenta of truth, scattered through the systems of his predecessors, from the one-sidedness of heresy, and to unite them in one great whole, necessarily failed because of the imperfection of his conception of God. Origen therefore forms a knot in the history of doctrine. Many threads meet in him; his far-reaching mind saw that they must be united in one web; and, standing as it were at the cradle of the development of Christian doctrine, he, the first Christian dogmatician, lays down the problems which should busy the mind of the Church for a long period, but was himself unable to find the solution. The threads of thought, which, like so many lines, had converged towards a centre in his great mind, separate again still more widely from each other in quitting him; the various aspects which he aimed at uniting, did not find a form capable of embracing them all; and the more closely he brought them together, the more clearly was their permanent disharmony revealed. His attempt at effecting an union became, on the contrary, a watchword for the unchaining of antagonisms and the initiation of new struggles. This point now demands our attention.

Let us first cast a glance at the development of doctrine during this remarkable period, and at the three principal figures who acted the part of representatives of the Church. From the end of the second century and onwards, the teachers of the Church arrived at the common conviction, that, in order to secure doctrinally the hypostasis of the Logos, they must advance beyond the literal signification of the term, inasmuch as God in general is also Reason (*λόγος*). Following Tertullian's example, the term "Son" was therefore adopted for a watchword. Hippolytus now says, the Son is out of the Logos; the Logos is the spiritual substance of God or of the Father Himself; so far is

He from being Himself the Son, that logically the Logos precedes the Son,—a thought which is further carried out by Origen. A great part of Tom. i. in Joh., where he represents the ἀρχὴ of John (in which was the λόγος, that is, the μονογενὴς or Son) as the divine σοφία, that is, as the νοῦς or λόγος of God Himself, out of which the Son then proceeds, is occupied with the development of this same thought. By means of the word Son, a clearer distinction was now drawn between the essence and the personality of the second hypostasis; but, at the same time, Sonship was understood at first to denote, not the essence, but merely the personality (for example, by Tertullian and Hippolytus); whereof the natural consequence was, that whereas, or because, the *essence* of the second hypostasis is eternal, its personality was conceived to be non-eternal. The temporal diremption, namely, was intended to aid in setting plainly forth and establishing the distinction between the eternal substance still undistinguished from the Father, and the personality. The less mature and ready mind of Tertullian (for example) was unable to discover any other means of mastering the distinction, than by fixing it in time. Without doubt, too, the watchword now chosen, "Son," brought with it the temptation to conceive the Sonship as having begun in time. At all events, one can easily understand that men like Clemens Alexandrinus and Irenæus (the latter of whom had already begun to treat the doctrine of the Logos critically), who in the main rested satisfied with the word Logos, must have found it easier, yea, even more necessary, to affirm the eternity of the divine wisdom and reason (that is, the eternity of the Son, in their sense), than those who started with the word Son. The consequent commixture of the Son with finitude, which on the one hand brought Tertullian nearer to Patripassianism, and on the other hand involved him in contradiction with himself, seeing that he, notwithstanding, deemed the Son to be derived from the eternal essence of God, Hippolytus endeavoured to set aside by drawing a clear distinction between God, as the alone infinite, supra-infinite One, and the world. His determinism, however, reduced the world, nay, even the humanity of Christ, to selflessness; and he also subjects the hypostatic existence of the Son to the almighty will of God. His gaze was already directed away from the later manifested personality of the Son, back to His eternal essence; and

he tried to establish a connection between the two, by means of the idea of the predestination of the personality of the Son. But the Son is plainly thus reduced to still greater dependence on the divine will; and that eternal essence is represented as belonging to the Father alone, and as communicated to the hypostatic Son, according to His will and counsel. Origen first rose decidedly above this point of view. He saw the contradiction between the supposition of an hypostasis, whose existence commences at a later time, on the one hand, and the attribution to it of an eternal divine essence, and the denial that it is a creature, on the other hand. He therefore combined the eternity of the divine essence with the fact of the genesis of the personality, by means of the doctrine of the *eternal*, that is, the eternally processive generation of the Son by the Father. Earlier writers had spoken much of the will of the Father in a way that equalized the Son and creatures, contrary to their intention; and Origen, in whose system the will plays so important a part, did not entirely escape this fault: at the same time, he described the Son as the *hypostatized will* of the Father, which proceeded forth from His wisdom, spirit, *νοῦς* = *λόγος*. In harmony with the doctrine of the eternal generation, Origen thus brought the tendencies of Tertullian and Hippolytus to a certain sort of conclusion; but at the same time set himself into strong realistic antagonism to the men of the second century, who had viewed the Son more idealistically as the divine reason and wisdom, or, at the utmost, as the divine thought which is at the same time world-creative. It is evident, however, that the definition of the Son as Will, can, in itself, no more secure the distinction of His hypostasis from the Father, than the definition of Him as the Logos. For as the Father is, and must continue to be, Logos, Reason, so also is He Will,—a circumstance which might escape the attention of Origen, with his peculiar conception of God, but could not be concealed from the Church, holding, as it did, the Christian idea of God. The only means of averting that danger, was the idea of a diremption of the divine essence. We have seen, also, that Origen repeatedly approximated to this idea, but was unable fully to carry it out, because his conception of God was essentially opposed to such a diremption, and was interwoven with the Hellenic Absolute or *Ὀν*. On the other hand, it deserves to be noted with approval,

that he tried to assign to the will also a place in the humanity of Christ, although his efforts ended somewhat ebionitically. Still more does it deserve mention, that, primarily for the sake of securing the truth of the ethical development of the humanity of Christ, he represented the incarnation, not, after the universal custom in his day, as a fact once for all accomplished and concluded, but as a continuous, nay more, progressive one.

CHAPTER SECOND.

SABELLIANISM.

SABELLIANISM—taking the word in its doctrinal, not in its historical signification—is capable of assuming many forms, the attainment of an acquaintance with which is our present object. The essential feature, it is true, of all the forms of Sabellianism, is the *Μοναρχία*, the unity of God; but the assertion thereof was compatible with a recognition of the distinction between God as He is in Himself, and God as revealed. The relation between the two, however, may be very differently viewed. Sabellianism, in its earliest form, did not deem the unchangeableness of God, His freedom from processes of growth and from suffering, necessary to His absolute unity: on the contrary, the early Patripassians taught that God entered into change and suffering. That God Himself was present in His revelation, was maintained by them with such intensity, that they directly identified the two. They took for granted, it is true, that God still continued God; but how His subjection to suffering and processes of growth was compatible therewith, they did not further inquire: in other words, they did not define the inner essence of God to be that which continues ever the same, and permanently distinguish it from the sphere of that which He became. Noetus does this more distinctly than Praxeas. He distinguished God's permanent being in Himself and the revelations, in which He manifests Himself as He pleases. It is clear, however, that even so, the unchangeableness of God is not fully secured. For, in the act of manifesting Himself, He enters, according to Noetus, into externality and

passibility. At the same time, he thus affirmed the objective truth of the revelations in harmony with the claims of the religious mind. But the speculative knowledge of God seems all the more strongly contradictory thereto, as, on the one hand, no motive is assigned why God should begin to reveal Himself, nor the revelation reconciled with His unchangeableness; and, on the other hand, the mode and number of God's revelations are not shown to be conditioned by His eternal essence. Beron and Beryll also neglected to give more attentive consideration to the divine unchangeableness, though, in a Christological point of view, they occupy higher ground.

Another more refined form of Monarchianism was that which, whilst aiming to exclude all suffering whatever from God, nevertheless held that God Himself was really present in His revelations under the form of deeds; and sought to reduce their indefinite plurality within fixed limits. God would then be in all His revelations unalterably one and the same; the possibility of a difference of revelations being based on the distinction drawn between God's unchangeable *inseity* (*Insichseyn*) and His historical life in the world, and the attribution of the change of revelations solely to this latter.

A still more sublimated form of this tendency was, thirdly, that which not merely excluded suffering and change from God's essence, but, instead of His historical life, admitted solely the existence of a movement, which, as the movement of His will, was held to have nothing to do with His being. So far as revelation is regarded merely as a work, and not as a mode of the existence of God, all that is present therein, is undoubtedly His thought or will; He Himself, however, is not revealed, but remains withdrawn from the world. But as the Christian mind could never be content with the meagre description of Christ as a mere work of God, the expedient might be adopted of saying, that though the entire God was not present in the revelation, or in the actuality, yet a ray of the divine essence was. A merely quantitative distinction from Patripassianism,—a distinction, too, which, in addition, pays an earnest-money to Ebionism,—is thus effected, but nothing more.

The final logical result of this tendency to give prominence to the abstract simplicity and immutability of God, would naturally be to transfer this abstract simplicity to the so-called reve-

lation also. For, as the divine omnipresence itself forbids the separation of the will and work of God from His being, seeing that He continues present in both, the movement or change which was meant to be confined to them, falls back into His being. Consequently, if God be regarded as the abstractly simple One, we can no longer represent Him as active in the work of revelation; for if He were, especially on the supposition of different revelations, He must be brought under the limits of time. That, therefore, which is termed revelation, is a simple subjective matter: the objective God remains in His being and doing ever and eternally the same: He merely appears as a different being, be it that the objective medium through which He presents Himself to the consciousness, breaks the rays of His essence differently; or be it that the individual subject, at different stages, knows the divine, which is one and the same, and which presents itself always alike, more or less perfectly. In the former case, we should have a feeble remainder of an objective self-revelation of God, in the sense, namely, of the world, and not God, being the cause of different aspects of the divine nature being revealed at different times; in the latter case, no objective revelation at all takes place, but the entire process of religion and revelation is dissipated, after a Pelagian (or deistic) fashion, into a simple matter of subjective human development:—so, indeed, that not even in the creation of the world is a place left for a revelation of God; for the creation of the world must be as incompatible with the abstract simplicity and unchangeableness of God as the act of the second creation. The entire mode of thought of early thinkers indisposed them for carrying this principle out to its logical results; but representatives of the second and third forms of Monarchianism made their appearance even as late as the third and fourth centuries.

We see thus, within this tendency, a gradual progress from a pantheistic principle, that is, a principle which commingles God and the world, to a deistic principle: these two extremes, however, are connected by the predominance given to the conception of God as substance, relatively to which the ethical aspect of God is thrown into the background, and which, from its unsatisfactory character, sways about between the extremes of a God who is immediately passible, and one who is separated from the world.

After these preliminary observations, let us return to the history. The result of the development of the Church, which since the days of Hippolytus and Origen had brought the doctrine of the immutability of the inner, divine essence decidedly to the foreground, had been to repress Patripassianism. About the middle of the third century, it withdrew from the scene; and only a few forlorn, anonymous voices were raised on its behalf: unless we take into consideration the pantheistic, dualistic movement which went forward almost outside of the limits of Christianity, and whose occurrence at this precise period cannot be regarded as accidental (Note 26).

But we have seen also, that even the system of Origen had not advanced beyond the idea of the abstract simplicity of God. If, as he maintains, the supra-essential God suffers within Himself no inner distinctions; and if, notwithstanding, on the other hand, the main matter is, that the Most High God should come forth and enter into fellowship with humanity; it appears more correct, with Sabellianism, to posit the latter, and, whilst retaining hold on the simplicity of God in Himself, to distinguish between the revealed and the hidden God, than, with Origen, to represent the Most High God as constantly hidden. And almost still more strongly than the interest in religion is the interest in science opposed to the reduction of the Son, after the example of Origen, to an uncertain middle being between God and the world.

Sabellius the Libyan, Presbyter of Plotemais in the Pentapolis, endeavoured to purify the patripassian system, and to bring it to far more complete development.¹ What had never at all before, or only very indefinitely, been done by earlier representatives of this tendency, he drew the Holy Spirit into the circle of his theory, and so laid down a doctrine of the Trinity of his own. He thus reduced the indefinite plurality of the re-

¹ Sources:—Athanas. c. Arian. Orat. iv. c. 2, 9, 13, 14, 25, cll. 12, 22; de Synod. c. 16; Expos. Fid. c. 2; Epiphan. hæc. 62; and the Anaceph.; Eusebius, H. E. 7, 6; Theodoret, hæc. fab. 2, 9. Compare also Basilus, Ep. 210, 214; Ambrosius, de Fide 1, 1, 2; 4, 4, 6. Augustine constantly confounds him with the Patripassians, but communicates some interesting particulars in the Tract. in Joh. 36 ff., 53 l.c., iv. 725 ff. 731, 853. Hilarius, de Trin. 7, 39. Compare also Schleiermacher's *Sämmtliche Werke*; Erste Abtheilung, Bd. i. pp. 485--575.

velations of the one God to the number three, in agreement with the Church. His fundamental idea is the following:—That which in God is an unity, undivided and indistinguishable, separates into a plurality in the world, and in it alone. Only in virtue of the mundane aspect (*Weltseite*) can we speak of distinctions or of a plurality in God. These distinctions, it is true, are not mere names, or mere subjective seeming; but the divine *Monas* is really and objectively in them, so that a real objective something corresponds to the different revelations. For, though they are by no means distinguished from the divine unity, in which they are contained as momenta, and which is in them, the one form of revelation is not identical with the other; for example, law and incarnation are not the same: therefore, also, Father and Son, which according to Theodoret correspond to the above-mentioned two, are not the same. The Sabellians illustrated the relation between the divine unity and plurality by a reference to the relationship between the Holy Spirit and His charisms.¹ The Holy Spirit is one in the many gifts which He bestows, although the gifts themselves really differ from each other. But as the gifts can only be apprehended and appear, in their difference, through the addition of the world, even so the plurality in God. The question then arises,—Did Sabellius conceive this plurality to be the work of God, or (just as the differences in the charisms arise from the differences in the natural bases on which they are engrafted) the effect of the already existing nature of the world, which reflects the one divine ray in different ways, although it, for its share, strictly speaking, works undividedly always and everywhere, and is merely dividedly appropriated and reflected by the objective world? The former supposition would lead to a divine history, be it of the nature or of the deeds of God: the latter would characterize the differences in the revelations, as the mere effect of the world. Applied to the incarnation, the latter would lead to Ebionism; applied to the Holy Ghost, to Pelagianism: for it depended, for example, entirely on the man Jesus, how much of the divine unity appeared in Him.

There can scarcely be any doubt that Sabellius referred the

¹ Athan. c. Ar., Orat. iv. 25,—*Φησὶ γὰρ (Σαβέλλιος) ὥσπερ διαιρίσεις χαρισμάτων εἰσὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐστὶ, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα.*

differences in the revelations back to God Himself, and insisted on their being regarded not merely as different deeds and works, but as different modes of the existence of God, although undoubtedly in the world.¹ For the divine Monas is not, in his view, motionless, but living. If it keep silence, it is without operation; if it speak, it is active. So far as it speaks, it may be termed Logos, and that *προφορικὸς*; so far as it keeps silence, it answers to the Logos *ἐνδιάθετος*. Logos, therefore, in the language of Sabellius, means something different from Son, who is but one of the forms of the speaking God.² Epiphanius and Augustine also (in Joann. Tract. 53) designate the speaking of the Monas, deed or will. The Son is also called the arm which God stretches out for action: probably, too, the Spirit is represented in the same manner agreeably to older Church analogies; so that the image refers again to the entire God. The outstretched arm is God engaged in action; the arm drawn back is God in rest, in His *inseity*³ (*Insichseyn*). The arm denotes, therefore, that the revelation contains no new divine hypostasis; but simply that the Monas, besides its motionless inseity, is also to be viewed as active and living. What and how many movements and outstretchings of the arm, or revelations, pertain to God, is no more clearly indicated by this image than by the

¹ To the question of Athanasius, c. Ar. 4, 14,—Whether the Monas expands itself for others or for itself? the answer may be given,—For others, but also for itself; it is itself that whereto it expands itself. This is not inconsistent with the charge brought against Sabellius, that, like Arius, he made men of greater consequence than the Logos, representing the Logos as proceeding forth from God for our sake. Athanasius himself (c. Ar. 4, 11) affirms both of him. If, as they say, the silent God is powerless (*ἀνενέργητος*), and first powerful when He comes forth on our behalf, we are the means of His completion, our origin contributes to His perfection. We therefore are higher than He, because our creation gives Him that which He did not yet possess: He needs us for His own existence.

² The Logos is referred to the incarnation according to Athan. l. c. 22, cll. 20: He did not, however, first come into existence in Christ, but merely became a Son. The Monas as Logos creates the world, l. c. 11:—*λαλῶν δὲ κτίζειν ἤρξατο*. They say:—*Τὸν λόγον ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν εἶναι λόγον ἀπλῶς, ὅτι δὲ ἐν ἡνθρώπῳ, τότε ὀνομάσθαι υἱὸν πρὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιφανείας μὴ εἶναι υἱὸν ἀλλὰ λόγον μόνον· καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο οὐκ ὦν πρότερον σὰρξ, οὕτως ὁ λόγος υἱὸς γέγονεν οὐκ ὦν πρότερον υἱός*. The Logos, therefore, advanced to Sonship by degrees, as Tertullian taught.

³ After the analogy of "aseity."—Tr.

analogy of the charisms. All that we learn is, that in the silent and motionless God, there is a potency of speech and action; and this potency Sabellius undoubtedly conceived to be eternal.

But now, as regards the relation between God's being and essence, on the one part, and His doing, on the other, there arises the question,—Whether the Monas continues outside of its doing and work, or whether its being is in the work, whether it is itself each of the movements? The latter is decidedly to be assumed, and the different revelations are different modes of existence, which the Monas assumes by means of its movements. In proof of this, we cannot indeed appeal to the *σχηματίζεσθαι* of Sabellius; for this word, by itself, might characterize the different *σχηματισμούς* as the result of the conjunction of the Monas with different parts of the world, through which the One appears as though it were diverse. But it is strikingly evident from the proposition, that the Monas expands itself to a *trias* (*πλατύνεται, ἐκτείνεται*), even as the one Spirit exposes and diffuses its fulness in the multiplicity of charisms. This expansion, extension, also termed evolution, *πλατυσμός, ἑκτασις, ἀναπλασμός προσώπων* (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 13, 14), is the positive ground of the rise of the Sabellian plurality or trinity; its antithesis is the *συστολή*, the withdrawal or constriction, which is a mere negative presupposition of a new *Πλατυσμός*. In order, namely, to accomplish a new act of revelation, or to assume a new form of existence, the Monas must undoubtedly recede from its full surrender to the previous mode, and must again collect itself, so as to be able to come forth in its entirety under a new shape. These two momenta, which appertain to a divine revelation, Sabellius appears to have termed the divine *διάλεξις*, dialectic (see Basil. Ep. 210, compare Note 29). Revelation may, therefore, progress intensively, and yet, extensively considered, the circles of the self-evolution of God may become ever narrower, as he unquestionably appears to declare, when he draws the parallel between body, soul, and spirit, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The general spirit of the system, however, requires stress to be laid on the fact, that all the forms of existence assumed by the Monas in the course of the process through which it passes, are of equal value, in so far as no one of them can fail, and in

all of them the entire Monas is present after some manner or other.¹

But if it be taken as certain that the revelations are movements of the divine life itself, and that Sabellius does not distinguish the doing and work of God from His living *being*, his system must plainly be pronounced completely pantheistic, unless its Trinity presupposes a creation, and with the creation, the distinction of the world from God. For then the world is nothing more than a mode of existence which God assumes; whereas, on the contrary, if an already created world be taken as their scene and medium, the revelations may be regarded as different modes of the divine existence, without any danger of Pantheism: nay more, they must be so regarded, if God is not to be kept strange to, and at a distance from, the world, and the purpose of revelation to be frustrated. If Sabellius regarded creation also as a self-expansion of God out of straitness (*ἀπὸ στενότητος*), he must have designated this mode of existence either Father or Monas or Logos, not Son; for one of the charges most frequently brought against him, was that of denying the pre-existence of the Son and the Spirit. He can no more have termed that mode of existence Monas, than all the other modes of existence; for Sabellius regarded Monas, not as the individual mode of the divine existence, but as the unity which continues the same in all. If the relation between the Monas and the revelations is similar to that between the Holy Ghost and His charisms, it follows, that as the Holy Ghost cannot have a real existence in the world and reveal Himself, save by means of His charisms, so also the Monas can only come forth through the medium of one or the other of its modes of existence and actions, though it itself cannot be at all identified with a single action.

¹ According to the work "c. Sabellii Gregales," in Athan. Opp. 2, 37 ff. (in Basil. Opp. as the 27th Homily), the image of body, soul, and spirit is employed by the Sabellians as follows:—As man consists of different parts, and is notwithstanding one, even so the Trinity: it may be compounded—that they were willing to allow (c. 13)—but the parts together form the one divine hypostasis. Athanasius says:—*Οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τριῶν ὑπονοῶν σύνθετον, πνεύματος, ψυχῆς, σώματος, οὕτω καὶ Θεὸν καθάπερ κακεῖνοι* (i. e., the Sabellians) *τολμῶσι*.—*Τὰ γὰρ τοῦ συνθέτου μέρη, καὶ τὰ κινουμένου κινήματα πρὸς τὴν ἀσύνθετον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον φύσιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν*. Ἐπεὶ καὶ πῶς ἀποστέλλει τὸ μέρος ἢ τὸ κίνημα αὐτοῦ ὁ πατήρ, ἀποστέλλων τὸν υἱόν; ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὁ υἱὸς ἐκπέμπων εἰς τὸν κόσμον;

On one supposition alone could Sabellius refer the Monas to the creation,—the supposition, namely, that he regarded creation or the world, not as a single revelation, but as a living presence or existence of God in actuality. In that case, however, the distinction between the silent and the speaking God would be done away with as regards creation, and a coarse Pantheism be substituted in its place. Every form of the actualization of the being and life of God should rather, on the contrary, be conceived, if not as one of the Sabellian *πρόσωπα*, yet as something different from the Monas in itself. Only in consequence of a confusion of the Father with the Monas, therefore, could a single revelation, like the creation of the world, be reduced back to the Monas. It is quite possible that Sabellius may have made such a confusion (Note 27); it was a common fault of the Church teachers of this and even of a later period. The entire God, the Monas, is undoubtedly designated Father in His relation to the world (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 22, *κοινὸς πάντων πατήρ*), and does not bear this title solely in the Trinity. The Sabellians, therefore, may also have frequently used the word Father, without fault, for Monas. Be that as it may, so far as we know, the Sabellians never traced back the creation of the world to the Father, or to the Monas in itself. Legislation alone is attributed to the Father (Note 28). It cannot be at all historically shown that Sabellius referred one of his trinitarian *διαίρέσεις*, or the trinitarian *πλατυσμούς*, to the creation also. It is not even certain whether he believed creation in general to have been brought about by a self-extension of God. All that Athanasius says (c. Ar. 4, 13) is,—The Sabellians perhaps derived their doctrine from the Stoics, who represented God as contracting and expanding Himself with the creation of the world.

Though it cannot be at all shown that Sabellius held the Monas or the Father to be the Creator of the world:—it seems certain rather, on the one hand, that his trinitarian distinctions first arise within the world which had come into existence in some other way, but do not refer to the creation; and equally certain, on the other hand, that the creation was ascribed to the Logos, whom Sabellius regarded as the Monas in life and motion. But how could he posit a particular deed of the Logos alongside of, and in addition to, the trinitarian revelation of God in the world? If the silent God is powerless, and the

speaking God strong; if He could do nothing whilst silent, and began to create when He spake, that is, as the Logos (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 11); we have a hint which distinguishes the act of creation essentially from all the rest. Apart from the world, God cannot be, cannot be conceived; it would be to conceive Him powerless, whereas He is not fully conceived, unless conceived as *ισχύοντα*, as speaking, or as in motion. Very similar was the judgment both of Origen and of Hermogenes, whom several older writers classed with the Sabellians. The distinction in God, on which is based the rise of the world, Sabellius deemed essential to Him; for God cannot lack power; God cannot, as to His essence, be merely the silent God; whereas the case is a totally different one with the other revelations of God in the world. They are not grounded in the nature of God, but are occasioned by the world, by its necessities. The condition of the world rendered them necessary or desirable. One of the most frequent accusations brought by the teachers of the Church against Sabellius, was that of representing God as appearing in the world, solely *πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστοτε χρείας*, either as Father, as Son, or as Holy Ghost (Note 29). Therein was involved also the transitoriness of the single Sabellian *πρόσωπα*. When the *χρεία* was once met, the *πρόσωπον* was no longer required. The need arises from sin, that is, from something which is not meant to be eternal; but if the ground of the existence of the *πρόσωπα* is ephemeral, they themselves also must be ephemeral. Such is the representation given by Gregory of Nyssa, in a passage hitherto unnoticed (A. Mai, Coll. Nov. T. 8, Appendix, p. 4). The Sabellians, says he, through reading such words as,—“I and the Father are one;” “Whoso seeth Me, seeth the Father also;” “When He shall have given up the kingdom to the Father and God,”—with too little acuteness of judgment, have fallen into godless error, *οἰόμενοι διὰ μὲν λειποταξίαν ἀνθρωπείνην προεληλυθέναι τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς προσκαίρως· αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πλημμελημάτων ἀναλελυκότα ἐνδύναι τε καὶ ἀναμεμίχθαι τῷ πατρὶ*. The same follows also from Sabellius’ notion, that God proceeds from one revelation or self-extension to another by resumption, which he appears to have figuratively described as a drawing in again of His outstretched arm (Aug. in Joann. 53, Opp. 4, 853).

A more fully developed system than that of Sabellius seems to have been, would have been compelled to make greater efforts to bring the creation, that general work of the speaking God, which continues the same through all revelations, into connection with its doctrine of the Trinity, and, as the first and fundamental revelation, to co-ordinate it with the succeeding ones; in other words, to ascribe it to a *πρόσωπον* after the manner of those which followed. But, on the one hand, even the Church itself did not do this, so far as it ascribed the creation indifferently both to Father and Son; and, on the other hand, creation itself and its character furnished Sabellius with an occasion and starting-point for the assumption of certain distinctions in, and manifold revelations of, the undivided divine unity: consequently, the Trinity, in his view of it, presupposed creation as an already accomplished thing; and apart altogether from a Trinity, he necessarily attributed it to the speaking Monas, which he terms Logos. If the work of creation pertained to one member alone of the Sabellian Trinity, and not to the speaking Monas in general, then the Monas must be divided, independently of, and prior to, the creation, into a simple principle of the creation of the world, a principle of incarnation, and so forth;—that is, God would be distinguished in Himself. Sabellius, therefore, abode by the position,—The divine unity does not divide itself; wherever it is, it is in its entirety; as far as concerns the eternal essence of God, the sole distinction is that into a silent and a speaking God; but the world which exists through His word, gives occasion, by the differences in its constitution, not merely to three different acts of revelation, but, as was indicated above, to three different modes of existence of Himself, in the law, in the incarnation, in the Holy Ghost. (Note 30.)

From all this it would appear that the relation of the Monas to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, is the following:—The Monas is the *ἐν ὑποκείμενον*, the one hypostasis, which manifested itself, during the course of the history of religion, in those three in different ways. Out of its fulness and unity, which continue ever the same, it sets forth different things for the different needs of the world. But it is not led to this manifestation by inner distinctions of essence, but by the world. It is true, the world alone does not make the distinctions. Not that

it and revelation in general are mere subjective representation ; or that, as Ebionites might suppose, the one, indivisible, divine, which in itself stands related alike to all, is unequally apprehended by the world,—perfectly, for example, by the most virtuous man, Jesus. On the contrary, Sabellius recognised really different divine deeds and movements ; but because these distinctions owe their existence solely to peculiarities of the world, which have not their ground in God, they are transitory, so far as the said peculiarities are transitory (Note 31) ; they do not contribute to the perfection of the divine essence ; whereas that the silent God should speak, was necessary to the completion of the conception of God. The teachers of the Church, taking the opposite course, looked upon creation as in itself an accidental feature of the conception of God, and in no respect necessary to its complete intellection. By the Trinity, on the contrary, they deemed it to be perfected ; and they would sooner have allowed, in opposition to Sabellius, that the œconomic Trinity set forth essential momenta of the divine life itself (which, be it noted, is also of an ethical nature), than, in agreement with him, teach that the genesis of the world was the completion of God. Ath. c. Ar. 4, 11:—Οὔτοι ἔλαττον τῷ Θεῷ, ἢ ἡμῖν διδόασιν. Ἐμεῖς γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ σιωπῶντες μὲν, ἐνθυμούμενοι δὲ ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἐνθυμήσεως καὶ εἰδωλοποιεῖσθαι ; these, however, τὸν Θεὸν σιωπῶντα μὲν ἀνενέργητον, λαλοῦντα δὲ ἰσχύειν αὐτὸν βούλονται· εἶγε σιωπῶν μὲν οὐκ ἡδύνατο ποιεῖν, λαλῶν δὲ κτιζεῖν ἤρξατο. Ἐρέσθαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς δίκαιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ὢν, τέλειος ἦν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν δύνασθαι ; Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀτελὴς ἦν, ἐν Θεῷ ὢν, γεννηθεὶς δὲ τέλειος γέγονεν, ἡμεῖς αἴτιοι τῆς τελειότητος αὐτοῦ, εἶγε δι' ἡμᾶς γεγέννηται· δι' ἡμᾶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν προσεῖληφεν· εἰ δὲ τέλειος ἦν ἐν Θεῷ, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν δύνασθαι, περιττὴ ἡ γέννησις αὐτοῦ, ἐδύνατο γὰρ, καὶ ἐν πατρὶ ὢν, δημιουργεῖν· ὥστε ἡ οὐ γεγέννηται, ἢ γεγέννηται οὐ δι' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι αἰὲ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστίν. Ἡ γὰρ γέννησις αὐτοῦ οὐ τὴν ἡμῶν κτίσιν δείκνυσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι. This passage shows that the Sabellians spoke not merely of a λόγος, but also of a γέννησις τοῦ λόγου ; probably they identified this latter with the λαλεῖν of the Father. Like Tertullian and the Arians, they represent this γέννησις as taking place before the creation of the world, nay more, as taking place for the sake of the creation. In common with the former, they assume a process of growth,

a progressive hypostatization. But they differ from both in conceiving the *γέννησις*, not as the origin of the hypostasis, but as the manifestation of the world-creative power. This passage, therefore, is an evidence, partly, that Monarchianism, about the year 260, had already assumed a form in many respects like the Trinity of their opponent Tertullian; and partly, also, that the Sabellians decidedly ascribed creation to the Logos.

Having investigated the relation of the divine Trias to the Monas, let us now take a glance at the relation of the members of the Trias to each other. It is clear, from what has been advanced above, that, as was frequently objected by the teachers of the Church, these three were never simultaneously, and, therefore, never properly speaking, members of the Trinity. During the period when God revealed Himself as Father, the Son did not yet exist; and during the period of the Holy Ghost, the Son and the Father no longer exist (cf. Montfaucon, Nov. Coll. T. ii. 2, Epiph. hæ. 62, 1; and in Athan. c. Ar. Or. 4, 12). According to Epiphanius and Theodoret (hæ. fab. 2, 9; compare Germanus Constantinop. de hæres. et Synodis in A. Mai, Spicileg. Roman. T. 7, 11, 12), to the Father was attributed legislation, to the Son the incarnation, to the Holy Ghost the inspiration of the Apostles, as also the quickening and animating of believers. The objective difference of these revelations is thus expressed and characterized with sufficient clearness (Note 32). But they employed two images in order to describe this relation with greater precision. Father, Son, Spirit, are analogous to body, soul, and spirit;—the three momenta or modes of existence of the one man. There is a similar trinity also in the sun. Firstly, there is its form in itself, its outward appearance (*εἶδος, σχῆμα πάσης τῆς ὑποστάσεως*, which is to be distinguished from the *ὑπόστασις* itself). This corresponds to the revelation of the law, which was a strange and purely objective thing; or, when the word Father is taken strictly, to the Father. Secondly, the pure disk of the sun makes its appearance for men, and enters into their sphere, in that it expands itself, as it were, to a circle of light and illuminates the earth. This corresponds to the revelation of the Son. Lastly, the sun penetrates into things themselves, bringing warmth and light. This corresponds to the visits of the Holy Spirit. Both images connect the individual members of the

Trias with each other, and both imply progress;—not, however, in the sense that those who have the Holy Spirit are more than those who have Christ; but merely in the sense, that the divine revelation or Monas penetrates ever more deeply into the existing world. The progress, therefore, is on the side of men, to whom one and the same God approaches constantly nearer through His different *σχηματισμοὺς*. To God Himself the Trinitarian process (*διάλεξις*) brings no progress. The sun does not first acquire enlightening and warming power, but has it from the beginning. Through the employment of special means (law, incarnation), the entire divinity comes ever more fully into activity. But although the entire divine essence is present in each of these *σχηματισμοί*, each of them sets forth a different aspect of the objective divine essence, according to the requirements of men; and thus prepares the way for an increasing appropriation of God.

This, of course, implies that the incarnation of God, for which Sabellius employs also the expression *ἐνανθρώπησις τοῦ λόγου*, could merely have the significance of a means to an end in his system; and that, as such, it might cease as soon as it had accomplished that for which it was brought into existence. He did not regard the Person of Christ as an end in itself; Christ is not the essential good, or, as Head and King, an essential part of the highest good, whose glorification we also have to subserve. But the Logos was born for our sake, and returns that He may be again as He was.¹ The reason thereof is, that the incarnation was occasioned solely by the world, and had not a necessary ground in God Himself, that is, in an inner distinction of the divine essence. Such a distinction did not exist in God, prior to His appearance on earth: "Before the appearance of Christ, there was no Son, but merely the Logos; and when the Logos became flesh, not having previously been flesh, the Logos became Son, not having previously been Son" (c. Ar. 4,

¹ Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12 (see following note), 4, 25:—'Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ παυθῆσθαι τὸ δογμα τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, τῆς χρείας πληρωθεῖσης; καὶ ἔσται λοιπὸν ἄχρι παιδιᾶς, τὰ γινόμενα, ὅτι μὴ ἀληθεία, ἀλλ' ὀνόματι ἐπιδοίχθη. He goes on then to say that this is the destruction of the Church and the world. Πανομένου δὲ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ υἱοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς, παύσεται καὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἡ χάρις—καὶ τί ἀκολουθήσει ἢ ἀφανισμὸς τῆς κτίσεως. The latter would be true if the world owed its existence to the Son, and not to the Logos (Note 32).

22). The Son is an energetic, but still a transitory theophany. Sabellius must, therefore, have treated the human aspect of Christ as a mere accident; and so far from following up the efforts made by Origen, to ensure the full reality of the humanity of Christ, by giving prominence to His soul, we do not even know whether he acknowledged Christ to have had a human soul. It is, in fact, improbable that he did; for otherwise he could not so easily have persisted in maintaining that this revelation would cease—and cease not merely at the end of the days, but when Christ returned to the Father, and the Holy Spirit was revealed.¹

Sabellius was so far from sharing the Ebionism of elder writers, or of Paul of Samosata, that he rather affirmed that the Logos was clothed with the man Jesus. But when he then adds—"Not the Logos was the Son, but this man was the only-begotten Son of God,"² the personality, contained as it is more completely in *υἱὸς* than in *λόγος*, would seem after all to be derived from the humanity alone; and this would lead to Ebionism, contrary to the fundamental view of Sabellius. It can only occasion confusion, however, to apply the modern idea of human personality directly to a period for which the attainment of this conception was still a task to be accomplished. The system of Sabellius, on the contrary, is such, as rather to require the denial of the personality of the man Jesus, if personality be taken in the modern sense. Personality, however, he held to be the realistic limit, annexed to the divine, as the true being; and he completely recognised the human personality in this sense, that is, as the limit set to the divine *ἐκτασις*, agreeably to its own will, by the humanity of Christ. From the opposed Ebionitical tendency to represent the human personality as something positive, and not merely as a negation, which has a real existence, the system of Sabellius is free. The unlimited

¹ Compare the passage from Epiph. in Note 29; Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12:—*Ἐν τῷ γεννηθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐκτίσθημεν, καὶ τῇ γεννήσει αὐτοῦ συνίστηκεν ἡ κτίσις, ἀνατρέχει δὲ ἵνα ᾗ, ὅπερ πρότερον ἦν.*—Παλινδρομοῦντος τοῦ λόγου οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἡ κτίσις. (For λόγου Sabellius probably said υἱοῦ); compare c. 22, 25; Ambros. de fide 4, 6,—*"ut in Patrem filius refundatur."* Montfaucon, Coll. Nov. T. ii. p. 2, in *"Eugenii Legatio ad Athan."*

² Athan. l. c. 20:—*Ἡ σὰρξ, ἣν ἐφόρεσεν ὁ λόγος, αὕτη ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός.* ib. :—*Τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὃν ἐφόρεσεν ὁ λόγος αὐτὸν εἶναι λέγουσι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ.*

God or Logos,—whom this system presupposes indeed to be in Himself an intelligent subject, and nothing more than the living Monas, but without being able to enter more deeply into the question of its inner personality, in consequence of being based on the category of substance,—appeared in Christ as limited, in a man, and in *this* sense as a person, or as a *υἱός*; whereas as *λόγος*, He was not *υἱός*. If we ask then,—Does not Sabellius represent humanity as constituting the revelation in Christ personal?—we may answer both in the negative and in the positive; for, strictly speaking, both the divine and the human aspect constitute the personality, though each in a different way, or in a different sense. So far as the personality is taken to be something positive, which as positive must appertain also to God, the divine is the principle of the personality of the Son; though in no other sense than that in which the personal Monas is so in itself, and in each of its revelations. So far, however, as a limit and bound is to be conceived as attaching to this positive something,—and it must be allowed to attach to the human personality, consequently also to Christ,—so far is the humanity of Christ that which is limited, and which, by bounding or circumscribing the divine extension, constitutes it Son. The real meaning of Sabellius must therefore have been the following:—The Son resulted neither from the correspondent expansion of the Monas, nor arose solely through the man who was born of Mary; but from the conjunction of the positive and the negative—a conjunction to which God gave the prime impulse. For only on the supposition that the two were in some way united, can the divine have had an historical, not merely a Docetical, existence; and the human life of Christ have been, not merely human, but of a higher significance.¹

But if the conjunction of the two (*ἡ ἀμφοῖν σύνοδος*) constituted the Son, the question at once arises,—Did the divine act of *ἐκτασις* undergo a modification or limitation, from the negativity of the finite, human aspect; or did it by its own deed subject itself to this limitation?² In the former case, the

¹ This is also the actual report which Athanasius gives of the Sabellians, l. c. c. 21:—*Φασὶ μὴ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ὃν ἐφόρειεν ὁ κύριος, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφοτέρον, τὸν τε λόγον καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶναι υἱόν, συνημμένα γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω, υἱός, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ὀνομάζεται.*

² Hilar. de Trin. 1, 16:—The Sabellian incarnation is “*protensio potius*

existent world exercised an influence on God, and inasmuch as God Himself is present in His extensions, made God passible, or limited Him. This would involve attributing a false independence to the world, relatively to God, such as might harmonize with a deistic or an ethnic mode of thought, but not with Sabellianism. He must, therefore, have regarded this limitation, in which the Person of Christ originated, as itself again a deed of the Logos. It was by His own act that the Logos subjected Himself to limits and bounds, though He employed the world as a means; and the world could not have possessed the power to be a limit to God, save through God Himself. If, however, God posits limitation in Himself, and yet, on the other hand, the entire divine Monas is not absorbed in this *σχηματισμός*,—because, although in itself indeed it is entirely therein, actually it is only therein in one aspect,—then a distinction is introduced into the inner essence of God, and the Monas must have posited in itself the determination through which it became Son. This limit now might be constituted by the principle of the *ὕλη* in Christ, which would be transferred to God with a touch of dualism. Christ's humanity must then be judged to have been protruded from God's own essence, as the material circumscription of His spiritual *ἐκτασις*; but this would be incompatible with the human birth of Christ, which Sabellius leaves untouched, and would lead back to the doctrine that God converted Himself into the man Jesus. Such a view Sabellius can have had no wish to adopt, inasmuch as he rejected what the earlier teachers of his tendency allowed, to wit, that God underwent suffering.¹ Consequently, unless he meant to sink back to a deistic or to a patripassian conception of God, it was necessary for him to suppose the distinction, by which God constituted

in hominem, quam descensio." In order that the unity of God may remain unaffected by the "series ex solido in carnem deducta, dum usque ad virginem Pater protensus ipsi sibi natus sit in Filium," that is, in order that God extending Himself as in an unbroken line might stretch Himself even unto Mary. Ib. 1, 26 :—Sabellius—"Deum verum operatum in corpore esse non ambigit."

¹ Augustine, indeed, brings this charge also against him. But as Epiphanius (hær. 62) expressly pronounces him innocent thereof, which he would not have done had he not been necessitated thereto, we must take for granted that Sabellius did not belong to the Patripassians, but forms a new knotty point in their series.

Himself Son, to have been effected independently of all ὅλη, whether in or out of God ; that is, he must have supposed it to take place in the spiritual essence of God, in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. The only other alternative was, to lower the significance of Christ, and no longer to maintain that the positive something above referred to, and the basis of the personality of the Son, were the Monas itself (Note 33). But if the distinctions fall into the essence of God, they cannot have been successive, nor are they ephemeral, but must be simultaneous, as the Church teaches. Even at this point, therefore, we see that Sabellius cannot maintain his position. This will become still clearer, when we consider the opposite conclusions which may be drawn from his system.

In point of fact, there is by no means a lack of elements of an Ebionitical cast in the system of Sabellius. The one point alone, that he reduces the revelation of Christ to the rank of a mere means, and does not also regard Him as an end in Himself, is a degradation of Him, which approximates to Ebionism. If we remark further, that he designates the divine in the Son a ray (*ἀκτίνα*), which proceeds forth from, and returns to, the Monas,—for which reason, besides the common charge of confounding everything together, founded on his merging the hypostatic distinctions into the one hypostasis of the Father or the Monas, we find also the opposite charge of falsely separating (*ἀποκοπή*) and dividing the divine essence, which necessarily leads to Subordinatianism or to the Hellenic form of Ebionism (Note 34) ;—if, finally, we consider how difficult for him, who refused to admit of any distinctions in God, must have been the question, whether the entire God was so present in the Son, that during His existence He was not active outside of Him ;—we can well understand how he should again seek for expressions to lessen the importance of the revelation of the Son, and thus allow Ebionitical principles to gain a foothold. An intensive interest in religion might, indeed, have preserved him from such a false course ; but, however coarse Patripassianism may have been in this respect, it was superior to Sabellianism. The latter was not a deepening of the interest in religion : on the contrary, its greater refinement seems to have been accompanied by religious superficiality ; for if we ask what Sabellius supposed Christ to have accomplished, no passage can be

pointed out in which the Passion of Christ is made the subject of consideration. In agreement with Patripassians, on the contrary, he appears in general to have formed a slight estimate of the significance of the sufferings of the God-man, even when he did not set them aside, and to have limited Christ's work principally to enlightenment and sanctification. This, at all events, seems to be implied by his employment of the image of the sun, and by his remarks on the activity of the warming and enlivening Holy Spirit.

Yet all this pertains to Sabellianism, as it were, contrary to its will, and in simple obedience to the law which binds extremes together—in the present case, the extremes of Ebionism and Docetism. It is interesting to take note of these Ebionitical features of the system, in order to see the comparatively short step from Sabellius to Paul of Samosata. Both agree in denying the pre-existence of the Son, and indeed the existence of hypostatical distinctions in general in God. They further agree also in their recognition of the distinction of the manifest and revealed God, alongside of His unity. The silent Monas of Sabellius answers to the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* of Paul; the speaking, or the Logos of the former, to the *λόγος προφορικὸς* of the latter. And although Paul took the world for his point of view, and Sabellius the divine, they approximate to each other, in so far as Paul, on the one hand, conceives a divine power, even though impersonal, to have been at work in the man Jesus; and on the other hand, Sabellius, although he had no intention of denying the humanity of Jesus, did not really advance beyond a determinate and momentary exhibition of the power of God in Him (a stretching out of the hand of God). It is true he believed the entire God Himself to have been present in the exhibition of power, after a determinate manner; but neither this presence nor its particular character was grounded in inner distinctions of the divine essence; the occasion thereto was given entirely by the world; and as far as concerns God, it was solely His will, receiving its impulse from the world, and not His own essence, that called into existence the triple revelation, which is unquestionably to be termed a manifestation, a coming forth, of His essence. That which He wills in revealing, He also, it is true, becomes: His deed is also being, self-unfolding, but merely momentary being, and

has solely the purpose of communicating to humanity that which it lacked.¹ The needs of the humanity having been met, it lives in unity with the indivisible Monas, and the Monas in unity with it : Christ henceforth has no significance whatever, nor even a bare existence.

To represent Christ as transitory, as a mere passing means to another end, contradicted the Christian consciousness in its very depths. For the Person of Christ does not stand in a temporary relation to the religion He founded, as do the founders of other religions, but is an eternally constitutive and integrant element thereof ; and even the view taken by Paul of Samosata was more satisfactory in this respect, for he assigned to the man Jesus a permanent position, nay more, in reward for his virtue, a divine position after His exaltation. Whilst Sabellius taught that humanity would one day become the body of God, through the Holy Spirit, apart from the Person of Christ (see Note 31), Paul, on the contrary, left a place for Christ as the eternal Head of humanity. Herewith, however, is most closely connected something of still greater importance. Sabellianism could not look upon humanity and deity as reconciled and united at the very centre ; and as to this matter, Paul and Sabellius occupy exactly the same position, though they arrive at it from opposite directions. Paul represents the humanity of Christ as the final cause of the deity which he attributes to Him ; the divine, therefore, was an accident of the man Jesus. Sabellius reduces the humanity to an accident ; it is curtailed and made transitory. But an union with an hu-

¹ The charge repeatedly brought by Athanasius against Sabellius, of recognising merely distinctions κατ' ἐννοιαν, that is, distinctions which are purely subjective, must consequently be explained in the light of what has been advanced above. Sabellius aimed to represent God as objectively different in His different revelations. He believed the divine communications to have as true an objective existence as the human needs. But it is unmistakeable, that if Sabellius had rigidly insisted on the indivisible unity of the Monas relatively to the sphere of revelation, he could not have believed that the different revelations were objectively different. In itself, and considered in relation to God, legislation and incarnation were one and the same, that is, the absolutely identical Monas was in both. This consequence, however, as we have seen, Sabellius does not draw. And he considered to be subjective representation, προσωποποίησις, not the difference in the revelations themselves, but merely the hypostatic difference of the principle in each case.

manity which is an illusion, is itself an illusion. Consequently, according to the Sabellian view, that which is of the highest importance, that for which there is the greatest need, has not been effected. From the stand-point of Sabellianism, so long as humanity and deity in Christ are represented as standing in so exclusive a relation to each other, it is impossible to designate Christianity the absolute religion, especially when we remember that it leaves the rest of men but one choice, the choice, namely, between an impersonal existence and an imperfect union with God.

Instead of regarding the appearance of Christ as a mere momentary exhibition of divine power, the Christian Church sees in Him the eternal centre of regenerated humanity, in and through whom God is personally and actually united with men. It was compelled, therefore, to ground the divine in Christ in the eternal essence of God; and the category of the will of God showed itself to be inadequate. But if there is an eternal element in God Himself corresponding to the divine in Christ, and if the divine in Christ is not to be placed under the category of power, but under that of hypostasis, then the distinction between the divine in Christ, or the Son, and the Father, must be posited as simultaneous and eternal, and the polemic of the Church will, in this aspect, lay special stress upon the doctrine, that the divine which was in Christ was the pre-existent Son and a permanent hypostasis. As regards the other, the task of the Church would be to assert the full truth of the human aspect. During an entire century, however, this aspect was thrown into the background relatively to the former. In fact, the question of the Trinity, which engaged the attention of the entire succeeding period, was absolutely necessary as a basis for the accomplishment of the other task. For full justice can never be done to the humanity in Christology, until the self-limitation, the self-exinanition of God be recognised; but how could such an idea be seriously entertained, where the absolute unity of the divine Monas is maintained, and where, consequently, the entire Monas must thus abase itself?

The chief opponent of Sabellius, Dionysius of Alexandria, of the two chief defects of Sabellianism,—to wit, that it did not recognise the truth of the humanity, and therefore arrived at no real incarnation, and that it could not characterize the divine

in Christ as an eternal determination of the essence of God,—appears to have taken notice almost solely of the latter. Indeed, the designation of the humanity of Christ as a mere garment, was long employed by the teachers of the Church without giving offence. And when Origen attempted to attain to a higher point by giving prominence to the free human soul of Christ, he did not succeed in his aim without making a step in the direction of Ebionism. Paul, however, to whom, be it remembered, this inheritance descended, and by whom it was increased, only served the purpose of causing the teachers of the Church to shrink from giving prominence to the free human soul of Christ. This aspect of the dogma, therefore, was left entirely untouched for the time; for, in fact, its day could not arrive until the necessary trinitarian presuppositions had been settled, the uncertainty of which laid open to question the very primary, that is, the objective, divine, foundations of Christology.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE SCHOOL OF ORIGEN IN THE THIRD CENTURY, AND THE SUBORDINATIONISM OF DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA.

BEFORE passing to the consideration of Dionysius of Alexandria, the most important follower of Origen, a few particulars must be mentioned, relative to the school of Origen in general. A great number of the first men of the East, during the second half of the third century, was educated by Origen, or by his writings. Apart from the exegetical schools of Egypt and Antioch, whose rise appears to have been due to his influence, and which were formed by Hesychius on the one hand, and Lucian and Dorotheus on the other (compare Neander's "Church History" ii. 1247), except Methodius, who at a later period became an opponent of Origen, we may enumerate, in this connection, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, and his brother Athenodorus; Pierius, with his brother Isidorus (Phot. Cod. 119), and Theognostus (cod. 106). Hierakas, also, was decisively influenced by Origen. At the beginning of the fourth century, we may mention Pamphilus and Eusebius of Cæsarea.

It is not just, with Baur (l. c. p. 308 f.), to describe the entire school of Origen as subordinationian, in relation to the Son; still less is it just to charge them with letting go the predicate of Eternity. Respecting Pierius, who was styled a second Origen, Photius relates, that he taught *εὐσεβῶς* concerning the Father and the Son; and that, although in one passage he termed them two *οὐσίας* or *φύσεις*, instead of two hypostases, he did not use the terms in the Arian sense, as is clear from that which precedes and that which follows (*τῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως ὀνόματι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τε τῶν ἐπομένων καὶ προηγούμενων τοῦ χωρίου, ἀντὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως χρώμενος*). The honour and dishonour of the image (*εἰκὼν*), he considered to be also the honour and dishonour of the prototype. The Holy Ghost, however, he subordinated to the glory of the Father and the Son. Had Pierius denied the eternal generation of the Son, Photius would not have failed to charge him with it. There must have been a ground for the praise which he bestows on his doctrine of the Son. Least of all is it likely that he classed him amongst those who repeated the subordinationian element in Origen's system in a heightened form. The subordination of the Holy Spirit, at that time, does not warrant us in concluding that the Son also was subordinated:—indeed, Photius expressly contradicts it. For when he blames him as *δυσσεβῶς δογματίζοντα*, on account of the subordination of the Holy Ghost, and praises his doctrine of the Son as *εὐσεβῆ*, the praise must be grounded on the circumstance, that he did not subordinate the Son. And as he elsewhere reproaches Origen with subordinating the Son, it would seem probable that Pierius further developed rather that part of the system of Origen, which taught the equality of the Father and the Son, than that which bore a subordinationian character. According to Basilus (Ep. 210), the same line was adopted by another important disciple of Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, who was even reproached with confounding Father and Son, after the manner of Sabellius.¹ In his panegyric of Origen (c. 4.), he designates the Logos the Source of all good, who alone can heal our defects, who is the Guide and Deliverer of our souls, the Creator and Ruler of the universe. In relation to the Father, he terms Him the *πρωτογενὴς λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς*; He Himself is the truth, the

¹ Basil. Ep. 210, 5,—*πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐπινοίᾳ μὲν εἶναι δύο, ὑποστάσει δὲ ἓν.*

σοφία, and the δύναμις of the Father of the universe. Besides this, He is in Him, and completely united with Him, not ἀπεξενωμένος αὐτοῦ, not too weak to attain to the Father; for which reason, it is wrong to suppose that He either cannot or will not lead everything to the praise of the Father; whereas, in fact, He alone can give to the Father the most perfect honour, on His own behalf, and on behalf of all things. For the Father has made Him one with Himself; so that we may almost say that the Father, through Him, goes out of Himself, in order to embrace and encompass Himself (δι' αὐτοῦ μόνον οὐχὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν (leg. αὐτὸν) ἐκπεριῶν), and to a certain extent holds Him in like honour with Himself, and is held in like honour. Himself, therefore, being perfect and living, and animated by the highest reason (τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ λόγος ἔμφυχος ὦν), He fits us completely for presenting worthy sacrifices of thanksgiving to God. That this is far enough removed from Arianism is self-evident, notwithstanding the decided colouring of Subordinationism. He does not reckon Him as part of the Universe, but represents the Father, after having gone out of Himself, as it were, through the living Logos, as embracing Himself in the Logos. He terms Him further, indeed, according to Basilus, *ποίημα* and *κτίσμα*; but this must not be so interpreted as to invalidate his previous statements. That he cannot have taught that the Son was of a different substance from the Father, is evident also from his being regarded as a patron of the Sabellians. He probably used these words in agreement with Proverbs viii., without intending thereby to call in question Origen's doctrine of the procession of the Son from God, by generation. It is probable, therefore, that, like his master, he combined emanatistic and subordination elements in his system (Note 35).

Theognostus endeavoured, in his "Hypotyposes" (ὑποτυπώσεις, adumbrationes), to show that the Father must have a Son, as also that we must conceive a Holy Spirit.¹ In the second discourse, he designates the Son a *κτίσμα*; for which Photius blames him severely; but as the work appears to have been written in the form of a dialogue, and as, according to

¹ Athan. de decret. syn. Nicæn. c. 25; Phot. Cod. 106.—Athan. Ep. 4 ad Scrap. c. 9, 11, he speaks against the supra-ordination of the Holy Spirit above the Son.

Photius, in the last conversation, especially towards the close, he speaks more worthily of the Son, we may probably regard the idea, which suggested itself also to Photius, as well grounded, namely, that Theognostus wrote the passages which put the Son on a lower level, not in his own name, but in the person of another. But even if this were not the case, Prov. viii. would prevent us allowing the words any weight, in opposition to the passage which Athanasius has preserved, and which is also found in the second book of his *ὑποτυπώσεις*. "The essence of the Son," says he, "was not superadded from without (*οὐκ ἔξωθεν τίς ἐστιν ἐφευρεθείσα ἢ τοῦ υἱοῦ οὐσία*), nor was it introduced out of nothing, that is, into the Trinity (*οὐδὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ἐπεισήχθη*), but was produced out of the essence of the Father (*ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἔφυ, ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς*), as brightness arises from light, and as vapour arises from water. The brightness is not the sun, nor the vapour the water; nor, again, is it anything foreign, but an *ἀπόρροια*, an outflow from the Father's essence; which notwithstanding no more undergoes division than the sun, which remains the same, and is not lessened by pouring forth rays. Even so, the essence of the Father undergoes no alteration through having the Son for His image." Here, therefore, we find those emanatistic comparisons which Origen also employed, and which in his case were compatible with a certain degree of Subordinationism. But we find no trace whatever of Arianism, of a surrender of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. From Arianism Theognostus is far removed, not merely by his doctrine of the essential equality of the Son, but also by his rejection of the idea that the Son was in any sense a mundane being: on the contrary, he polemicizes against those who represented the Son as having been produced out of nothing,—a doctrine which became a watchword of the Arians at a later period.¹ Besides Athanasius, Titus of Bostra also (Phot. Cod. 232), together with the two Gregories, held Theognostus in high

¹ According to Photius, he did not assume the existence of an eternal *ὑλη*, and cannot therefore have taught that the world was formed out of a *ὑλη* in God, that is, out of the substance of God. Consequently, in this respect also, it must have been impossible for him to put the Son on an equality with the world. Agreeably to the prevailing views of the time, he believed the world to have been created out of nothing.

honour. It would be interesting to know how he proved that the Father must have a Son. The very idea of such a proof, however, shows that he did not regard the existence of the Son as in any respect a matter of caprice or accident. What he then says concerning the essence of the Son, warrants us in presuming, that he aimed at discovering some sort of a necessity for a Son in the divine essence itself. If this be the case, he clearly cannot have given up the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son.

Christology must have been treated by him in detail, for the fifth and sixth sections of his "Hypotyposes" are devoted to the question of the incarnation of the Son. Photius found therein many Origenistic elements, which he deemed it proper to blame; but, as the worst point of all, he mentions his doctrine respecting the real omnipresence of Christ.¹ He is said to have taken special pains to demonstrate the possibility of an incarnation.

Methodius of Patara (compare his Opp. ed. Combefis. Paris, 1644, pp. 284—474), in his genuine writings, so far as we can discover from the fragments still extant, did not indeed apply the term *ἁμοούσιος* to the pre-existent Son, as did the Roman Synod (I consider the work entitled "De Sym. et Anna" to be spurious); but still, probably accepted the doctrine of His eternal pre-existence, though not in the Origenistic form of eternal generation. He did not adopt Origen's explanation of the words, "This day have I begotten Thee," denoting the eternal to-day; but substituted for it another, to wit,—God willed to generate Him who was before the *Æons*, for the world also; that is, to *reveal* Him (l. c. 388,—*τὸν προύοντα ἤδη πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ἐβουλήθη καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννῆσαι ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ, πρόσθεν ἀγνοούμενον γνωρῖσαι*). His teachings appear to have much greater affinity with those of Tertullian and Hippolytus. There still remains between them, however, this important difference, that whereas the latter represented the hypostasis of the Son as originating contemporaneously with the creation of the world, and accordingly attached the highest significance to the matter of generation, relatively to the Son Himself, Methodius, on the contrary, made the entire signifi-

¹ Ἀποστολῇ λέγειν ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν φανταζόμεθα ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλοις τύποις περιγραφόμενον, μόνη δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ περιγραφόμενον.

cance of the *γέννησις* for the Son, to consist in its revealing Him to the world (probably in Christ); whilst He remained in Himself unchangeably what He was before the *Æons*. Christ did not first become Son at His baptism by adoption; nor will a time ever come when He will cease to be Son, but He is Son out of the limits of time, timelessly (*ἀορίστως, ἀχρόνως*, p. 387). Of the words, "In the beginning (*ἐν ἀρχῇ*) God created the heavens and the earth," his explanation is, that *ἀρχή* is the divine wisdom. In harmony herewith, as with Prov. viii. 22, is John i. 1. For the *Ἀρχή*, out of which the *λόγος* grew, is the Father (*τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἀφ' ἧς ἀνεβλάστησεν ὁ ὁρθότατος Λόγος, τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων φαμὲν ἐν ᾧ ἦν*). On the contrary, the words,—“The same was in the beginning (*ἐν ἀρχῇ*) with God,”—signify that the Son shared the dominion with God (*τὸ ἐξουσιαστικὸν τοῦ Λόγου, ὃ εἶχε παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἰς γένεσιν παρελθεῖν, ἔοικε σημαίνειν, τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀρχὴν εἰπῶν*). After the beginningless beginning, the Father, He therefore becomes the beginning of the rest, through which all things were made (*Οὐκοῦν ἀρχή, μετὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναρχὸν ἀρχὴν, τὸν Πατέρα αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων γίνεται, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα δημιουργεῖται*, l. c. 345). If the Son be said to be produced from the Father, the equality of His *φύσις*, His co-essentiality, is affirmed in the strongest manner. Still, the passage adduced does not altogether exclude the possibility of Subordinationism. The Son is not, indeed, said to have owed His origin to the will of the Father; but, at the same time, He is not said to have been coeternal with God. The highest predicate assigned to the Son, according to p. 388, is that of *ἄχρονος*; the predicate *ἀναρχος* is reserved for the Father. We must not, however, conclude therefrom, that he meant to teach regarding the Son, *ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, for *ἀρχή* does not necessarily denote origin in time (otherwise the word would be used in the context alternately in three different senses), but denotes the real ground:—the Father alone is the *ρίζα* of the Son. Another passage also admits of being interpreted subordinationally; though that is not necessarily its meaning:—De Creat. p. 344; “There are two creating powers: one which produces whatever it wills out of nothing, by its mere will,—this is the Father; the second, on the contrary, which, in imitation of what already exists, and gives to the world its beauty, order, and variety, is the

Son, the Father's almighty and strong hand, by which He establishes beauty and order, after having called matter into existence, out of nothing." (*Δύο δὲ δυνάμεις ἔφαμεν εἶναι, ποιητικὰς, τὴν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, γυμνῶ τῷ βουλήματι, χωρὶς μερισμοῦ ἅμα τὸ (leg. τῷ) θελῆσαι αὐτουργοῦσαν, ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν τυγχάνει δὲ ὁ πατήρ· θάτερον δὲ κατακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ποικίλλουσαν κατὰ μίμησιν τῆς προτέρας τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα. ἔστι δὲ ὁ υἱὸς ἢ παντοδύναμος καὶ κραταῖα χεὶρ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐν ᾗ μετὰ τῷ ποιῆσαι τὴν ὕλην ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων κατακοσμεῖ.*) When, therefore, Photius speaks of Arian adulterations by Methodius, what has been advanced above shows that they are, at all events, not discoverable in the fragments now extant. As to Christology, he refers the bride ("Song of Songs" iv. 7), amongst other things, to the humanity of Christ, for the sake of which He left the Father and came to the world, to bestow Himself upon her (the *νύμφη* is the *σὰρξ ἀμόλυντος τοῦ κυρίου, ἧς χάριν καταλείψας τὸν πατέρα κατήλθεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ προσεκολλήθη αὐτῇ ἐνανθρωπήσας*, pp. 386 f.). Further, the queen who is placed at the right hand (Ps. xlv.), whilst God actually places Himself at the left, is the humanity of Christ adorned with virtue, as with a garment worked with gold, the unspotted blessed flesh, which the Logos carried with Him into heaven, and set at the right hand of the Father. The genuine fragments in our possession do not contain more precise ideas on the subject of Christology: one thing only deserves mention, that in the *Sympos. Virg.* p. 392, Christ is styled the Archetype of virginity. In the work entitled "*De Sym. et Anna*," the high estimate here put on virginity has already been developed into the doctrine of the eternal virginity of Mary.

With Dionysius of Alexandria (about A.D. 200) the case is otherwise than with the last-mentioned writers. That he was far from entertaining Ebionitical views, indeed, is clear from his relation to the First Antiocheian Council held against Paul of Samosata.¹ But it can scarcely be denied, that, for a time, the zeal with which he opposed the Sabellians, and endeavoured to lay down fixed distinctions between the Father and the Son, carried him to greater lengths in the matter of Subordinationism, than those to which Origen went. In a letter to Ammonius

¹ Euseb. H. E. 7, 27, 30, init., but specially from 7, 6.

and Euphranor against Sabellianism, which had spread so widely in Libya, that several bishops became its adherents, and the Son of God was scarcely preached any longer in the Church,¹ he said,—“The Son is a work and a creature of God, not appertaining to Him by nature, but in his essence as foreign to God as the vinedresser is to the vine, the shipbuilder to the ship ; for, inasmuch as he was a creature, he did not exist prior to his creation.” (Athan. l. c. 4 :—*Ποίημα καὶ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, μῆτε δὲ φύσει ἶδων, ἀλλὰ ξένον κατ’ οὐσίαν αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ πατρὸς ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ γεωργὸς πρὸς τὴν ἀμπελον, καὶ ὁ ναυπηγὸς πρὸς τὸ σκάφος. Καὶ γὰρ ὡς ποίημα, ὃν οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται.*) He therewith attacks, consequently, both the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son taught by Origen and his school, and also that of the equality of the essence of the Father and the Son. Athanasius would fain, indeed, refer these words to the God-man, instead of to the Logos. In fact, on a subsequent occasion, Dionysius himself took partial advantage of this expedient :² for in the same passage of his later work, he deemed it necessary to justify his employment of those words, relatively to the Logos. But when he pleads that the Greeks were in the habit of styling the authors of books and the originators of ideas, their *creators*, although, strictly speaking, the writer or the thinker is their *father*, he is far from being excused ; for the latter image is also subordination in tendency. Least of all does he thus justify the words—“He was not, ere He was brought into existence ;” and there is scarcely a hair’s-breadth between them and the Shibboleth of Arianism. Still less can the excuse pleaded by Athanasius be accepted, namely, that he did not intend to lay down a positive confession regarding Christ in that letter, but merely to controvert Sabellianism ; that, for this reason, he simply laid down the opposite view with all possible emphasis, and by means of the passages of Scripture, which teach that Christ thirsted, hungered, suffered, prayed to the Father, and so forth, endeavoured to force from his op-

¹ Athan. de sententia Dionysii, c. 5.

² l. c. 20, 22. He might avail himself of the expedient, with some show of justice, relatively also to the image of the vintner and the vine, which is evidently borrowed from the Scriptures, where it bears upon the relation of the Father to the God-man. His words, however, clearly referred the images to the pre-existent Son (see the quotation given in the text).

ponents, the recognition of the personality of the Son, in distinction from that of the Father. It is true, indeed, that the Church was led to acknowledge the necessity of a distinction of God from God, by the person of the historical Christ. But a man who, in his polemic against others, himself assailed the true deity of the Son (as he did in that concluding proposition), cannot have reserved for himself the right of positively confessing that deity, as Athanasius appears to take for granted. What he had to do, was simply to retract; and an open confession, that his polemical zeal had carried him away into false statements, would only have done him honour.

But however decidedly this is to be acknowledged, some excuse must still be discoverable for the omission of this confession, by a man of a so decidedly honourable a character. His mind was directed more to the practical than to the speculative; and, whilst possessed of a healthy feeling for the actual, he was endowed with but a small measure of scientific acuteness: hence, he did not fully grasp the consequences of the principles he laid down. Further, when we compare him with Arius, there can be no doubt that, in the main, his tendency and intention were very different from that of Arius. "Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem." The principle referred to, which formed the central and main feature of the Arian system, did not hold that position in the system of Dionysius; but was a wrong and premature deduction from the distinction which must be allowed to exist between the Father and the Son. He had no interest in denying the reality of the deity of the Son; and the actual infringement upon it, with which he is chargeable, was an unconscious one. In the very same letter in which he drew that Arian conclusion, he laid down completely contradictory principles. Instead of the words, *ξένον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*, we find again the old image of the fountain and the stream, of the root and the stem (de sent. Dion. c. 18), and the new one of parent and child (de decr. Nic. Syn. 25); which decidedly imply the essential equality of the Son and the Father. It was possible for him, therefore, with some show of justice, to complain that his opponents had given a distorted version of his views. For, said he, they quote the first-mentioned words as expressive of my full and real views; whereas, those comparisons, as being imperfect, I merely threw out in passing; and the more apt

ones, such as those just mentioned, I treated in detail. In that therefore he did not feel the contradictions of his letter, it was the more necessary distinctly to charge him with his lack of doctrinal clearness, rendering him as it did, first incautious, and afterwards too ready to give way, and preventing him from seeing plainly that, as to the doctrinal principles actually laid down, if not as to his inmost meaning and tendencies, he had gone over to another point of view;—to confess which, would have been his duty, had he been capable of thinking with greater precision and acuteness.

By the letter to Ammonius and Euphranor he was unable to convince his opponents, as in the Nepotian controversy: on the contrary, Sabellians must have been confirmed in their own view, when they found that the view taken by their antagonist led to such results. His letter, in fact, did awaken opposition in the minds of some non-Sabellians; and some of them travelled to Rome for the purpose of laying the matter before the Dionysius there. Besides what has been just mentioned, they complained that he declined to term the Son equal in essence with the Father (*ὁμοούσιος*). In his reply to this charge, the Alexandrian Dionysius (*ἀπολογία καὶ ἐλεγχος*) says,—It is not correct to charge him with rejecting this word (c. 20). He states, that though he could not find the word in the Scriptures, he did find the sense; and with this sense his own opinion harmonized. With the greatest distinctness, he then declares that he viewed the Father as the eternal light, and the Son as the equally eternal brightness; because there cannot be light without brightness. He calls the Logos an *ἀπόρροια* of God, as truly of like substance with Him as a human son is of like substance with his father (c. 22). When he says, the Father created all things, he does not mean to reduce the Son to the rank of a creature, but the Son is posited and meant along with and in the Father; that is, the word Father he considered to be of significance, not merely in relation to mundane beings, but also in relation to the divine nature itself (c. 15–21). In the main, therefore, he returns to the doctrine of Origen, as regards the eternity and essential equality of the Son. Nay more; Origen, as we have seen, was never able to lay down this essential equality with distinctness, because the incommunicable *Ὁς* always appeared to him to be the properly divine; whereas Dionysius, in

entire agreement with his more practical point of view, seems to have been no longer confused by the distinction between the *ὄν* and the *δόξα* of God (Note 36). On the contrary, he believed the Father to be the root of all deity; that is, actually communicable as respects His *θεότης*. If Origen said,—The Son is the Will, proceeding forth from the divine *νοῦς*; so Dionysius designates the Father the *λόγος ἐγκείμενος*, the necessarily and self-existent Reason, the Son, *λόγος προσηδών*, the self-objectifying Reason, the self-manifesting Word, in which Reason is immanent,—the former, indeed, being the appearance of the latter (c. 23, Note 37). But as the Father and the Son are inseparable and indivisible from each other (*ἀχώριστοι ἀδιαίρετοι*), even so is in their hands the Spirit; which can neither be emptied of Him who sends it, nor of Him who is its vehicle and bearer (c. 19).

SECTION III.

THE CHURCH'S CONFESSION OF THE ETERNAL HYPOSTASIS
OF THE SON, AND OF HIS ESSENTIAL EQUALITY WITH
THE FATHER, AT THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CONTROVERSY PRELIMINARILY CARRIED ON WITH
SABELLIANISM AND SUBORDINATIANISM.

THE Roman Bishop Dionysius (see Athanas. de decret. Nic. Synod. c. 26) had informed the Alexandrian Bishop of the charges brought against him by several African bishops. He convened also a Synod in Rome, with the general tenor of whose conclusions we are acquainted: Athan. de Synodis, c. 45, — *Ἀλλά τινων αἰτιασαμένων παρὰ τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ Ῥώμης τὸν τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπίσκοπον, ὡς λέγοντα πόλημα καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιον τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρὶ, ἡ μὲν κατὰ Ῥώμην σύνοδος ἡγανάκτησεν, ὁ δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπίσκοπος τὴν πάντων γνώμην γράφει πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνομον ἑαυτοῦ.* Besides this, he appears to have written a work under the title *Ἀνατροπή* etc., of which Athanasius has preserved a tolerably large fragment (de decret. Nic. Syn. 26). In this work, he first attacks the Sabellians, and then those who distinguish and cut up the *μοναρχία* into three powers and divided hypostases, or beings (*Wesen*), and divinities (*διαιροῦντας καὶ κατατέμνοντας καὶ ἀναιροῦντας τὴν μοναρχίαν εἰς τρεῖς δυνάμεις τινὰς καὶ μεμερισμένας ὑποστάσεις καὶ θεότητας τρεῖς*: ib., *ξένας ἀλλήλαις καὶ παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας*). I can scarcely go with Neander, when he asserts the inaccuracy of the statement of the Roman Dionysius, that such doctrines were taught by some in Africa ("Church History" 2, 1045). It is not at all improbable in itself, that, during this trinitarian century, the feeling of the

necessity of a Trinity, which then possessed the Church so strongly, and which sought satisfaction in all possible directions, may have led some to the verge of Tritheism: and this passage gives us a hint, where those who gave way to such a tendency are to be sought. It is a modified form of Marcionitism, adapted to the striving after a doctrine of the Trinity which characterized this century, that here presents itself to us. To Marcion's God of legislation, and to the God of incarnation, there was added, at this time, the Holy Spirit. If we note further, as did the Roman Dionysius, that the Sabellians were intent above all things on the assertion of the divine unity, whereas these Tritheists had landed in a triplicity of principles, we shall agree with him in judging them to be diametrically opposed to each other. At the same time, this does not prevent us seeing that there is a connection between the two. We found above (see Note 34, and the passage to which it relates, page 167), that when the Sabellians tried to maintain the newness of the objective revelation in Christ—a point to which Marcion attached prime importance—or, as we are now in a position to say, when they yielded to the trinitarian impulse of their age, they actually might be easily led to the *τομαίς, διαίρεσιν, απορροαίς*, with which Theodoret reproaches them. The Arians, too, almost constantly charge the Sabellians with dividing the divine unity (Note 38); and Athanasius and Hilary partially follow their example; so that it is not improbable, that in Africa Marcionitism and Sabellianism were so commingled, that the entire divine essence was, strictly speaking, held to be compounded of these principles.

After pronouncing an adverse judgment on the Sabellian doctrine, the Roman Dionysius passes on to the consideration of the doctrine of the Alexandrian Bishop (without, however, mentioning his name), the natural tendency of which was to reduce the Son to the rank of a mundane being. If the Son were born (*γεννητός*), if we may say that He was formed and created, then there must have been a time when as yet He was not. He was, however, always in the Father (who can never have been without power and wisdom), as His power and wisdom (Note 39). Of this absurd consequence, that the Father was once without Son, those, he goes on to say, appear to have taken no notice, who term the Son a creature (*κτίσμα*). They do not under-

stand Proverbs viii. 22—"The Lord created me as (*geschaffen als*) the beginning of His ways"—aright; for the passage refers to the dominion transferred over created things; and other passages which speak of the generation of the Son ought to be compared. His view of the true doctrine of the Church, which preserves equally the divine Trinity and the holy proclamation of the divine *μοναρχία*, he expresses in the following words:—"With the God of the universe, the divine *Logos* must necessarily be united; but in God, the Holy Spirit also must be and dwell. But now the divine Trias must needs again be combined and summed up in one, as in a head, that is, I mean, in the Almighty God of the universe." (De decr. Nic. 26:—*Ἡνώσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον λόγον ἐμψυχωρεῖν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιατᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· ἤδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἓνα ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινα (τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω) συγκεφαλαιούσθαι τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. Μαρκίωνος γὰρ τοῦ ματαιόφρονος διδασκαλία, εἰς τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τῆς μοναρχίας τομὴν καὶ διαίρεσιν (sc. εἰσφέροντος), κ.τ.λ.)* Dionysius of Alexandria trod so closely in the footsteps of this significant statement, in his Defence, that the formula itself is legible out of the main position which he lays down. "So we unfold," says he, "the indivisible Monas into a Trias, and sum the Trias up again, undiminished, in the Monas (*εἰς τὴν μονάδα συγκεφαλαιούμεθα*, de Sent. Dionys. 17)." The utmost difference between the two is, that the Alexandrian Dionysius gives more decided expression to the distinction than is given to it by the formula of the Roman Bishop; and that, further, the former allows the hypostasis of the Father more distinctly to predominate, if, as is probable, he assigned to the Monas the place of the Father. It is possible, however, that the Roman understood by *κορυφή* the Father, and that the entire divine sphere presented itself to his mind under the image of a triangle, whose uppermost angle is the Father.¹

¹ The other view would be,—The three constitute the one Almighty God, concentrating in Him, as different lines converge in one point or in one centre. On this view, as well as on the other, the distinctions are taken for granted, that is, the existence of a Trinity is presupposed; and then steps are taken to combine them. In the latter case, however, the three are and remain completely co-ordinated, which was not as yet the case even in the system of Athanasius.

One might almost wish, with Neander, that Dionysius of Alexandria had not so soon given way, but that the struggle which so nearly awaited the Church, and of which a feeble prelude occurred even in the third century, had been fought out peacefully and thoroughly between men of like spirit such as these. Not merely single individuals, however, but the Church as a whole, was destined to take part in the great work, in order that the knowledge which should finally result from bringing the discerpted elements into the fullest antagonism to each other, might the more clearly and surely become common property. But even these discussions must have exerted a most important influence on the more extended ones that followed, and, as it were, have chalked out the course they should pursue. And as this struggle preluded the great Arian controversy, so also did the decision arrived at prelude the decision in the case of Arianism. As the Alexandrian Dionysius, by withdrawing the Arian proposition which he had advanced, did justice to that general Christian consciousness which had always retained its power over him, and which could never be satisfied with a redemption effected by a mere creature, however exalted; so are we fully warranted in anticipating that the Church, however great its previous vacillation, will prove capable of taking the right course, relatively to the points which constitute its foundation. But even at the time of Dionysius, the circumstance brought out during the struggle, that no one of the controversialists was disposed to treat the Son as a mere creature, or even consciously and decidedly to subordinate Him to the Father, must have greatly tended to strengthen this common consciousness. The principle of the equality of the essence of the Son with that of the Father, laid down by the early Church, was merely revived by these controversies; but, in consequence of the temporary effort to conceive the Son as posited in time, had developed into a clear conviction that Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son was an inevitable consequence of the coessentiality or true deity of the Son, and must be adopted by the Church, unless it were prepared to pass over into Sabellianism or Arianism.

From the time of Tertullian onwards, the Eastern Church alone was the arena of doctrinal movements; the Western Church disappeared from the scene. Dionysius of Rome was

the first to lead the Western Church again to take part in the movement: but he was so far in advance, as compared with Tertullian, and so very different from him, that, in order to account for the sudden leap, we naturally look for connecting links between the two; and such connecting links there must unquestionably have been. Whilst the Greek Church had made such affinity with Hellenic philosophy, that it was unable entirely to break away from the conception of God, as the *Ὁν* (even the *ἀγένητον*, which was employed to denote deity “sensu strictissimo,” and was deemed predicable of the Father alone, was merely a new form of the *Ὁν*),—the natural consequence whereof was, that the Son could not be represented as participating in the inmost divine essence, and must, therefore, even though in part contrary to intention, be subordinated to the Most High God;—the Western Church continued, as it would appear, a stranger to the Hellenic philosophy, and its idea of God. Taking the facts of Christianity for its starting-point, it ventured to undertake the transformation of the old conception of God, in a trinitarian sense; and never ceased to attribute to the Son true divine substance,—as, indeed, followed naturally enough from the circumstance, that it did not, like Origen, assume a divine *Ὁν* back of the divine *δόξα*, but reckoned this divine *δόξα*, in which the Son was acknowledged to participate, as part of the inner divine essence, or reckoned the inner divine essence to the *δόξα*. We have seen that Tertullian and his school were unable to establish the hypostasis of the Son, on which they insisted so strongly, and which, it is true, they held to have proceeded forth from the inmost essence of God, save at the price of a decided subordination under the Father. In the hands of Dionysius, on the contrary, half a century later, we find that things wear altogether a different appearance,—that subordination, namely, has been strongly repressed, and that the unity of the essence of the Father and of the Son is not merely asserted, but carried out in such a way, that the hypostatic distinction of the Son lost the clearness given it by Tertullian, and approximated in some measure to Sabellianism; though with the difference, that the distinctions in the divine essence were represented, not as originating in consequence of the creation of the world, but as immanent, eternal, and simultaneous. In order

to fill up the gap between Tertullian and Dionysius, a man deserves mention, who has been overlooked by recent writers on the History of Dogmas,—I mean Zeno, Bishop of Verona. The opinion, that the works attributed to him, and which were first published at Venice A.D. 1508 (Bibl. Max. PP. T. 3, 356 ff.), were either written by entirely different authors, or by a Zeno who flourished somewhat before Ambrosius (about A.D. 360), and was Bishop in Verona, is based on a letter addressed by Ambrosius to Bishop Syagrius in Verona, where he says (see Ambr. Opp. 5, 297):—"Puellam (Indiciam) Zenonis sanctæ memoriæ judicio probatam ejusque sanctificatam benedictione—in periculo reatus deducendam arbitrare." But this passage neither says that the nun was from Verona, nor that the Zeno who confirmed her was Bishop in Verona. On external grounds, little objection can be made to accepting the statement as true, that these works were written by a Bishop Zeno in Verona, who lived about the time of Origen and Cyprian, and under Gallienus; unless internal grounds are opposed thereto (compare Bibl. Max. l. c. 357 ff.). But the portions which we shall here bring under consideration, contain a doctrine of the Trinity, such as could not have been sanctioned by the Church subsequently to the Council of Nicæa; and which indicates that their author most probably flourished between Tertullian or Hippolytus, and Dionysius of Rome. At the same time, the very decided originality and individuality of the writings, alone render them worthy of a more detailed consideration. In the first Homily on Genesis (l. c. 359a), the author speaks against the eternity of matter, and a duality of opposed principles, in terms similar to those employed by Dionysius of Alexandria (see above). God is rather the principle; out of Himself He gave to Himself the principle of being. This is our God, who has discriminated Himself into God: this the Father, who, in His abiding state (*statu*, which reminds one of Tertullian), in His entirety, duplicated Himself in the Son, in order not to rob Himself of anything. "Hic est Deus noster, qui se digessit in Deum, hic Pater, qui suo manente integro statu, totum se reciprocavit in Filium, ne quid sibimet derogaret. Denique alter in altero exultat, cum spiritus s. plenitudine una originali coæternitate renitens. Quemadmodum, si dicere dignum est, duo maria quæ

in semet recumbunt, freto æstus alternos in unum conferente connexa; quæ licet sui proprietate, locis, vocabulisque discreta sint, tamen trini profundi vaporis (*ἀπορροίας*) una virtus, una substantia, una est fluendi natura, nec potest incomprehensibilis communisque undæ dividi magnitudo, et tamen utrunque (utrinque?) commeando largiflua, utrisque propria, nulli privata. Etenim damnum patientur ubertatis et gratiæ si adimatur (sc. id), quod uno eodemque æstu alterum ex altero decoratur." This obscure passage compares Father and Son to two seas, each of which exists for itself, but whose waters meet and combine in a strait. Each of the seas is something by itself; is distinguished from the other by its peculiar character, by place and by name; but neither is lessened by the existence of the other. Through the narrow channel, by which they are connected, both gain in fulness, being otherwise of the same substance; whereas both would be losers if the interchange were to cease, and they were deprived of the adornment they mutually owe to the meeting and blending of their waters. The Holy Ghost appears here to be described as the connecting link; but main stress is still laid on Father and Son. He speaks in a similar way in the third Homily:—"The Son is equal to the Father. He says, —The Father is in Me, and I am in the Father; one embraces the other (invicem se capit), with the Holy Spirit." The relation between the Father and the Son is treated with still greater speciality in the Homilies "de æterna Dei generatione" (l. c. p. 386). If, on the one hand, what has been adduced is sufficient to show, that for the successive Trinity of Tertullian he had substituted a simultaneous one, and that, inasmuch as he transfers Tertullian's *gradus*, as simultaneous, into the *status* of the divine essence, which he conceived to consist of several centres, enjoying, notwithstanding their connection, an existence of their own, he had not witnessed the Sabellian controversies without profit; the latter passage betrays, on the other hand, a remarkable affinity with Tertullian. It is true, the Son is termed "Totus de toto," not merely "portio;" the Father brought forth in the Son another Self (pater in ipsum alium se genuit ex se) out of Himself, out of His ungenerated substance (ex innascibili (i.e., ἀγεννήτῳ) sua substantiā); out of God, God is born—out of the unborn One, the only-begotten One. But he says also,—Before all the Æons, in the secret

depths of His holy intelligence, in the counsel of His own mind, unsearchable and known only to Himself, the Father embraced the Son, not without love to Him, but without as yet revealing Him. Hom. 2 :—" Out of the mouth of the eternal Father, who alone was acquainted with the secret of His own mind, proceeded the only-begotten Son, the noble guest of His heart (*cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus*), in order that the universe, which as yet did not exist, might be created. Thence onwards, He became visible, because He was destined to visit the human race; though, in all other respects, He was equal to the Father." The third Homily says still more distinctly, that, prior to the creation of the world, the Father kept the Son hidden in His own consciousness (*nescio qua sua conscientia velatum*), and embraced, not indeed without love, but without as yet fully distinguishing Him from Himself (*non sine affectu, sed sine discrimine*). In order, however, to the realization of the order of things which had been devised, that unutterable power and incomprehensible wisdom thrust forth the Word out of His heart. Then Omnipotence propagated itself: out of God was born God, who possesses in Himself all that the Father is, and has,—not, however, withdrawing anything from the Father, for that which is the Son's is the Father's, and that which belongs to the Father belongs to both (*excogitatarum ut ordinem instrueret rerum, ineffabilis illa Virtus, incomprehensibilisque Sapientia e regione cordis eructat verbum*. Omnipotentia se propagat. De Deo nascitur Deus, totum Patres habens, nihil derogans Patri—quia, quod est Filii, Patris est, quod Patris, amborum). The Father rejoices in the other Self, which He has produced out of Himself (*lætatur Pater in alio se, quem genuit ex se*). The mode of generation is inexplicable; but to suppose that He cannot be termed generated, who proceeded forth, is madness. For the Son limits Himself (*temperat se*), on behalf of nature; "*ne æternæ majestatis dominum non possit mundi istius mediocritas sustinere*." In these latter words, he seeks to guard against the appearance of bringing the eternal divine essence of the Son into too close proximity to the world; as would seem to be the case, if He first proceeded forth from God as His Word, at the creation of the world. It is unmistakeable, however, that he represents the Son as proceeding out of the heart of the Father, and His

determinate "discrimen," as first taking place at the creation of the world; and the sole perceptible difference between Zeno and Tertullian is, that the former takes greater pains to make sure the full eternal deity of the Son in the Father (in corde Patris), the co-ordination of the Son with the Father after His procession to hypostatical existence, and, in general, the permanence and simultaneity of the Trinity. The position—that the Father has in the Son His other Self (*alterum se*), or Himself as an object—was further carried out, at a later period (in the fifth century), in the treatise appended to the works of Cyprian, entitled "*De Sina et Zion adv. Jud.*," after the following manner: "*Salvator speculum Patris immaculatum, eo quod sanctus spiritus, Dei Filius geminatum se videat Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre, utriusque se in se vident; ideo speculum immaculatum.*" We shall find similar language used, however, even by Athanasius and Hilary.

The principal momenta of the Christology of Zeno (if the sections which treat thereof be genuine; and in favour of their genuineness many things plead, although I should not like to assert it so confidently as in the case of the previous portions) are as follows. We must distinguish a double birth of the Son (as Tertullian and Hippolytus taught),—the first was without mother, the second without Father. In the womb of the Virgin He prepared for Himself a body (nothing is said regarding the soul). Out of love to His image, constricted into a child, God weeps (*amore imaginis sue coactus in infantem vagit Deus*). The Virgin comprised in herself Him whom the world and its greatness cannot comprise. Meanwhile, He threw aside His glory, but not His power. He whose eternity admits of no age, went through the different ages of man. He who confers eternity on the times, borrowed human life from time. Contrary to His consciousness, he suffered as a weak man, in order that immortality might become the portion of man, who was snatched away by the law of death. This passage reminds one of early Christian hymns. Somewhat Doce-tical in character is "*de nat. Chr. hom. 2*," where he tries to show, that if Mary were a virgin in conceiving, she must also have been a virgin in bringing forth (*sine dolore, etc.*). As God, He must have been able to be what He willed; accordingly, He became what He was not, but did not cease to be what he had

previously been (Hom. 1, de nat. Chr. :—"Vultis scire in compendio veritatem? Factus est quod non erat: nec tamen desiit esse ante quod fuerat"). But we need not be surprised at these Docetical features; we know both from Hippolytus and Methodius, that they were not foreign to the time. For a long period after Origen, it was an universal custom to slight the soul of Christ; and where it is done, it is a sign of high antiquity. Nor, again, need we be surprised at the repudiation (hom. de nat. Chr. 1) of Ebionism, which teaches "Jesum Christum ab utero Mariæ sumsisse principium, Deumque exinde ob justitiam factum esse, non natum;" of Subordinationianism, which does indeed term the Son of God, God, "sed non ex Patre nobilitatis perpetuitate progenitum, fuisseque tempus quando non fuit;" and of the "Judæa secta," which refuses to distinguish between Father and Son. For, as far as concerns the second in particular, we have certainly found the doctrine, that there was a time when the Son did not exist, both taught under various forms during the third century, and also expressly condemned by many teachers of the Church, for example, by Origen.

This is probably the most suitable place for devoting a word to some other men of the Latin Church;—for example, first to Arnobius and Minucius Felix, of whom the former at all events was an African, and both of whom flourished in the third century; then to Lactantius, who was a scholar of the former.

Arnobius endeavoured to demonstrate from the miracles of Christ, that He was not one from amongst us (adv. Gent. 1, 45 f.); but, on the contrary, because of the great gifts which He has brought us, deserves to be called God (1, 42). "Deus ille sublimis fuit, Deus *radice ab intima*, Deus ab incognitis regnis et ab omnium principe Deus sospitator est missus." "Ye say, it is true," he cries to the heathen, "Your God is dead." "But death is no disgrace; Socrates and others lost nothing by death; as little did their cause lose thereby. Moreover, the simple divine essence did not suffer when Christ died. If the Sybil, whom you believe to be filled with Apollo, were to be murdered by wicked robbers, would you say, 'Apollo was killed in her?' Death befell the man assumed by Him, not Him Himself; that which was borne, not the vehicle and bearer (*mors gestaminis*

fruit, non gestantis). And even this He would not have had to endure, had there not been so great, so mysterious a work to be accomplished" (1, 62). The illustration of the Sybil might be taken to indicate that he regarded Christ as a mere prophet. But he also designates Him, "*Deus radice ab intima*," and in 1, 60, "*vis invisibilis, habens nullam substantiam corporalem*." So exalted, indeed, was He, that it was necessary for Him to throw around Himself a covering of dark matter, on which the eye might rest, and on which the gaze of dull contemplation might be fixed. Had he presented Himself on earth, in His "*primogenita natura*," who would have been able to behold Him? Wherefore He assumed the human form, and concealed His might under a cloak of resemblance to our race, in order that He might be seen, and might be able to execute all that for which He came into the world, in pursuance of the behest and commission of the Most High King. His Christ is so far from being a man, that he rather verges strongly towards Docetism; and he does not appear to have objected even to the expression—Christ was "*homo simulatus*" (1, 61). The real kernel of the "*velamen*" or "*tegmen*," that is, of His humanity, is His "*primogenia natura*." For this reason, he ascribes to the death of Christ, as the taking away of that "*tegmen*," the peculiar effect that He was now seen in His real essence, especially by the spirits, who were seized with terror when they discovered that He was God, whom they had esteemed to be one of us. (*Exutus corpore, quod in exigua sui circumferebat parte, postquam videri se passus est, cujus esset aut magnitudinis sciri: novitate rerum exterrita universa mundi sunt elementa turbata, tellus mota contremuit, etc. Quid enim restabat, ut fieret, postquam Deus est cognitus is, qui esse jam dudum unus judicabatur e nobis? 1, 53.*) He treats the work of Christ as consisting mainly in His doctrine of the true God, who cherishes the same feelings towards all alike, who neither punishes nor requires sacrifices; and in the exhibition, in His own person, of the divine longsuffering and tenderness. He was the Mediator of the revelation of God. The idea of the God-man had no constitutive significance for him; indeed, with his undeveloped system, he had scarcely arrived at the idea. Still, we may suppose without improbability, that he did not wish to appear before the heathen with all the mysteries of Christianity, and

that he passed over the doctrine of the Trinity in particular, because the unity of God appeared to him to supply a peculiarly forcible argument in favour of Christianity against the heathen, —which argument he perhaps feared to shake by bringing forward the doctrine of the Trinity, especially as he may have felt incapable of fully grappling with the difficulties it presented. This, however, is a new proof that he had not penetrated very deeply into the soul of the doctrines of Christianity.—Still more meagre are the results arrived at from an examination of Minucius Felix. He says (Octavius, c. 20),—All philosophers of repute teach one God, even though under different names. So that everybody must believe, either that Christians are now philosophers, or that philosophers were already Christians. In his view, as in that of Arnobius, the principal and characteristic doctrines of Christianity are, the unity of God, His invisibility and omniscience, His providence, the end of the world, and the resurrection of the dead. Of Christ, he only says in passing (c. 29),—“To our religion you ascribe a guilty man, and reckon to him his cross. But you wander far from the truth, when you fancy that a guilty man could deserve, or an earthly being bring about, His own recognition as God (—“*erratis, qui putatis Deum credi aut meruisse noxium aut potuisse terrenum*”). Still, these words imply, not merely that Christ was holy, but also that He was not of the earth, and for this cause He is believed in as God. “Woe to him,” he goes on to say, “whose entire hope rests on a mortal man; all his help is lost, as soon as this man disappears.” Neither Arnobius nor Minucius Felix allude to the Holy Spirit and the Trinity.

The peculiar, and as yet little considered, Christology of Lactantius, laid down in his “*Institutiones*,” belongs properly to another place; but the traditional elements thereof, which are to a certain extent inconsistent with his own views, both in tone, form, and substance, bear a remarkable resemblance to that portion of Zeno’s system which we have touched upon. I refer to what he says regarding the pre-existent higher essence of Christ. This is the more remarkable, as the doctrine of Christ’s higher nature, contained in his *Institutiones*, though evidently emasculated, is out of harmony with his general views of things, could not be deduced from his premisses, and must therefore be regarded as fragments of an entirely different

system of the world. Lactantius becomes, on this very ground, a striking witness to the correctness of the view we have taken of the history of this dogma, prior to Arius. The Son of God, says he, proceeded forth from God for the creation of the world, as a word proceeds out of the mouth,—hypostatically, however, and not as “*tacitus spiritus*.” This Son is also termed the Word of God, which the Greeks express still better by *Logos*, for *Logos* denotes both word and reason (l. c. 8, 9). He is very different from the other angels. “*Quoniam spiritus et sermo diversis partibus proferuntur, spiritus naribus, ore sermo procedit, magna inter hunc Dei Filium ceterosque angelos differentia est. Illi enim ex Deo taciti spiritus exierunt, qui non ad doctrinam Dei tradendam sed ad ministerium creabantur. Ille vero, quum sit et ipse spiritus, tamen cum voce ac sono ex Dei ore processit, sicut verbum, ea scilicet ratione, quia voce ejus ad populum fuerat usus, i.e., quod ille magister futurus esset doctrinæ dei et cœlestis arcani ad homines perferendi.*” He is therefore God’s spokesman, produced by God, in order that He might speak, “*quod ipsum primo locutus est, ut per eum ipse ad nos loqueretur, et ille vocem Dei ac voluntatem nobis revelaret. Merito igitur Sermo et Verbum Dei dicitur: quia Deus procedentem de ore suo vocalem spiritum, quem non utero sed mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam majestatis suæ virtute ac potentia in effigiem, quæ proprio sensu ac sapientia vigeat, comprehendit.*” This “*sensus*” and “*potentia*” He derived from the Father (de Patre tanquam rivus de fonte traduxit). If his derivation of the “*Sermo Dei*” from God, for the purpose of the creation of the world and of revelation, fully warrants us in classing Lactantius amongst the teachers of the Western Church, particularly subsequent to Tertullian, he bears a special resemblance to Zeno, through the idea, which he repeatedly advances, of the “*duplex nativitas*” of Christ, the one for the creation of the world, the other for the incarnation; then a still closer resemblance, through his description of the first birth, which he says was “*sine matre*.” In this connection he protests against the doctrine of Orpheus and Hermes, who represented the Son as the fruit of a sexual dualism in God, who is both *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτομήτωρ*. Apuleius quotes, as a verse of Orpheus, the words, *Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἐπλετο νύμφη*. At His first birth, on the contrary, we should

rather say that the Son was ἀμύητος, and in the second ἀπάτωρ. Finally, Lactantius follows the example of the older writers, but specially of Zeno, in applying to the first birth of the Son the words, “eructavit cor meum verbum bonum;” and shows, in the above passage, how in his view the Son was at first concealed in the “mens Dei,” and then was manifested through the speaking of God. All this sufficiently proves that he too believed in the equality of the essence of the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son with that of the Father. But Lactantius undoubtedly betrays also a strong retrogressive tendency. Wherever the Son is represented as proceeding forth from God for the creation of the world, and for the revelation of God in it, it is possible in itself that such a doctrinal system may end either in Sabellianism on the one hand, or in Arianism on the other; and such a vacillation we find to have been characteristic of the Fathers between Tertullian and Origen. Nor was it possible for it to cease, so long as the various elements had not been separated, and the heterogeneous principles to which they alternately surrendered themselves had not been logically developed into opposed systems. The decisive appearance of Sabellianism in the third century led to a partial separation of the elements; and, as we see, even Lactantius very decidedly, though, it must be allowed, inconsistently, ranged himself under the banner of one party. In doing so, he repudiated very distinctly the Sabellian view, with its denial of an hypostasis, but at the same time inclined all the more decidedly to Subordinationism. Zeno, on the contrary, endeavoured to nullify the subordination involved in the doctrine, that the Son first proceeded forth from God for the creation of the world, by teaching that He was previously an object of love in the heart of the Father, coeternal with God; but he fails to answer clearly the question, as to the relation between the eternal existence of the Son in the Father, and His production for the purpose of the creation of the world and of the incarnation. Dionysius of Rome, on the other hand, appears to have left the idea of the generation of the Son entirely aside, and to have contented himself solely with the eternal unity of the Son with the Father in distinction from Him, without more carefully inquiring into the mode of this being, or asking whether an eternal generation or production of the Son took place in God. Dionysius of Alexandria, like Zeno, finally

arrives at a kind of duplication of the *vous* in the Father and the Son (Note 40).

Whatever other differences there may have been between them, and whatever indefiniteness may have characterized their expositions, it is evident that this entire series of men, from the Eastern and Western Church, had certain fixed and invariable doctrinal views. They all clung to the essential equality of the Son and the Father, and to the distinction of the Son's pre-existent hypostasis from that of the Father. But we find also various indications that the Church was gradually arriving at a more and more fixed doctrinal type, of this same general character. After the controversy between the two Dionysiuses, Sabelianism disappeared ever more completely from the scene; and in the following century was treated, both by Arians and orthodox, as a view already repudiated by the Church,—a circumstance which points back to the afore-mentioned Romish Synod. In opposition to Arianism, also, the later Church teachers appealed to this Synod. But the reaction which now set in against the system of Origen, especially against its subordinationist aspect, is particularly deserving of notice. This reaction was characterized, indeed, by many displeasing features, but strikingly demonstrates the correctness of what has just been said. The first and milder form of the polemic may be found, perhaps, at the close of the Confession of Faith adopted by the Synod of Antioch (Note 41). But a still more strong polemic was waged about the year 300. It is instructive to read, in the Apology of Pamphilus, the points of accusation against Origen, as they are the same which were brought forward even prior to the Arian controversy, and indicate very plainly what was at that time deemed necessary to orthodoxy in general. Inasmuch as Pamphilus does not say that the opponents of Origen were in error on these points, and required what was false, but endeavours rather to show that Origen had taught what they required; nay more, in that he grants that it would have been heresy in Origen to have taught the doctrines which his opponents attributed to him; this monument is the more interesting. Whether he was able to clear Origen of the charges, or whether Eusebius took part in the composition of the first book of the Apology or not, does not concern us in this connection. The work was certainly written between A.D. 307 and 309.

The first charge is, that Origen did not believe the Son to have been born, or begotten,—which does not mean that he recognised no distinction between the unbegotten Father and the Son, but, as the answer shows, that he did not hold the Son to be Son of God by nature; whereas he ought to have taught, that He was of the substance of the Father, and of a different nature from the creature.¹ The second charge was that of representing the Son as having arrived at subsistence by *προβολή*, after the manner of Valentinus. The third charge was, that he refused to designate Christ God, and made Him a mere man. The fourth charge was, treating the history of Christ docetically. The fifth, teaching two Christs. In connection with this latter point, special remark is deserved by the hint that the giving great prominence to the human soul of Christ seemed to many to be equivalent to teaching two Christs, and was, therefore, a cause of offence. “*Si quis sane offenditur, quod dixit, Salvatorem etiam animam suscepisse, nihil de hoc amplius respondendum puto, nisi quod hujus sententiæ non Origenes auctor est, sed ipsa sancta scriptura, etc.;—from which we see clearly how very far the completeness of the human aspect of the Person of Christ was lost to the view of the Church, in consequence of the prominence given to the doctrine of His higher nature. We shall have occasion to make the same remark respecting Athanasius, at the beginning of his career.*”

Another very important source of information concerning the character of the general views of the Church during the second half of the third century, are the two Synods of Antioch, convened in the years 265 and 270, for the purpose of judging Paul of Samosata (Note 42). Their decrees, although they undoubtedly lacked a strictly doctrinal form, and had rather

¹ Pamphilus adduces, in reply, a number of passages, in which the Son is described as Light of Light; as Love from God, who is Love; as an out-flow from God; nay more, as *ὁμοούσιος* with the Father. The latter probably originated with Rufinus, though we have found that, on a subsequent occasion, Dionysius of Alexandria, when he was required to use this term, showed himself ready to do so. But that, in the main, the translation of Rufinus gives a correct impression of the work of Pamphilus and Eusebius, is evident from Jerome's charge against it, of containing the poison of Arianism. Compare the Introduction to this treatise in de la Rue's ed. T. iv.

an exegetical character, were recognised as orthodox by later Synods. We find in them a strong predominance given to the Father over the Son, for example, at the very outset; and other words and turns of expression are employed, which would probably have been avoided subsequently to the Council of Nice. The Confession runs as follows:—"We believe that God, to wit, the Father, is unbegotten, One, without beginning, invisible," etc. "Through the revelation of His beloved Son, we receive a knowledge of Him, though it is imperfect, owing to our weakness." "The Son is *γεννητός*," it goes on to say, "the only-begotten Son, the image of the invisible Father, the first-born of creation, the Wisdom and Logos and Power of God, who existed before the *Æons*, not merely in the divine foreknowledge (*προγνώσει*), but we confess and proclaim Him, as we have learnt from the Old and New Testaments, as *God*, both in His essence and in His hypostasis (*οὐσία καὶ ὑποστάσει*).¹ Whoso denies that the Son of God existed before the foundation of the world, and maintains that this is to teach two Gods, him we regard as estranged from the canon of the Church; and all the communities of the Church General are of the like opinion (*τούτον ἀλλότριον τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ κανόνος ἡγούμεθα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ καθολικαὶ ἐκκλησίαι συμφωνοῦσιν ἡμῖν*).² Concerning Him who was always with the Father (*σὺν τῷ πατρὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα*), we believe, that He accomplished the Father's will in the creation of the universe. Through Him the Father created all things, not as through an instrument, nor as through an impersonal wisdom (*οὐχ ὡς δι' ὄργανου οὐδ' ὡς δι' ἐπιστήμης ἀνυποστάτου*); for, when the Father begat the Son, He begat a living, personal energy (*ὡς ζῶσαν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐνυπόστατον*). He appeared to Abraham, conversed with the patriarchs, now as an angel, now as the Lord, now as God. But we say also, that the law was given to Moses by the intervention of the Son

¹ Judging from the context, *οὐσία*, as the antithesis to *προγνώσει*, will refer to the reality of the pre-existence. At a later period, the Arians frequently adopted the above Confession as their own, possibly for the very reason that it corresponded to the requirements of the Fathers of Antioch.

² The Oriental bishops sent the *Epistola Synodica* to which this Confession was annexed to the Western Church, to Dionysius of Rome, to the Alexandrian Church, and, indeed, to all bishops, presbyters, and deacons, *κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην* (Euseb. l. c. 7, 30 init.).

(*διακονοῦντος τοῦ υἱοῦ*)."¹ And now the Confession passes on from the pre-existent Son to His incarnation:—"We believe and confess, further, that the Son, who was God with the Father and Lord of all creation, was sent by the Father from heaven, and became flesh, assuming humanity; for which cause, the body out of the Virgin, containing as it did all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, is unchangeably united and deified with His deity. Hence was one and the same Jesus Christ proclaimed as God and man in the law and the prophets, and in the entire Church which is under heaven is believed in as One." (*Τὸν δὲ υἱὸν παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὄντα, Θεὸν μὲν καὶ κύριον τῶν γεννητῶν ἀπάντων, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποσταλέντα ἐξ οὐρανῶν καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐνθρονηκέναι (ὁμολογοῦμεν, κ.τ.λ.). διόπερ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου σῶμα, χωρήσαν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς, τῇ θεότητι ἀτρέπτως ἦνεται καὶ τεθεοποιῇται.* (This last expression of Paul's was allowed to pass.) *Οὐ χάριν ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεφητεύετο ἐν νόμῳ καὶ προφήταις, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν πάσῃ πεπίστευται, Θεὸς μὲν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῶ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, τὰ μὲν σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τέρατα, τὰ ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις ἀναγεγραμμένα ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ἐπιτελέσας, τὸ δὲ σαρκὸς καὶ αἵματος μετесχηκέναι τὸν αὐτὸν πεπειραμένον κατὰ πάντα καθ' ὁμοιότητα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. Οὕτω καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς πρὸ τῆς σαρκώσεως ἐν ταῖς θείαις γραφαῖς, ὡς εἰς, ὠνόμασται.*²)

The Confession opens with the following words:—"It seemed good to us to set forth as follows, in writing, the faith

¹ As everything which relates to the hypostatical pre-existence of the Son was directed primarily, indeed, against Paul,—naturally, however, against Monarchianism in general, and, therefore, against Sabellius also,—so should I be inclined to see in this very emphatic mention of the share taken by the Son in the law, an allusion to the Sabellians, with whom the Orientals must certainly have become acquainted after, if not before, the controversy between the two Dionysiuses. For the Sabellians ascribed legislation to the Father, whereas they excluded the Son entirely from the Old Testament.

² Then follow the passages, Lamentations iv. 20; 2 Cor. iii. 17; 1 Cor. x. 4, 9; Heb. xi. 26; 1 Peter i. 10 f.; 1 Cor. i. 24. *Εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς Θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία, πρὸ αἰῶνων ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ καθὼς Χριστὸς ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα πολλαῖς ἐπινοαῖς ἐπινοεῖται.* Not a word is spoken concerning the soul, which, after the time of Apollinarius, would be quite unintelligible.

as we have received and held it from the beginning, which has been handed down to us, and is preserved in the Holy Catholic Church to the present day, which has come to us in an unbroken line from the holy Apostles, who were eye-witnesses and servants of the Word."

By this act of the Church, Ebionism, in its higher Hellenic form also was shut out (a circumstance which, as we shall see, was not without an important bearing on the Arian controversies); and if to this end it was necessary to confess the pre-existence of the hypostasis of the Son, Sabellianism also was excluded; and if, finally, the real motive for the rejection of Paul of Samosata was the conviction, that the full conception of Christianity requires us to acknowledge that the Deity appeared in the Son in a personal form, and was not a mere power; if, accordingly, the doctrine of the Son's pre-mundane generation out of the Father were taught, and these two points—that is, the pre-existence of the hypostasis and the generation out of the Father—were developed into, and summed up in, the determinate doctrine of the eternal existence of the hypostasis of the Son with the Father,—we may see very clearly what direction the stream of Church thought was taking, towards the end of the third century. It is the direction which resulted, by an internal necessity, from the course pursued by the preceding history, from its ever fuller and clearer development of doctrine, no less than from the inner, ever-present principle which gave the impulse. The position of the Arians was that of men who are born out of due time; or, to adopt another image, they resembled stagnant, or even receding waters; for, just as the Church, in consequence of the favourable political position in which it was placed, quitted its earlier career—a career rich in conflict, and therefore rich in vitality—and entered on the easy and open, but also flat plain; and further, when, in consequence thereof, the vital power by which the Church should work up, purge, and appropriate the ante-Christian elements, ceased, at all events, for the moment to bear any proportion to the masses of the heathen world which now pressed into it, the Arians stood still. At this point, however, our attention must be directed to a new aspect of the matter.

As early as the second half of the third century, we find within the Church itself, independently of the heathens who

pressed rapidly into it, a dangerous mixture with the world, and a suspicious attention to externals, to power and mere numbers, even at the cost of inner truth; and, finally, an intimacy with heathen philosophy, without the vigour necessary to its transformation, which necessarily reacted corruptingly on the Christian mind, and sapped the energy of the conscience of Christian science in relation to its subject-matter, that is, faith.¹

These external considerations alone, prove that the storm which burst at the commencement of the fourth century was not sudden and unprepared. On the historian, however, devolves the further task of showing that the possibility of even the great Arian movement was grounded in the doctrinal condition of a previous age, and that, agreeably to a higher order, it was both necessary to, and exerted a wholesome influence on, the development of doctrine in the Church.

To this subject the introduction to the next section will be devoted, where we shall find the doctrinal materials of the great conflict; that is, both the weaknesses and defects of the dogma, in the form to which we have seen it grow; and the frequent inclinations to subordination and Arian representations, on the part of the world of cultivated laymen,—inclinations which necessarily assumed greater power in the Church the more it endeavoured to stand forth in a worldly shape and form.

¹ Let us call to mind Paul of Samosata (Euseb. H. E. 7, 30), whose part even Lucian the martyr is said to have taken; the claims of the Romish bishops, which rose with every new success; the commencing pomp and externality of the Cultus; the opposition already necessary to be raised against the worship of martyrs (for example, under Commodian); the impurity of the view taken of marriage and celibacy; the beginnings of monasticism—a fleeing from the world which only a feeble Christian consciousness could regard as identical with the denial of the world required by Christianity, whilst it really served, along with that other, to make the Church hierarchical, that is, to give it a worldly form, whilst preserving the appearance of Christianity; and, finally, let us call to mind how frequently men highly esteemed in the Church were styled Rhetors and Sophists—titles by no means so unobjectionable as that of Philosopher, used in the second century.

CHAPTER SECOND.

ARIUS AND HIS FORERUNNERS.

WHAT led so many even of the cultivated into the Church, from the end of the third century onwards, and from the time of Constantine the Great, was not so much an universally diffused and deeper conviction of the need of redemption and the necessity for a redeemer other than man, as the total decomposition of Heathenism, brought about by philosophy or illumination and by Christianity. As compared with Polytheism and its superstition, Christianity was the religion of Monotheism; and it was distinguished from Judaism by its universalism. It was recognised, therefore, as the true religion, and as fitted to give life and reality to the final conclusion at which heathen philosophy had arrived, to wit, the unity of God, and to secure for it a place amongst the convictions of mankind as a whole. In which connection, it was not forgotten that the merely negative universalism at which the heathen world had arrived, after the annihilation of its national gods, was converted by Christianity into a positive universalism. For the one God taught by Christianity, and the knowledge of whom it deems to be the true philosophy, is not a mere idea of the reason, but a living, watchful Providence, who reveals Himself for the whole of humanity, and thus satisfies not merely the intellect, but the religious impulse; which latter especially can be content with nothing short of the communication of God Himself. We can thus understand why Christianity took such immense strides, and why also it made extensive, in part, at the cost of intensive, progress.

The danger of taking a superficial view of Christianity, and the temptation to regard the development of doctrine hitherto considered, as a secondary matter, and the living Monotheism of Christianity, on the contrary, as the main matter, could only have been easily evaded in one way,—to wit, by connecting the doctrine of the Person of Christ with a more fully developed doctrine of His work and office, and thus giving the former a greater hold on the mind. This, however, presupposed a deeper

estimate of the doctrines of anthropology, and of the state of sin and grace, for which the time had not yet come. Those who were truly animated by the spirit of the Church devoted their best powers to the subject of the Trinity, and had therewith enough to do. Did not the foundation-stone need first to be laid?—what Christianity is in itself objectively, first to be ascertained? So long as the reason why Christ ought to be regarded as the Son of God, in an hypostatical form, and why, because of the appearance of Christ, the old Monotheism should be so boldly cast aside, was as imperfectly understood as it was at first; many Christians, specially of the just-mentioned monotheistic sort, were necessarily driven to regard it as an useless expenditure of pains on the part of God, to appear, as the creeds of the Church maintained, in the hypostasis of the Son in Christ; and to such a feeling neither the Scriptures nor the tradition of the Church could furnish a sufficient counterpoise, where the religious impulse, whose cry is for a marriage of the perfect God with humanity, lacked vitality, and there had been no experience of the need of redemption. Precisely in this connection the circumstance must be considered, that the Eastern Church had taken a predominantly theoretical, the Western a predominantly practical turn; and that both had diverged in many respects from the true religious centre.

In the East, from the time of Origen onwards, theological science flourished ever more and more, but passed frequently over into a supernatural intellectualism, which laid chief stress on doctrine in general; and, as the character of this Church would lead us to expect, on the doctrine of God in particular. To regard Christ, however, merely as the teacher, the revealer of God, is, at the very outset, to make Him a mere organ and means, and not a constitutive element, of that which is to be revealed. His person, and therefore the Trinity also, could not then be regarded as forming part of the contents of His doctrine, as He would rather be the mere "*principium cognoscendi*," or the formal principle. To this conclusion, too, many actually arrived, both Arians and Sabellians. Furthermore, the theology of the Eastern Church had not yet freed itself from the abstract conception of God, taught by Hellenic philosophy, as we see most plainly from the circumstance that aseity was attributed, not to the entire trinitarian God, but to one

hypostasis; the consequence of which was, that this hypostasis was inevitably put into the position either of the Most High God, or of the entire God, and a constant vacillation between Subordinationism and Sabellianism. It is particularly deserving of remark in this connection, that the Church teachers of the fourth century very frequently appeal to Philo, to Porphyry, to Plotinus, to Amelius, to Numenius, and other Neo-Platonists; and believed that they could find the Christian conception of God in an almost pure state in the writings of these men, who, in consequence of the Christian influences under which they had lived, had constructed a kind of doctrine of the Trinity. The Father is the *Ὁν*, the *αἰών*, etc. This *Ὁν*, which is the Father, was probably the ultimate foundation of the Subordinationism from which the Eastern Church found such difficulty in freeing itself, notwithstanding the evident incompatibility thereof with its religious convictions. We need scarcely remark, that such an intellectualism as this could not possibly ensure to Christ an eternal significance, nor indeed assign to His humanity in general a sure place, but always necessarily inclined to seek a one-sided support in the Logos; nor, lastly, that there invariably slumbered behind it a superficial view of sin, a notion that it could be overcome by higher enlightenment. Indeed, there is no doubt that this intellectualism, with its disregard of anthropology, of the doctrine of sin, and of the work of Christ, was already Pelagianistic at the bottom.

The Western Church, on the contrary, was stirred by a spirit of a more practical or ethical kind. It very quickly saw the change in the position occupied by Christianity in the world, and understood how to make use thereof; accordingly, instead of taking up a negative position, or theoretically isolating itself, the Church set itself the task of morally transforming the world by means of Christianity. This powerful moral impulse was embodied in the Western representative of Montanism, Tertullian, but propagated itself from him in Novatian, Cyprian, in Arnobius, Minucius Felix, and Lactantius, the last mentioned of whom incorporated a kind of ethics with his Institutions. At a later period, Ambrose and Augustine intensified this tendency in the direction of religion; Pelagius made it more superficial.

I. *Lactantius.*

At the period now under review, when, although the Western Church was stirred by the practical impulse just described, at the same time the consciousness of the need of redemption and of the power of sin was still undeveloped, the significance of the Person of Christ was limited principally to a reference to the will. He appeared in order to bring about right action. Now, it is self-evident that, if Christ came merely to be a teacher and example of virtue, the Church was at very useless pains in bringing forward its doctrine of the Trinity. At this point, however, the idea of the *ethical* incarnation of God, which required to be included as a momentum of Christology, was brought forward for the first time in a more developed shape. Nor need we be much surprised to find that Lactantius, who represented this aspect in a vigorous and original manner, did not succeed very well in combining it with the Trinity. We shall have occasion, however, to recognise that the tendency in the Church to assert the identity of the essence of the Son with that of the Father, must have been very strong, when it forced from Lactantius, with his one-sided ethical fundamental views, such a Christology, however defective its form.

In the view of Lactantius, the ethical constitutes the central feature of Christianity. The vigour of his moral consciousness expresses itself in a remarkable manner, and in glaring contrast with most of the Oriental Fathers, in his work "*De via Dei*;" especially also in his Christology. "He bade His only-begotten Son," says he (*Instit.* 4, 11), "the Creator of the world (*opificem*), His counsellor, descend from heaven, in order that He might carry the holy religion of God to the nations of the heathen, and might teach them the righteousness which a faithless people had cast away." Here, indeed, he places religion and ethics alongside of each other; but, as is well known, he derives "*religio*" from "*religare*" (4, 28), and, accordingly, gives to the ethical element even in religion the decided predominance. Christ he terms, therefore, "*Magister, doctor virtutis*" (4, 11), doctor, *præceptor justitiæ*" (4, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25). He does not understand this, however, merely of His words:—the Son was sent to be the "*viva præsensque lex*," so different from the Old Testament law, that Moses, the lawgiver, was himself

obliged to prophesy His coming (4, 17, 25). He is the bringer in of a new law. No one, since the foundation of the world, was like Christ, who taught wisdom by His word, and confirmed His doctrine by the presence of His virtue (c. 23). But why was it necessary for such a teacher to come from heaven? In order that henceforth there might be no longer a difference between earthly and heavenly. Here he leans for support on his supernaturalism. "*In homine interna et propria doctrina nullo pacto esse potest.*" The spirit which is shut up in the body, and its perishable nature, cannot by itself understand and lay hold of the truth, if it do not learn it elsewhere. The pure knowledge of virtue must therefore come from above. But why would not an earthly teacher (*terrenus doctor*), to whom the good had been revealed, have sufficed? Because it did not depend merely on the teaching, but also on the representation, of virtue, and because the former, without the latter, is an imperfect and inoperative thing. An earthly teacher could not be perfect; for, even if we were to conceive him in possession of a pure knowledge of the good, he could neither grasp the highest virtue, nor resist all sins, the incitement to which lies in the body. On the contrary, the heavenly teacher, whom His deity made partaker of wisdom, and His immortality of virtue, must needs be perfect, both in His doctrine and in all things. Accordingly, it is not merely necessary for the right teacher of virtue to come down from God; but he alone is the true teacher, who personally embodies the good, or who is the living and present law. He is thus led by the ethical to the recognition of the necessity of the incarnation, to the idea of the incarnation of the law. God must become man in order to realize righteousness on earth. On this thought he dwells with peculiar fondness, and by its means was able to give an explanation even of the exinanition and the death of Christ. "It has often been denied," says he (c. 22), "that anything can be taken away from an immortal nature, and that incarnation, the burden of the flesh and its sufferings, could be either worthy of or necessary for God. For surely it must be easy enough for Him to show Himself to men, and to teach them righteousness, without assuming the weakness of the body; nay, indeed, with the better result if He showed Himself as God. For if the power and might of the commanding God had approached to men, all would have ren-

dered obedience. Why, then, did He come, not as God, but poor and lowly, so that He was despised and punished by men? Why did He not warn the men who sought to lay hands on Him away, by His power, or escape from them by His deity? Why did He not reveal His majesty, at all events, in the article of death?" All these objections, says he, I will carefully examine and refute, that every one will not merely cease to wonder that God should be crucified, but will see clearly that Christ could not have been believed in as God had not that happened which some blame.

He who gives a command must himself observe it; otherwise, it has no force. For if that which is commanded is good in itself, the lawgiver must not separate himself from the number and fellowship of the rest of men; on the contrary, he must himself live as he teaches other men to live. Only on condition that he who commands, puts himself on a level with him who is commanded, is the freedom of the latter ensured to him. Then the latter is free in obeying; if, however, he who commands, does not submit to the law which he imposes on others, and lives otherwise than as he commands, those who are commanded are not free in their obedience, and cannot be bound to render obedience. For this reason, it behoved God to subject Himself to His own law; and this He could only do, by becoming a man and living as we live. Now, for the first time, is our obligation complete. For now no one can any longer say,—‘I am unable to do what Thou requirest; my nature is too weak. Thou forbiddest me anger, concupiscence, passion, the fear of pain and death, and yet it is against nature: or, if Thou supposest we can resist nature, show me how, that I may know.’ What presumption to impose laws on a free man, which one does not obey oneself! Hence comes it, that no man obeys the laws of philosophers. Rather will I have examples than words; for to talk is easy, but to do, hard. Such excuses, which lead to our despising the teachers when they are men, and, when God is the teacher, lean for support on human weakness, are put to silence as soon as God subjects Himself to the law,—the condition whereof is His incarnation.

From this statement, we might, strictly speaking, draw the conclusion, that the incarnation was necessary to the ethical perfection of God Himself, to the full actuality of His ethical

existence. This aspect of the matter he passes over lightly, and gives the greater prominence to the œconomical (c. 24). "Without assuming a mortal body, God could not be a perfect teacher of righteousness. For if He came to men as God, He could not, even apart from the consideration that mortal eyes would be unable to bear the brightness of His majesty, as God teach virtue; for without body, He could not do what He had to teach, and therefore His doctrine would be imperfect. It is true, Thou sinnest not, one might have said to Him; but it is because Thou art free from this body of ours. Thou hast no desires, because, as an immortal, Thou hast no needs. I, on the contrary, need many things, for the support of this life of mine. Thou fearest not death, because it has no power over Thee. Thou despisest pain, because it can do Thee no harm. But I, a mortal, fear both; for both cause me pain. Such excuses the teacher of virtue must needs cut short; but he could only do so if he were able to say,—'What thou callest impossible, I do myself; therefore thy sin is not necessary, but is thy guilt. The flesh, concerning which thou sayest, To sin is essential to it, I also bear; and yet sin does not reign in me. Pain and death for righteousness' sake, which appear to thee unbearable because of the weakness of the flesh, has also its power in me; and that which thou fearest I conquer, in order to make thee also a victor over pain and death. I go before thee, through that which thou callest unbearable; canst thou not follow one who merely commands? so follow him who goes before thee as a leader.' Thou seest, therefore, how much more perfect a *mortal teacher* is than an immortal one; for the former can teach mortals, whereas the latter, not being himself subjected to suffering, cannot instruct in patience. I do not, however, say this in order to place man higher than God; but in order to show that a man cannot be a perfect teacher, if he is not at the same time God, and therefore able to impress upon others the necessity of obedience by heavenly authority: nor, on the other hand, can God be a perfect teacher, if he do not clothe Himself in a human body, in order, by carrying out His words into action, to shut up all others under the necessity of obedience. The leader to life, the teacher of righteousness, must have a body; otherwise it is impossible that His doctrine should be full and perfect, should have root and ground, should abide in and cling to men. He

Himself must needs subject Himself to the weakness of the flesh and the body, and take up into Himself the virtue of which He is the teacher, in order that He might teach it both by word and deed" (c. 24).

In order, then, that virtue and the law might abide in us, be perfectly implanted in us, Lactantius supposes that it was necessary for it to assume a living shape, to become man; the good must suffer, virtue must become incarnate. But this living law, this living virtue, is Christ, God and man, as Mediator between the two. (Fuit ergo et Deus et homo, inter Deum atque hominem medius constitutus. Unde illum Græci *Μεσότης* vocant : c. 25.)

One might still suppose that Christ, though conceived as the living law, as the personal embodiment of virtue, stood outside of us, even as did the law of Moses. He reminds us, however, that example has a very different effect from commands. It is a hand which draws us after itself (He is "prævius et manum porrigit secuturo," c. 24); it is an attraction and an incitement (incitamentum); first when the Lawgiver becomes man, does His law acquire perfectly obligatory force, and therefore its perfect power (c. 25). Through Him who is eternal, and as man also God, God has confirmed the eternal law (c. 17), and the law has gained an authority and force, which it would not have had if the Lawgiver had been a mere man. Men could not be compelled to righteousness by a merely human lawgiver, unless a higher power and authority were superadded (c. 25). But inasmuch as He is both God and man, necessity is laid on men to obey (that is, the law has acquired power to influence); not by any sort of violence, but by shame, and in such a way that freedom, rewards, and punishments remain;—the former, because it was still possible for them to disobey if they chose, in that He appeared, not in might and glory, but in lowliness; the latter, because they were able to obey if they would. Veiled in the flesh, He has shown that flesh also is able to lay hold on virtue (carnem posse capere virtutem). The Master of virtue became perfectly like men, in order, by His own victory over sin, to teach men that sin may be conquered by them (c. 24). A spirit without body could not conduct to immortality, for it is the flesh which prevents us men from following God; being earthly and mortal, it drags down the spirit which is united with

it to the earth, and from immortality to death. For this reason the Mediator came, God in the flesh, in order that the flesh might follow Him, and that He might rescue man from death, to whose dominion the flesh is subject. In order that we might be able to resist the lusts of the flesh, God has opened up and shown us a way to overcome the flesh. The perfect and ideal virtue (*omnibus numeris absoluta*) confers on the victors the wreath and the reward of immortality (c. 25).

This ethical view of the Person of Christ, Lactantius then carries out in relation to His work. He by no means denies the outward miracles of Christ; on the contrary, he regards them as proofs of His higher nature; but still he takes particular delight in searching out their ethical significance. They are the types of much higher spiritual miracles: and so also have His sufferings a deep figurative meaning (c. 26). The heavenly power opened the eyes of the blind, and proclaimed by this deed, that, turned towards the nations which knew not God, it would illuminate the heart of the foolish with the light of wisdom, and open the eyes of their understanding to the contemplation of the truth. He unstopped the ears of the deaf; and thereby proclaimed, that those who knew not the truth would soon be able to hear and understand the words of God. He caused tongues to speak; for not until the tongue proclaims the power and majesty of God, does it come to its natural use, whereas previously it is dumb. In like manner He goes through the miracles of healing and the raisings of the dead. Not merely what He did, but also what He suffered, had a significance for the future, and announced that wisdom would be an object of hatred. The vinegar mixed with gall, which was given Him to drink, foreboded to His disciples bitter and hard experiences; for truth seems harsh and hateful to all who, not knowing virtue, spend their life in deadly lusts. And the crown of thorns which surrounded His head denoted that He would gather to Himself a divine people from amongst sinners. We, who were unrighteous, and were gathered together from amongst thorns, surround the sacred head of God; called by Him who is the Master and Lord of all living creatures, we surround Him like a wreath. He bore tortures, blows, and at last death, in order that, under Him as a leader, man might lead death, vanquished and bound with chains, as a captive in

triumph. But this most shameful mode of death, to which the lowest alone are condemned, was inflicted on Him in order that He might bring help to the low and weak; in order that there might be none unable to imitate Him; and, further, in order that His body, which was destined to rise again the third day, might remain unmutilated. But, above all, because He was appointed to be lifted up, in order that His sufferings might be evident to all. And so, in His passion, He stretched wide His hands and embraced the world, in order even then to show that, from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, a great people should be gathered together, out of all tongues and tribes, under His wings, to receive that highest and exalted sign on their foreheads (c. 26).

It cannot be denied that Lactantius thus struck a new and very remarkable chord; nor ought it to be objected, that the ethical method adopted by him leads only to a perfect man, but not to the incarnation of God. For he maintains that man cannot even know, much less set forth, the perfect good apart from God. And if, as he hints, the ethical perfection both of the law and of God requires that God also should realize virtue as a man, living amongst men; and if, further, the revelation of the good remains incomplete, so long as the heavenly and the earthly are not fully adjusted, until the former manifests itself completely in the latter; Lactantius had ground enough for teaching an incarnation in the strictest sense, especially as he must have been concerned to represent the love which manifested itself in the "*viva præsensque lex*," or "*virtus*," as the inmost essence of God.

This, however, he does not carry out: on the contrary, out of regard to his Monotheism, he glaringly contradicts the doctrine of the Church; at the same time, also, falling into inconsistency with himself. God he considers to be absolutely simple and indivisible (*Inst. lib. i.*). It is true, uncultivated people, such as misunderstand the Scriptures, are incautious, and weak in the faith, look upon Christ as a second God (4, 29). But He never called Himself God, in order that He might not be untrue to His mission of overthrowing Heathenism, as He would have been had He introduced in its place a new kind of Polytheism; and in order not to seek His own, and thus be guilty of falling away from God, who sent Him (4, 14). Lac-

tantius could not indeed have held a mere man to be the living law, the personal virtue; for the flesh drags all to the earth, to sin, and to death, with the sole exception of Christ. In order that it might have no power over Him, He must be an unchangeable and perfect spirit, who merely assumed flesh for the purpose of vanquishing it, and who, to the end that He might be able to withstand its assaults, had been previously established in good. He thus arrives at the idea of a higher nature in Christ, which he even conceives as a pre-existent hypostasis; but his Monotheism prevents him admitting this hypostasis into the inner circle of the divine. We see from this connection that Lactantius ought properly to have represented Christ as assuming an humanity tainted with the sin of the race, in order that He might endure and overcome the temptations which we experience, and which, in his view, proceed from the body. And, in point of fact, he did not deem the significance of the supernatural birth of Christ to be its protecting Him from the sin of the race; but He must be born differently from other men, to the end it might be certain and plain that a heavenly spirit had become man, in the man Jesus. With the flesh which He bore, He took upon Himself sins,—not of course His own sins, for He had none, but the sins of the flesh; and the effect of His baptism was to wash out these sins, as in a spiritual bath (4, 15).

This higher, blessed spirit (*beatus*, 4, 8), although he is a spirit amongst others (*ceteri angeli*, 4, 8, 16), although he is a creature and belongs to the world (*factus*), is also very different from the rest. He was created before all, that He might be the Creator of the universe and the counsellor of God. When God was about to put His hand to this glorious work of creation, He brought forth an holy, incorruptible, and irreprehensible spirit (*sanctum et incorruptibilem et irreprehensibilem spiritum genuit*), whom He *designated* Son. And although He afterwards created innumerable other spirits through Him, whom we term angels, He deigned to confer the divine name on this first-born One alone, the Head of the angels (4, 14), because in Him was the fulness of the Father's power and glory. His proper name no one knows, save He Himself; but it will be made manifest at the end of the days. Amongst men He is termed Christ, that is, King; not because of this earthly kingdom, for the taking possession of which the time is not yet

come, but because of the heavenly and eternal kingdom. But as His origin from God was a peculiar one (see pp. 193 f.), out of the heart of God—for which reason, also, the words “*gigni, generari*,” are applied to Him (c. 6, 8),—so also was His nature exalted. The personal Word of God, which He is, abides to all eternity; for power and wisdom flowed over from the Father into Him, as a stream from its source (c. 8). God having determined to send to men the perfect law and the teacher of virtue, He commanded the Son to subject Himself to a second birth. He entered, accordingly, into the pure womb of the Virgin, and clothed Himself with a human body. But because Christ came on earth, adorned with virtue and righteousness, nay more, because He was Himself virtue and righteousness, it was right (He deserved it from all peoples, for His virtue’s sake) that He should be believed as God (4, 16). For the sake of the virtue and faithfulness He displayed towards God on earth, the kingdom and the honour and the dominion were conferred upon Him, and all peoples and tribes and tongues shall serve Him, and His power is eternal, and His kingdom shall see no end. Even now He has power with those who honour His name, who confess His majesty, who follow His teachings, who imitate His virtue; but when He shall come again to judge all souls, and to restore the righteous to life, then will He truly become the Governor of the whole earth; and the golden age will begin (c. 12). In the eternal temple which He founds, He will be the eternal Priest (c. 14). Notwithstanding all the subordination, therefore, he places Him so high, as not merely to assign Him a thoroughly unique position in the universe; but even to see occasion for justifying Christians in asserting that they worship but one God, whilst at the same time they speak of two, to wit, of God the Father and God the Son (c. 29). When we speak thus, says he, we do not mean an entirely different one, nor do we separate the two (*non diversum dicimus, nec utrumque secernimus*); for neither the Father can be separated from the Son, nor the Son from the Father; indeed, God could not be termed Father without Son, nor could the Son have been generated (*generari*) without Father. Inasmuch, then, as the Father makes the Son (*faciat*), and the Son is made, both possess one common mind, one spirit, one substance (*una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est*). The

former, however, is, as it were, the overflowing fountain (fons exuberans); the latter is the stream which flows out of it. "Ille tanquam Sol," says he with Tertullian, "hic quasi radius a Sole porrectus." Because the Son is as dear as He is faithful to the most high Father, He is no more separated from Him than the stream is separate from its source, or the ray from the sun; for the water of the fountain is in the stream, and the light of the sun is in the ray. Even so, we cannot conceive the word without the mouth which gives utterance to it, nor the hand and power separated from the body. But all these names are given to the Son. And, though a father concede to his only and beloved son the title and authority of the master of the house, still the house continues one and the lord one. Father and Son, therefore, are one God. One is alone, free, the Most High God, without beginning (*carens origine*), in that He Himself is the beginning of things, and in Him all things, even the Son, are included. And because the mind and will of the one is in that of the other, or, better, because one mind and will is in both (*vel potius una mens et voluntas in utroque*), both persons are justly termed the one God; for all that is in the Father flows over into the Son, and whatever the Son has He derives from the Father. Wherefore, also, the Most High and singular God (*singularis Deus*) can only be worshipped through the Son. Whoso honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father.

Lactantius thus approximates more closely to the doctrine of the Church, at the close of his treatise on Christ; for, in agreement with it, he recognises the equality of the essence of the Son with that of the Father, His hypostatical pre-existence, and His divine dignity. When, however, he denies that He is coeternal with the Father, who alone is without beginning, he contradicts his own assertion of the equality of the essence of the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son with that of the Father. He also, according to what was advanced in the preceding section, fell foul of the clearly indicated tendency of the Church subsequently to Origen; but, at the same time, he must be allowed to have been justified in entertaining the view he did, so long as teachers of the Church, like Zeno of Verona, maintained that the generation of the Son occurred simultaneously with the commencement of the world. For thus the generation

of the Son and the creation of the world were brought into too close proximity. When, then, he modified this view of the Son, as originated prior to, and for the purpose of, the creation of the world, which was traditional in occidental Africa, by placing the Son in the series of mundane beings, and thus representing Him as a creature, even though the highest, he separated, indeed, elements which, though incompatible with each other, Tertulian had combined in his system ; but fell, in consequence, into inconsistencies, and failed to meet the claims of his own ethical construction of Christology (see p. 210). Nor did he ward off the danger of Polytheism ; for he gave to a creature the name of God, designated Father and Son the one God, and attributed to the Son equality of essence with the Father, in such a way as to give the idea of creation an ethnic and emanatistic colouring. Even at this point, it is clear enough that Monotheism, out of regard for which he adopted subordinationian views, is more completely secured when the Son is put on an equality with the Father, than when He is subordinated in any sense, at all satisfactory to the Christian mind. Indeed, Lactantius himself was at last compelled (c. 29), for the purpose of securing the unity of God, to recognise the equality of the Father and the Son (*una mens, unus spiritus, una substantia*).

By this doctrine of the pre-existent and created Son was his Christology also destined to be pressed ; for it is incompatible both with a true humanity and a true self-abasement. The highest of the angels can naturally only assume a human husk, the body ; otherwise, two complete, finite beings would be, as it were, incased in each other. Further, that higher spirit comes to the earth with virtue already perfect ; and yet He is to be an example to men, and is to grow in virtue and be rewarded for it ; whilst, at the same time, as an eternal spirit, He is unshakeable, and therefore in no danger whatever from the assaults of the flesh. That a being with such a nature bore merely an apparent resemblance to us, who possess a soul, and are through it exposed to temptations, could only have escaped the notice of Lactantius in consequence of a further fault of his, that, namely, of regarding the spirit of man as perfectly good and pure in itself, and of attributing evil entirely to the body. Herewith also are connected Pelagian principles, such as, the presupposition that, if we have the perfect image of

virtue before us, our spirit is capable of the same virtue, and of vanquishing the flesh; which involves him in plain contradiction with the argument he had previously employed, that an earthly teacher could not be without sin, and that a higher power, a heavenly teacher, is therefore necessary to the exhibition of perfect virtue in the flesh. For, indeed, our moral power would be greater if He needed the indwelling of the Word, in order to set forth perfect virtue; whilst we, through simply beholding this representation, without the communication of His power, and even without having previously attained the forgiveness of sin by Him, are able to rise up to heaven. It is at this point we see that Lactantius must either attribute a higher significance to Christ, or the pains he is at to posit such a person as he does, are useless and without sufficient ground. The fault thereof, however, must by no means be sought in the stress he lays on the ethical, but in his inadequate conception of the ethical. His virtue is confined to secondary spheres; even the moral relation to God is not more carefully considered. Had he distinctly recognised the ethical to be the highest, as, in agreement with his entire tendency, he should have done, he would not have been able to call a secondary being the "*lex viva*," but the Most High God alone. Then the question arises,—Can a subordinate being bind us to unconditional obedience to the law in his own name? Or, can the arbitrariness which is not bound to the law find a place in God, when it can find no place in Him who is the living law? In that case, the ethical has in the last instance no hold, is based on caprice, and has its ground, not in the sphere of the absolute, but in that of the secondary. Had he conceived God Himself to be the living law, the appearance of the living law would have been, as the Church teaches, the appearance of God Himself, and the latter might have been shown to be an ethical necessity. Lactantius' strange doctrine of the "*manus sinistra Dei*," the Holy Spirit who takes part in the evil, the "*interpretamentum boni*," is a clear enough proof that he deemed it necessary to think God in false and fancied exaltation above the ethical. But to represent arbitrariness, caprice, as the highest in God, is simply the practical Occidental expression for the absolutely indeterminate *Ὁ* of the East,—it was falling back into the physical. A similar regression was his making the body the seat of sin; in consequence,

however, of failing to show completely that the ground of the ethical is in God Himself, and therefore of not recognising its absoluteness, he failed also to see that the ethical must root in fellowship with God, and in His real communication of Himself. Had he weighed this properly, he would have arrived, with his deeper view of the divine righteousness (*de via Dei*), at a clearer conviction of the necessity of the atonement, which is quite left out of sight, even in the beautiful remarks which he makes concerning the death of Christ. In this way, also, the significance of Christ the Mediator would have been heightened; and both for the sake of the atonement and of vital fellowship with God (necessary to be established even on account of the ethical alone), he would have been driven to see in Christ, not the presence of an exalted finite spirit, but of the Most High God Himself.

With all this, however, we must mention, to his praise, that he did not regard Christ as a mere organ of God, as a means in God's hand, as Sabellianism was compelled, and as Arianism was inclined, to do. In his view, Christ is an end in Himself, and that in a sense which does not hold of men or spirits in general; He is, namely, the object of divine worship together with the Father. He recognised it also as necessary to the perfection of the Son, that He should have fellowship with the Father, nay more, that He should be of one substance with the Father.

II. *Eusebius of Cæsarea.*

In casting a glance at the Eastern Church prior to the appearance of Arius on the scene, the system of Eusebius of Cæsarea gives us the truest picture of the points which the then prevailing doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ had left unsettled, and which rendered it possible for many to continue vacillating between Subordinationism and Sabellianism. He stands both near enough to, and far enough from, Arius and Athanasius, to show us plainly that the decision arrived at by the Council of Nicæa, in the case of Arius, could not but be adverse; and that, notwithstanding, the controversies which succeeded that decision were still a possibility. We learn from him, further, that the Church had arrived at a point at

which it could not stand still, but must choose one or other of two courses,—either to take a step in advance, and define the indefinite, or to go backwards either into Heathenism or into Judaism.

It has been matter of controversy for a long period, whether Eusebius should be reckoned orthodox after the Nicene standard, or be classed with the adherents of Arius.¹ In recent times, the Catholic Church has shown a decided inclination to the latter supposition; the former supposition has become almost traditional with investigators belonging to the Anglican Church.² German science, on the contrary, is pretty unanimous in the opinion, that neither of the two is the case.³ In fact, his doctrinal system is a chameleon-hued thing, a mirror of the unsolved problems of the Church of that age.

According to Eusebius, God is in His inmost essence one; only with an eye to the world, and God's relation to it, can we speak of a Trinity. To hold that the unity of God, or the *Monas*, expresses that which is inmost in God, and not that the unity is to be conceived as containing plurality within itself, appeared to him necessary, whether regard be had principally to the general, or to the distinctively Christian, idea of God. Inasmuch, namely, as God is the highest, and as this highest can only be one and not several; inasmuch, further, as there cannot be more than one uncreated being; contemplation, in its loftiest flights, arrives at the One. This One is exalted above all plurality, for plurality has place only in subordinate spheres; it is absolutely perfect in itself, self-sufficient, and is as far from needing, as it is from suffering itself, to be complemented by another. It lies out beyond all that has been created, because it

¹ Amongst the ancients, Socrates, Theodoret, Gelasius Cyzic. pronounce him orthodox; Athanasius regarded him with a degree of suspicion; Epiphanius and Jerome treat him more harshly.

² For Arian, he is held by Petavius, Baronius, Montfaucon (*Coll. Nov. T. I. xv.-xxix.*), Clericus, and Möhler; for orthodox, by Montacutus, G. Bull, Cave (*Hist. liter. Appendix, Diss. 3, pp. 193-206*), and with a reference to the work of Eusebius on the Theophany, first edited by himself, Samuel Lee, in a longer treatise (*pp. xxiv.-xcii.*). Valesius, also, takes the favourable view of the case.

³ Martini, *Eusebii Cæsar. de divin. Christi sententia*, 1795; Baur, *Trinität*. 473 ff.; and specially Hænell, *de Euseb. Cæs. religionis christ. defensore*, Gött. 1843, pp. 42 ff.

is absolutely self-caused: for this reason, it cannot be compared with the world; and to attempt a comparison is godless. Therefore, also, is it the Unutterable, the Inexplicable, Being absolutely (τὸ ἄΟν), or the primal substance (ἡ πρώτη Οὐσία); it is aseity conceived as a person. In setting forth this (as he deemed it) exalted conception of God, Eusebius was quite aware of his accordance with the Neo-Platonists; but it did not seem at all objectionable, that the extra-Christian and the Christian idea of God should be identical. In its relation to all things lying outside of this unity, he designates the ἄΟν, ἀρχὴ ἀναρχος, the πρῶτον αἴτιον.¹ But as respects the Christian idea of God, it is universally allowed that even the Son is not self-caused, but is caused by the Father; and if the Son is generated, then the Father alone can be described as ungenerated. But as the Ungenerated is one and the same with the ἄΟν, the Christian expression "Father" is to be referred to the ἄΟν; and as that aseity, and the supreme unity involved therein, constitutes the proper essence of the Deity, deity can be predicated alone, "sensu eminenti," of the Father. He is the representative of the μοναρχία. If another, for example, the Son, were coeternal with the Father, we should have two eternals, or Polytheism (adv. Marcell. 2, 12).

By this line of argument, however, Eusebius meant rather to establish than to do away with the Trinity. As Polytheism is abhorrent to faith, the Christian mind could never acknowledge a Trinity if Father and Son were placed on exactly the same level. And if they be supposed to constitute together the one Eternal, we should arrive at Sabellianism. For, either both would be completely the same, and then every trace of a Trinity would be blotted out;² or if they constituted one, in the sense of one being the complement of the other, neither the Father nor the Son would be complete, neither would be entirely the one, by Himself, apart from the other. If, however, they need another element to constitute their being, neither of

¹ Compare Præp. Evang. 11, 9, 16-19. Theoph. 2, 24. 27. 29.

² Adv. Marc. 2, 12:—ὁ δὲ Μάρκελλος, αἰσθὼς αἰδίων εἶναι αὐτὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἀγεννήτον, πολλάκις ᾤσατο, οὐ συνορῶν, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἔτιρον τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν λόγον φάσαι, δύο ἔσται αἰδία, ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔ' ἔσται ἀρχὴ μία. Εἰ δὲ ἢν λέγοιτο αἰδίων, τὸν αὐτὸν ὀριζόμενος εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν τῷ λόγῳ, γυμνὸν τὸν—Σαβίλλιον ὁμολογῆσει, υἱοπάτορα τὸν ἑα εἰσάγων.

the two would be a perfect, self-sufficient hypostasis;¹ but the one must be reduced to the rank of divine *ποιότητες*, that is, become a predicate, and the other be recognised as the subject: in which case, the distinction can have no reality. Or the one will be accident, the other substance; or the one divine essence will be divided into several parts, which taken together constitute the Deity. In either of these cases, the hypostasis of the Son, which is universally recognised as necessary, would become an unreality; for the Christian mind is not satisfied that God should be in Christ as a mere power, or transitorily, but demands that He have a personal existence in Him.

Precisely, therefore, in order that a lofty and permanent significance may be attached to Christ, and that a Trinity may be possible, the Son must be regarded as something different from the Unbegotten One, who is the highest deity itself. He must be the *δεύτερος Θεός*, in rank (*τιμῇ*) inferior to the Father; He is the *δεύτερα οὐσία* or *ὑπόστασις*; the Father is to be conceived as existing prior to Him (*προϋπάρχων*), not indeed in time—for before the creation of the world there was no time—but causatively: for the Father is the highest and ultimate *αἴτιον*.² Both His being and the mode of His being the Son derives from the Father, and that through the medium of His will and purpose (*γνώμη, προαίρεσις, βουλὴ*).³

The idea of God, therefore, is complete, prior to and apart from the Trinity; the unity alone constitutes the full conception of God, and not the plurality with the unity; the *μοναρχία* is God, “sensu eminenti;” and the *μοναρχία* pertains to the Father alone. God’s being a Trinity depends on His *will*. At the same time, this does not signify that God might be other

¹ Demonstr. ev. 4, 3, ed. Paris, 1628, p. 148:—“Ὁ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν τέλειος καὶ πρῶτος ὡς πατὴρ καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ συστάσεως αἴτιος, οὐδὲν εἰς συμπλήρωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ θεότητος παρὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ λαμβάνων.

² Dem. ev. 4, 3:—“Ὁ δὲ ὡς ἐξ αἰτίου (πατρός) γεγονὼς υἱός, δεύτερος οὐ ἴστιν υἱὸς καθίστηται, παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦδε εἶναι εἰληφώς.

³ L. c. “Ἡ μὲν αὐγὴ (this had been the favourite image of Origen; but it seemed insufficient to Eusebius, because of its physical, or even emanatistic character) οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκλάμπει, κατὰ δὲ τι τῆς οὐσίας συμβεβηκὸς ἀχώριστον. Ὁ δὲ υἱὸς κατὰ γνώμην καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰκὼν ὑπόστα τοῦ πατρὸς. Βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς γέγονεν υἱὸς πατὴρ, καὶ φῶς δεύτερον κατὰ πάντα ἑαυτῷ ἀφωμοιομένον, ὑπιστάσαστο. He designates the Son also δημιουργημα, ἀρχιτεκτόνημα. Dem. Ev. 4, 2.

than trinitarian, for it is impossible to God not to will the perfect. Indeed, Eusebius seems to have introduced volition and consciousness, simply in order that nothing in God might appear to be dominated by an unconscious being, by a mere natural necessity. The doctrine of the Church, also, really had this same end in view, when it connected the eternal self-causation of God with His self-love; with the difference, however, that Eusebius most decidedly represents the self-grounding of the Trinitarian God as a grounding of the Trinity by the *Father*;—the Father alone being the cause of Himself, the Son being grounded by the Father. In one aspect alone was Eusebius able to conceive the Son as eternally in God, and so, to a certain extent, to represent Him as a constitutive element of the entire conception of God. Namely, that which the divine will posits or generates must have already lain eternally in the understanding and will of God (*potentia*); above all is this true of the Son, who was spoken out of the heart of the Father, who is His manifested understanding and will. Eusebius, however, does not further lay stress on, or follow out, this idea of the eternal being, which the Son had whilst He was still entirely immanent in the Father, and, as it were, nothing but an attribute or quality of God Himself. That by itself would have seemed to him an approximation to Sabellianism, because it represented Christ as without hypostasis. He does not even term this eternal existence of the Son in the Father, His eternal generation.¹

But what necessity of reason was there for Eusebius actually positing a Trinity, when he believed the Father, therefore also the Supreme Deity, to be completely the Deity, even apart from the Trinity? To take this step, he was induced, partly by interest in Christianity, and partly by a regard to the world in

¹ Theodoret H. E. 1, 12:—'Ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὶν ἐνεργείᾳ γεννηθῆναι, δυνάμει ἢ ἐν τῇ πατρὶ ἀγεννήτως, ὅτος τοῦ πατρὸς ὡς καὶ βασιλεὺς δεῖ, καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ δυνάμει πάντα ὅτος δεῖ τε καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ, καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος. The passage is not contained in Socrates; nor is it quite certain whether these words belong to Constantine or to Eusebius. That they fit into the system of Eusebius, although he could not have said, "There was a time when the Son existed in God alone," is clear from what has been advanced above. On the contrary, the mode in which Lee (l. c. L. not.) tries to reconcile the passage with Nicene orthodoxy, is unsatisfactory. For *δυνάμει*, as opposed to *ἐνεργείᾳ*, signifies not power (*Gewalt*), but *potentially* (*der Potenz nach*).

general; and so far is he from being sparing in lofty predicates for the Son and Christ, that we are decidedly justified in saying that he does not teach subordination for its own sake; on the contrary, he willingly rose as high as seemed compatible with a due regard to the *ἀγέννητον* of the Father.

The Father, or God, cannot communicate His being, that is, the *ἀγεννησία*; He is unapproachable; He cannot be in any respect compared with the world, and therefore cannot enter into any direct relation to it. From this it follows, that He, by Himself, could not be its Creator. He is too high to be a Creator; which, of course, implies that creation is too low for Him: it could not bear Him and His hand; it would be consumed (Dem. Evang. 4, 13). This shows us clearly enough, that the inmost being of God is conceived, not as Love, but as abstract infinitude. On this ground, a middle being is required, which is neither the Father nor the world; for if it were either the one or the other, it could not create. This middle being, even apart from the incarnation, is the Son (Dem. Evang. 4, 13); He is the Logos, who did not abide in God (*ἐνδοῦ μένων ἐν ἡσυχάζοντι τῷ πατρὶ*, adv. Marcell. 1, 1), but came forth, and thus acquired an independent existence, became an hypostasis, which needed not another to complement it, although He needed the Father as the ground of His being. So far, indeed, from needing to be complemented, He is in Himself a separate and distinct totality. He is not to be counted part of God in the highest sense; for the principle of His being is in another. But as He is not God, so also is He not world; for He is endowed with all divine attributes,—with omnipotence, wisdom, and so forth, even as is the Father Himself. He was not merely not produced out of nothing (even the world, in the view of Eusebius, is not created out of nothing, but the divine will and the divine power supplied, as it were, the material), but He was begotten in an unique manner of God, Light of light (Dem. Ev. 4, 3); nor is He merely like, but really carries within Himself, the essence of God. Here also we meet again with the Origenistic distinction between God as subject and the divine predicates (*δόξα*). So far as the Father is the supreme divine subject, so far can the Son, of course, be termed God only figuratively, or in a derived sense; He bears this title, namely, in so far as, like God, He is One in Himself, and by His unique

character sets forth the unity of God to the world ; and as God in Himself, is the supreme principle of all, so He is the principle of the universe.¹ But if we look at the predicates, which in the wider sense appertain also to the essence of God (πλήρωμα Θεοῦ, or τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος), and are frequently attributed thereto by Eusebius,—they themselves, and not merely their likeness, appertain to the Son. To describe the matter briefly,—the Son was a personal duplication of the mode of existence of the divine attributes, which themselves are of a divine essence ; irrespective, however, of the divine subject, which as ἀγέννητον is incommunicable.¹ This is the sense of his favourite designation,—The Son is the Father's perfect image (Theol. Eccl. 1, 2, l. c. pp. 61, 62 ; Dem. Ev. 4, 3) ; and hence, taken in the whole, he ought rather to be classed amongst the Tritheists, than amongst the Arians. The Son is not the original ; nor is He a duplication of God in *Himself* ; but the copy, that which is posited. He not merely has the characteristic features of the archetype, that is, the divine attributes in perfection, but is Himself living and hypostatical, and therein also similar or equal to the Father. For this reason, Eusebius could find no difficulty in attributing to the Son the same nature as to the Father, without thereby retracting anything of the ἀγεννησία of the Father.

He would appear, therefore, to be the independent organ of God for the creation of the world—an organ which, like the Father, has life in itself, though, unlike the Father, not out of itself. He is the metaphysical, personal Mediator between God and the world, the bond which connects the world with the Uncreated One, and constitutes it capable and worthy of existence.²

¹ De eccl. theol. 1, 2 :—The Son is Son not merely through His earthly birth, but through His birth from God the Father, before all *Æons*, καθ' ἣν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος καὶ αὐτὸν υἱὸν Θεὸν ὑπιστάσαστο (compare Dem. Evang. 4, 3). He then goes on to say,—Οὐκ ἰδιόκτητον καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφωρισμένον, οὐδ' ἀναρχὸν τινα καὶ ἀγέννητον, οὐδὲ ἀλλοθὲν ποτὶ ζῆσιν καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλοτρίαν ἐφιλοκόμενον θεότητα, ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς πατρικῆς μετουσίᾳ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς ἐκ' αὐτὸν προχομένης πληρούμενον. For this reason, Eusebius designates the Son αὐτόλογος, αὐτοσοφία, and even αὐτόθεος ; for although grounded by God, He has all this in Himself, as in a distinct and separate totality. He is τέλειος, ἀπὸ τελείου, etc.

² As in Philo's system ; but far more definitely hypostatical. See the Dem. Ev. 4, 5, 13.

He is its head and first-born, and through Him the world has its perfection : He is also the bond running through the universe, and as it were its soul : He is not, however, diffused through it, but hypostatically concentrated in Himself. As the creative principle of the world, which comprises in itself the imitated fulness of the deity, He does not form a mere part of the world, but occupies in it an unique or specific position : by no means the position of a mere means ; He is the highest personal good in the world, wherein consists its perfection. As the world is a μέγα σῶμα, with many members, so must the Son also necessarily be one, its soul. In this respect also, He is the image of the Father, setting forth His μοναρχία (Dem. ev. 4, 5. 3 ; Eccl. Theol. 1, 2). We can only conceive of one most perfect thing amongst the many ; and this most perfect thing is the Son, who is in all points as like, or equal, to the Father as is possible, unless we substitute identity for distinction, and thus adopt the Jewish error, which renounces the highest boon (γέρας), to wit, that new view of the world which secures to it unity and goodness through its Mediator, in whom, as in its head, consists its perfection (compare the de eccl. theol. 1, 4 ; Dem. Ev. 4, 3. 5). But He is the personal, creative principle of the world ; it follows, therefore, that as time first came into existence with the world, He could not have been begotten, that is, He could not first have attained an hypostatical existence outside of God, in time. He was begotten before all Æons, and is in so far ἀνάρχως, that is, without beginning in time, for He was begotten out of time. We see thus, that had it been necessary, he might have described the generation as eternal, though in a somewhat different sense from Origen's. He did not do so however ; nor, further, does he ever style the Son συναϊδιος with the Father. Plainly in order to be able to give more decided prominence to the distinction between that which is cause and that which is effect, he avoids teaching the coeternality of the two, notwithstanding he also maintained the Son to be exalted above the world and time, and therefore rejected the position—"There was a time when the Son was not." He was able to say, and actually did say, The Son was always with the Father.¹ He might even have consented to the use of the term συναϊδιον, on the understanding that the causal relation should be left un-

¹ Dem. ev. 4, 3, p. 149 :—τῷ πατρὶ ὡς υἱὸν διὰ παντὸς συνόντα. /

touchèd. For its integrity seemed to him better assured, when as it were an interval was left between the Father and the Son, by way of sensibly expressing the logical relation, about which he was really concerned. The difference between him and Origen, therefore, is the following :—For the doctrine of the eternal generation, and the principle that light is inconceivable without brightness, he substituted the idea of the untemporal generation before all *Æons*. He was not satisfied with the image employed by Origen, because, to teach that the procession of the Son was inevitable, seemed to him to be emanatistic, ethnic, unworthy of God ; because brightness could be taken as a mere quality of light, that is, as a mere accident of the divine substance ; in short, because the figure appeared to favour Sabellianism. Further reasons were—because it implied the hypostasis of the Father to be imperfect in itself, without the Son, even as light is not light without brightness ; and lastly, because it did not express the *ἀγέννητον* of the Father, which is to be conceived as *προϋποκείμενον*.¹ On the other hand, however, he again exalts the Son, attributing to Him divine *οὐσία*, more frequently, and in a more comprehensive manner, than Origen. Nay more, in relation to the first he says,—The idea of the Son is involved in that of the Father ; the Son was always with the Father, and so forth : it is clear, therefore, on the whole, that he had no intention of forming a lower estimate of the Son than did Origen. The consequence of Eusebius giving, as it were, a sensuous stamp to the causal relation between the Father and the Son, was that he conceived the procession of the Son to have been effected by one single act of God, whereas Origen represents the generation as a continuous thing.

From the metaphysical position assigned to the Son relatively to the world, as its Mediator, it naturally follows, that He is the principle of all revelation, both of the general revelation (Dem. ev. 4, 6. 10. 13) and of the historical revelations made subsequently to the Fall. Even in Old Testament times He appeared in the form of a man (Dem. ev. 5, 11, p. 218) ; and rays of the Logos were in the prophets (Dem. ev. 4, 10 : “*βραχέας ἀκτῖνες* of His light”). But the entire Logos appeared

¹ Dem. ev. 4, 3. He prefers the image of *ἐκδίαι* to that of light and its brightness ; for *ἐκδίαι* proceeds forth from ointment, and forms an independent atmosphere, without diminution or division (Dem. ev. 4, 3).

under the New Testament, to heal humanity in its deeply sunken condition (Dem. ev. 4, 10). He appropriated a truly human body out of Mary, without therefore renouncing His indissoluble unity with the Father, or rendering Himself possible. The sun does not suffer, says he, after the example of Origen, when its rays shine on an impure place: the relation of the Logos to the humanity, appropriated by Him, was a purely active one; the relation of the humanity was a passive one,—it was the harp, the Logos was the player (Dem. ev. 4, 13). The death of Christ he views as a sacrifice, as a propitiation for our sins; and displayed, at this point in particular, the deep Christian interest he took in the incarnation of the Logos (Dem. ev. 4, 12). After His exaltation, His body was deified and swallowed up in deity; but neither His hypostasis nor His kingdom shall ever come to an end.

This idea of Christ, which existed prior to the Council of Nice,¹ was entertained, not by an isolated few, but by very many in the Church about A.D. 320 (Note 43). In agreement with the great body of the Church, he regarded it as equally certain with Monotheism itself, that the distinctively Christian, new element, that the highest element, is the reconciliation of God through God in Christ (Eccl. Theol. 1, 2); that the divine was given in Christ in a personal form; that thus the true view of the world was opened up to men—that view, namely, according to which, humanity, nay, even the world, is a great whole, one body, whose eternal Head is Christ, the Prophet, High Priest, and King (Dem. ev. 4, 4; adv. Marc. 1, 1). Although, then, his theory may be pronounced unsatisfactory, and fairly charged with curtailing the one or the other aspect, concerning himself we may say, that he did not design such a curtailment. On the contrary, his true and proper efforts were in harmony with the demands of the Church. The more, therefore, must he be content to be tested by the question, whether his theory aids in doing full justice to those bases, whose recognition he himself aimed at securing by its means; indeed, he himself demanded to be judged by this very standard. But of this, more hereafter. In the first instance, however, it must be acknowledged, on the one hand, that the dogmaticians of the Church of his day

¹ It is not quite accurate to regard this middle theory between Arius and Athanasius as the fruit of the conflict between the two men.

had not arrived at a fixed judgment concerning the chief points about which his theory was concerned ; and, on the other hand, that his theory was closely connected with wide-spread representations : had this not been the case, Arius could not have found the support he did when he appeared. The Church advanced to the full understanding of the points referred to during the Arian controversy. The majority had no definite theory, and were compelled by the Arian struggles to enter for the first time on a deeper investigation of these questions. Indeed, this was precisely the blessing of the Arian controversy, that, owing to its profound inner significance, and to the Synods which it caused to be convened at so many different points of the Christian world, the collective powers of the Church were concentrated on this problem, and thus the dogmatic progress, which had become necessary, was realized. It is true, indeed, that even before the Church formally devoted itself to this dogmatical work (about A.D. 325), that Christian conscience or tact, which is immanent in faith, enabled it to decide on the character of Arian principles ; and it did actually give its judgment. But this judgment had no scientific worth ; its worth was simply and solely that of a confession of the common faith,—a character which it is necessary for a creed to possess. And scientific efforts, so far from being thereby rendered unnecessary, were thus supplied with a firm ground on which to stand. We can accordingly understand the apparently contradictory circumstances, that Arius should at first be so unanimously condemned by the great Synod of Nicæa ; and yet that afterwards, not Arianism indeed, but still semi-Arianism, should for a time have held so influential a position in the Church.

III. *Arius.*

We do not give a complete and adequate description of Arius, when we merely say that his system gathered up and combined in itself everything of a subordination or lowering character relative to the Son, that had not been excluded by the preceding development of the Church : were this all, it would have been impossible for him to have made any great impression. His system owed its seductiveness to the circumstance, that the features of the kind just referred to, were

dominated by an idea apparently favourable to a tendency to lay stress on the hypostasis of the Son, which had not only become an historical necessity, but was in itself completely justified; nay more, not merely to favour, but to give it for the first time fixity and substance. The almost hundred years' controversy with the various forms of Sabellianism had necessarily given rise to a tendency to attach greater importance to the hypostasis; and, as many even of the ancients saw, the athletic law of ἀνθολογία (antagonism) exerted its influence on many of the Church teachers of this age. Sabellianism, which was simply a higher potency of Docetism, constantly threatened to reduce the incarnation of Christ—that is, in reality, the Christian religion—to a transitory phenomenon. Nor could the conception of the reconciliation between God and man fail to be superficial, so long as the union of God and man in Christ was deemed momentary, or almost of the nature of a vision. Humanity cannot have been reconciled with God through Christ to its very roots; the reconciliation cannot become a certain truth and a permanent reality in us; unless a perfect man, and not a mere body, a mere human shell, were assumed by God, and unless this assumption penetrated to the inmost centre of the human personality. This point Sabellianism never reached; on the contrary, its efforts to attain to a true humanity necessarily ended in Ebionism. There was something dazzling in the great pains it took, relatively to the revelation in Christ; but the actual performance was so far from corresponding to the efforts put forth, that it would have been more satisfactory had some of the pains been spared, and, instead thereof, a more permanent and substantial result presented.

This is the reason why we have found the Church teachers, from Tertullian onwards, with few exceptions, far more favourably inclined to, at all events, some form of Subordinationism, than many of the second century (for example, Irenæus). These latter, on the contrary, were most concerned to assert the true deity of the Son, and therefore approximated more nearly to Monarchianism of the Sabellian kind, than did the teachers of the third century. But when Monarchianism went on definitely and systematically to repudiate that which the latter Church teachers had merely momentarily left in the background, the duty devolving on the Church, during the third century,

no longer continued to be that of establishing the truth of the deity of Christ and His equality with the Father; for, during the second century, this had been clearly seen and established. Its work lay, on the contrary, so decidedly in the opposite direction, that for a time it was almost necessary to take regressive steps, in order to the attaining of a full apprehension of the problem awaiting solution. The new point to be gained was, the idea of the hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ; which was the only thing fitted to raise the Church above both Ebionism and Sabellianism, above the category of divine power and that of divine substance, and to constitute the eternal and absolute significance of the Person of Christ and Christianity a matter of settled conviction. Consequently, the task devolving on the fourth century was, in the first instance, simply that of connecting the idea of hypostasis—which, after being toned down by Irenæus and his successors, had been more carefully considered during the third century—with the ancient affirmation of the true deity of the Son. This, however, was just the most difficult task of all, requiring as it did both the transformation of the preceding, and the determination of the Christian, conception of God. Even in Nicæa no attempt was made to explain the mode of this conjunction, to conciliate the hypostasis of the Son with the unity of the divine essence: all that the Fathers there assembled did, was to declare *that* the hypostatic form of the higher nature of Christ, and the true deity thereof, are two points equally certain to faith; that the conjunction in question is immediately effected in, and should be confessed by, faith; for which reason, it is incumbent on Christian science to bring about the recognition of the union of the two, without detriment to either.

Shortly before Arius, we find that the zeal displayed by the teachers of the Church, in opposition to Sabellianism, and in the assertion of the reality and permanence of the hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, was moderated by the controversy with Dionysius of Alexandria; and that they received a warning to avoid the onesidedness which forgets that the true path of the Church, in relation to doctrine, lies always between two errors. Clear tokens have shown to us, that from his day onwards there more and more frequently arose men, who, whilst adopting the doctrine of the essential equality of the Father and the Son

from the Sabellians, and that of the hypostasis of the latter from the Subordinationians, set their faces, not merely against one or the other of these two parties, but against both (see Section Third, Chapter First). Even the school of Origen furnished its full share of men of this tendency (see Section Second, Chapter Third). But we have found also, that many, both in the West and in the East, were unable to maintain that the Son was of the like substance with God, and had an hypostasis, save on subordinationian principles. They either represented the Son as first proceeding forth from or begotten by God, for the creation of the world; or else as a middle being between God and the world. Contradictory as these transitional theories were in themselves, and certain as it was that they necessarily curtailed the equality of the essence of the Son with that of the Father, which they desired to uphold, their authors still clung to them, because, apart from such subordination elements, they feared having to surrender the hardly-won hypostasis of the Son, falling back into Sabellianism, with its denial of distinctions, and thus renewing the old struggles. These theories, therefore, and its own marked antagonism to the already repudiated Sabellianism, apart altogether from other matters, must have decidedly facilitated the introduction of Arianism; even as, on the other hand, after Arianism and Athanasianism had openly entered the lists against each other, it became possible for men like Eusebius to wear the favourable appearance of pursuing a middle course between two extremes. This appearance drew around them a great multitude of very agile but unsteady forces, which, affected by the struggles going on around, were forced to enter more deeply into the matter; and were unable to gain a firm footing, until they decidedly ranged themselves either on the side of Arius or on that of Athanasius.

After the controversy of Dionysius, the anti-subordinationian tendency attained to constantly greater predominance in the Alexandrian Church, although it was at first repressed by Origenistic traditions. About A.D. 270, Theognostus flourished there; and from A.D. 283 to A.D. 300, Pierius. A fragment is still extant of a lost work, entitled *περὶ τῆς ἐνιδρύσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (in Greek, in A. Mai's Coll. Nov. 7, 306, 307, cll. 134), by Petrus, Bishop of Alexandria from A.D. 300 to 311, in which he teaches the identity of the nature of the Son with that

of the Father. (Note 44.) Shortly after the death of Petrus, Alexander became Bishop of Alexandria. According to an account which is not thoroughly accredited, Arius was not merely a presbyter under him, but also the successor of Pierius as teacher at the school of Catechetes, and enjoyed the reputation of varied learning. He received his education, probably in company with Eusebius of Nicomedia, whom he designates *Σύλλουκκιανιστὰ*, from Lucian in Antioch, amongst others. Personal considerations, and especially conceit, which manifests itself in his *Thalia*, may have partly influenced him in attacking Alexander and the growing anti-subordinationian tendency; but still there is no doubt that, even prior to the controversy, his point of view was different from his opponent's (Socr. H. E. i. 6; Epist. Alex.). Alexander reproached him with having concealed his opinions for a considerable period. In an association of presbyters, the Bishop had delivered a discourse on the Trinity, of whose contents all that we know (Socr. H. E. i. 5) is, that he set his face against a onesided tendency to the discrimination of the hypostases, and endeavoured to lead the mind back from the triplicity to the unity, seeking to point out the latter in the former (*ἐν τριάδι μονάδα εἶναι φιλοσοφῶν ἐθεολόγει*). That to which we drew attention above, thus manifests itself at the very commencement of the controversy,—namely, either progress is made to the recognition of the full deity of the Son; or else a return is made from the anti-Sabellian momentum of hypostasis to the earlier one of the true *deity* of the Son, but under a higher form. That Alexander meant to give up the point which had been gained during the third century, to wit, the hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, is not probable; but he appears to have taken the Trinity, as a thing already established, for his starting-point, and thence to have gone on to the unity of the hypostases. He would seem, therefore, to have laid hold of the problem, just as it had been set forth by Dionysius of Rome. Arius believed that he saw Sabellianism therein, —without doubt, however, unjustly; for a Sabellian might well have joined with Arius in saying,—“There was a time when the Son was not.” On the contrary, it is probable, inasmuch as Arius at once objected to Alexander,—*εἰ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱὸν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως ἔχει ὁ γεννηθεὶς, καὶ ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱός*,—that Alexander agreed with Arius in

teaching the generation of the Son; but held that the generation should be conceived as eternal, on the ground that if the Logos and Wisdom were not coeternal with God, God must have been at one time *ἄλογος, ἄσοφος* (compare Socr. H. E. i. 6; compare Note 46; see Note 45); whereas Arius tried to show that the idea of generation, consequently of *ἀρχή*, in the sense of principle, involves a beginning in time, or an "initium." In this matter he was undoubtedly very unlike the speculative Origen; but on that very ground more to the taste of common understandings, especially as he possessed considerable dialectical skill.¹

As Arius was unwilling to posit time as existing prior to the world, therefore also prior to the Son, the unscientific, clumsy phrase, *ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, did not denote, in his hand, strictly what the words expressed, but something different, for which it was intended to prepare the way. It acquired its true meaning from the negation which it was intended to convey,—to wit, the Son is not coeternal with the Father.² The causal relation involves the priority of the cause to the effect. In this way, however, the cause, God, would be placed in time, in order that the Son might be placed in time. Instead, therefore, of being unlike each other, both would be alike, in so far as the one is as truly

¹ After Athanasius, however, he shrunk from entirely following the common understanding of men, and supposing time to have been even before the existence of a world: hence he avoided saying, *ἦν χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, and left out *χρόνος*; and yet he went on to argue as though he had used *χρόνος*. What he really aimed at showing was, that the idea and being of the Father do not necessarily involve the idea and being of the Son, but that the Son, in relation to the Father, is something accidental.

² Epiph. Hær. 69, 6, from the letter addressed by Arius to Eusebius:—"We are persecuted, because we say—The Son had an *ἀρχή*." Here also there is again the same amphiboly. In the Ep. ad Alex. ib. 7, and Ath. de Syn. 16, we read:—"Ο μὲν Θεὸς αἰτίας τῶν πάντων τυγχάνων, ἔστιν ἀναρχος μονότατος. Ὁ δὲ υἱός, ἀχρόνως γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων πσιθεὶς καὶ θεμελιωθεὶς, οὐκ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀχρόνως πρὸ πάντων γεννηθεὶς, μόνος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπίσθη. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν αἰδίδιος, ἢ συναἰδίδιος, ἢ συναγίννητος τῷ πατρί: οὐδὲ ἅμα τῷ πατρί τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ὥς τινεὶς λέγουσι τὰ πρὸς τι, δύο ἀγεννήτους ἀρχὰς εἰσηγούμενοι, ἀλλ' ὡς μόνας καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων, οὕτως ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ πάντων ἔστιν διὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔστιν, ὡς καὶ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν, κατὰ μέσσην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κηρύξαντες. To Eusebius, indeed, he wrote in a different tone regarding Alexander. The latter probably assigned to the Father the pre-eminence of the principle, but he can scarcely have designated Him the Monas.

bound by the conditions of time as the other. In order, therefore, to bring out the wished-for subordination, he was compelled to go back to the law of causation, and out of its different forms to select the one which most distinctly involved the subordination of the Son. A cause may be either onesided or reciprocal; that is, the action may be either all on one side, or each may act in turn. It may be essential and necessary to a cause, to pass into action; indeed, it is possible for it to be so necessary, that the cause would not merely not be a cause, but would have no existence at all, if it did not act: or the effect may not arise necessarily from the essence of the cause, but be dependent on something, which may either exist or not exist without detriment to the cause;—it may depend, for example, on a free act of will; in which latter case, the effect would owe its rise to something accidental and indifferent to the essence of the cause, and would consequently be itself fortuitous, contingent. Finally, the effect may be something equal or similar to the cause and its essence, or something foreign and disparate;—the latter, when the causative energy does not flow naturally and necessarily out of the essence of the cause, but waits for an external, that is, a fortuitous impulse. Arius does not enter on an investigation of these different forms of the causal relation with a view to ascertaining which is applicable to the case in question, but selects the one that suits him best,—that which first suggests itself to superficial thinking. God (the Father) is the *αἷτιον*, the Cause absolutely; besides Him there is only the Nothing. Out of Himself, He could not produce the Son; for that would make the Son either a Valentinian *προβολή*, or a portion of God, having the like essence with Him (Manichæan); and the unity of God would be rent asunder after a Sabellian fashion, as was done by Hierakas (Note 46). Inasmuch, therefore, as there was no eternal matter, God must have called the Son into existence out of nothing.¹ From which it follows further, that because He cannot be of the substance of God, He was created by the *Will* of God (*θελήματι Θεοῦ κτισθέντα*).

On these two principles, Arius at first took his stand:—The Son is not eternal, and He is created out of nothing. The for-

¹ Ep. ad Euseb. :—"We say this (that the Son is *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*), because He is neither a part of God, nor formed from previously existing material."

mer principle has but little force in itself, because he immediately adds (see note 2, p. 232), He was begotten out of time, before the world and time (*πρὸ αἰώνων*). The proper significance of the first position is determined by the second, which leads us from the time to the *mode* of the genesis of the Son, to His creation. The idea of the deity, he means to say, is complete in itself; its being is to be presupposed perfect, even apart from the Son. The Son forms, in no respect, a constituent part of the divine essence. There was no eternal necessity whatever in the essence of God that He should have a Son; for such a necessity would have been equivalent to a potential being of the Son in God. It was therefore not the idea of causality that impelled him to maintain that the Son was created out of nothing, and did not arise out of the essence of God. For between parents and children, for example, the causal relation is also one of essence, as Athanasius often objected. A further consideration co-operated to induce him to deny that the Son was of the substance of the Father. This consideration was not the unity of God, or a strict Monotheism; for Arius unhesitatingly, after his manner, set his face against a rigid Monotheism. But his conception of God admitted absolutely of no distinctions, no self-diremption, no self-communication. He feared that if passages like "Of Him," "Out of His bosom," "I proceeded forth from the Father," were referred to the Son as an essentially equal portion (*μέρος ὁμοουσίου*) or as a *προβολή*, God would be made *σύνθετος*, *διάλπετος*, that is, He would lose, if not His unity, yet His simplicity (Ep. ad Alex.) and His self-sameness; He would become *τρεπτὸς καὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα τῷ σώματι πάσχων*. He can only preserve His singularity by retaining His simplicity. Arius' chief blows were directed therefore against Sabellianism: he does not indeed deny that it is monotheistic, but charges it with robbing God of His singularity, and with commingling God and the world by neglecting to note the simplicity of the divine being. In Arius' eyes, God is *ἀναρχος*, *μονώτατος*, *ἀδιάλπετος*.

The development of the idea of God has therefore now reached the point when the question arises, Whether God is in Himself rigid, abstract being, or living motion, and therefore the subject of distinctions. Arius failed to see the great difference between that which Alexander aimed at and Sabellianism; he was blind also to the fact that the Monarchianism of Sabel-

lius started with a conception of God exactly like his own, to wit, from the conception of the essence of God as abstract unity. The only difference between Sabellius and Arius was, that the former placed the unity and simplicity of God under the category of substance, and was therefore able to conceive it as having accidents (the aspect of revelation, for example), which must ever return unto, and be commingled with, the substance; whereas Arius advanced further to the category of *αἰτιον* or cause, and first by means thereof aimed at distinguishing more determinately between that which posits and that which is posited. God is *μονώτατος*, the highest causality in relation to the world; and that which is itself *ἀγέννητον*, the final cause, alone deserves, in the strictest sense, the name of Deity. Arius did not deem the conception of that causality to be complete, unless taken together with the incomparableness and simplicity of God. Then first, in his view, do we arrive at a determinate and fixed distinction between the final cause and that which is posited, and consequently at the truth of the causal relation. That a speculative element was contained in this advance from the category of substance to that of causality, cannot be doubted. The only question is, Whether Arius, in his zeal for the causal relation, did not so overstrain the distinction between that which is effect and that which is cause, as to arrive at precisely the opposite result, to wit, that the cause can never really produce an effect, or, in other words, that the cause is incapable of being a cause. But, before proceeding to consider this question, let us first bring under notice the other aspect of Arius' first point of view. In his Epistle to Alexander he says, not merely,—“God alone is wise, good, unchangeable, the God of the Law, of the Prophets, and of the New Testament;” but also,—“He begat His only-begotten Son before eternal times (*πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνων*), by whom also He made the world and the universe; He begat Him, however, not merely in seeming (*δοκῆσει*), but in truth; He constituted Him an hypostasis by His own will (*ὑπέστησε*), and made Him unchangeable and unalterable (*ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀαλλοίωτον*). To the same effect in the Epistle to Eusebius,—*βουλήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων—πληρὴς Θεὸς μονογενὴς ἀαλλοιώτως*; a perfect work of God (*κτίσμα θεοῦ τέλειον*),—not, however, like one of His other works; a production, but not like one of His other productions.”

From this we see clearly, that at first he had no intention of depriving the Son of His unique position. The beginnings of Arius still bear very marked traces of the development which had preceded. The Son was still regarded as occupying an unique position among creatures; as unalterable and unchangeable; as bearing, therefore, a distinctive and peculiar likeness to the Father; as not needing first to merit the dignity and name of God, but as at once *πλήρης Θεός* (Ep. ad Euseb.). In giving Him life and being, the Father at the same time gave Him also His glory (*τὰς δόξας συνυποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς*, Ep. ad Alex.). He is therefore again represented as a middle being between God and the world. We find a new confirmation of this in the circumstance, that the Son was equipped for the creation of the world. For not only Athanasius, but even Alexander (Socr. H. E. 1, 6), justly asked,—“How can He who creates be like that which is created?” Precisely Arius’ view of the causal relation necessarily involved fixing the greatest gulf also between the world and the Son, its Creator. The Son is raised to this high position, not indeed as an end in Himself, but merely as a means, with the design of filling up the still greater gulf naturally existing between God and the world; but in order to His being the principle of the cosmos, He is equipped with these lofty predicates. God in His uniqueness and majesty is too exalted, says Arius also, according to Eusebius (see above), for it not to be unworthy of Him to create the world; the world would not have been able to bear His hands (cf. de decr. syn. Nic. c. 8). For this reason, He created at first a single being, whom He termed Son and Logos, in order that He, taking up a middle position, might create the other things (*τούτου μέσου γενομένου*: Athan. c. Ar. or. 2, 24 f.).¹ We

¹ It is therefore probable that the idea of the creation, as effected by means of the Son, had even at that time been entertained by Arius. The notion advanced by Asterius, that the Son *learnt* how to create from the Father (Athan. c. Ar. or. 2, 28), belongs to an entirely different doctrinal formation, for there the *πρῶτον* of the Son is already visible; but the Father is represented as creating immediately, and not merely through the Son. For if the Son be reduced to a lower rank than that assigned to Him at first, even by Arius, if a world is to be created at all, its creation must be entrusted to the Father Himself; that is, the entire basis on which they had originally begun to build their conception of God was again destroyed (see below). The opinion entertained by some Arians appears to have held

here see quite clearly, that the old higher conception of the Son hovered before the mind of Arius at the commencement of His career. For if God is too exalted, and the world too low to bear the immediate creative action of God; and if, on the other hand, He is not too lofty to create the Son immediately, nor the Son too low to be immediately created; evidently the Son must be as nearly as possible adequate to God: and this stands in most intimate connection with the circumstance of Arius then attributing perfection and unchangeableness to the Son (*πλήρης Θεὸς μονογενὴς ἀναλλοίωτος*).

Arius, however, soon went further; indeed, he could not avoid doing so; and although, from time to time, as though shocked at the conclusions to which he was being led,¹ he evinced a disposition to retrace his steps (for example, in the above-mentioned epistles to Eusebius and Alexander, after having allowed himself, even during his stay in Alexandria, in the first heat of the controversy, to be partially led away to statements which he was not able fully to endorse till a later period: compare the Ep. Alex. in Socr. 1, 6, and the Ep. Alex. ad Alex., Theodoret, H. E. 1, 3), the necessity of the case drove him irresistibly onwards, till he arrived at the system laid down in the *Thalia*.²

If, then, the Son is exalted above the world, and is constituted its Creator, in order that He may bridge over the gulf between it and the majesty of God; and if, accordingly, He continues in the nearness to God described above; what becomes of that utterly incomparable elevation and singularity of the Father? For, in that the Son was the worthy image of the Father, there was no longer any need for this very vehement opposition. On the contrary, something of the cause must have passed over into its adequate effect; consequently, the received doctrine of the essential equality of the Son could no longer be deemed objectionable, nor the use of the expression *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων* be justified. Precisely this, however, appeared to him to lead, on the one hand, to Emanatism and to a division of God; and, on the other

a middle position between this and the one above mentioned. To the Father appertained the *δημιουργία*, that is, probably, the creative act considered as an unity; to the Son the *κτίσματα*, that is, the creative works, which are a plurality.

¹ Unless we are ready to charge him point blank with double dealing.

² Compare, in particular, Athan. c. Ar. or. 1.

hand, to involve a corruption of the idea of causality, in consequence of importance enough not being attached to the distinction between effect and cause. He apprehended the reduction of the causal relation to a patripassian identity, or to a Sabellian substantiality, if too great a resemblance were posited between the Son and the Father. Inasmuch, therefore, as he intended by means of the causal relation to denote the distinction between the incommunicable, exalted Deity, and everything outside of it, he was compelled to adopt the course of giving greater prominence to the difference between the Son and the Father. If the Son really stood so near to God as he represented, for His very excellence sake, a certain necessity would have lain on the essence of God to bring Him forth; the existence of the Son would be, to a certain extent, involved in the idea of God Himself; He must be in some way supposed to have existed eternally in God, especially as His excellence could not have been derived from nothing, but must have been grounded in the divine essence and self-communication. Arius therefore passed by this form of the divine causality,—which involved the transmission of something of the essence of the cause to the effect, as in the case of parents and children; and which further seemed to him to bear a physical character, and to lessen the distinction between cause and effect,—and preferred another. To this course he was impelled by the decisive words, *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, implying as they did, that the essence of the Son was absolutely different from that of the Father; for they required both the development of the consequences involved in them, and the rejection of traditional determinations, the more inexorably, as, in the view of Arius, this was the only way in which full justice could be done to the incomparable dignity of God.

He ought, then, logically to have gone on to say,—Inasmuch as the Son must have sprung from nothing, and was a creature; and inasmuch, further, as everything which belongs to the world is unworthy of the dignity of God; there can exist neither Son nor world, but God alone in His singularity and solitude. For obvious reasons, however, he was unwilling to go so far; and contented himself with the obvious advantage offered by the *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, which appeared to him satisfactorily to provide for the dignity of God, and which presupposes a conception of causality, whose analogue is the free will of man, positing things

that are not essentially necessary or homogeneous, but rather fortuitous, casual.¹

That which is created out of nothing, is of a nature totally different from that of God. Least of all can it be unchangeable, unalterable; for otherwise it would, in some way or other, be possessed of absoluteness; and absoluteness belongs to God alone. Nor could it be a temporal being; for the temporal is subject to growth, and therefore to change. Consequently (he now teaches), the Son is alterable and changeable (*τρεπτὸς καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὡς καὶ πάντα τὰ λογικά*). As to essence, He is foreign to God (*ξένος, ἀλλότριος*), completely separated from Him (*ἀπεσχοινομένους*), unlike the substance of the Father, not veritably and naturally Logos of the Father, not the true power of God; but one of the so-called powers of God, as the locust (*ἀκρις*) also is termed not merely a power, but a great power (see Joel ii.); the many other powers, however, resemble the Son (Ep. Alex. in Socr. 1, 6; Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5, 6). If the case stand thus with the physical quality of the power and might of the Son, what remains for the will and the intellect? The Son neither knows Himself nor the Father completely; the Father is by nature a mystery, unutterable, incognizable by the creature; it is His idea to be unsearchable. For which reason, even the Son cannot reveal Him perfectly (Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 6, 9; de Syn. 15; Note 47).

At this point we discern most clearly the feebleness, not merely of the religious, but even of the higher scientific impulse in Arius. In the sphere of the relative, his movements are easy and skilful; in the handling of the lower categories of logic, he evinces dialectic address; but he applies them as a standard to

¹ In consequence of not having the idea of true, ethical freedom, Arius feared to represent the cause of the world as working by necessity; and he was, therefore, unable to give a satisfactory account of its origin. Its author, therefore, in the last instance, was Chance; only Arius gives this chance a seat in the will of God, in the form of caprice. He was right in repudiating a purely physical conception of God, seeing that it admits of no distinction between God and the world. But still he clings with one hand to the very same conception of God, when he gives an irrationality like accident, caprice, a place in God; and that with the notion of highly exalting Him. The fortuitous, in the form of an "accidens," may be attributed to God, viewed as substance; indeed, like Arius' conception of God, it is necessarily characterized thereby.

everything, and is unable to rise to anything higher. He is entirely destitute of the strictly speculative faculty. God's essence he represents as totally incognizable, and this incognizableness he deems to form part of His exaltedness: at the same time, he forgets that if we cannot know anything of God, we cannot know that His essence is incognizable. And further, although he maintains that we cannot truly know anything of God, he applies the idea of causality to Him in any way that answers his purpose. As concerns the religious aspect of the matter,—Christianity cannot on such a theory be the absolute religion; it can only differ from other religions in degree, not in kind. Nay more, we cannot even entertain the hope that another revelation will supply the lack. Alike by the divine loftiness, and by his own essential lowness—a lowness which not even God can change—man is condemned to remain eternally distant from God. God is, and continues, removed to an invisible distance; to communicate a knowledge of Himself, would be to communicate Himself, to break through the limits imposed by His loftiness. God therefore remains by Himself, and man by Himself: their separation is an essential one.

Finally, as to the *Will*:—this also is changeable. Arius denies to the Son essential goodness. Even whilst still in Alexandria, Socrates informs us, the Arians were asked (l. c.),—If the Logos, that is, the Son, were mutable, was it possible for Him to change into the opposite, as did the devil?—and they answered in the affirmative. Arius allowed, it is true, that Christ remained virtuous, and did not turn to worse things; but if He should will, it is always in His power to turn to evil. Because God foresaw that He would continue faithful, He chose Him from all others: as God foreknew that He would be good (*καλόν*), He anticipatorily conferred upon Him the honour of being called Logos and Son. This honour He subsequently earned for Himself, as a man, by His virtue; so that the works foreseen by God were the cause of His becoming that which He now is.¹ In this way, the dignity of being Son of God by

¹ Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5:—Καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει, ὥσπερ πάντες, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τρεπτός, τῇ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἀντιξουσίου, ἕως βούλεται, μῖναι καλός, ὅτε μόντοι θέλει, δύναται τρέπασθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, τρεπτῆς ὡς φύσις. Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ φησι, καὶ προγινώσκων ὁ Θεὸς, ἵσταται καλὸν αὐτὸν,

birth, and consequently by nature, is taken away; and saints also, with the aid of the like *τρόπων ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἄσκησις*, may become what He is (compare Theodoret, H. E. 1, 3). An entirely different principle now begins to be adopted, and a merely ethical Sonship to be substituted for that of essence and nature. We have already found the idea of an ethical Sonship in a very developed state in the system of Lactantius (after hints by Paul of Samosata); Lactantius, however, never ceased to presuppose the essential and natural Sonship. The only novelty, therefore, is, that Arius reduces the natural divine Sonship of Christ to a completely inoperative thing, or, more exactly expressed, reduces it to nonentity. This harmonizes very well with one part of his system. He was concerned not merely to establish the loftiness of God, which, in the last instance, he was compelled to define as the absolute freedom of an arbitrary causality; but also to separate God and man in such a way as to secure to each complete (deistic) independence. If man is completely set loose from God, he is by that very means endowed with a likeness to God, in that, namely, God and the divine bear the same non-essential relation to him as the world bears to God. This separation, therefore, restores to man his equality to God;—neither the will of God nor the will of man is determined by anything essentially contained in it. Man also enjoys, in his measure, that formal freedom, which in God is absolute, and which constitutes the divine loftiness. Although, therefore, the divine causality was unable to transfuse any part of the divine essence into man and into the nature of Christ, because otherwise the distinction affirmed by Arius, between God and the world, would be effaced; yet the freedom of Christ, indeed the freedom of men in general, is the principle which enables that which was created out of nothing, and is yet void of content, to secure a divine substance for its form; which, in a word, renders it capable of producing the divine out of itself, and of thus becoming deified. And, if we are not very nice in our use of words, this self-deification might be described as a divine *χάρις*, or *θέσις* or *θεοποίησις*,¹ so far as God does not prevent it,

παραβῶν αὐτῷ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν δίδωκεν, ἣν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰρετικῆς ἔσχε μετὰ ταῦτα, ὥστε ἐξ ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὡν προέγινε ὁ Θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γιγνόναι πεποίηκεν. Compare Theodor. H. E. 1, 3, and the next note.

¹ Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5, 6:—*Εἰ δὲ καὶ λέγεται Θεός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθινός*

but allows it to come to pass, and so far as He accepts the perfect man, the man who has become God, as His Son, and confers upon Him titles and dignities.

But although this formally ethical principle fits very well into one portion of the system of Arius, it is equally far from suiting the remainder. If divine Sonship, not merely in the new and higher form, but in general, must first be earned through the medium of formal freedom; if, further, the pre-existent hypostasis, and the good which may be inherent therein, ought to be, nay more, must necessarily be, inactive, inasmuch as resemblance to God cannot proceed from God Himself, but must be the fruit of the exercise of freedom, not only in the case of men, but also in that of Christ;—to what purpose, then, this pre-existent hypostasis, which is reduced to inactivity? It is without significance relatively to Christology; it is nothing but a burdensome, confusing, cosmological appendage, which ought rather to have been cast aside with the occupation of this totally new point of view. Athanasius and Alexander were justified in saying to Arius, that his home was rather with Paul of Samosata than in the Church. Or is the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son supposed to render any service at all, even though merely in connection with creation? But he has so lessened it, and reduced it to the level of other rational creatures; he has made its entire dignity so completely dependent on its moral behaviour, that it is powerless to effect the creation of the world.¹ Or was this necessary, that Christ might be able to bring His revelation? What Arius thought of this matter we have seen already; and, at all events, his disciples very

ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ χάριτος, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον Θεὸν. De sent. Dion. c. 23 :—Οὐκ ἔστι μὲν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀληθινὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός, κατὰ θέσιν δὲ λέγεται καὶ οὗτος υἱός, ὡς κτίσμα. Or. 1, 9 :—Μετοχῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ἰθιοποιήθη. Ep. Alex. ad Alex. in Theodor. H. E. 1, 3 :—“No one is Son of God by nature,” say they; “therefore also the Son has not φύσει ἐξαιρέτόν τι above others: but God selected Him from all others (ἐξελεχθαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ πάντων) because He foreknew that He would not go astray.”

¹ It is true, even in the Thalia, he does not venture to give utterance to this thought, but, at the same time, it sets forth the Son, so far as, in virtue of His office of Creator, He must occupy a higher position than we, as a mere instrument and means, of which we are the end; and, so far as He does not exist solely on our account, He is put on a level with us. Compare Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5. 6; Socr. H. E. l. c. 1, 6.

properly went on to maintain, that the Son also needed first to learn what He knew, and to deny to Him both essential knowledge and essential goodness (see note, p. 236). Nay more, Eustathius of Antioch (Gallandi Bibl. IV. 580) informs us that some Arians did not even shrink from classing Christ amongst sinners. Inasmuch, further, as, in his view, all men are alike free, being rational creatures, what need can there be of Christ? Even in his *Thalia*, Arius found nothing whatever to say regarding sin. Nay more, according to his idea of virtue and freedom, every man must be able to redeem himself, or rather to raise himself up to God. Still, Arius must always have attached great significance to this pre-existent hypostasis; for he regarded it as, strictly speaking, the personal element in the human life of Christ, and on its account was compelled to mutilate the humanity of Christ, by denying to it a human soul; because, otherwise, two finite spirits must have been represented as constituting one person. But even on this supposition, the only office discharged by the hypostasis, is that of an hindrance; and precisely at this point does it become very evident that his principles, carried to their logical results, necessitated the rejection of the notion of a pre-existent hypostasis. Had he taken this step, he would have completely identified himself with Paul of Samosata. As it is, however, he is neither one thing nor another; and, being occupied solely with finite and single objects, never rises to a free survey of the connections of the whole as such. He reduces God Himself, in His pre-eminence, to singularity, to an abstract individual, shut up in His own egoism: of love, that is, of the absolutely ethical, he has no notion whatever. Even the ethical which he recognises is a relative thing, grounded in the antithesis between God and man. We might also show, in connection with all the main points, that his dialectic, being that of the understanding, never fails, agreeably to its innate character, unconsciously to nullify earlier by later principles; although, at the same time, it consoles itself with the ineradicable conviction of the clearness and certainty of its own knowledge. Let it suffice, however, to draw attention to one or two. Arius affirms that there is but one God; and, because he refuses to allow anything to be abstracted from Him, he represents Him as incommunicable. And yet his deistic point of view drives him to

attribute such an absoluteness to the world, as constitutes it in reality a plurality of deities. In presence of the freedom of man, God actually recedes completely into the background. Further, let it be remarked how Arius at first represents the Son as a *κτίσμα*, in order to preserve the simplicity and unity of God; and at the same time constitutes Him a creative, inferior God, in order that the gulf arising from the loftiness of God may not be too great. On a subsequent occasion, for the sake of this same divine loftiness, he puts the Son on a far lower level; but did not reflect that he was thus depriving the world of its basis, as which, his conception of God required him to regard the Son, and the Son alone. Finally, if this basis can no longer consistently be held to lie in the Son, but must be contained immediately in the Father alone, the principle of the entire course of thought, that on which he had mainly leant for support when reducing the Son to the rank of a *κτίσμα*, is undermined; to wit, that of the abstract simplicity, incommunicableness of God, and His absolute separation from the world. It is clear, that a system of thought so destitute of hold, and so unweariedly occupied in refuting itself, could never produce a permanent type of doctrine; the restlessness, however, with which it jumped from one momentum to another, and ever turned the one against the other, was fitted to set them all in motion and ferment, and thus to prepare the way for their interpenetration and intermixture.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ATHANASIUS.

THE doctrine of Arius met with the warmest opposition, in the first instance, in Alexandria. Alexander refuted it from the Holy Scriptures, specially by means of the prologue to the Gospel of John. How can He be the First-born, if He is to be put on the same level with us all? Or how can He be the creator of Him whose equal He is? If the Logos and Wisdom were not as eternal as God, God must at one period have been

without wisdom and reason. Further, were the Son mutable, how could He be so intimately united with the Father? If He is in the Father, and the Father in Him, He must thus be preserved from mutability; and not even the incarnation can have produced an alteration in Him. Further, how is it possible that He, who is reason itself, should not know the Father, whose reason He is (*λόγος*)? Or how can He have been brought into existence solely on our behalf, for whose sake, and by whom, all things were created? (Socr. H. E. 1, 6.) So far from having been Himself created out of nothing, He rather Himself created all things out of nothing, and must, therefore, be far removed from that which is created. On the contrary, it is impossible even in thought to represent an interval (*διάστημα*) between Father and Son. Not as though the Son had not been generated; one only is unbegotten, to wit, the Father; but the generation of the Son was something so exalted, that it surpassed the understanding of the Evangelists, and surpasses, perhaps, that of the angels also. He then, in particular, lays bare the subreption contained in the Arian proposition—*ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. This, again, involves the existence of a time; but all time is created by Him, and comes into existence along with the world; consequently, the time in which He is said not to have existed, must have existed through Him, for otherwise the cause would be posterior to its effect. If a time had been created anterior to Him, He could no longer be described as the First-born of all creation. The Father, therefore, must always have been Father, because the Son, through whom He is Father, always existed. Precisely for this reason is He ever the perfect Father, who never lacks anything good (*τέλειος ἀνέλλιπής ἐν τῷ καλῷ*). Whoso denies the brightness, denies also the archetypal light (*πρωτότυπον φῶς*), of which it is the reflection. If He, who is the express image (*χαρακτήρ*) and copy of the divine essence, is not eternal, neither is the substance of the image and the object of the copy eternal. On this ground, the Sonship of the Redeemer has nothing in common with that of others; for His was a natural Sonship (*κατὰ φύσιν τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος*): the latter is one of adoption (*θέσει*). We are mutable in both aspects, and therefore need help from the Unchangeable One. How, then, can the wisdom of God be supposed to progress, or the power of God to increase? Or how can wisdom be sup-

posed to be turned into folly, and strength into weakness? To the creature alone, on the contrary, is it given as a blessing, to be able to increase in virtue; and through Him, who is by nature Son, to be freed from the spirit of fear, and to receive sonship by grace, by adoption. The latter may possibly be lost; the former cannot be lost. But it is a calumny of the Arians to charge him (Alexander) with teaching that there are two ungenerated Beings, or to maintain that he ought to teach it, if he do not. The Father alone is unbegotten; He alone has no ground of His being out of Himself (*οὐδένα τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸν αἰτιον ὄντα*). The Son is in every other respect equal to the Father, and falls short in nothing, save that He is not unbegotten (*μόνη τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ λειπόμενον αὐτοῦ*); and to this difference refer the words, "The Father is greater than I." But He was not, therefore, created out of nothing, but is of the Father. In connection herewith, not only Arius, but also Sabellius and Valentine, are repudiated, who ascribe to God something resembling the body, corporeal divisions and emissions, instead of resting satisfied with the unutterable mystery, whose unsearchableness is declared even by the Scriptures (*Isa. liii. 8*), "Who shall declare His generation?" (*Theodor. H. E. 1, 3.*) We see from this, that Alexander's aim was to establish the closest possible connection between the hypostasis of the Son and His eternal divine essence. In carrying out his design, he decidedly posits a duality in God, and, if we may judge from the images employed by him, conceives the Logos of the Father to be objectified in the Son; though he does not express any opinion as to the relation between the reason and power of the Father (apart from which, no conception can be formed of Him), and the reason and power of the Son. His images, in themselves, would warrant us in concluding, that he conceived the Father to have reason and power, not in Himself, but in the Son; that he simply identified the reason of the Father and of the Son; that, consequently, the Son was the Father Himself, under a determinate form, and, as a determination or attribute, constituted part of the full conception of the Father. This, however, would contradict the duality which he had previously laid down.

A very numerous attended Synod, held at Alexandria (*Socr. l. c.*), concurred with Alexander, and deposed Arius and

his followers. But as Arius had a supporter in Eusebius of Nicomedia, and other Oriental bishops also took his part, an Œcumenical Council was convened at Nicæa, in the year 325, for the settlement of the points in dispute. The judgment of the Alexandrian Synod was confirmed, and the Nicene Creed was framed, which acknowledges the generation of the Son from the Father, and gives the following more precise definition of it:—That the Son is of the essence of the Father; that He is very God of very God; that He was begotten, not created. Mainly, however, in consequence of the efforts of Athanasius—that vigorous champion of Christian interests—there was added the recapitulatory term, *ὁμοούσιον*, the main purpose of which was, to express the identity of essence, though it also further implied or presupposed the equal coexistence of two: this latter was involved also in the term *γεννᾶν*. The only expression in the Symbolum, bearing on the nature of the distinction between the two, is the following: “The Son is of the Father, who begat Him.” It is primarily directed against Arianism, not against Sabellianism. The latter, however, was also excluded, in so far as it was unable to attach any meaning to the idea of generation, specially not to that of the generation of a pre-existent hypostasis, which, as the Symbolum affirms, created the world. But the Creed contains also the idea of the *eternal* generation, as is clear when we combine the simultaneity of Father and Son with the *γεννᾶν*. To the double affirmation contained in *ὁμοούσιον*, there is a correspondent double negation:—1. The Son did *not arise out of nothing*, nor indeed out of any other substance, or any other essence, than the Father (consequently, not merely *ὁμοιος* to the Father); He was, therefore, neither created nor mutable. 2. It is unlawful to say, There was a *time* when He was not, or, He was not ere He was generated; for these are propositions which apply the idea of time to the generation of the Son, and imply that the generation had a commencement. (Note 48.)

The duty devolving on the Fathers at the Council of Nicæa, was to set forth and *confess* the substance of the Christian faith, not to give doctrinal speculations. Hitherto, only a few had entered on dogmatical investigations; not till twenty years later did the Church in general devote attention thereto. If we take into consideration that the first effect of devoting attention to

the dialectic conciliation of doctrines must necessarily be to rob many of that immediate assurance of the truth of Christianity by which they were possessed, and that the place of the really grand unity of spirit evinced in Nicæa must be usurped by a manifold variety of views, which, ere they could be brought, as to their principal features, not to say into uniformity, but into an harmonious unity, must be discussed, reflected upon, and thoroughly cleared up,—we shall esteem it a special favour of Providence, that the conscience of the Church was appealed to for its testimony and confession, so long as it still retained its direct certitude and simplicity; and that thus, at the very commencement of its voyage, a beacon was enkindled to mark the Church's pathway across the stormy seas which lay before it. But a firm and steady pilot's hand was also provided for the voyage, in the person of a man who was endowed with a superior, farseeing, and no less speculative than Christian mind, and who, through his power of endurance and strength of character, always remained master of the position. Athanasius the Great made it the task of his long and very eventful life to defend the creed adopted by the Nicene Council, with all the weapons of science and spiritual chivalry, against the vacillating and shortsighted on the one hand, and the apostate on the other hand, and to constitute it, not merely a vital and common treasure of all believers, but also a subject of real knowledge. And to him was given what is given to but very few—the happiness of seeing the idea to which, as youth and man, he had devoted his life, attain to ever wider influence and recognition, and of sinking into the grave, not merely crowned with honour, but laden with the fruits of his labours.

Specially noteworthy, as indicative of the character of the tendency of the Church at the beginning of the fourth century, are (besides the above) the two works written by Athanasius prior to the Nicene Council, and without reference to Arius, entitled *λόγος κατὰ Ἑλλήνων* (oratio contra Gentes), and *περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου* (de incarnatione Verbi Dei). These works set before us, at the same time, the beginnings of Athanasius. He evinces an acquaintance with Greek philosophy, and his presentation of Christian doctrine has many points of affinity therewith; at the same time, however, the vital centre of Christianity is grasped by him with such intense

fervour, and is treated in such a scientific spirit, that it gives us the groundwork of a grand system of speculative Christian theology. What engaged his attention above all things else, was the Logos. His existence he presupposed, firstly, as the faith of the Church; secondly, as conceded by the philosophy of the day; lastly, on historical grounds. He does not, it is true, enter into a closer investigation of the relation of the Logos to the Father, and to the unity of God; he does, however, examine His relation to the *world* in all the three aspects, of creation, preservation, and incarnation.

The purpose of his work was to communicate that which he had learnt from the many blessed teachers who had explained the holy Scriptures, and to show that the Christian faith—by which he understood the belief in the incarnation of the Logos—was no slight (*εὐτελής*) nor irrational (*ἄλογον*) thing.

Let us, in the first place, consider his doctrine of God and man, in order thus to see what was the basis of his doctrine of the God-man.

He arrives at his idea of God, in the first place, by overcoming the error of Heathenism. God is neither the world, says he, nor a part of the world. In the world, every part is dependent on the other,—the rivers on the mountains, the mountains on the earth, the earth on the sun. God, however, cannot be dependent on another; if He were, He would not be God (c. Gent. c. 27). God must be self-sufficient, and requires for His existence nothing beside Himself. Nor can the whole world, its members joined together, as it were, into one body, be called God. It is true, there is nothing outside of the entire universe; and therefore it appears independent, self-sufficient. But if the individual members combine to form a whole, and this whole is therefore constituted by them, the whole consists of the individual parts, which together are the parts of the whole. This, however, is totally different from the idea of God. God is a whole; but He is not the parts; He does not consist of different parts, but is the cause of the world and of its composition. If He consisted of parts, He would be unequal to Himself, inasmuch as that which is unequal would be the complement of His being. Sun is not moon; moon is not earth; earth is not sea. The ear is not the eye; nor the hand the foot. This difference of the parts pertains to the idea of the body; the

same difference, therefore, would appertain to God also, if He were identical with the universe, conceived as one body. Further, not being compounded, God is incorporeal, invisible, not tangible by hands, but apprehensible solely by the spirit; for this reason, therefore, He cannot be the world. On the contrary, He is in Himself, in His essence, self-sufficient, full of Himself (*contra Gentes* 28); and the cause of the existence of the universe.

But he does not believe that this self-sufficient God abides in His transcendence. On the contrary, like the old propounders of the doctrine of the Logos, particularly of the Alexandrian school, Athanasius says,—He is in the world as the immanent principle of its harmony. He desires no abstract loftiness of God, as did unbelieving Judaism; he neither apprehends any danger to God, nor regards it as unworthy of Him, that He should come into contact with the world. Although it is created out of nothing, and therefore, considered in itself, can neither bear nor maintain itself; still its idea involves an essential connection between God or the Logos and itself. This presupposes an entirely different conception of God from the heathenish one of the **Ον*, and from the Jewish, to both of which abstract simplicity is essential,—in the former case, the simplicity of substantial Pantheism, in the latter case, that of Deism. Rather, says Athanasius, giving the idea of God an ethical turn,—God is good and not envious; therefore did He create the world; but especially in men has He taken an interest, through the Logos. Seeing that they cannot live always, He created them in His image, and endowed them with the power of the Logos, so that they became, as it were, shadows of the Logos (*σκιαι λόγου*) and *λογικοί*. In that He further saw that the will of men was in itself still empty, and might incline to either side, He protected it preventively by the command and by paradise. By nature, man was mortal; for he was created out of things that were not (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*). But he possessed the capacity of immortality, through his union with the Logos. Had he by obedience continued in that union, the physical necessity of death would have been overcome by the divine principle of immortality, the Logos: men would then have been as gods. But man disobeyed, and death penetrated into the world, even as the divine threatening had announced. It

entered by an inner necessity; for sin deprived man of the Logos, the only principle able to overcome his natural mortality. As sin grew, death grew; the image of God was destroyed; the work of God was overthrown (de inc. c. 3-6). The knot was tied still more firmly by the threatened punishment. The divine threat, the pledged word of the God of truth, could not suffer: on the other hand, must the work and image of God perish? It was not worthy of God to allow His own noble work of art to perish, for the sake of a deceit of the devil. Better had it been for God not to have created, than for the evil to have the better. To have allowed that which love had created to perish, would have been weakness, and inconsistent with omnipotence. Still more inconsistent with love. God did not look with indifference on His perishing work; it appealed to His love (*ἐξεκαλέσατο*, c. 4, 6).

Should God then require repentance, and through repentance restore man to immortality? In itself, this would not have been unworthy of Him; but He could not lay Himself open to the charge of untruth, even though for our benefit. Repentance was not sufficient: had sin been the sole point in question, and not also punishment, repentance would have sufficed. But as matters actually stood, and seeing that God (the righteous) is true, who could help out of the difficulty, save the Logos? He, who created man out of nothing, was able to suffer for all, to stand in the stead of all (c. 7). Therefore the Logos came; He, who was incorporeal, imperishable, omnipresent, appeared in order to reveal Himself. He saw both our misery and the threats of the law; He saw how unseemly (*ἄτοπον*) it would be to annul the law, save by fulfilling and satisfying it; and at the same time, how unseemly it would be that the Creator should allow His rational world to perish. And as He saw the ever-swelling tide of sin, and that all were in bondage unto death, He took compassion on them and assumed a body, not by any necessity of nature (*φύσεως ἀκολουθία*), for His essence is incorporeal (c. 1), but for the purpose of confirming and maintaining the first creation by means of the second. It is characteristic of the speculative mind of Athanasius, that he everywhere treats the first and second creations as closely connected with each other; that, in accounting for the miracle of incarnation, he goes back to that of creation; and shows that,

for the sake both of the unity of the idea of the world and of God, it was necessary that He, and He alone, through whom the Father created the world, should renew it.

But He assumed no other body than ours. Had His object merely been to appear in some sort of body or other, He would not have needed ours; and if a simple theophany had been all that was required, He might have taken to Himself a much worthier organ. Rather did He assume our body, and out of the unspotted Virgin He built to Himself a body for a temple. This He constituted His organ (*ἰδιοποιεῖσαι ὡς περ ὄργανον*), that He might dwell in it and be known through it. In consequence of this appropriation of our nature, He was able to give His body to the death for all. And now, inasmuch as all have died in Him, the law is annulled by being fulfilled, that is, its curse is removed through the satisfaction. But in appropriating the body, He bestowed upon it immortality, and through it has restored immortality to our nature. That which the act of appropriation implanted in our nature, as a mere potency, at the incarnation, became an actuality through His resurrection. He must needs let death have power over His body; in order that, by the death of death (the negation of the negation), in His resurrection there might be revealed the full and settled reality of life triumphing over, and reaching beyond, its antagonist, death (c. 8, 9).

The entire appearance of Christ, but, above all, His death, had an universal significance; because the Logos, who is above all, who is the Creator and Archetype, thereby made human nature His own. The appropriation had an effect not merely on the particular man Jesus, but also on human nature in general; for this reason, the death of all found its fulfilment in the body of the Lord (*ἐπληροῦτο*, c. 20). Guilt was heaped upon Him, collected itself in Him, the representative of the race; and His death was a payment for all. It was necessary that death should be broken, not merely in some one particular form, but as a general principle; and therefore did it behove Him to admit and take it up into Himself, so that He might overcome it completely. Now, inasmuch as the Logos, being the immortal Son of the Father, could not die, He took upon Himself a mortal body, to the intent that, by participating in the Logos, who is over all, it might be capable of dying for all,

that is, of taking the guilt of all upon itself, of admitting the universal principle of death into itself, and of thus paying the universal debt and obtaining an universal victory over death. (Note 49.) Athanasius had the deepest insight into the connection between that which the incarnate Logos did and men, into its validity for us. To no other did it pertain to convert mortality into immortality, than to Him who in the beginning created the universe out of nothing, and who was Himself the Life (*αὐτοζωή*); to no other than the archetype, the image of the Father, did it appertain to create man anew, "in the image of God" (c. 20, 13). If an image has been defaced, in order to its renewal the original must be compared (c. 14). Now that this Logos has taken to Himself our nature, our nature possesses Him; He belongs to us, who constitute the body of which He is the Head. Henceforth corruption has no more power over men, even in death; for in virtue of the unity of the body (which believers constitute for Christ), the Logos dwells in them. When a mighty king enters into a great city, even though he should but occupy one house therein, the whole city (just because it constitutes a whole) receives the highest honour. And so, when the Logos entered into our region and became the tenant of (even though only) one body, which was like ours, the power of death, which had reigned over all men from of old, disappeared (c. 9). We die still, it is true; but merely in order that we likewise may participate in the resurrection to a better state.

The first and principal ground of His incarnation, therefore, was, that the condemning law might be done away with, which burdens us with guilt and with the punishment of death. With this, also, was most closely connected, that death itself should be overcome by His payment of our debt, that is, by His own death. Another ground why the Logos must needs become man, was that men were otherwise too weak to know God (c. 11-13). Without the knowledge of God, men would have lived in vain; for, from the very beginning, they were created thereto. They had received a share in the Logos, the image of God; they were created to be His and the Father's image, in order that they might be able in the Spirit to lay hold on the Logos, and, in the Word, on the Father. This grace of the commencement (*ἡ κατ' εἰκόνα χάρις*) sufficed in itself, apart

from the world or anything else, for attaining a knowledge of God (c. 12, c. Gentes 2, 30); it of itself reflected God. But as God knew the weakness and negligence of man, He gave him the world as a revelation, that great and beautiful edifice, which, in its harmony and unity, reflects the unity and wisdom of God. He further sought to help them through the law and the prophets, as through a sacred school, appointed to give the knowledge of God to the whole of humanity, in order that it might learn to rule its passions, and to live virtuously. Men, however, degraded themselves ever more to the level of irrational and brute creatures. How then were they to be helped? By the revelation in creation, which they no longer regarded as a revelation, but as a deity? They had turned their gaze downwards; and therefore the Logos also descended, assumed a body from beneath, made Himself like men, in order that they who refused to know Him out of creation might learn to know Him from the works which He wrought through the body (de incarn. c. 12-14). In this latter exposition, the incarnation is represented, not as the substance, but merely as the means or organ of doctrine. It might appear, therefore, as though, in the view of Athanasius, the main point was simply the knowledge of the λόγος ἄσαρκος and of the Father, prior and subsequently to Christ. But, after the above account of the points to which Athanasius attached chief importance, this would plainly be a false view. His object was rather, after having treated of the main purpose of the appearance of Christ, which he deemed to consist in deeds, to show that even the intellect of man required a revelation, such as was given by the incarnation: as was natural, however, he did not succeed so well in showing the unconditional necessity of the incarnation in relation to the prophetic office as he had succeeded in relation to the high-priestly office; as to the latter point, indeed, he approximated very nearly to Anselm.

But in opposition to this incarnation objections are raised. How can we reconcile, he goes on to say, the dwelling of the Logos in a human body with His all-embracing infinitude? (c. 16, 17.) He replies,—Though He dwelt in the body, He was not shut up in it; nor was He shut out from other places; but, as the Logos, He was in the body, moving it even as He moves the universe, which He created. It is true, He is not merely

in the universe, but also outside thereof, as to His essence (*κατ' οὐσίαν*); He is also in the entire creation, seeing that He is in all its powers (*ἐν πάσιν ἐστὶν ταῖς ἐαυτοῦ δυνάμεσι*), ordering all things, extending His providence to all in all, giving life to each individual thing, and to the universe as a whole, embracing the universe without being embraced by it, existing everywhere in His entirety (*ὅλος κατὰ πάντα*) in His Father alone. Our soul images forth in a weak way, how He, though in this body, was yet able to animate the universe. For, whilst sitting in the house, it is able to embrace distant objects, and to think of the heavens,—only, that its thoughts are not deeds, and do not move the heavens, as did the Logos in Christ; it merely knows their motion. What he here above all insists upon is, that the Logos, and not the limited humanity, is the true point of departure for the consideration of the Person of Christ. The Logos was not bound by the body, but held and bore it, even as He holds and bears up the universe; at one and the same time He was in the body and in the universe; nay more, as He was in, so also was He outside of, the All, resting in the Father. For this reason, it was impossible for the Logos to suffer either through birth, or through sin, or through death; on the contrary, in holding, He sanctified the body. Out of the Virgin He formed for Himself a body, in order to show that He was the Creator of the universe; and, without being seen as the Logos in the body, or being shut in by it, He made Himself known as Creator by His miraculous works. That Athanasius appropriates the sufferings of Christ to the divine nature also, even though not immediately, is evident from his doctrine of the *ἰδιοποίησις*, referred to above. Because the Logos appropriates the sufferings of the human nature along with the nature itself, they acquire a significance in and for the Logos Himself; and, on the other hand, because they are His, they acquire, as does His victory, an universal significance. He takes special pains, however, to point out that His miracles were revelations, self-representations, of His person, of Himself, as the Creator. He did not regard them as the mere credentials of His doctrine, but as veritable victories over nature, and over the heathenish view of the world. In the miracles, Creator and creature were most clearly discriminated from each other; for by the obedience which nature then rendered to His com-

manding word, He was revealed to it as its Ruler and Creator. Still, he deems the constantly occurring spiritual marvels the greatest of all (c. 27 ff.). No one doubts, when darkness disappears in the morning, that the sun is the cause thereof. And so, no one can doubt who Christ is, when he once beholds His works. Fear of death, and impotence to resist it, reigned ere He came. Now His followers tread death under their feet. They despise it as already dead; and the devil, who had the power of death, is treated by believers as dead. Previously, death was a terror; now, youths and maidens despise him and hasten to the martyr's fate. That Christ rose again and now lives, is evident from what He does: He daily erects trophies to Himself out of His disciples. That He is not a dead man, is clear from His omnipotent workings in the hearts of Greeks and Barbarians (c. 46 ff.). Since the incarnation of the Logos, Heathenism has fallen, the wisdom of this world has become folly, and the oracles are dumb. In the place of innumerable particularistic religions, one has been substituted which embraces all nations. In heaven, in hades, in humanity, and on earth—everywhere does man see the deity of the Logos unfolded before him, and himself encompassed by it. *Πάντων γὰρ τῶν τῆς κτίσεως μερῶν ἦλθετο ὁ Κύριος* (c. 45, cll. 16 f.).

Our heathen opponents, it is true, advance, as their principal objection, "It was not worthy of the Logos to appear in a body" (c. 41 f.). With the penetration of a speculative mind, he answers,—If the Logos is in all things, in the entire world, which is justly termed one great body,—nay, even in each individual thing,—why could He not also dwell in a man, whom He moved, through whom He manifested Himself, even as He manifests Himself through the world? That which is true of the whole, must be true also of the parts; if the former is not unworthy of the Logos, neither is the latter; and if it be unworthy of Him to dwell in this body, it must also be unworthy of Him to dwell in the world. If He is in the whole, He is also in the parts. If He is in one part, He can use it as His organ for and on the whole. He is in Himself indivisible, *ὅλος ἐν ἐκάστῳ καὶ πᾶσι*; as He is in the sun and moon, so is He in humanity, which is a part of the universe. But—and he herewith provides for assigning a specific position to Christ—the spirit of man, also, although it pervades the whole man, reveals

itself at one point of the body, to wit, the tongue. They ask, further,—“Why then did He not, at all events, assume a shining body?” Because His coming had not an epideictical, but a curative purpose. The main point was not simply to appear and to strike the eyes of beholders. He came to teach and to heal: therefore did He become a servant; therefore did He become that which men needed, in order that they might not be merely stunned by the loftiness and divinity of His appearance. It was not the brilliantly shining bodies, the sun, the moon, the ether, that had gone astray; they had remained in their proper order, the order appointed for them by their King, the Logos: it was men who had gone astray. He therefore constituted their body His organ, in order that, although they were unable to know Him in the universe as a whole, He might perhaps not remain concealed from them in the part; and in order that, though they were unable to behold His invisible power, they might possibly be able to understand and know Him through His resemblance to themselves. For the contrast between His divine works and the body like their own must needs suggest a comparison, and thus lead them to the knowledge of His deity. If this is inconceivable, it is inconceivable also that He should be known by means of the world. Although in the world, nothing of the world pertains essentially to Him; but the world does participate in Him. Even so, though He employed the body as His organ, there was nothing in common between them; on the contrary, He sanctified the body. Plato says,—When the Generator of the worlds sees the world storm-tossed and in danger of coming to the place of inequality, He ascends His throne at the helm of the soul, gives it aid, and sets all things to rights. What marvel, then, if we say,—Humanity had gone astray, and therefore the Logos ascended His throne on it, and appeared as a man (c. 42, 43)?

Another objection is,—“God might have helped men by a mere nod.” Athanasius answered,—The world, it is true, was created by a nod; but now it was a question not merely of the creation of man, but the man already created must be considered: and he could only be helped by one like himself; in other words, man could not be magically helped by an entirely new creation, but the redemptive work must make use of, and begin with, his already existing powers and character. The

Creator must come nigh to the fallen through the medium of a human organ, and this organ He must take from that which already existed; for it was the existent, and not the non-existent, that stood in need of salvation. Further, the death which needed to be overcome was not something external to the body, but adhered inwardly to it; as a permanent principle, and not merely as a single assault or act, did it threaten man. He might have overcome death from without; but it would still have remained in man. Hence it was necessary that the process should be an inward one. Our body, subjected as it was to death, was assumed, and was married with life; it was clothed with immortality, and death was vanquished. The body now has life for its garment,—as it were, a robe of asbestus. This is far more than if a stop had been put to death's work, by a mere external and authoritative command, and it itself had remained unvanquished. It was therefore perfectly worthy of the Logos to come in the body in order to overcome death, and to reveal Himself everywhere,—as through creation, so also through His body and His deeds, and to fill all things with His knowledge (c. 44). Therefore, let every man regard the Logos in the works which He accomplished as God-man, which were not human works, but works of the Logos, and let him judge for himself whether that be human or divine. If it be human, let him mock. If it be not human, but divine, let him stand and admire this revelation. Through this trifling thing (*πράγμα εὐτελές*) was the divine exhibited to us; through this death did immortality penetrate to all; through the incarnation of the Logos was providence made manifest for the universe. But the things which He accomplished by His incarnation are so numerous, that to attempt to count them up would be like attempting to drain the sea. Wave presses on wave, and for the eye to embrace the whole is impossible. *Ὁ λόγος ἐνηθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν* (c. 54).

Although the immediate subject of these writings is not the relation of the Logos to the Father, so much is clear, that, according to this view of the matter, drawn as it is out of the very centre of Christianity, to wit, the idea of the atonement, to the Son pertains true and perfect deity, even as to the Father. He is discriminated in the clearest manner from all creatures; and as the Logos over all, rather rests in the Father (*αὐτό-*

λογος καὶ Θεός, de incarn. 54); is the Father's image and like the Father, the archetype of men (c. 13). He is also most decidedly distinguished from all angels, for they are not the image of the Father (ibid.). In these treatises, therefore, Athanasius stands nearer to Sabellianism than to Subordinationism; so far, namely, as he is more concerned about the true and full deity of the Son than about His distinction from the Father. But he differs from Sabellius in regarding the Logos as the image of the Father, pre-existent, yea, ever resting in God, which Marcellus, for example, could not allow. As respects his Christology, by the depth of his view of the fundamental idea of Christianity, he reminds us of the best Fathers of the second century, particularly of Irenæus. He surpasses them, however, in clearness and scientific precision. The soul of his system is the Logos over all, who, as such, in that He became man, is the head and representative of humanity in two respects,—to wit, in that He took upon Himself its guilt and punishment; and that the healing of human nature in and through Him becomes the portion of humanity, and is diffused from Him to all. At the same time, it is worthy of note, that he did not conceive the Logos in Christ as a mere influence, but as a being of God in Him. In fact, he looked upon the Logos as the motive, hegemonic, personal principle in the God-man; but he makes no particular allusion to the human soul. The arguments he advances, undoubtedly presuppose a complete humanity (compare, for example, de incarn. c. 42 f.); but he makes express mention of the body alone (σῶμα, σὰρξ); and the enemy to be vanquished is principally death. The impotence of the soul to know itself immortal, is undoubtedly represented as one ground of the incarnation; but his theory, in the form in which it is here set forth, does not require for the removal of this impotence, that Christ should substitutionarily appropriate or feel it Himself, but merely that He should admit into Himself the objective principle of death, that He should take upon Himself the debt (ὀφειλόμενον, not culpa) of men; and this supplied no occasion for more carefully considering the question of the human soul of Christ. Such a view leaves no place in the humanity for free choice, free determination, for change, or even for true development (although he aimed at preserving the reality of the humanity); but the man Jesus was

simply and solely the Logos, walking among men in the human nature which He bore. Athanasius thus verged towards the old representation of the body of Christ as a garment or temple, which excludes the full idea of the incarnation. It is remarkable, however, that precisely here, Athanasius made a decided effort to rise beyond that meagre notion, in that he started from a different point, to wit, from the idea of Christ as the representative both of guilt-laden and of God-pleasing and immortal humanity. For he frequently repeats the remark,—What we needed was not a mere theophany, but that He should really become one of us; in order to be our representative, He must not merely have, or bear, or dwell in a man, but must Himself be this man. Athanasius thus rose most decidedly above every form of Sabellian Christology; and therefore, taking our stand on this thought, which was the centre of his system, we may beforehand anticipate the nature and degree of the progress which we shall afterwards find him making.

EPOCH THIRD.

FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA TO THAT OF
CONSTANTINOPLE, A.D. 381.

SECTION FIRST.

TRINITARIAN MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE ARIAN SCHOOL.

THE creed adopted by the Council of Nicæa did nothing more for Christian science, in the first instance, than define the goal at which it should aim; it neither did, nor pretended to, attain to the goal. But the determination of the goal is the commencement of its attainment. After the long course through which the dogma had run, now unduly inclining to the one side and then to the other, it became very necessary that the immediate conviction entertained by the Church, relatively to Christ, should assume a more concentrated form, and that testimony should be laid concerning the totality of His person. To this, Arianism gave occasion; for it called everything in question. Not merely did it tend back to Ebionism; not merely was it unable, with its Docetism and its doctrine of a created higher spirit, to allow even the possibility of an incarnation; but, by putting a fantastical under-God between God and man, it separated the two quite as much as it appeared to unite them. Finally, the secret of Arianism was simply, in the first place, that a real, above all, a complete, revelation of God Himself was

an impossibility ; and in the second place, that such a revelation, if it were possible, was unnecessary. But the creed adopted by the Fathers of the Council of Nicæa, to the point which had been established during the preceding century,—to wit, the indwelling of God in Christ under the very highest, that is, under a personal form, in other words, to the hypostasis of the Son (a point which was now confirmed, in substance, if not in a strictly doctrinal form, as in accordance with the faith),—added that of His *true deity*, which also had been recognised at a previous period, though for a time allowed to recede to the background. Each of these points, as we have learnt from the course hitherto taken by them, stands or falls with the other, notwithstanding that they appear to be mutually opposed. They are opposed in the sense, namely, in which two poles are opposed. In reality, they constitute the momenta of the higher nature of Christ, which relate to, are inwardly conditioned by, and therefore depend on and are involved in, each other. Each preserves the truth, which was of essential importance relatively to its own aspect of the Person of Christ. They being taken for granted, the necessary conditions of Christian piety are completely fulfilled, as far as this matter is concerned. Without one of the two, a scientific Christology is impossible. An hypostasis without deity (such as Arianism teaches, which is but a refined form of Ebionism, differing therefrom merely in degree, not in kind), would be as contradictory to Christian piety and science as the divinity, without a particular hypostasis, of the higher aspect of Christ (such as is taught by that refined form of Docetism, Sabellianism). Whilst the former, strictly speaking, denies the Christian revelation altogether, the latter changes its inner character, and, not recognising Christ as an abiding revelation, it cannot regard God and man as truly and completely reconciled. Both, therefore, necessarily arrive at the same conclusion—at the conclusion, namely, that the highest revelation has not yet been made, nay, more, that such a revelation is an impossibility. Both are characterized by the abstractness of their conception of God ;—the latter clinging to the abstract unity of God, which may easily change into the notion of the All-unity (Alleinheit) ; the former clinging to the quite as abstract, incommunicable simplicity of God, to the *φθόνος τῆς θείας φύσεως*, as Gregory Nazianzen aptly terms it (Or. 1). According to both, therefore, we

are still bound by the ante-Christian view of the world in general, and have not yet arrived at the Christian.

But though the Nicene Creed very clearly recognised these two constitutive momenta of the higher nature of Christ, it avoided with right tact a more determinate doctrinal formula-*zation* thereof. This creed, it is true, claims unconditionally for the Son, deity and full equality of essence with the Father; but it passes over without further investigation, the questions of the precise nature of the hypostasis, the mode of its generation, and the basis of the Trinity in the Christian idea of God. Indeed, the greatest variety of opinion prevailed amongst the principal Church teachers of this and the following centuries regarding this matter; and all were recognised as christologically admissible, in so far as they did justice to the fundamental demand of faith, to wit, to the doctrine, that the divine which was in Christ was personal, and corresponded to a distinction in God, or of God from God, really existent, though not more precisely defined; and was therefore not a momentary, but a permanent and eternal, being of God in Christ.¹

The stormy discussions of the half century succeeding the Nicene Council, for which the scientific position occupied by the Church afforded, as is clear from what has been advanced, opportunity enough, were in the first instance excited by Arianism. We have already remarked, that through Arianism the momenta hitherto recognised were set into a condition of ferment relatively

¹ In accordance herewith, the history of the doctrine of the Trinity henceforth pursues a separate course from that of Christology, so far as it is mainly occupied with its own distinct and peculiar questions; though it continues to hold by the two momenta above mentioned, which are the indispensable conditions of Christology. These its *theological* presuppositions once recognised (similarly also, the necessary *anthropological* presuppositions), it was possible for Christology to enter on its distinctive work;—and this we find it doing in the fourth century. All that we shall therefore need to do, in order to accomplish the purpose we have in view, is to consider, on the one hand, how, during the conflicts in which the Church engaged till the Second Œcumenical Synod, the trinitarian conception of God, laid down in the Nicene Creed, was established and confirmed, and consequently the momenta of the higher aspect of Christ's person, which had been completely gained, were ensured; and, on the other hand, how the elements of the human aspect were completely and conclusively recognised; and on the basis of these presuppositions, to proceed to our further Christological work.

to each other. Hence we find that all the principal heresies of an earlier period were revived ; be it that they proceeded forth from, or were set loose by it. In a kind of rapid recapitulation, they reappeared for a moment on the stage of the Church, serving the purpose of ripening its judgment in all directions ; but themselves sinking quickly again into oblivion, and losing all their former seductive power, as soon as they had fulfilled their mission.

These struggles took place principally between three factors : *firstly*, the Arian school ; *secondly*, the newly revived Sabellian school, with the new form of Ebionism ; *thirdly*, the Church and its tendency. One section of the first-mentioned school, the Semi-Arians, an unsteady and bustling party, were in a special degree the life of the movement ; and after they had stoutly overcome Sabellianism and Ebionism, embodied in themselves on a large scale, the tendency towards the doctrine of the Nicene Council. In their own system, with its undecided character, and inability to offer serious resistance, religion and science were in conflict ; but the more advanced Arians pressed them to a decision ; and having once allowed their interest in Christianity to predominate over other considerations, this inner approximation to the great Church teachers of the time, gave their system also by degrees a firmer hold.

As far as concerns the Arians proper, their number always was relatively small ; for, without truly satisfying the intellect, or advancing beyond the dualism between God and the world, they inflicted a death-blow on christianly religious interests. Hence they gained admission and acquired importance, solely either where they were favoured by external combinations, or where they resorted to reserve and accommodation, or even made concessions. Small as this party or school was, as the nature of the case would lead us to expect, its influence on the further development of the dogma of the Trinity was by no means insignificant, nor did it lack important representatives.¹

Above all, mention must be made of Aëtius and Eunomius, both of whom lived in Antioch ; the former a physician and theological writer, the latter deacon.²

¹ The strict Arians were designated 'Εξουονόμοι, 'Ανόμοιοι, or, after their chiefs, Aëtians and Eunomians, also Eudoxians.

² Compare Lange's "Der Arianismus in seiner weitem Entwicklung,"

Neither of them followed out further that ethical principle which, as held by Arians, would lead back to Ebionism; on the contrary, so far as we are informed, Ætius was principally occupied in confuting the equality of essence and the coeternality of the Son with the Father, whereas Eunomius directed his efforts to the development of Arianism as a doctrinal system. In their polemical works, both start with the conception of God as the abstractly simple Being, of whom neither self-communication nor generation can be predicated. God Himself is, in their view, nothing but this absolute simplicity,—Being, in the absolute sense. They regarded it as the most sublime and lofty, but also as the indispensable, predicate of God; and therefore they identified this primal simplicity, which is neither derived from another being, nor can generate another being out of itself, with the essence of God in general. Accordingly, adopting the style of the Church, they taught,—The Father is, as all allow, *ἀγέννητος*; nay more, the Father is the *ἀγέννητον* in God. But this *ἀγέννητον* is absolute Being, or the strict and proper essence of God; consequently, the Father, who alone is unbegotten, is also, in the strict sense, alone God. And as He cannot have been derived along with the Son from another source, for then He would no longer be unbegotten; so also can He not generate the Son, for then He would not be the unbegotten, simple one, but God would be divided into a begotten and unbegotten one. The *ἀγέννητον* excludes parts and division, difference and composition; but it is neither a mere subjective notion, nor the bare negation of generation, but something positive and objective. This positive something is the absolute *self-relatedness* (*Bezo-genheit auf sich*), absolute selfsameness or simplicity, which needs only to be made the object of thought to exclude all generation; because generation necessarily involves the diremp-

in Illgen's *Zeitschrift* 5, 1, and Klose's "Geschichte und Lehre des Eunomius," Kiel 1833. With special love, but also with his usual disfavour towards the Church, is this portion of the History of Dogmas treated by Baur, l. c. pp. 361-394; with skill and happy insight by Meyer, in his "Trinitätslehre," pp. 175 ff. Of Eunomius himself, there belong to this connection his Apology (Fabr. Bibl. gr. vol. 8), and the "Ἐκθεσις πίστεως in Socr. 5, 10. Against him Basilus wrote the 'Ἀντιβήτικὸς κατὰ δυσσεβῶς Εὐνομίου; and Gregory of Nyssa replied to the response of Eunomius in 12 books, entitled 'Ἀντιβήτικοι πρὸς Εὐνομίου λόγοι 12. For notices of Ætius, see Epiph. Hær. 76, and the first Book of Gregory, c. 6.

tion, the division, of the absolutely simple. The causal relation, which the Arian school so stoutly defended in opposition to Sabellianism (see above), is therefore not applied directly to God in Himself, as though His absolute Being were regarded as an eternal volition or grounding of His own existence; but the fundamental presupposition is, that God can only be said to Be, and that He is absolutely identical with Himself.¹ If God abides unceasingly in His unbegotten essence, and that which is begotten continues ever begotten, the notion of equality of substance or of similarity is plainly untenable. For as long as the two beings continue what they are, so long is it impossible to institute a comparison between their essence. And as their being, so also is their knowledge of themselves, totally different. Each of the two knows Himself, when He knows Himself at all, as He is, and not as the other:—the one knows Himself as ungenerated, the other as generated. Were Father and Son equal, as the Church teaches, the Son also must be unbegotten; and what would then become of the doctrine of His generation, or of His distinction? Eunomius therefore requires of the doctrine of the Church, *either*, that it exclude every species of subordination, even that which is involved in the one being unbegotten and the other begotten; in which case, it would soon be seen whether, in returning to the one God, all distinctions between Father and Son must not be allowed to fall to the ground; *or*, that it take the subordination seriously, as do the Arians, and represent the one unbegotten One as unbegotten, absolutely simple, and therefore incapable of generating anything out of His essence, and place the Son in the class of creatures. What, asks he, could the unbegotten One take out of His essence, except that which is unbegotten? But according to the doctrine of the Church, inasmuch as the Son is conceived to be on the one hand begotten, and yet on the other hand, to spring from the essence of God, there must be both a begotten and an unbegotten element in God. The Church has undoubtedly its meaning, said they, when it teaches that God is to be conceived

¹ Thus Aëtius says, in No. 5 of the *Ἐπιχρήματα* (see Epiph. hær. 76).—"If God has not given Himself being, not because of any weakness of nature, but because He is exalted above all causality (above being caused), how can a being that is generated reach up to His essential unchangeableness?" Compare No. 2.

as the cause of Himself ; but that lies beyond our horizon ; for we regard abstract simplicity as the ultimate and highest in God. Better, says Aëtius naively, is the unbegotten than the begotten ; for the former has in itself the advantages which the latter has outside of itself. That which is unbegotten, Eunomius goes on to say, cannot possibly resemble the essence of that which is begotten ; the unbegotten is unbegotten, and that is its essence : if then the begotten resembles the unbegotten in its essence, it also must be unbegotten.¹

Without doubt, Eunomius was quite right in maintaining, that if God in Himself is merely the one simple Being, which, being absolutely without distinctions, stands related solely to itself, there is no place for distinctions in God, and therefore none for a Son. But that is a mere tautological proposition, and the answer is simply,—Such an idea of God is incogitable and false, appropriate to Deism and Judaism, but not to Christianity. We shall find also that the teachers of the Church met them with a different conception of God, and thus cut away the very roots of Arianism. At the same time, it cannot be denied that these Arians had actually hit upon the weak point in the dogmatical system of their opponents. When, in opposition to the Son who is generated, the Father is said to be ungenerated, the Father must be deemed identical with the *θεός*, with the divine essence in general, if aseity were thus meant to be predicated of the Father alone, and, after the example of older writers, they did not go on to say that the Father is as truly constituted Father by the Son, as the Son is constituted Son by the Father. So long as it was deemed necessary to the preservation of the unity of the Trinity to represent the one Father as the source, not merely of the hypostasis, but also of the deity, of the others ; and so long as the Son was not most distinctly conceded a participation in the aseity of the divine substance ; so long was He not freed from subordination, notwithstanding its being called for by the ideas of His equality of essence and eternal generation. If, however, the Son be allowed to participate in aseity, the passivity, which the Arians were never weary

¹ Besides, Eunomius persists in asserting that Sonship and generation imply a beginning ; that they are consequently incompatible with the predicate of eternity ; and that the predicate of eternity would involve the Son's being unbegotten.

of asserting to be necessarily characteristic of generation, must be decidedly excluded from the generated, and the Son be rather constituted a living momentum of the self-causative God, and thus the Trinity be introduced into that inmost root of the deity, the aseity. The bases thereof were laid even in the fourth century ; but they had not yet been plainly and completely carried out. So much the more instructive is it, therefore, to see how the defenders of the view, that God is abstract simplicity, fall into contradiction with themselves, and thus give negative testimony in favour of the very tendency which they were engaged in combating.

The incomparable (*ἀσύγκριτος*), self-sufficient, simple, unapproachable (*ἀπρόσιτος*) God, who is exalted above every cause, whether in or out of Himself, must not be represented as entirely alone, nor the world as without its cause. But to represent God as the cause of the world, and yet to maintain that the world is characterized solely by unlikeness to its Author, is scarcely reconcilable with the idea of the first cause ; and the only resource of Arianism is, to take refuge in the mystery of the creation out of nothing, which nothing it is compelled to describe in an absolutely supernatural or Docetical manner as the essence of the world (*μη εἶναι*). The following point, however, is still more important. How can the absolutely simple, self-identical God, ever come to create ? Eunomius denies both movement and self-communication to the divine essence, but goes back to the divine will (*ἐνέργεια*), which—as to be distinguished, be it noted, from the divine essence—called into existence out of nothing that which is, and first of all, the Son as the Creator of the world.¹ But to appeal to the will in distinction from the substance—that the Church had a right to do, and availed itself of its privilege when it taught that the world was grounded in the will of God ; but Eunomius was not at liberty to make this distinction between will and essence, unless he ceased to represent God merely as abstract, absolute simplicity, and turned to a more living conception. And then the strength of his opposition to the generation of the Son would have been broken, in so far as he could no longer say that aseity or simplicity constituted the essence of God, was that in Him which is inviolable. The method adopted by Eunomius necessitated his

¹ Compare Gregor. Nyss. adv. Eunom. or. 1.

dissociating the divine will from the divine essence, contrary to his own presupposition, if he meant to arrive at a world. He might, indeed, have described the will in God, as something non-essential, accidental, superadded from without. But being unwilling to do so, he fell into new difficulties. He was compelled to trace not only the active will (*ἐνέργεια*) of God, but also the idea of the world, back to the divine essence, as its original seat. The real and ideal potency of the creation of the world, must surely have been contained eternally in God, as he himself acknowledges;¹ but how could it break loose from the simple essence of God? We see, therefore, that when he abides by the rigid simplicity and self-identity of God, he either arrives at no world at all, or is compelled to assign the actual world a place eternally, and even immediately, in the essence of God; in other words, he unavoidably falls into the very heathenish error which he himself repudiates—that error which is unable to distinguish between the substance and the will of God, and is therefore pantheistic.²

The Son was held to owe His existence, not to the essence, but to the *ἐνέργεια* of God; and the essence not to be in any sense contained in the *ἐνέργεια*. The divine essence, therefore, cannot properly be termed Father; for the essence continues immoveable in its simplicity outside of the *ἐνέργεια*: the *ἐνέργεια* alone can be termed Father, so far as it brings forth the Son. And the Son is not unlike this energy, but is its image and likeness, seeing that He also has the power to create. In this direction, it was possible for him to approximate to the Nicene Creed, and to return to the milder form of the doctrine of Arius; and, in fact, he says, in his Confession of Faith,—“The Son is a creature, but not like other creatures, etc.; and the higher dignity possessed by Him was not solely the reward of His virtue, but, on the contrary, He became God because He was the Son, and as a Son was generated.” Still there is a wide gap between him and Lactantius, who laid down essential deity

¹ Apol. Eunom. c. 24.

² Eunomius does neither the one nor the other, but continues helplessly clinging to the dualism between the finite and the infinite, which, under his hands, forces its way into God Himself:—the dualism, namely, between the essence of God, which is *ἀπείρο* and simple, and the will of God, which relates to finite objects. Gregory, therefore, charges him with Manichæism.

as the starting-point for the ethical. Eunomius, on the contrary, lets the ethical go ; indeed, he lacked real interest as well in the ethical as the religious. (Note 50.)

These Arians, to whom substantially belonged Arcadius also, who tried to make himself out more orthodox than he really was, exercised a special influence on the Semi-Arians (*ἡμιάρητοι*), who bore, besides, the names Eusebians or Homoiusiasts. Overpowered by the force of the arguments brought against their halting and uncertain position, both by the Arians and the Church, and feeling themselves repelled by the former, these Homoiusiasts advanced ever more completely from the doctrine of the similarity to that of the identity of essence. Athanasius aptly met them with the consideration, that similarity can only be spoken of in relation to qualities, not to the essence by itself ; for the essence must either be the same or not the same. And so also, the Arians urged, if God or the Father is the ungenerated One, everything outside of Him must belong to the class of generated things ; if to be ungenerated is the essence of the Father, to be generated must be the essence of everything outside of Him ; consequently, the essence of the latter is the antithesis of the former, and completely dissimilar, not similar, to it. In fact, the Semi-Arians displayed little power of resistance and little productiveness : they belong rather to the general history of the Church than to the history of Dogmas ; and, in consideration of this circumstance, or, in other words, in consideration of their interest in religion, might with greater justice be termed Semi-Nicenes than Semi-Arians.

For a long period they did not advance beyond the doctrinal position held by Eusebius of Cæsarea (see above) ; and the various formulæ adopted by them bore essentially the same stamp, until the Synod of Ancyra, in the year 358, distinctly asserted the Son not to be a created being, and taught that He was begotten of the substance of the Father. Athanasius now recognised them as brethren ; and the doctrine of Cyrill of Jerusalem, who also acknowledged the Son to be coeternal with the Father, is scarcely distinguishable from the Nicene Creed. (Note 51.) Apart from external circumstances, they had a hold only so long as the authors of the Nicene Creed could be supposed to have inclined towards Sabellianism. This supposition was strengthened during the first twenty or thirty years after the Council

of Nicæa, by the conduct of Marcellus, who was one of its adherents; and against him, rather than against the Council itself, were their weapons directed, especially those of Eusebius of Cæsarea. After having convinced themselves that those who taught the *ὁμοούσιον* were not Sabellian, they gained an ever clearer insight into the untenableness of their own position, and consequently passed more completely over to the party of the Nicene Council.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE REVIVAL OF SABELLIANISM, AND THE EBIONISM WHICH SPRANG FROM IT.

MARCELLUS of Ancyra had stood in the foremost ranks of the antagonists of Arianism,—a circumstance which spoke in his favour at Rome longer than it ought to have done. (Note 52.) A short time after the Nicene Council, however, when he became aware of the strength of the party which, whilst conceding to the Son divine essence and eternal generation, yet, in perfect agreement with Eusebius of Cæsarea, assigned to the Father the first, to the Son the second place, and in many other respects subordinated the latter; and further, when he found that Arianism derived great support from this vacillation, he opened a campaign in a great work, especially against this middle tendency. At the same time, he attacked also older writers, such as Origen; but he particularly assailed the strong Oriental party, which consisted of the two Eusebiuses, Paulinus, and others, whom he also expressly mentions, although he pretended that Asterius was the proper occasion of the work (compare adv. Marcell. 1, 4, p. 27). They cannot, said he, maintain the divine unity, if they regard the Son as actually God; for by making Him a distinct personality, outside of God, they rend the divine essence; but if they assert the divine unity, they deprive the Son of deity by subordinating Him. So far, therefore, Marcellus was at one with the Arians; the Semi-Arians could not continue in their vacillating position. But he goes beyond the Nicene Council when, with a view to destroying in its very

roots the Arian separation between Father and Son, he believed it necessary to subject to examination, and to cast aside, all points on which those were accustomed to lay stress, who maintained a distinction between Father and Son. These are the ideas of *generation*, *Sonship* (in the place of which he wished to substitute "procession of the Logos," Eccl. Theol. 2, 8), *image*, *visibility*, which were applied by the Fathers of Nicæa to the Logos. The Semi-Arian party in particular took pleasure in calling the Son the image of the Father; so also Asterius. But they drew the conclusion, that so certainly as the image is different from, and inferior to, that which it represents, even so certainly must the Son occupy a lower position than the Father. Further, the Father is absolutely exalted above the world, invisible; the Son, on the contrary, in virtue of His relationship with the world, is characterized by visibility, and therefore appeared under the Old Testament; finally, Sonship and generation subordinate the Son as an effect to its cause. In order to evade these objections, Marcellus endeavoured to limit all these expressions, which even the Fathers of Nicæa had referred to the higher aspect of Christ's Person, to the human aspect, or to the person in its unity and totality; thus hoping the more certainly to exclude every element which could prove of advantage to the Arians. Hence he says,—Not the Logos is termed the image of God, but the God-man; for otherwise the Arians would unquestionably be justified in subordinating the Logos to God, and denying to Him true divinity. The Logos, who is invisible like God, first became the visible image of God when He assumed the man Jesus, and in Him humanity, which is the image and likeness of God. Thus also the Logos first became Son through the humanity which He assumed. Christ usually styles Himself Son of man, and this is to be carefully noted (Eccl. Theol. 1, 16): He first became Son of God by becoming Son of man, or man; for the Logos caused the man whom He assumed and completed to be exalted to the rank of Son of God.¹ The passages in the Old Testament, otherwise referred to the pre-existence of the Son, he described as prophetic anticipations of that which should come with the incarnation; hence also he treated Prov. viii. as a prophecy, and counted

¹ Compare adv. Marc. 1, 4, pp. 20, 24 (Ed. Paris, 1628), 2, 3, pp. 43, 46.

Solomon amongst the prophets.¹ When Wisdom says, "I was set up from the beginning of the world," he referred it to that divine purpose of incarnation through which the Logos first received a sort of existence outside of God as the Son of God. The idea of generation also would remove the Logos outside of, and subordinate Him to, God. He therefore justifies the Arians in asserting that the Nicene Fathers cannot maintain their point of view, unless they call the Son ungenerated, and therefore eternal like God; but accepts without hesitation the consequence threatened by the Arians, and avows his belief in a Logos, who is unbegotten, eternally united with the Father, coeternal with, consequently in no sense subordinate to, but also not discriminated from Him (adv. Marc. 2, 1, p. 32). The Logos, in his view (adv. Marc. 2, 2, pp. 35 f.), is equivalent to Pneuma, as he endeavours to prove by a comparison of the prologue to the Gospel of John with the Synoptics; but Pneuma is equivalent to God, for God is a Spirit: the Logos, therefore, is simply God Himself—conceived, namely, in activity.

We have directed attention above to the great significance attached to the words, Son, generation, etc., since Tertullian's time; and to the circumstance, that in the third century the doctrine of the Logos taught during the second century was cast into the shade, by the hypostatical element denoted by the word Son. We have seen also, that the Sonship continued to be marked by subordination, so long as it had not found a place in the eternal essence of God Himself. Now Marcellus, who took the doctrine of the Church as his point of departure, stands before us as the embodiment of the despair of solving the problem, how the eternal Logos can be at the same time designated the eternal Son. If we suppose the Son to have a place in the inner sphere of the divine nature, He must be unbegotten, like the Father, and then He is no longer Son. There is therefore no alternative but to renounce the idea of a Son, both as far as affects the inner essence of God (in which there is room for identity of essence, but not for a distinct hypostasis), and also for the period preceding the creation of the world. The renun-

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 3, pp. 44 f.; Eccl. Theol. 3, 2, p. 154; adv. Marc. 2, 1, p. 32:—*Μήτις εἶναι, μήτι προϋφιστάναι, μήτι ὅλως πάντοτε υἱὸν ὑπάρξει τῷ Θεῷ, πρὸ τοῦ τεχθῆναι διὰ τῆς παρθένου δοξαζῶν αὐτὸν δι' ὅλον εἶναι λόγον φάσκον.*

ciation of the idea in this latter respect leads of itself to the subordination of the Son, as is abundantly clear from the history of the third century.

But by thus letting go the fruit of the struggles of the third century, namely, the idea of "Sonship," and going back on the mere Logos, the entire system was at once altered. Out of regard, however, for the full deity of the Son, in the sense in which he still conceded Him an existence, namely, to the deity of the God-man, he totally denied His hypostatical pre-existence; for only in this way did it seem possible to him to ascribe full deity to the Son, to preserve His equality with the Father. As he constantly repeated,—Before the incarnation there was no Son, but merely the Logos; so also did he go on to say,—Prior to the creation God alone existed.¹ God abode in Himself, keeping silence; besides Him was merely the Nothing. But out of nothing, God purposed to create the world. He carried the idea thereof in Himself, but the idea lacked actuality. The world was conceived, and also named (or more correctly, "prepared," *ἐτοιμάζων*, according to Eccl. Theol. 2, 8, p. 113, to be read for *ὀνομάζων*, adv. Marc. 2, 2, p. 41), by God through the Logos, who was in Him. For He was ever reason, and always spake within Himself. But in order that the world might become an actuality, He gave utterance to the creative word; and this was the procession of the creative omnipotence of God, in which wisdom also is inherent, or the procession of the Logos, as the *ἐνέργεια δραστηκὴ πράξεως* of God.² With men also the ordering, commanding word is that by which they accomplish most of their works. This word is, on the one hand, distinguished from God at rest and silent; on the other hand, however, united with Him; both together constitute the complete conception of God. Marcellus was quite aware how closely he thus approximated to Sabellianism; but he expressly blamed Sabellius both for his lack of insight into the significance

¹ For example, adv. Marc. 2, 1, p. 32. The consequence of applying the word Son to the Logos, Marcellus supposed, were sensuous representations of God. Adv. Marc. 1, 4; Eccl. Theol. 2, 8.

Adv. Marc. 2, 2, p. 39. Prior to the world, *οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πλὴν Θεοῦ μόνον*. The Logos alone first *δυναμίει* in the Father, and absolutely one with Him (ib. p. 37), *οἷος ἃν εἴη ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ λόγος*.

² Also *λόγος ἐνέργος*. Compare Eccl. Theol. 2, 9. 15. p. 125; adv. Marc. 2, 2. p. 41; Eccl. Theol. 3, 3. p. 166.

of the term, and for not having the right conception of God.

It must be allowed that there is an important difference between Marcellus and Sabellius. Marcellus decidedly maintains a creation out of nothing,¹ and imports into God Himself a *κόσμος νοητός*, reason and the potency of the Logos; whereas Sabellius gives a more substantial and physical representation of the process. Marcellus had also appropriated the category of absolute causality, of which Arius made such vigorous use, and had engrafted it on the principle of Sabellianism as far as concerned the relation of God to the world.

Still, Eusebius was probably right in characterizing his doctrine of the Trinity as Sabellian.² We see this especially from the mode in which Marcellus explains the words, "Let us make man." Instead of regarding them as addressed to the Son, as did the Fathers of Nicæa, he explains them as follows:—Even an human artist, when all lies ready, and he is just about to commence his work, may say, Let us make the picture. In such a sense did God speak these words to Himself. One might, indeed, suppose for a moment that the idea of a distinction in God was not hereby completely cast aside; but had merely passed over into that of the divine self-diremption, which frequently recurs at a later period, and which was supposed to constitute the divine self-consciousness. In favour of which might also be pleaded, that he, notwithstanding, assigned to reason an eternal place in God. This, however, cannot be carried out; for, firstly, nothing whatever is said regarding the Holy Ghost in the silent God; secondly, Marcellus would then

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 2. p. 39; de eccl. theol. 2, 15. p. 125. But still we find him also employing the expression, "The Monas expanded itself into a Trias." De eccl. theol. 3, 4: ἀπορρήτῳ λόγῳ ἡ μονὰς φαίνεται πλατυνομένη μὲν εἰς τριάδα, διαιριῖσθαι δὲ μηδαμῶς ὑπομένουσα. In conjunction with which, however, must be taken c. Marc. 2, 2, according to which the expansion of the Monas related not to it itself, but merely to the *ἐνέργεια* of the *θεότης*; whereas the Monas continues indissolubly one (*ἐνέργειά ἡ θεότης μὴ πλατύνεσθαι δοκῇ*).

² Eccl. theol. 1, 1. 15. pp. 76 f., c. 17 p. 79; adv. Marc. 2, 2. pp. 39, 40: The Logos is not an angel or other being outside of God; not even in the revelation, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον δυνάμει καὶ ὑποστάσει χωρῖσαι τοῖς δυνατόν· ἢ γὰρ ἵστι καὶ ταῦτόν τῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐδενὶ χωριζόμενος ἴδιον, ἢ μόνῃ τῇ τῆς πράξεως ἐνέργειᾳ.

have a double Trinity, an immanent and an œconomic one :—of which no evidence can be adduced. He evidently conceived the *ἐνέργεια δραστική*, so far as it accomplished its highest work in the incarnation, as the second momentum of the Trinity ; and, so far as the Holy Ghost proceeds from the God-man, he aimed at representing the third momentum as a branch of the second (Eccl. theol. 3, 4. p. 168). Finally, the distinction he draws is by no means between a speaking and a spoken, but between a speaking and a silent God. The speaking God is his *ἐνέργεια δραστική*, which constantly dwells in, and remains inseparable from, God, and bears within itself the divine power and wisdom. The silent or resting (*ἡσυχάζων*) God, on the contrary, is God in His inner fulness and glory, corresponding to the Father ; even as the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* has the Son for its goal, carries within itself the principle of the incarnation, and, as it were, attains to and satisfies itself in the effect produced, when it brings forth Him in accordance with whose idea all things were created from the beginning. For this reason, Baur's conjecture, that Marcellus tried to draw between the Father and the Son some such distinction as that between being and thought, is untenable ; for there can be no doubt that he regarded the silent God as identical with the Father, and believed the latter to have in Himself all fulness, with reason and thought. Marcellus was necessitated, it is true, to regard speaking and thought as still one in the inner essence of God ; but for this very reason, speaking, in the strict sense of the term, had as yet no existence. The God who merely thinks is primarily silent, and silent alone ; contrasted with whom is the Speaking One, the *λόγος*. This silent one is the Father ; the Logos, so far as He does not yet speak, must, according to the fundamental view of Marcellus, be simply identified with the Father, who is also designated the One who is (*der Seyende*), though not in the sense of His not being able to think. Undoubtedly, the principle of the speaking God, the Logos, must also be contained in God ; and in this aspect, one might say that the speaking God is the *λόγος προφορικὸς*, and that this *λόγος* is *in* God *ἐνδιάθετος* (Klose, p. 29). This distinction, however, we do not find that Marcellus drew ; still less did he distinguish in the inner divine essence between being and self-consciousness ; but the *Ὄν* itself Marcellus conceives to contain the divine fulness, to which be-

long also reason and thought. He does not teach a preformation of the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* in the inner divine essence, but is accustomed to look upon the silent God monadically, or as the *ὦν*; and not till he comes to the speaking God (the *ἐνέργεια δραστική*) does he refer to the Church doctrine touching the Son. Still less, as is clear from what has been advanced, are we warranted in representing him as teaching that Father, Son, and Spirit are three persons of the Monas, completely co-ordinated with one another (as Klose does; see pp. 27 f.), and so co-ordinated, that the Son (and the Spirit also?) is not derived from, but united with (*ἡνωμένος, συνημένος*), the Father as an equally independent *ἀρχή* (or, if we include the Holy Spirit, *ἀρχαί*). In opposition to this view stands Marcellus' conception of God as the *ὦν*, of the Monas which admits of no *διαίρεσις*, and the series of passages (Klose, pp. 27 f.) in which he lays stress on the unity of God, after the manner of the Monarchians. Nowhere does he attempt to reduce back the Trias, taught by him, to the Monas; and he could scarcely have avoided doing this had he held the Trias to consist of eternal hypostases in God.

The incarnation he considered to have been undertaken on account of the sin and necessities of men, and on no other ground; but he can only assign even to Christ the transitory position of a means to another end. "Who was worthy," says he, "amongst righteous men and angels to take away the punishment suspended by God over men? No other being but the Logos, who was with the Father, and who created along with Him, and to whom God said, Let us make men in our image and likeness" (adv. Marc. 2, 2. pp. 40, 41). "Not to seek or to find anything for Himself, but purely on our account, did He become man,¹ in order to set forth him who had been vanquished by the devil, as the devil's conqueror. For this reason He took man upon Himself, in order to bestow on him the first fruits of His power. Now, this man who is united with the Word is the beloved one. His purpose was to battle with the devil in human flesh; and to render man not only imperishable and immortal, but also to set him on a throne in heaven with

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 3, 4, pp. 48 ff: Οὐχ ἵν' ὁ λόγος ὠφεληθῇ, τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀνείληψι σάρκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἡ σὰρξ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον κοινωνίαν ἀθανάσιας τίνῃ.

God. In His immeasurable goodness, He purposed not only to free man from bondage, death, and perishableness, but also to confer upon him a glory which transcends man (*τῆς ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου δόξης*). Fallen man, who had lost the kingdom, was meant by God's will to become Lord and God; and, therefore, the method of salvation was devised. When the Logos came in human flesh, and became King, man, who was previously abased, destroyed all the power and might of the devil." "What greater glory," he exclaims, "can be conferred on man than this glory! Fallen man He has counted worthy to be united with His Logos, through the Virgin" (*συναφθῆναι*, l. c. p. 48, c. 3). "Let not Asterius be surprised that something which is younger than the body (that is, the divine Sonship of Christ, which was the result of the incarnation) should attain to the dignity of being regarded as the eldest. For in that the Logos thought fit to take upon Himself, out of the pure Virgin, humanity, although younger, and therewith to conjoin His own nature (*ἐνώσας*), He not only constituted the man created in Him the first-born of all creation, but wills also that he be the principle of everything which is in heaven and upon earth." What he means to say is, that Christ, although later in point of time, was, as the idea and operative principle, the earlier; even as the final aim, though later in point of appearance, is the first in point of idea. In Him humanity attained its completion. At this point one would expect Marcellus to introduce the doctrine of the eternal duration of the person and kingdom of Christ; why he did not do so, we shall soon see. On account of His humanity, therefore, Christ is termed the First-born of all creation, and not as though He had been begotten prior thereto. For how could He who had always existed be the first-born of another? On the contrary, the first-born is the new man, in whom God purposed to sum up all things. (*Πρωτότοκος οὖν πάσης κτίσεως διὰ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα γένεσιν ὠνομάσθη, οὐ διὰ τὴν πρώτην, ὡς αὐτοὶ οἰοῦνται κτίσιν. . . . τὸν πρῶτον καινὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰς ὃν τὰ πάντα ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι ἐβουλήθη ὁ Θεὸς, τοῦτον αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ πρωτότοκον πάσης ὀνομάζουσι κτίσεως*: l. c. p. 43.)¹

But what is Marcellus' conception of the incarnation, when he endeavours to describe it more precisely? The body was a

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 3, p. 44.

truly human body, and consequently, like all things else, in the last instance, created out of nothing. In so far, therefore, the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* of God, or His Word, held precisely the same relation to this man as to other things in the world. But with this man (*σὰρξ*), the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* was connected in a peculiar manner. For, whereas generally it remains outside of the objects which are brought into existence by its command, it dwells in His *σὰρξ*; the action of God was, as it were, fixed, so long as the purpose in view required it. The divine *ἐνέργεια*, says he, expanded itself as far as, and into, this man, laying hold on, assuming, and uniting itself with him. Henceforth this divine *ἐνέργεια* was the motive, the active principle of the body.¹ Marcellus was thus able to assign to the God-man a distinctive position; for, whereas the divine activity does not fill, and is merely present with, so far as it outwardly works upon, other things, it filled Christ with its presence, and had an existence in Him.

But, even on this view of the matter, the divine in Christ cannot be described as a peculiar hypostasis different from the Father. The operative Word, when it extends itself into the humanity of Christ, is not personal in itself; personal alone is the Father in His entirety, and He, as Father, keeps silence; and if He also, like the Word, is immanent, we cannot suppose that Marcellus conceived the entire divine *ἐνέργεια*, which was fixed in the man Jesus, to have been included in Him. For humanity appeared to him absolutely incapable of being the suitable organ of God.² Here, therefore, we find occurring again what we have noticed at an earlier period, namely, that

¹ L. c. 2, 4, p. 54: *Δραστικῇ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνῃ τῇ σαρκὶ συνὼν τοῦ κινεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ πράττειν, ὥσαυτε ἐν εὐαγγελίοις φέρεται, οὐσίᾳ τῷ Θεῷ συνηπτο, οἷα λόγος ὑπάρχων αὐτοῦ ἀχώριστος καὶ ἀδιάστατος.* For this reason, also, he magnifies in forcible terms the greatness and novelty of the mystery revealed in Christ. De eccl. theol. 3, 3, p. 157: *Τίς γὰρ πρὸ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποδείξεως ἠπίστανται ἂν, ὅτι λόγος Θεοῦ, διὰ παρθένου τοιχοῖς τῆν ἡμετέραν ἀναλήψεται σάρκα, καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν θείτητα ἐν αὐτῇ σωματικῶς ἐκιδέσεται.* The flesh assumed by Him had not previously existed: the Lord our God created it, the Creator of the *μὴ ὄν*. Adv. Marc. 2, 3, p. 45; 2, 2, p. 40: *Τί γὰρ ἴτερον ἢ ἀποκεκρυμμένον μυστήριον, ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον; οὕτω δὲ ἢ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τουτί πρότερον τὸ μυστήριον, ὥστε μηδὲν τοῦ προτέρου λαοῦ σαφῶς τὰ κατὰ λόγον εἶδέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τοῦ πλοῦτου τῆς δόξης καὶ τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου μυστηρίου ἀπολαύειν νυνί.*

² Adv. Marc. 2, 4, p. 52: If any one suppose, *τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σάρκα*

the God-man is represented as owing His personality to the limit, the circumscription, the negation, added by the humanity to the divine *ἐνέργεια*, which continues the positive element, though not hypostatical in itself. Marcellus, it is true, did not by any means consider the hypostasis of the God-man to have been grounded in an human Ego, and a positive finite principle; but looked upon the circumstance, that so long as the Logos dwelt in, and was encompassed by, the humanity of Christ, He had a certain existence of His own outside of God, and was so far a kind of hypostasis, not as an advantage possessed by, but as a defect of, the person of the God-man, as part of His humiliation.¹

Not merely the earthly form of His humanity, therefore, but His being a man at all, he necessarily counts part of His humiliation, which, as such, could not be permanent. With some degree of acuteness, he argues as follows (adv. Marc. 2, 4): If the Logos had become man for His own sake, to seek something for Himself, or if He Himself could have profited anything by His humanity, it would be conceivable that His humanity should abide for ever. But as it was pure love which moved Him to condescend to appear in the form of a servant—that form in which we are not completely united with God; and as, on the other hand, His work for us will terminate at the judgment; it would be erroneous to suppose that His humanity will abide eternally. By His incarnation, the Logos subjected Himself to a limit and form inadequate to His true essence. He was extruded from God, it is true, merely *ἐνέργεια*, but still this is not a small matter; and the distinction between God and Him became to a certain extent an actuality, through the humanity which He assumed. The God-man spake: “I do not *Mine own* will, but the will of My Father.” And in Gethsemane, the harmony (*συμφωνία*) between the will of Christ and that of God was dissolved for a moment, though *ἀξίαν εἶναι τοῦ λόγου*, at all events, the *σάρξ* which rose again, let him know, *ὅτι οὐ πᾶν, ὑπερ ἀθάνατον, τοῦτο ἀξίον Θεοῦ· μίζων γὰρ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀθανασίας ὁ Θεός*.

¹ Ibid. p. 51: *Κεχωρῆσθαι* (leg. *κεχωρίσθαι*) τοῦ πατρὸς φαίνεται προφάσει *σικρός*. Eccl. theol. 3, 13, p. 181: *ἐνέργειᾳ μόνῃ χωρίζειν αὐτὸν δοκῶν*. Adv. Marc. 2, 4: *Πῶς ἔστι τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφὴν ἣν ἀνέληφεν ὁ λόγος, μορφὴν οὐσαν δούλου συνεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν*; God, or at all events His *ἐνέργεια*, is passive under the limitation: a remnant of Patripassianism.

without sin.¹ Must the Logos, then, be supposed to be eternally saddled with this humanity, which is inadequate to Him, and to the assumption of which love alone moved Him to humble Himself? By no means. Were such the case, not even He Himself could ever be said to be perfect; on the contrary, He would for ever fall short of His idea. He must needs, therefore, become again that which He previously was. One might suppose, indeed, that the humanity of Christ could be so glorified as to be worthy of, and adequate to, the eternal indwelling of the deity, of the Logos. But even though the humanity should be made immortal and imperishable, the deity would continue infinitely exalted above it. And, further, what end would the eternity of the humanity of Christ serve, even relatively to us? Christ Himself said, "It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." Accordingly, the humanity of the Logos and its regiment will continue so long as the work of redemption lasts, and the victory begun therein is not fully completed. The goal, however, once gained, the consummation of things will demand that the Logos return into God, and become that which He previously was (adv. Marc. 2, 4, p. 53: *ἵνα οὕτως ἢ ἐν Θεῷ ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ἦν*); but the body must be emptied of the Logos, or laid aside (*ἐρημον εἶσεσθαι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Λόγου*, l. c. c. 2-4).²

Looking at the high position Marcellus had assigned to the God-man, to wit, the position of the crown of humanity, we should deem Him fitted for something better than a mere transitory means. And yet he was compelled at last to regard Him in the latter light. On the one hand, Marcellus considered the destiny of man in general to be perfect union with God (c. Marc. 2, 2, pp. 40 ff.); and the incarnation was in his eyes so great a thing, because the God-man and His fate were the solution of the problem, the beginning of the perfection of humanity. But, on the other hand, humanity contradicts full union with God; it has something in it essentially inadequate to God, which, so long as it exists at all, cannot be abolished. For this reason, the perfect man, the God-man, must needs

¹ Adv. Marc. 1, 4, pp. 28 f.; 2, 2, pp. 37, 39.

² Compare adv. Marc. 2, 3 and 4; Eccl. Theol. 3, 12-14, pp. 180 f. He denies, therefore, the eternal pre-existence and post-existence of the Son, and limits His existence to the middle period.

return out of the other form of existence which He had assumed, into identity with God, and cease to be man, in order that He may be made perfect. This was necessary, further, in order that He may go before us in the process through which we too are destined to pass. We also can only attain to perfection by being raised above ourselves (l. c. p. 42), in order that God may be all in all. The conclusion, therefore, is unavoidable, that our humanity, too, must cease to be, in order that God alone may be. At this point, Origen's opponent becomes almost more Origenistic than Origen himself. He remarks,—If at the time of the universal ἀποκατάστασις, according to Paul, even creation itself is to be converted into freedom, will not the servant's form which the Logos assumed, be by its very idea unsuitable to Him? (Euseb. Eccl. Theol. 3, 19.) From this passage, as also from the view given by Marcellus of the relation between the human and the divine, we may conclude with certainty, that finitude in general was, in his eyes, equivalent to bondage and the form of a servant; that, consequently, if the world is destined to attain to freedom, which is its goal (as he often asserts),¹ it also, as well as Christ, its Captain, must cast aside the servant's form; or, in other words, humanity must be abolished, and be transferred or transformed into the divine essence.²

We see, therefore, that Marcellus separates the divine and human in the same abstract way as the Arians; and the conclusion to be drawn also is substantially the same, to wit, that the one member of the antithesis excludes the other. Those Arians whose tendency was predominantly empirical, and who lacked, so to speak, both practical and theoretical piety, really represented man as the Highest, as the concrete and living Divine, whilst they reduced the personal God to a bare abstract unity. Marcellus, on the contrary, in consequence of his more religious and speculative tendencies, arrived at the conclusion, that, in the last instance, God alone will exist. The God of the Arians is purely envious; but man, notwithstanding, took care of himself, by setting himself substantially in the place of God. The God of Marcellus is good and communicative; but, because He is represented as only communicative (His communication is effected through the medium of the plan of sal-

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 4, p. 52.

² Adv. Marc. 2, 3, pp. 44, 47.

vation),—in such a sense, too, that nothing permanent, nothing good, can be allowed to pertain to the first creation,—the continuity of the communications of the divine life leaves no room for any distinction whatever; in order that man may be perfected, God sets Himself in his place; the ἀποκατάστασις does away with the very grounds of the creation; the perfection of the world is its termination; and finally, therefore, the God whose sole work was self-communication, stands as isolated, as worldless, as He was in the beginning. From which it is clear, that, even according to this system, God continues θεῶν φθονερόν, until He allows the world to be distinguished from Himself as a Good, and concedes to it an unity with Himself, which admits of and maintains the distinction. If the divine love has not the ὅρος in itself, it becomes in its very effusion again exclusive, and therefore physical.

And, in point of fact, this exclusiveness shows itself clearly enough in the circumstance, that he continues to view the inmost divine essence as an abstract, simple point, as a silent Monas. Love is not the inmost and highest element in God; nor is that inmost substance ever revealed. He tries to keep God far from all division and separation, by assigning everything outside of Him, not to Himself, but solely to His activity.¹ This activity neither touches nor moves the divine essence in its simplicity; the divine simplicity admits of no distinctions whatever. But, as this simplicity is represented as the highest element, as the very essence, of God, it follows, that the ἐνέργεια δραστηκή, or the will of God in its actuality, can only play on the surface of the divine being. God is not through and through will or living; but in Himself is inactive and rigidly silent; at times, however, He breaks this silence, though we can scarcely attribute it to any necessity of nature. Once again, therefore, as in the case of Eunomius, we find the doctrine of a will, which, on the one hand, has nothing in common with that which constitutes the essence of God (that is, with its simple infinitude, its solitariness), and yet, on the other hand, relates to the finite, which is supposed to be excluded from the divine nature. In this way, the world's existence is at one and the same time posited and made impossible; and both by God, for

¹ Compare Hilarius de Trin. 7, 3-7, pp. 916-919, ed. Maur. The Sabellius to whom he refers in these passages, is in my opinion Marcellus.

the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* is in both cases His. The world alternates between existence and non-existence. But the same contradiction of position and exclusion affects God also, who Himself has an alternating idea: at one time He speaks and works; at another, He returns to silence, absorbs the world into Himself under the pretence of perfecting it, and shuts it out from independent existence. What was necessary, was that that rigid distinction, which afterwards passes over into uniformity, should be given up, and that, instead of the alternation, an inward mediation should be effected between unity and distinction, and that the one should be shown to involve and be contained in the other. This work, however, could never be accomplished so long as attention was devoted solely to the relation of God to the world, and no successful efforts were made, above all, to reconcile the divine unity itself with distinctions.

In the respects just touched upon, the system of Marcellus contains a still unvanquished remnant of Dualism. But it has besides still more objectionable features. If the highest in God is that unity which abides in itself; and if the essence of God takes no part whatever in His productive activity (*ἐνέργεια δραστική*); then, in Christ there dwelt, not the essence, but merely an action of God, fixed in the man Jesus through a longer series of momenta. Marcellus thus diverged, it is true, from the earlier Sabellianism, which conceived God to have converted Himself into the man, even more distinctly than Sabellius himself, who regarded God's self-unfoldment in the Son as an unfolding of the divine essence itself. By this means also, he removed, more completely than Sabellius was able to do, the appearance of a change having been produced in the divine essence by the incarnation. For time and change, the manifold movements, etc., undertaken by the Logos in Christ, affected merely the divine activity, not the divine essence.¹ On this supposition, however, the presence of God in Christ is reduced to a purely dynamical one; not, indeed, as though there had been in Christ merely a divine effect, whilst the power producing the effect remained outside of Him, for both the divine

¹ Only in so far as he allows the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* to be connected with the essence of God, does he fail to exempt it from the movements and changes which the former undergoes.

action and the acting power were in Him. Notwithstanding, the inner essence of God took no part in the incarnation. Nay more, where a more living conception of the omnipresence of God is entertained, where the "*omnipræsentia operativa*" is conceived to involve the "*omnipræsentia essentialis*," there the distinguishing features which Marcellus supposed he was preserving for Christ, fall away of themselves. Nor shall we be able to charge Eusebius with injustice, when we find him objecting,—"*A divine power lived and moved in many men, even before the days of Christ: the new element introduced by Christianity, is the personal indwelling of God.*"¹ Such a personal indwelling, however, Marcellus was unable to concede, because he denied the existence of distinctions in God. A personal God-man, objective to God, appeared to him an essentially imperfect thing; humanity, being inadequate to the divine, must be cast aside ere a perfect union with God can become possible. We arrive, accordingly, at the principle,—It is impossible for the incarnation of God to be a complete one, nor can the union of God and man be thereby brought to pass; both are essentially, physically (*φύσιν*) separated, and can only be united on one condition, that the humanity cease to exist. But so long as the so-called divine Sonship lasted, it was sustained solely by the divine power, by divine action, not by the divine essence. Eunomius also was quite willing to allow the Logos to be as close a resemblance to God as possible, provided only the resemblance were not referred to the essence, but merely to the will of God.

The Ebionism into which this new and refined form of Sabellianism (compare above, p. 150) debouched, occupies in one respect a lower position than Arianism, or even than the Ebionism of the common kind:—to wit, the means which Marcellus represents God as employing for the production of Christ, merely sufficed to exclude the human personality of Christ, and

¹ Adv. Marc. 2, 4. Eusebius raises, also, frequently the very apt objection, that although Marcellus affirms that the Logos is invisible, and that no man can know God, save through Him in His visible state, or in the God-man, he still arrives at no revelation, because he is unable to allow that God had a real existence in the Son; all that he attains to is a hint or a symbol of revelation, a *σημαρτικὴ δύναμις*; for example, Eccl. Theol. 1, 17, 20, p. 90.

to constitute His entire appearance a living theophanic symbol, which continues in existence till the judgment; without, however, on the other hand, advancing beyond the category of the dynamical. In this respect, the system of Marcellus' disciple, Photinus of Sirmium, shows traces of progress.¹

Photinus developed more clearly the Ebionitical consequences of Sabellianism; but he also, after taking his stand on the true and full humanity of Christ, which he only allowed to have been the subject of a divine influence, sought a compensation for the lack of a physical unity between Christ and God, in their moral unity; for which he required no further condition, than the supernatural birth of Christ. From which it follows of itself, that there can no longer be any reason why the man Jesus, crowned and deified for His virtue's sake, should not be eternally King and Lord in His kingdom. (Note 53.)

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE CONFUTATION OF ARIANISM AND SABELLIANISM BY THE GREAT CHURCH TEACHERS OF THE THIRD EPOCH.

WHEN treating of the struggles with Gnosticism, through which the Church had to pass, we found that it had at command an array of able men, who had been raised up to fight its battles and gain its victories; and so now, especially towards the close of the conflict with Arianism, a series of great men was called into existence, distinguished alike for the depth of their Christian life, and their ability for speculative inquiries, who served the Church by their labours, and adorned it by their intellectual and moral eminence. The greatest Fathers of the Church flourished at this period: during the second half of the fourth century, the Patristic literature of the early Church reached its culminating point. To the objections raised by Sabellians and Arians, apt replies flowed forth out of the fulness of the Christian intellect; and the wounds inflicted by opponents,

¹ Compare Athan. de syn. 26; Epiph. Hær. 71; Socr. H. E. 2, 18; Hil. de Trin. 7, 3-7; Fragm. 2, 5, 12; de Synod. c. 38, 39; Marius Mercator Nestorii, serm. 4; Theodoret. hær. fab. 2, 11.

served but to unseal afresh the sources of Christian knowledge, and to cause them to overflow more richly. Arianism, it is true, was soulless, a product of the bare understanding; and, incapable of viewing the matter from the centre, and the parts in their connection with the whole, it clung to the individual and empirical. The positive element which it lays down, or, at all events, leaves standing, is also characterized by abnormality. Not only to minds of the present age, but also to sound reason in general, does an inferior God, a finite, created being which is represented as a creator, appear monstrous, and even superstitious. Furthermore, seeing that, as a system, Arianism has little or nothing to recommend it in itself, and that the human mind would never by itself have arrived at such a monstrous mixture of rational and supernatural elements, it testifies involuntarily to the prior existence of an entirely different faith, which, on the one hand, it has essentially altered, though, on the other hand, it bears clear traces of its influence and impress; in other words, it testifies to the true power of the Christian idea. It stands like a soulless, fantastic ruin, which points to a higher past, and owes its existence to a blundering attempt to coerce the fulness of the primitive Christian idea within the forms of the abstract understanding. In so far, it has a certain resemblance, not only to Socinianism, but also to the older Rationalism of the present day. This latter had no intention of breaking with Christianity; but was willing to allow all that the Scriptures teach regarding Christ to be true in an inferior sense; without perceiving, in its self-deception, that there remained merely a fantastic shell, a soulless, idealess history, which is at once too much and too little. But however untenable Arianism may be as a system, in a scientific point of view; and so certainly as only those whose sole culture is a superficial one of the bare understanding, can regard it as the golden mean between two extremes; in another respect, as we have previously shown, it was a highly important phenomenon; and it was justified in disputing the right of the Church to the principle which is its life, until the Church had refuted the objections brought against it, and reconciled the contradictions, to which its attention was called, by setting forth the empirical and individual in the light of that view of the whole with which it started; and, above all, until it had renounced all connection

with the basis on which both Arianism and Sabellianism rest. That basis is the ante-Christian idea of God, as the unknown, infinite being, which, remaining shut up in the rigid simplicity of its own nature, cannot enter into true fellowship with man, —an idea, whose natural and logical end is either Deism or Pantheism.

We have seen previously (compare the Second Epoch), that during the conflict with the various heathenish and Jewish forms of Gnosticism, the Christian Church acquired its knowledge of the essential attributes or momenta of the idea of God in general. Subsequently to that period, Pantheism and Deism made their appearance in great, though still bungling and inconsequent, forms. Both were far superior to the two older tendencies of Gnosticism and Ebionism, with which they have otherwise so many points of affinity, in so far as they were penetrated by many Christian elements, which, on the one hand, were the source of strength, though, on the other hand, the source of inconsistency and weakness. Both Arianism and Sabellianism appeared to recognise, or at all events to leave untouched, the results at which the Church had previously arrived relatively to the attributes of the idea of God. And yet, in accordance with the experience, that when new and deeper questions are asked, doubt is always thrown for a time on the whole of the principles already recognised, these heresies were destined to make clear, that the Church must either be prepared to lose all that it had gained, or, besides refuting objections, advance on to new results. In point of fact, both Sabellianism and Arianism introduced changes into the doctrine of the divine attributes. In the case of the former, this is quite evident from its older and predominantly physical forms; for it drags down God completely into the physical; it establishes no distinction between God and the world, that can hold its ground; and the very continuity which it posits between the world and God, prevents it taking an ethical view of the latter, prevents it from gaining an insight into that divine love, which, having power over itself, wills the existence of free creatures, and even in the incarnation honours the freedom of humanity. In its later forms, Sabellianism endeavoured, as far as possible, to avoid emanatistic elements; but to the extent to which it succeeded, to that extent did it represent God as abiding in Himself, without communicating His

essence; and His revelation as merely "showing" Him, as mere doctrine;—and the doctrine of a God who does not communicate Himself is meagre, nay more, is manifestly self-contradictory in substance, and therefore fitted to lead the way to the opposed deistical point of view. Deism distinguishes more clearly between God and the world, by substituting, as we have pointed out, the category of causality for that of substantiality :—though, be it observed, this substitution affected merely the relation of God to the world, and by no means His relation to Himself, as the cause of Himself. In the relation of the divine causality to the world, Arianism recognised the following point,—that the effect, if it have a real, and not merely an apparent existence, is neither a momentum of, nor primarily annexed to the cause; but exists outside, and relatively independent thereof; and that a cause is not really a cause, has not really worked, until it gives its effect a being of its own. This relative independence of the effect is then heightened by the introduction of the ethical principle. Arianism, however, in consequence of its deistic character, was not able fully to carry out the category of causality, even in relation to the world, but advanced no further than the first step. It posits, indeed, an activity of the first cause; not, however, on its own account, but merely in so far as is necessary to demonstrate the possibility of a world independent of God; it goes back to a first cause for the commencement, but not for the continuance, of the world. It believed the world, once brought into existence, to possess in itself, in particular, power for the exercise of virtue and the attainment of knowledge. Nay more, from the Arian point of view, a deed of God, an act of divine self-communication, must necessarily have been esteemed a dangerous commingling of God and the world, a threatening of the existence of the latter, and a resumption as it were of the act of creation; for the world owed its independent existence to the fact, that the divine causality posited something outside of God. But herein is involved also, that for Arianism, God must stand in an alien and cold relation to man, that He cannot be *Love*; nor, on the other hand, can the virtue of man be viewed as love, seeing that love cries out for real fellowship. The only ethical element, therefore, that can here be recognised, on the supposition that God and man stand over against each other as personalities, justified in maintaining a kind of exclu-

sive independence of each other, is justice or righteousness, but not love :—the view taken of the ethical, is simply a juridical, a legal one. The very discrimination, therefore, aimed at by Arianism, like the continuity aimed at by Sabellianism, rendered it impossible to retain a hold on the full ethical character of the idea of God. Both alike lost sight of the attribute of divine love, in a rigid conception of God. But if love fail, all other attributes receive at once another significance and position. On this matter, however, it is not necessary further to dwell. In connection with the idea of creation, we may remark further, that when Arianism represents the causality of God merely as one single act, that is, the one act of the production of the Son, who was destined to be the Creator of the world, it has at once too little and too much. The world is deemed too bad for God to have been concerned either in its creation or sustentation; and yet, after it has once been created, it confronts God almost on a footing of equality, in accordance with the category of bare justice. God being supposed to be absolutely immutable, cannot take part in the world any further than is necessary for its attaining an independent existence outside of Him. And yet, to assert Him to have been only once the cause of the world, and to deny that He continues at every moment its cause, is to represent Him as mutable. Nay more, the divine causality also is interrupted, if God is not also the ground of the continuous existence of the world. And if it be incompatible with the divine sublimity or unchangeableness, that God should live in constant activity, a single act, the quitting of His rest even for once, is equally incompatible therewith; and Arianism, therefore, must either deny the existence of the world, or conceive God to be constantly active. This would indeed lead back to Pantheism, if, in characterizing the causality as perennial, the idea of causality itself were given up, instead of acquiring completeness. But so certainly as the idea of a perennial causality destroys the possibility of Deism, even so certain is it that, instead of involving, as some think, the abolition of causality, it is its confirmation and full carrying out. As such, it also confirms and establishes the distinction between God and the world. This it only does, of course, when such a view is taken of the ethical causality of God, or of self-communicating love, as does not involve its passing beyond the category of right and law, without at the same time

constituting that category part of the full ethical idea ; in other words, without assigning to subjective freedom its place as a momentum in the collective process.

The only way to protect the treasures once gained, against the new heresies, and to overcome Pantheism and Deism, was determinately to advance, on the foundations laid, to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ If God is merely self-communicative, without at the same time, and above all things, possessing and maintaining Himself (*sich selbst zu haben und zu halten*), He is selfless and undistinguishable from the world, He is a being which can neither be termed God nor world, because it is physical and absolute at one and the same time. If God, on the contrary, is conceived as personal, as master of Himself, the world is shut out, it is true, from forming part of His idea, it is no longer a momentum of His being. The idea of God, however, is first to be viewed in its *αὐτάρκεια*, purely by itself. But if we rest there, as Arianism did, we cannot posit the existence of any world at all ; or, if one exist, it has a merely accidental existence. God shuts Himself up in abstract self-sufficiency and simplicity. But as such an abstract simplicity contradicts the ethical nature of God, it must be renounced ; and accordingly, the very preservation of the result already arrived at, that is, of the ethical idea of God, rendered it necessary that the Church should further define God as He is in Himself to be, not an abstract Monas, but rather, even apart from the world and His activity therein, a living spirit, originating movements in His own being. Therewith was laid the foundation-stone of a speculative doctrine of the Trinity.

This was the knowledge at which the great Church teachers of the age then arrived. The idea of a living God, as contrasted with the pantheistic or heathenish, and with the deistic idea, found fixed expression in the doctrine of a Trinity of the divine essence. It is undoubtedly true that Christendom owed its conviction that God is a Trinity to revelation, and did not deduce it directly from the conception of God. But at the same time, the doctrine of the Trinity rescued for, if it did not directly confer upon, the Church, the idea of God as the essen-

¹ Nitzsch has shown, with peculiar clearness, that the doctrine of the Trinity is the victory alike over Pantheism and Deism, over the error of Heathenism and that of Judaism.

tially living God. That God can only be conceived by us as possessed of spiritual vitality through the medium of the Trinity, was not yet clearly perceived; and few attempts were made to construe the Trinity out of the idea of God. At all events, however, the conviction was arrived at, that there is the widest difference between the Christian idea of God and both that of Hellenic philosophy and that of Deism, inasmuch as God is to be conceived as a living spirit. The Church felt that it had secured this living idea of God in the Trinity, the existence of which was vouched by faith, although it was not yet scientifically understood, that is, the perception had not yet been arrived at, that a triplicity of momenta was necessary to the constitution of the conception of God as the living Spirit.

Let us now examine more carefully the conflict of the Church with Arianism and Sabellianism. This conflict involved three things:—

- I. The critical examination of the systems.
- II. The confutation of their objections.
- III. The further development of the doctrine of the Church.

I. Athanasius was fully justified in asserting the Arian doctrine to be an innovation (c. Ar. or. 1, 8). Never had the Church defined the Son to be a being created out of nothing; never had it separated Him from God, or attributed to Him a different nature from that of the Father. As little had any teacher of the Church ever dreamed of dwelling with satisfaction, as Arius did, on expressions which lower the Son, still less of basing his system upon them. To curtail the dignity of Christ, was not the end they had in view; they taught subordination only so far as they were unable to reconcile the highest utterances of Christ (to which, be it remarked, they felt themselves, properly speaking, chiefly drawn) with the unity of God. Their view of redemption was totally different from that of Arius, and they saw in Christ the realization of fellowship, not merely between a higher and a lower creature, but between God and man. The Fathers at Nicæa were fully justified, therefore, in appealing both to the whole of Christian antiquity and to the Scriptures; and alongside of many men of the third century, Athanasius adduces Ignatius as a witness against Arius (de Synod. c. 47)

The individual elements of the Arian conception of God are

then, in particular, condemned. Athanasius aptly directs attention to the lack of a religious principle in the system of Arius, when he says (de decr. Nic. Synod. 1),—The entire position taken up by Arianism is a false one; for, instead of asking, How could Christ, although God, become man? it asks, How can Christ be God although man? In other words, its Christological starting-point is untheologically the humanity, and therefore it failed to arrive at the deity. The deity can be shown to be the principle of itself and of humanity; but the humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the deity. Further, God is to them as light without brightness, as a dried-up fountain (c. Ar. or. 1, 14, 19). Through sheer sublimity, the God of Arius is unable to create (c. Ar. or. 2, 25). But if the world is so unworthy of God, and cannot bear Him, what help is it to posit a Son whose work is to create, but who is Himself a creature? If the world cannot bear God, no more can the Son, seeing that He also is a mere creature; and He would require another mediator, that mediator a third, and so on in infinitum (2, 26). Again, if the principle which created the world is not itself God, but is superadded from without (*ἐξωθεν ἐπεισαγόμενον, ἐπίκτητον*, compare or. 1, 17), God stands in no connection with the world, but both He and the world remain by themselves, isolated and abstract. The Son is said to have come to bring us into connection with God. If He is to effect this object, He must Himself also be an object of faith; but how can a creature be the object of faith? The true and proper object of faith is the divine; if, then, faith were directed to a creature alongside of the true God, it would be divided in itself, and we should have *δύο πίστεις*,¹ and the dismemberment of the divine and the disunity of the religious consciousness, which were characteristic of the heathens, would characterize us also (or. 3, 16). A creature made an object of worship is an idol, and to no being created out of nothing can it pertain to create out of nothing (2, 20–22, 29; 1, 26).

A creature has not the power or capacity to unite us with God (2, 69); and miserable is the self-deception which con-

¹ Ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἵνα μὲν πιστῇ τὸν δι' ἑτερον πιστόν, καὶ δύο κυρίως λατρεύειν ἐνὶ μὲν ἀγνότητι, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ γεννητῇ, καὶ κτίσματι δύο τε πίστεις ἔχειν, μίαν μὲν εἰς τὸν ἀληθινόν, ἑτέραν δὲ εἰς τὸν ποιηθέντα καὶ πλασθέντα, παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ λεχθέντα Θεόν.

tants itself with the mere semblance of a gift, which supposes itself to be able to receive from a creature that which God alone can bestow. Freedom is inconceivable, if he who is to free us is himself a bondsman, and not rather God (2, 16). The Son alone can make us children; adoptive sonship presupposes a real sonship. Only in union with God are the wants of men satisfied; but how can we be deified or made free from the curse by a nature that is foreign to us, or indeed by any other than God Himself? God must reconcile and unite us to Himself through Himself (1, 37-39, 49-51; 2, 69, 70). We first received the Holy Spirit as a lasting possession (*βεβαίως*), after Christ had animated humanity with the Holy Ghost in Himself, in His own person. Every created thing is mutable; in order, therefore, to our standing fast, it was necessary that we should participate in the immutable. Man was to be deified; and that God alone could effect: he was to be made like Him; and that was possible alone through the archetype, whose image we were meant to bear from the beginning (2, 70, cll. 1, 49). How could a creature, which itself must be subject to judgment, deliver us from judgment? (2, 6.) How can he, whose knowledge of himself and God is imperfect, reveal God to us even in the way of doctrine? How can he who, like the Logos of Arius, needs first to learn, and who therefore may be subjected to error, forgetfulness, and change, be Wisdom? (1, 23 ff.) In short, both the idea of religion and that of creation are incompatible with Arianism. The world is a whole, a living being. If, then, the Son is Himself a creature, and yet at the same time the creator of the world, we arrive at a world that both creates and is created,—a notion which rends the unity of the world, in the same manner as we have previously seen the unity of faith to be rent (2, 28). Such a mediator for the creation of the world would derange and disturb, instead of mediating.¹ Yet Arianism, strictly speaking, gave up the hope of union with God, and consequently did not consider the realization of that union to be the task imposed on the Logos and the God-man. It therefore assigned to Christ merely the position of a teacher and example. Athanasius also acknowledged Him to be such

¹ Athanasius points out the dualistic features of this point of view when he speaks of the Manichæism of its advocates, ad Episc. Ægypt. et Lib. c. 16; c. Ar. 1, 23.

(c. Ar. 1, 51; adv. Apoll. 1, 4, 5; Ps. xvii.); but he at the same time shows that if this be all, Arianism ought consistently to pass over into Ebionism. The Arians maintain, that Christ merely proclaimed the forgiveness of sins (c. Ar. 2, 68); but a remission of sins by mere edict must necessarily remain external to man; the guilt and bondage of sin would still remain. What was required, was a real redemption by means of a real union with God (2, 14, 69). When God works, His work must be permanent, and cannot require to be constantly repeated: on the Arian view, therefore, man can never arrive at permanent perfection. Nay more, Arianism depotentiates man altogether; for it denies that union with God is his destiny; whilst, on the other hand, it degrades God, and reduces Him to a *θεῖον φθονερόν*, by the false sublimity which it feigns for Him.

The error of Arianism, therefore, is, that, on the one hand, it commingles God and the world, by setting up a creature as mediator between God and man, and making thereof an article of faith; and yet, on the other hand, separates the two so essentially and completely, that not even love is able to reduce the distinction to unity. As then the pretended exaltation of God turns into an abasement of Him, nay more, to a confusion of Him with the world, in the Son, so is it with the Son also. Apparently He receives a lofty position, for He is the Creator, the causality; but because He is not the final cause, He is in reality lower than the world, for the world is the final cause. Hence Athanasius rightly says,—If the Son exists only for our sake, if He came into existence merely that we might be brought into existence, He is a mere means, and we, as the end in view, were the object of the divine thought before Him. His existence, therefore, is a transitory one,—that is, only necessary so long as the means, the organ, is necessary, by which we are to be called into existence. His origin He owes to us. The case is the same, if His exaltation affected His higher nature also, and if it were exalted on account of the virtue, which He had the opportunity of displaying towards us (c. Ar. or. 1, 40). All this Athanasius sums up in the one proposition,—If He was not God, there was no need of Him (2, 41). But we need God; for we are created to know, and be united with, Him; and He alone can give us this knowledge, and bring about this union.—In so many respects does he show that Arianism, with

its inner invalidity, is incapable of affording the mind the satisfaction which it promises.

II. No less acuteness characterizes his rejoinders to the main objections brought against the doctrine of the Church by the Arians and Sabellians. To notice in detail their explanations of Scripture passages and the Church's exposure thereof, would lead us too far away from our main purpose (compare, however, on Prov. viii. 22, Heb. i. 4, Rom. viii. 29, Col. i. 15, Heb. iv. 2, Athan. c. Ar. or. 2, and 3, 7 ff.; Basil. M. c. Eunom. L. iv.; Greg. Naz. or. 30). Let us now consider the refutation of their dogmatical objections. The Arians said,—The Son must be a creature; for if He were of the substance of God, coeternal with Him, God would be divided, and physical ideas be applied to Him. They asked therefore also,—Did God beget His Son voluntarily or not? If involuntarily, God was subject to compulsion; if voluntarily, the Son having been begotten by the will of the Father, does not belong to His substance, but is a creature. Further,—Did He exist ere He was begotten, or not? If He existed, He must have been eternal; and then we should have the contradiction, that He existed ere He was generated. Consequently, He was not before He was generated; and there was therefore once a time when He did not exist. Finally, they asked,—If the Father is unbegotten, and the unbegotten alone can be designated God, how can deity, in the strict sense, be said to belong to the Son? If the Son is begotten, but yet eternal like the Father, He ought to be described as the unbegotten-begotten one (*ἀγεννητογέννητος*); He must be the Father's brother, and, in order to be perfectly like Him, must Himself also have a Son; not to mention that we should thus fall into Ditheism. That the latter objections, in a slightly altered form, proceeded also from the Sabellians, we have seen in the case of Marcellus. Athanasius replied as follows,—Heathenish it is not, to give the Son divine honour, if He is really God; certainly, however, if He be a creature, as the Arians affirm. Perfect resemblance to the Father does not require that the Son be the Father, *i.e.*, it does not require identity. The Son is perfectly like the Father, in virtue of His immutability, because He remains what He is, even as the Father remains what He is. Amongst men we see only imper-

fect copies of fatherhood and sonship; for the same person stands successively in both relations: he who is now a father was once a son, and he who is now the son will one day himself be a father. Instead of the mutability and mobility which characterize men, in the deity the Father represents Fatherhood absolutely and eternally, and the Son Sonship. Indeed, this absolute Fatherhood and Sonship in heaven are the archetype of all fatherhood and sonship on earth.¹ The Arians, as we know, were particularly proud of the syllogisms which they derived from the position, that ἀγέννητον was equivalent to θεότης. Athanasius maintains, that it is an abstract formula to describe God as the Unbegotten One. In prayer, when we seek out the fullest and worthiest conception, no one dreams of addressing God by the name, "Unbegotten One." The proper name of the Unbegotten One is Father. If we look at the world, which was created or begotten, in this sense the Son was not at all begotten, but is unbegotten like the Father. So also, if we look to the relation between the Son and the divine essence, and designate this essence unbegotten, it belongs to the Son equally with the Father, and therefore the latter is eternal; but the Father ought not to be identified with the divine essence.² On the contrary, considered in relation to the Son, the Father is unbegotten, and the Son begotten by the Father. Human mothers, it is true, first become mothers, and are not such eternally; even as they themselves come into existence out of non-existence. But this is a sign of finitude. The Father, on the contrary, because He is perfect, does not first begin to be a Father, as though He had not been a Father previously; it belongs to His essence to be a Father, even as brightness belongs to light; and this His essence He does not acquire gradually, but it is His eternally. Therefore, because the Father exists either not at all, or is eternally Father, the Son also is eternally

¹ C. Ar. or. 1, 21. Οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀλλήλων γεννῶνται καὶ ὁ γεννώμενος ἐκ γεννωμένου πατὴρ γυνήθεις εἰκότως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐτίρουν γίνεται πατήρ—διὸ οὐδὲ ἴστιν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κυρίως πατήρ καὶ κυρίως υἱὸς οὐδὲ ἴσθηκεν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ πατήρ καὶ τὸ υἱός, ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς υἱὸς γίνεται καὶ πατήρ. "Ὅθεν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος μόνως ὁ πατήρ κυρίως πατήρ ἴστι, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς κυρίως υἱὸς ἴστιν.

² Compare c. Ar. or. 1, 30-34; de decr. Nic. Syn. 28. Ἀγίνωτος is the Father designated, not in relation to the Son, but solely in relation to the γινόμενα.

Son.¹ Gregory Nazianzen developed this idea further, as follows,—Not even in earth is the causal relation limited to cases in which the cause precedes and the effect follows; in other words, succession in time, is not an essential attribute of the causal relation: the causal relation may have a place, he urges, in connection with things whose existence is contemporaneous; and adduces as an illustration, light and the effects it produces.² This contemporaneity of cause and effect is evidently a form of the causal relation which is more akin to the higher category of interaction, according to which, without confusion of the distinction, both members of the relation are fully co-ordinated. It is plain also, that causality is in one aspect more perfect, when it is contemporaneous with the existence of that which is the cause. For then it is not merely an accidental cause, which might just as well not be a cause at all; but it is essentially a cause, and it is involved in its very idea that it should be a cause. At the same time, however, it is quite as evident, that on this view of the causal relation, the effect ceases to be something external to the cause, and to occupy an independent position relatively thereto. For, inasmuch as henceforth we are not to conceive the cause without the effect, the effect must belong to the essence of that which is the cause. Not that the Son is therefore the Father, or the brightness the sun; on the contrary, the distinction still continues; but it must be transferred to the sphere of eternal being and its reciprocally related distinctions. Taking this view of the connection between causality or generation and the eternal essence of the Father, two conclusions must be drawn: *firstly*, that it is no longer contingent or dependent on the pleasure of that which is the cause, whether it be a causality or not; for if the generation of the Son had its ground primarily in a particular act of will, He could no longer be maintained to be coeternal with the Father, in the full sense of the term; it would be possible

¹ C. Ar. or. 1, 12-14, 20, 22, 23, 27.—C. 27. "Ὡςπερ ἠρώτησαν τὰς γυναῖκας περὶ τῶν χρόνων, οὕτω πυνθανίσθωσαν καὶ τοῦ ἡλίου περὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς πηγῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἵνα μάθωσιν, ὅτι—ταῦτα ἴσθιν—αἰεὶ σὺν ἑκείνοις. C. 12:—Τίς οὕτως ἴσθιν ἀνόητος, ὡς ἀμφιβάλλειν περὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ εἶναι τὸν υἱόν; Πότε γὰρ τις εἶδε Φῶς χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος λαμπρότητος;

² Greg. Naz. or. 29, 3:—Δῆλον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον, ὡς οὐ πάντως πρῆσβύτερον τοῦτων, ὧν ἴσθιν αἴτιον, οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ φωτός ἥλιος.

to form a complete conception of the essence of God apart from the Son; and the Son must be looked upon as something superadded to the divine essence from without. For this reason, *secondly*, that which is effected can no longer wear the character of fortuity or mutability; but as a necessary effect, without which a proper conception cannot be formed of the divine, both the fact and the mode of its being are determined by the essence of that which is its cause. No wonder, then, that the struggle was concentrated specially on this point. Arianism did its utmost to prevent the application to the relation between Father and Son of this form of causality, which supposes an eternal connection to exist between the effect and the essence of that which is its cause: this is the explanation of the dilemma adduced above (page 295). Athanasius, however, replied,—If the Arians talk of constraint, because the generation of the Son did not take place after precedent consultation, or in accordance with an act of volition, they ought to apply the same rule to other matters pertaining to the essence of God; for example, to His attributes. Does God, then, first consider ere He resolves to be good? Does freedom consist alone in the possibility of choice, in the capability of acting otherwise? No; a nature that is good and perfect is higher than choice (3, 62 f.).¹ Similar also is the reply given by Gregory Nazianzen.² But the Son is not on that account of the nature of a mere attribute, as the Sabellians affirm; nor is He an efflux of God, which would involve the division of the essence of God, but the entire (ὁλόκληρον) divine essence, which, wherever it is present, is present in its entirety or not at all, and in this aspect is simple, indivisible, uncompounded, is in the Father and in the Son, though in each after a peculiar manner: to wit, in the Father prototypically, as the living archetype, the primal source; in the Son antitypically, as the absolute image, which reflects the Father.

¹ C. Ar. 3, 62:—Καὶ τίς ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτῷ, ποιηρότατος, καὶ πάντα πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν ἔλκοντις; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῇ βουλήσει (compulsion) ἐβάλλασιν, τὸ δὲ μῦζον καὶ ὑπερκείμενον οὐκ ἐθάρησαν—τὸ κατὰ φύσιν.—Ἐλπάττωσαν ἡμῖν αὐτοί· τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ βίῳ τὸν Θεόν, ἐκ βουλήσεως πρόσκειται αὐτῷ ἢ οὐ βουλήσει; In the first case, it is possible that He be not good, for the sake of the choice (βοπή εἰς ἐκάστην, of the πάθος of the λογικὴ φύσις). But to say this of God is absurd.

² Greg. Naz. or. 29, 6.

III. This leads us to the third point, which was the further development of the doctrine of the Church. Each of the two, both Father and Son, directs attention through Himself to the other,¹ because each of the two is involved in the distinctive essence of the other (*ιδιότης* is the word used by Gregory Nazianzen). When then, asks Athanasius, are we to suppose God to have existed without Him who is His own (that is, who is so far from being contingent, who is so imperdible, so indispensable to the integrity of His own idea, that this other self constituted as it were a part of the very divine being)? Or who can regard that which is His own (*ἴδιον*) as something foreign, as something pertaining to another substance? No created thing, indeed, whatever bears any resemblance to its Creator, as far as the essence is concerned, but is external to Him; and, owing its existence to His good pleasure and His will, exerted through the Logos, it is possible for it to cease to exist, should such be the Creator's will. This is the nature of the creature. But that which belongs peculiarly to the essence of the Father, namely, the Son, how can it, without audacity and impiety, be described as a something created out of nothing, as something which had no existence prior to its generation, or as something contingently superadded, which may, some time or other, cease again to have being? If any man find such ideas arising in his mind, let him consider well, that nothing may be deducted from the perfection and fulness of the essence of the Father;² and in order that he may perceive more clearly the absurdity of the error, let him remember that the Son is the image and brightness of the Father, the configuration (*χαρακτήρ*) of His essence and the truth. If the light exist, the brightness is its image; if the essence exist, He is the complete expression of the essence (*χαρακτήρ ὁλόκληρος*).³ Let those, therefore, who subject the image and form of the divine to the

¹ Ath. c. Ar. 1, 33: Τὸ πατὴρ δηλωτικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. Compare c. 34, 16:—Αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν υἱὸν βλέποντες ὁράμεν τὸν πατέρα. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔννοια καὶ κατὰληψις γνώσις ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ εἶναι γέννημα.

² C. Ar. 1, 28, in a manner similar to this the eternity of the Son is argued, from the consideration, that it was καλὸν that the Father should always have been Father. See above on Origen.

³ Ist das Licht, so ist der Abglanz sein Bild, ist das Wesen, so ist er des Wesens vollkommener Ausdruck.

conditions of time, look well to the abyss of godlessness into which they are falling. If there ever was a time when the Son did not exist, then the truth cannot have dwelt eternally in God; for the Son says, "I am the truth." Given the essence (*υπόστασις*), the image and expression must also be given; for the image of God is not a thing painted from without, but *God Himself is the begetter thereof, and beholding Himself therein, He rejoices* (αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς γεννητὴς ἐστὶ ταύτης ἐν ᾗ ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν προσχαίρει ταύτη). When can the Father be said not to have looked on Himself in His image? or when was it not His delight? (Prov. viii. 30.) How could the Creator and Originator of the world behold Himself in that which was merely created? For the image must needs be, as is the Father of the image.¹

We have found writers in the West giving utterance to similar thoughts even at an earlier period (see above, pages 186 ff.). In the fourth century also, the same view was propounded by Hilary of Pictavium. The idea that Father and Son know and behold themselves in each other, was familiar to him. One is, as it were, the mirror of the other; not in the sense that the divine lucific essence projected the merely imagined image of a being foreign to itself, but the mirror or the image is a living nature, and the one is essentially identical with the other. But if they (along with the Holy Ghost, who is still less made the subject of consideration) constitute the Deity, then it necessarily follows from the premises, that *the self-consciousness of the Deity consists in this reciprocal knowledge* of the Father and the Son (*cognitio mutua*), which is not merely a knowledge which the one has *of*, but which each has *in*, the other. And this relation seemed to Hilary so clear and certain, that he applied it also to the æconomic Trinity. To the sphere of the Father's thoughts belong the things which He predestines to realization in the future. The Son, looking into the will of the Father, has the knowledge of the idea of His

¹ C. Ar. 1, 20: Τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὑπαρχουσῆς, πάντως εὐθὺς εἶναι δεῖ τὸν χαρακτήρα καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ταύτης· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἐστὶ γραφομένη ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκὼν· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς γεννητὴς ἐστὶ ταύτης ἐν ᾗ ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν προσχαίρει ταύτη. Πότε γοῦν οὐχ ἰάρα ἑαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνι; ἢ πότε οὐ προσέχαιρε;— πῶς δὲ καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν ἴδοι ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ κτιστὴ ἐν κτιστῇ καὶ γεννητῇ οὐσίᾳ; τοιαύτην γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ταύτης πατὴρ.

own work; in other words, by gazing on the thoughts of the Father, He attains to the self-knowledge of that which is essentially the will of His own nature. But this introspection is brought about through the medium of their mutual love and nature.¹

This remarkable theory contains already a kind of speculative construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, out of the idea of the divine self-consciousness. The Father must see, must gaze upon, Himself. In the world, that is, in the created world, He cannot do this; for it is not His perfect image, unchangeable, eternal, divine. If it were, it would no longer be world, but would rather belong to the essence of God; it could neither be said to have become, nor to be now becoming. And, on the other hand, to suppose that genesis (*das Werden*) belongs to the character of God, is to substitute the heathenish in the place of the Christian conception of God. But if the world is not the other self, in which He can contemplate and know Himself, He must have a perfect image in and with Himself, and this image is designated Son. It belongs necessarily to the essence of God, and is as eternal as God, inasmuch as He can neither begin, nor ever cease, to know Himself. We see now, therefore, the significance of the thought which so frequently occurs in the writings of Athanasius,—apart from the Son, the Father would be without reason, without wisdom (knowledge), without the truth (without the knowledge of Himself, the truth). It has not the same import as it perhaps had in some of the older writers, that the Father, taken by Himself, has not in Himself the principle of all this, but the Son alone; for that would lead to the notion, so frequently repudiated by him, that God is a composite being; whereas he asserts the entire deity to be in the Father and in the Son. Nor can he mean

¹ De Trin. 2, 3: "Pater autem quomodo erit (sc. Pater), si non quod in se substantiæ atque naturæ est, agnoscat in Filio? 9, 69: Tanquam speculum unus unius est, speculum autem ita, ut non imaginatam speciem naturæ exterioris splendor emittat, sed dum vivens natura naturæ viventi indifferens est. Comment. in Matt. c. 11, v. 27: Eandem utriusque (Patris et Filii) in mutua cognitione esse substantiam docet (Christus). Tract. in Psalm. xci. 6: Voluntatem Patris Filius tanquam exemplum operationis intropicit, quia intra paternarum cogitationum providentiam quadam futurarum rerum prædestinatione formantur (sc. res futuræ). Intropicit autem per mutuam caritatem atque naturam."

to teach that the Son was a mere quality of the Father, that is, of God (compare, for example, c. Ar. 4, 4, 2); for then there would have been no need to battle with Arianism and Sabellianism, inasmuch as both would, without hesitation, have conceded the existence of such a Logos in the Father. His meaning must rather have been the following (especially as it was a common custom to attribute wisdom, reason, etc., to the Father also):—that divine self-knowledge, in other words, the divine knowledge "*sensu eminenti*," is inconceivable, save on the assumption, that a perfect image, a Son, stands over against Him, in whom He beholds Himself, or with whom He has self-consciousness.¹ That a very decided step was thus taken in advance of the ante-Christian conception of God, needs no further elucidation; it deserves notice, however, that a death-blow was thus finally dealt at the view of the divine essence, as abstract, motionless, simplicity. The positing of a perfect image, in which the Father contemplates Himself, would be impossible, had not God previously discriminated Himself in Himself; in other words, were it not as just to apply the idea of distinction as that of unity to the divine nature. This point, opposed as it was alike to Sabellianism and to Arianism, was so far from being regarded as dangerous by Athanasius and the other Church teachers of that day, that they used it as a new argument for the refutation of their opponents, and as a fundamental principle for the development of the doctrine of God into a doctrine of the Trinity. That idea of God which excluded a Trinity, to wit, the idea of Him as shut up in His own sublimity, as indiscriminated in Himself, as the *Monas*, they considered to be false. They believed, on the contrary, that in God is eternal life, eternal movement. Who is able, says Athanasius (*de decret. Nic. Syn.* 12), to separate brightness from the sun, or to conceive of a fountain without life (c. 15)? God is not to be compared to a sea, which receives its water from without, but to a fountain. The divine foun-

¹ After the above account, it will be impossible to give Baur the credit of having gone to the sources for the view of Athanasius contained in such words as—"At one time he regards the Son as a free subject, at another as selfless and dependent, without doing anything to combine the two;" and, "no trace of an attempt to reconcile the unity with the distinctions is discoverable in his writings" (l. c. 439).

tain is never dry; light never lacks brightness. God is not unfruitful (*ἄγονος*). Were He *ἄγονος*, He would also be *ἀνεργηγῆτος*, and could not create; for He creates through the Son.¹ This was a correct view to take of the matter, whether they had regard to the Scriptures which teach that the creation was the work of the Son, or to the circumstance (see above, pages 287 ff.) that, through the Trinity, the idea of God acquires that completeness in the self-consciousness by which pantheistic elements are excluded, and the idea of creation rendered possible; or, finally, to the consideration, that, through the Trinity, the idea of God as a self-occluded, motionless being, with which the existence of a world is incompatible, is overcome, and that, with the assumption of a Son, who, inasmuch as He is deity under a fixed form, stands in a closer relation to finitude, a path of transition is opened to an external world.² But that we must not merely say,—the Father and Son eternally coexist, but,—The Son is begotten by the Father, he demonstrates as follows: If we only say the former, we arrive at a double God (*διφυὴ θεόν*, c. Ar. 4, 3), at a duality of original beings, which do not derive their existence from some one being. The divine unity, therefore, is preserved by representing the Logos as derived from the Monas, not by introducing a dyas of beings, neither of which is the Father of the other. In like manner, Sabellianism also is to be condemned, because it shuts out a duality conciliated through the medium of unity. Athanasius reproaches it with fusing the distinct ideas of cause and effect (*αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατόν*), of generator and generated, into one. On the contrary, Gregory Nazianzen remarks (or. 29, 2 ff.), carrying the matter out further in this aspect,—There were three cases possible: the divine might be represented either as an

¹ C. Ar. 4, 4: *Εἰ ἄγονος, καὶ ἀνεργηγῆτος ὁ Θεός, γέννημα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὁ υἱός, δι' οὗ ἐργάζεται.* Adv. Sab. Greg. Init.: The Jews have a God *ἄγονον υἱοῦ, καὶ ἀκαρπον ζῶντος λόγου καὶ σοφίας ἀληθινῆς.* Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 14, 19.

² C. Ar. or. 1, 16: It is precisely the same thing to say,—God gives a share in Himself, as to say, He begets. No one teaches that the self-communication of God introduces division and separation into God; for, were it so, we could have no part in Him. But if we can have part in God, it follows, that the Son also can have part in Him, and that indeed "*sensu eminenti*;" for we can only have part in God, so far as He communicates Himself to us.

anarchy, or as a polyarchy, or as a monarchy. The first is disorder; the second brings tumult, and leads also to the disorder of a dissolution. We must regard monarchy, therefore, as the preferable alternative. Not, however, a monarchy circumscribed by one *πρόσωπον*; for the one also revolts against itself (*ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν στασιάζον πρὸς ἑαυτόν*), in that it strives to pass into plurality; but a monarchy constituted by the like dignity of the essence (*ὁμοτιμία*), by harmony of sentiment (*γνώμης σύμπνοια*), by identity of motion (*ταυτότης κινήσεως*), and by inclination (*σύννευσις*) to one of them (the Father). In finitude, a plurality without division is an impossibility; but it is possible in God. For this reason, the Monas moved forward from the beginning into the Dyad, and finally came to a stand in the Triad (*διὰ τοῦτο μονὰς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινήθεισα, μέχρι τριάδος ἔστι*); and this we hold to be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,—the one the generator and producer (*προβολεὺς*), impassive, above time, incorporeal; the second, begotten; the third, produced (*πρόβλημα*). For we cannot venture, with some of the wise men of Greece, who, when discoursing of the first and second cause, compared God to an overflowing bowl, to designate these, overflowings of goodness (*ὑπέρχυσιν*). To do so, would be to run the risk of introducing an involuntary generation, a physical overflow, which God was unable to repress (*περίττευμα φυσικὸν, δυσκάθεκτον*), and which would be totally unworthy of Him. Epistle 243, *πρὸς Εὐάγγελιον μόναχον* (which, however, it is true, is probably spurious), employs, besides, the simile of a circle and its radii, which, although distinct, can yet only be thought in conjunction with each other; the simile of a word, which, without being separated from the speaking intellect, acquires, at the same time, an objective existence in the souls of the hearers, and, instead of separating, unites the souls; that is, a word continues identically the same as to essence, and yet exists in different forms. "As the rays of light have their peculiar constitution (*τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν*), without division of substance, and are neither separated from the light nor cut off from each other, but carry the pleasant light to us; so also our Redeemer and the Holy Spirit, these twin rays, bring to us the light of the Father. They diffuse their blessings even to us, and yet they remain united with the Father." Accordingly, there are different

modes of existence (εἶδη) of one and the same substance (οὐσία) in the Trinity. There is one river (μία ῥοή), flowing forth from the one eye of the source (that is, from the Father) from the beginning; but there are two branches, inasmuch as the streams assume distinct forms (διῆρντος, τῶν ποταμῶν σχηματισθέντων τοῖς εἶδεσι). Although, therefore, the distinctions in God are termed three ὑφεστῶτες in point of number, as Athanasius saw in each hypostasis not merely a part of God, but the entire God (ὅλον ὅλου τύπον καὶ ταυτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφομοίωμα, compare Greg. Naz. or. 30, 20),—yet there is one deity, one φύσις in all, and Father, Son, Spirit, are τρεῖς ιδιότητες νοερὰ, τέλειαι, καθ' ἑαυτὰς ὑφεστῶσαι (compare πρὸς Ἀρειαν sub fin.), that is, three different modes of existence of one and the same whole.

With their derivation of the Trinity from the eternal vitality and movement of God in Himself, we must undoubtedly connect the circumstance, that Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen were inclined to suppose that the generation was not merely an eternal, but an eternally continuous act. Otherwise, the act of generation would be represented as a single act of God; and God, therefore, must be concluded to have been imperfect prior to the act, if to generate and the thing generated pertain to His inmost essence.¹

It will repay our labour to ascertain more exactly the views entertained by Basilus and Gregory of Nyssa on the subject of the Trinity. The main position of the former, in opposition to Eunomius, is,—the word “unbegotten” is a name, not of the essence of God, but of one of His modes of existence (c. Eun. 4, p. 763, C., ὑπάρχειως τρόπος τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας ὄνομα); the divine essence has other predicates. If every peculiar mode of existence brings with it a distinction in the essence, and if the Son cannot be of like substance with the Father, because He has one mode of existence peculiar to Himself and the Father another, men could not be of like substance with each other, because each of them has his own distinctive mode

¹ Compare Greg. Naz. περὶ υἱοῦ λογ. α. (or. 29, 13). The Arians object,—εἰ μὲν οὐ πέπαυται τοῦ γεννᾶν ὁ Θεός, ἀτελής ἢ γέννησις, καὶ ποτε παύσεται. He endeavours to show that it never ceases, although it can never be said to be ἀτελής. Athan. c. Arian. 4, 12; Basil c. Eunom. 4, 760, ed. Paris, 1638, T. 1.

of existence. We regard Father, Son, and Spirit, therefore, not as different *οὐσίας*, but as names denoting the *ὑπαρξίς* of each of them (p. 765, B.). As they are all God, the Father cannot be more God than the Son; even as one man is not more man than another. Quantitative differences do not bear application to essences; there, it is either to be or not to be. But this does not make it impossible for the Son to be other than the Father (*ἐτέρως ἔχειν*, p. 762); for example, the former is other in virtue of His generation. The dignity of both must be alike, for the essence of the generator and the generated must be one; and the effect is not always less than the cause (p. 761, B.). Were the *ἀγέννητον* a title of honour, it must be given to the Son also; and it does belong to Him, in so far as we understand by it, the uncreated, the unbegotten, the one who is without beginning (pp. 715, 719; c. Eun. L. 1). Whence, then, the necessity for a subjection in point of *τάξις*, or a precedence in point of time, finding place amongst those whose essence is one? Why could not the God of the universe coexist eternally with an image of Himself eternally reflected? In this case, therefore, we can only speak of an order involved in the inner relation of the matter itself, to wit, the relation of cause and effect. As the cause, the Father takes precedence of the Son (p. 720, C.); but although the Father in this respect may be termed greater (*τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας λόγῳ*), it does not interfere with the *ὁμότιμον τῆς ἀξίας*.

But notwithstanding that their essence and their dignity are equal, the one is not the other. The Unbegotten is God, it is true; but it is not a definition of God, for not everything which God is, is unbegotten. The conception of God is not covered by the term *ἀγέννητον*; but to the common essence must be superadded characteristic marks, which distinguish the Father and the Son. In the *first* place, the Father begets the Son. If God, as our opponents maintain, is not to be supposed to beget, for fear we should have to hold the doctrine of an efflux; let us also say that He does not create, in order that He may not become weary. But if God can create without being passible, much more can He beget without being passible (c. Eun. 4, 760). And in the second Book against Eunomius (p. 730), he sharply blames those who talk in a tone of compassion about the multitude, confuting opinions which they pretend only brute-

like men can entertain respecting God; but who, whilst they themselves reject the figurative word generation, and, in rejecting the word, reject also the idea of the hypostatic essential equality of the Son and the Father, and leave unproved those who lower the Son to the rank of a creature. *Secondly*, the Son,—such is the import of generation,—has His ἀρχή from the Father, in equality of essence (c. Eun. 2, 737). He is not a part of God, but ὁλος ὅλου γεννητὸν; they are not two parts, made out of one whole, but are τέλεια δύο (c. Eun. 4, 765). Nor is the element common to the two, a substance which existed prior to the persons, and which was divided, one part being given to the one, and another to the other; but the entire essence is in each, though each has it in a different mode. This mode constitutes the distinction or peculiar character (διαφορὰ, ἰδιότης χαρακτηρίζουσα, c. Eun. 1, p. 719; compare 2, 728). Now, whereas, in the case of men, the differences between those who are of like substance are constituted also thereby, that one has an advantage which the other has not; in other words, whereas human individuals are discriminated from each other also by limitation or privation (distinctions which in their very nature may be transitory, if the one acquires the advantage of which he was formerly destitute); such differences cannot exist in the Trinity. For each of the πρόσωπα must possess all divine qualities and excellences. The distinctions, therefore, are not constituted by στέρησις, that is, by one possessing an advantage which the other lacks: the distinctive characteristic must rather be something positive, something which does not involve the superiority either of the one or the other (c. Eun. 4, 765). Nor, on the other hand, is this positive something a superior quality pertaining to the divine essence. It is another mode of being of that essence; and the names, Father, Son, Spirit, are not absolute, but relative, designations; for, were they absolute designations, the three would be different essences. They refer to a relation of the πρόσωπα, not primarily to the world, but rather to each other; just as the idea of Friend, of one who is begotten, says nothing regarding the essence, but is a relative idea which we can imagine to be connected with another essence. For this reason, Basilus, like Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius, says,—The idea of the Father is given with that of the Son, and *vice versa*. This other mode of being or these ἰδιότητες, which he

also terms *χαρακτήρας, μορφή* (c. Eun. 2, 744), distinguish the common substance, it is true, by characteristic marks (*τοῖς ἰδιάζουσι χαρακῆρσι*), but do not disjoin it. For example, deity is common to all; Fatherhood and Sonship are distinctive peculiarities; and the union of the two, of the common and the peculiar (*ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρου συμπλοκῆς τοῦ τε κοινοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου*), gives us the true conception of both.

How, then, do they describe the relation of these peculiar modes of existence of the one Deity to each other? In the first place, although totally distinct from, they are not contradictory to, each other; seeing that they share the same essence. Secondly, they do not merely exclude, but rather mutually presuppose, each other,—the one suggests to the mind the idea of the other. They stand in such an inner relation to each other, that the thought of the one necessarily involves the thought of the other; in other words, they are relative conceptions; even as one cannot think an angle, or a side of a triangle, separately, without thinking both. By way of explanation, Basilus uses the following illustrations:—The Son is like a seal, which expresses the entire nature of the Father, or like the knowledge which passes entirely out of the teacher (that is, out of a subjective mode of being) into the pupil, and acquires in this latter another (objective) mode of being. Or He may be compared to thoughts, which as products are different from the producing intellect, or from the movements of the intellect, but yet are, and remain, connected therewith, in a manner unaffected by the conditions of time. Neither Father nor Son is a designation of passivity; but both are relative ideas, which declare that the two are intimately united with each other, that they are inwardly related to, whilst distinguished from, each other (compare c. Eunom. 2, 740, A., 737, B.). In consequence of this intimate relation between the *πρόσωπα*, which makes it impossible to form a conception of the one apart from the other, the unity, the simplicity of God, is not endangered by the different *τρόποι τῆς ὑπάρξεως* (p. 745). With equal justice we might say, that to affirm any plurality whatever of God, disturbs His simplicity. As the persons are internally connected with each other by the identity of their nature, and of their eternal point of departure; so also are they connected in their works, and yet remain distinct. Every work is accomplished by the entire Deity, by each

person in a different way; so that we arrive at the formula,—the divine will, starting with or deriving its impulse from the first cause as from a source, passes through its own image, the God-Logos, in order to manifest itself in actuality (c. Eun. 2, 745, E.). It is true, the simplicity of God is in this case not so disturbed by the Trias, that a different conception is formed of it than that recognised by the Arians. The Arians reckoned thereto, the divine incommunicableness; the self-communication of God, which the Church represents as absolute in the relation between the Father and the Son, His image, they considered to be a passivity on the part of God. This, all the teachers of the Church deny. Negatively contrasting it with divisibility and composition, they view the simplicity of God positively in the following manner:—the occluded, eternal unity of the divine essence subsists in a trias of hypostases, which can neither be increased nor diminished, but are indissolubly conjoined with each other. This latter idea, Gregory of Nyssa especially has carried out. But Basilius also did something of the same sort, in his own way. If we ask, namely, whether, when he speaks of hypostasis, he means a person in the sense in which we use the term of men, we must answer, No. There is a resemblance between person and hypostasis, it is true, in so far as both are constituted by the superaddition of distinctive momenta to the common essence (by *προσθήκη* of the *ιδιώματα*, or of the *ιδιόζουσα έννοια*, or of the *γνώρισμα*, c. Eun. 2, 745). They resemble each other, further, in that each of the hypostases has something which the other has not (*ἐξάλπερα ιδιώματα*, de vera Fide, T. 2, 390). A difference between them, however, lies in what we have advanced above, namely, that each of the divine hypostases possesses all the qualities which can be regarded as superiorities;—a thing which cannot be said of human persons. With this is connected the further consideration, that whereas men can be numbered, number is inapplicable to God. Computability presupposes a separateness of existence which can have no place in God. We do not designate God one, at all, as to number, but as to essence; that is, we define Him as simple; whereas amongst creatures, even that which is one is not simple. It does not follow, because a thing is one in point of number, it is therefore simple; and that which is one as to essence, that is, simple, is not therefore one as to number: to the divine simpli-

city, the idea of number cannot be applied, for number relates to corporeal objects (Ep. ad Cæs. 141, T. 3, 164). His idea seems to be, that whatever is subjected to the laws of number, is for that very reason not absolute. For the One involves the possibility of a duality (see above, page 303 f.), of a plurality of beings of the same genus; it implies therefore a limitation, which has no place with God. Sooner could we suppose Father, Son, and Spirit, if not the essence of God, to be subjected to number. But even this, Basilus refuses to allow (de spir. S. c. 18, T. 2, 334). "We do not maintain three Gods, but one essence. The king and his picture are one. But each of the hypostases is like itself alone, and therefore cannot be taken together with the others by computation. We cannot say of Father, Son, Spirit, one, two, three; but one Father, one Son, one Spirit."—In the last point, he goes undoubtedly too far, unless he means wholly to exclude number from the Trinity: for what objection can there be to comprising the three under the common idea of the *τρόπος υπάρξεως*, and to saying, there are three hypostases? His intention, however, was simply to avoid viewing them as three Gods; the unity of essence, denominated deity, must remain unaffected by the triplicity; regarding the matter in the light of the deity alone, there is but a simple, indivisible unity. Basilus appears further to have been guided by the just feeling, that deity, divine essence, ought not to be taken as the higher, the generic conception, under which the three are subsumed; for if deity be the generic idea, it will scarcely be possible to avoid Tritheism, and then the distinctions in the divine substance would be divisions. Whereas everything wears a different aspect if hypostasis be taken as the common conception, under which are included Father, Son, and Spirit; for hypostasis can undoubtedly be a subject of computation, seeing that, as a relative idea, it suggests at once another like itself, which cannot be affirmed of the divine essence.

In this respect, the position taken up by Gregory of Nyssa is peculiarly interesting; for he enters into a more careful consideration of the question of the relation of the divine essence to the hypostases, and of the unity in the plurality.

Our opponents, says he (de s. trin. T. 3, 6 ff.), charge us at one time with Tritheism, at another time with Sabellianism,

or the error of the Jews. We abhor both. In opposition to the heathen, we maintain the unity of the divine essence; in opposition to the Jews, the distinction of hypostases (Orat. catechet. Magna, T. 3, 43 ff.). We do not reject every sort of plurality, but merely that kind which penetrates so deeply as to discern the essence of God; for that is heathenish. The truth holds its onward course between the two, Heathenism and Judaism; overthrows the heresies on both sides, and adopts what is good from all. By the unity of essence, we cut away the phantastic plurality of Heathenism, and so heal the heathen; by number, on the other hand, in the form in which we hold it (the plurality of hypostases), we cure the Jews (Cat. c. 3). But now it is possible for the same thing to fall under number, and yet not to fall under number, to be distinguished as to hypostasis without being divided as to the substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*); a vague notion may be formed, but it cannot be clearly expressed. That there is a plurality of hypostases in God, he deduces, in the first place (Cat. M. 1, 2), from the consideration, that no one maintains that God is devoid of utterance or word. If God be not without word, it follows that He must have a Logos (*λόγον ἔχειν τὸν μὴ ἄλογον*). It is true, that men also have word, without therefore having the Logos. But the word must be conceived to be appropriate to the nature of which it is an utterance; and will have a loftier import in the case of God; in our case, a lower import, agreeably to the finitude of our nature. Indeed, the same thing holds good of power, wisdom, life; all which pertain to us also, though in limited measure. In accordance with our nature, our word has no fixed form (*ἀπαγής*). But when we speak of the word of God, we must not suppose that it has merely a momentary existence in the movement of the speaker, and that it immediately disappears again. On the contrary, just as the word of our perishable nature is perishable, even so the word of the eternal and unchangeable essence of God is eternal and substantial. But from the idea of the eternity of the divine word, we must advance to that of its vitality; for it cannot be regarded as lifeless, after the manner of stones; on the contrary, its subsistence is so completely incorporeal and *spiritual*, that it would have no subsistence at all, if it had no life. As spiritual, it is further to be deemed simple and not composite; from which it follows, that it does not merely parti-

cipate in life, whilst it has its subsistence in some other being, for on the latter supposition, it would be composite. Seeing, however, that it is not composite, but simple, it must *be life in itself* (*αὐτοζῶν εἶναι τὸν λόγον*). If the divine word is a living Word, it must be able to determine, to form resolutions; and this capacity (*προαιρετικὴ δύναμις*) cannot be impotent, but must be conjoined also with *power*. Now the almighty will of this Word is always inclined to the good and never to the evil, and is able also to carry out whatever good it may resolve. Accordingly, everything is created through the Logos; He is able to do what He will, and He wills only the good, the perfect, the wise (compare Rupp's "Gregory of Nyssa," pp. 168 ff.).

But as far as concerns the relation of the Logos to the Father, he goes on to say,—The Word is different from Him whose word it is; it is, in a certain sense, one of the relative ideas (*τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων ἐστίν*), for a word suggests a speaker. Accordingly, Judaism is kept at a distance. Even a human word is something different from the mind, and yet it is not separated from it, nor is it identical therewith; for the word renders the mind (*νοῦς*) visible (*ἄγει εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές*) or reveals it. Hence Gregory of Nyssa regards the relation between Father and Son as an inner self-revelation of God. By its independent subsistence, the Word is distinguished from Him through whom it exists; but having the same attributes as God (for example, goodness, power, wisdom, etc.), it is by nature one with God (Cat. M. c. 2). Should some one reply,—If you count three hypostases, why do you not count (in other words, hypostatize) the other attributes, but say, One power, one goodness?—we answer,—Because we believe in one deity, and because the attributes together constitute this deity, or the divine essence. Inasmuch now as we know the divine essence solely from its works and revelations, one may also say,—By deity, as it exists for us, we understand the divine activity (*ἐνέργεια*). But this, too (like all the divine attributes), pertains to all three hypostases, though to each after its own manner (de s. Trin. T. 3, 6 ff.).

Relatively to the Trinity, Gregory lays special stress on the distinction between the ideas *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*,—ideas which at an earlier period were frequently confounded, because *ὑπόστασις* was held to be etymologically identical with substance (Heb. i. 3); whereas *οὐσία*, as opposed to a mere notion, or to a

merely phænomenal existence, might be employed to denote the real substantial distinction in God; for as actual realities they can be termed *οὐσίαι*. But the distinctive feature (*ιδιὸν*, *ιδιότης*) was not designated thereby. Gregory now sets apart the word *ὑπόστασις* to express the distinctive peculiarity, and employs it no longer in the sense of *οὐσία*, of substance, as the Nicene Fathers, and with them Athanasius, had frequently done, but as equivalent to *πρόσωπον*, interchanging the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον*. On account of the misuse of the latter word by the Sabellians, he limited himself to the former when he aimed at logical precision, for in his view it expressed the real objective substance of the *ιδιὸν*.¹

Gregory devoted three works to the discussion of this question, and contributed materially to fix the uncertain usage of the Church:—the work “De differentia essentiae et hypostasis” (T. 3, 32 ff.); the “Quod non tres Dii sint” (T. 3, 15 ff.); and the *Περὶ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν* (T. 2, 82 ff.). In the first-mentioned work, he describes it as an error common to both Arianism and Sabellianism, to confound the two ideas of essence and hypostasis. Because the hypostases are different, therefore, say the Arians, the essence also is different; because the essence is one and the same, say the Sabellians, therefore there can only be one hypostasis. But they ought to be discriminated as follows:—*οὐσία* is the common element; the hypostases are to be defined as the centres of unity of the distinctive peculiarities (*συνδρομή τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ἰδιωμάτων*, l. c. p. 35; compare Basil. c. Eun. 2, 728); and these hypostases are incommunicable in relation to each other, and cannot meet in one common hypostasis (*τὰ ἰδιώματα* or *γνωρίσματα χαρακτηρίζοντα τὰς ὑποστάσεις, ἀκοινώνητα, ἀσύμβατα*, l. c. p. 32). So far ought we to be from interchanging essence and hypostasis, that the latter is related to the former as an accident (*συμβεβηκότα*) is related to its substance (*περὶ κ. ἐννοιῶν*, p. 88). Now, as hypo-

¹ The divine essence, *οὐσία* or *ὑποκείμενον*, he does not term hypostasis, though there can be no doubt that he ought to have ascribed to it that which we call personality, because personality is the highest form of spirituality, and spirituality in its full compass belongs, according to Gregory, to the very essence of God. His view of the matter therefore was,—he had not at all fully developed it,—that the one divine Ego exists in the three hypostases; in each, however, after a different manner;—each hypostasis is a particular form of the Ego.

stasis is that which discriminates those who have the like essence (Father, Son, Spirit), and as each of them has this distinctive characteristic, Gregory is perfectly right in not hesitating to apply number to them (T. 2, 82): he treats the hypostasis, however, and not the essence, as the One, which repeatedly occurs in the Trinity ("Quod non tres Dii," p. 17: 'Ο μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότητας ἐκάστω τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται, καὶ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται, the hypostases can be counted by addition, ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν). But if the three hypostases can be counted, and are incommixtible (no *μῖξις* nor *ἀνακύκλησις* of the hypostases can take place, because the distinction between cause and effect, the *διαφορὰ κατὰ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν*, always remains); if they are *οὐσαι μερικαί*, or, more precisely, if each is *ἰδικὰ, ἄτομον ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρόσωπον* (T. 2, 83), the question arises, Does not this lead to Trithism? This question is handled in detail in his other two works. Ablabius had asked,—Peter, James, and John are called three men, although they have one nature; and it is not absurd, therefore, to use the plural of the term nature, in reference to several beings of the like substance. And yet we are suddenly told that the sacred Trinity is an exception to the rule; that Father, Son, Spirit, are three, and of like nature, and yet are not to be counted as three Gods. Gregory's answer seems at first sight strange; but it is rooted, and that deeply, in the realistic character of his entire view of the world. It is an abuse of language, says he (3, 17), to describe those who have the same essence as several, by applying to them the plural of the word nature. The word "man" denotes the nature which is common to all, and this nature can only be one; there are not many human natures. The nature is in itself incapable either of increase or of alteration. And yet we use the word which describes the nature in the plural, and speak of many men; which is just as if there were many human natures, or many humanities. Gregory, therefore, does not protest against all counting whatsoever, but against the use of a word to denote plurality, which has been coined to denote the nature, which cannot be multiple. Those who think of three Gods fall into precisely the same error. The idea of God, or of the deity, is one, indivisible; there exists but one simple divine essence; the plurality does not affect this essence itself, but merely the hy-

postases, each of which contains the entire essence. It is wrong, therefore, to speak as though the divine essence itself were a plurality. If we wish to speak accurately, scientifically, we ought not to attribute that to the essence, which falls solely into the sphere of the hypostases. Consequently, the idea of God must not be treated as the generic idea under which Father, Son, and Spirit are subsumed, but the idea of hypostasis. This he expresses in various ways. The essence is not divided in the three Persons, therefore also not the word "God;" for it denotes the essence. That unscientific mode of expression is attended with no danger when we speak of men, because scarcely any one will fall on the notion of several humanities. But when we speak of God, we must use greater accuracy; for if we say that there are several Gods or divinities, we lose the idea of God altogether: we no longer have any God at all, seeing that God is simple and unchangeable (3, 25 f.). In the case of humanity, it is, to a certain extent, allowable to treat the word man, although it denotes the essence, not as the self-same, identical, simple essence, but as capable of change, and of being used in the plural form. For that which falls within the compass of the idea man is, in fact, mutable; of those who bear the name man, there are at one time more, at another time less; at one time these, at another those. He means to say, therefore, that in the case of the human race, humanity itself is, to a certain extent, drawn into the change of the individuals, so that it is partly justifiable to use the term in the plural. But in the Holy Triad there remain eternally the same *πρόσωπα*; these *πρόσωπα* continue eternally the same; they admit of no increase to a Tetrad, no diminution to a Dyad, of no growth and no termination (2, 84). Herein lies not only the thought, that the idea of God, which excludes change and multiplicity of Gods by its simplicity, does not allow of being subjected to the law of number, but also the beginnings of an answer to the further near-lying question,—Whether the persons of the Trinity are not distinguished from each other, as, for example, human persons are distinguished? Individual men are peculiar modes of existence of the entire genus. The question is negatived. There is undoubtedly a certain similarity; namely, neither in the case of God nor of man is it allowable to identify essence and hypostasis; nor is it just to regard the latter as the former

when we wish to speak precisely,—for example, to speak of the Son as a God. But there is also a difference; and the perception of this difference prevents us in another direction from using language which implies that there are three Gods. We are able to conceive of a man by himself; he is so subjected to the laws of space, especially through his body; he is so externally separated from others, that counting has its full import as applied to him. And when several carry on the same work, each usually accomplishes it by himself, and separated from the rest (T. 3, 22, 25). Indeed, the loose connection between, the isolation of, the persons of the human race, mark their mutability. It is otherwise in God; for no conception whatever can be formed of the one hypostasis apart from, but solely in and with, the two others, and there is not room for a more or a less. They are relative conceptions, which stand or fall with each other; and are therefore conjoined in the most intimate manner to a solid-*aric* unity.¹ This idea is then developed, both in relation to their *being* and to their *operation*. In regard to the former, Gregory refers to the fact, that not all human *πρόσωπα* are derived from one *πρόσωπον*, but each from a different one. In the Holy Triad, on the contrary, everything proceeds forth from one centre of unity, the Father, who on that account is termed *κυρίως* God,² because in His hypostasis, as it were, divinity has its principal seat (*ἀρχή*).³ But as to the operation of the hypostases, all divine activity proceeds forth from the Father as the primary impulse, advances onwards through the Son, and cul-

¹ De diff. ess. et hyp. p. 36 :—The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (c. i. 3) speaks as *κατασκευάζων τὸ ἀδιαστάτως ἐκινεῖσθαι τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱόν*. —So also is the Son involved in the conception of the Father :—*ὥστε τὸν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τοῦ μονογενοῦς διὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμμάτων ἀνατείναντα, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως ἐν περινοίᾳ γινέσθαι, οὐκ ἐπαλλασσομένης οὐδὲ συναναμειγνυμένης τῆς θεωρουμένης αὐτοῖς ιδιότητος, ὥστε ἢ τῷ πατρὶ τὴν γέννησιν ἢ τῷ υἱῷ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἐκμφορᾶζουσιν*, etc. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνατόν, υἱὸν ὀνομάσαντα μὴ καὶ πατὸς ἐν περινοίᾳ γινέσθαι, σχετικῶς τῆς προσηγορίας ταύτης καὶ τὸν πατέρα συναναφαινούσης.

² That is, because He is the principle of the hypostatical element in the two others, but not of their divine nature. At all events, he says (2, 82 ff.), —Not as God, is the Father this distinct hypostasis (that is, Father); otherwise the Son would not be God.

³ T. 2, 85 :—*Ἐν γὰρ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξ οὗ ὁ υἱὸς γινώσκει καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγ. ἐκπορεύεται διὸ καὶ κυρίως τὸν ἵνα αἴτιον ᾖ τῶν αὐτοῦ αἰτιωτῶν, ἵνα Θεὸν Φαμεν*.

minates in the Holy Spirit. Every work, therefore, passes through the three points or *prosopa*, *πηγή, ενέργεια, τελείωσις*; in their respective activity, which setting forth, as it does, one movement and one governing (*κίνησις και διακόσμησις*), of the good divine will, they are not separated by time.¹ Accordingly, the Son is immediately out of the first (*προσεχώς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου*), and the Spirit is immediately through that which is out of the first (*Quod non tres, etc. fin.*). Not, therefore, by time, not by place, not by will, not by work, are the persons separated.² Not even number bears a full application to them, because they are essentially connected, and in no respect separated, momenta of the entire divine essence (T. 3, 25). Those things alone can be arithmetically added which have an *ἰδίᾳ περιγραφῇ*; such an *ἰδίᾳ περιγραφῇ* is possessed alone by objects corporeally bounded; consequently, the divine cannot be counted. Gregory, therefore, employs also an expression which connects the hypostases (*συμβεβηκότα*) more closely with the essence, without, however, confounding them therewith; to wit, the divine nature is simple, but it is discriminated in itself (*διαφορὰν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἔχει*), as becomes its majesty (c. Eun. 1, 342). What his meaning was, will probably be clear from another passage (*de differ. ess. et hyp. pp. 33, 34*). The Trinity, says he, presents us with an enigma—a conjoined distinction (*διάκρισις συνημένη*) and a discriminated conjunction (*διακεκριμένη συνάφεια*). He employs a beautiful image to show that the distinction need not destroy the unity, nor the unity exclude the distinctive (*τῶν γνωρισμάτων τὸ ἰδιάζον*). The rainbow is a reflection of light which, whilst it proceeds forth from, is also refracted back to, the sun. To the light corresponds the divine essence. The light in the rainbow and in the sun is one; but in the rainbow the light, which in itself is one, arrives, as it were, at its maturity. The one light does not therefore distribute itself into many lights, but the colours of the rainbow remain conjoined in unity, and

¹ T. 3, 22 :—Πᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἢ θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν διήκουσα, καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολυτρόπους ἐννοίας ὀνομαζομένη, ἐκ πατρὸς ἀφορμᾶται καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ τελειοῦται. Διὰ τοῦτο εἰς πλῆθος τῶν ἐνεργούντων τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐ διασχίζεται.

² T. 2, 85 :—Οὔτε γὰρ χρόνῳ διαιρεῖται ἀλλήλων τὰ πρόσωπα τῆς θεότητος, οὔτε τύπῳ, οὐ βουλῇ οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύματι, οὐκ ἐνεργίᾳ, οὐ πάθει οὐδενὶ τοιούτων, οἷάπερ θεωρεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἢ μόνον, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ πατὴρ ἔστι, καὶ οὐχ υἱός, etc.

although clearly distinct each from the other, shade away imperceptibly into each other. After the same manner may the hypostases be represented as the full-blown flower of the one divine essence; its distinctive characteristics beam forth from each of the three whom we believe to constitute the sacred Triad, as from the rainbow. No difference, however, can be perceived between the essence of the one and that of the other; but along with the unity of essence, there shine forth from each the peculiarities by which it is known (*ὥσπερ τοῖνυν ἐν τῷ ὑποδείγματι* (sc. *τῆς ἱριδος*) *καὶ τὰς τῶν χρωμάτων διαφορὰς φανερώς διαγινώσκουμεν, καὶ διάστασιν ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστι τῇ αἰσθήσει λαβεῖν, οὕτω μοι λόγισαι δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἀναλογίσασθαι, τὰς μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων ιδιότητας, ὥσπερ τι ἄνθος τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἱρὶν προφαινομένων ἐπαστράπτειν ἐκάστω τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τριάδι πεπιστευμένων τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ιδιότητος μηδεμίαν ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινοεῖσθαι διαφορὰν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ κοινότητι τῆς οὐσίας τὰς γνωριστικὰς ιδιότητας ἐπιλάμπειν ἐκάστω*).¹

A more careful examination, therefore, shows that there is no ground for reproaching him with Tritheism. It is incorrect to say, that Gregory conceives the hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity to be related to each other as are two individual men; for, on the contrary, he rather reduces the entire distinction between Father and Son to this—that the former is the *αἴτιον*, the latter the *αἰτιατόν* (π. κ. ε. p. 85), whereas the distinctions between actual men are much deeper.² In connection herewith

¹ T. 3, 36 :—Read further, *Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑποδείγματι ἡ ἀπαντάζουσα τὴν πολυχρῶμον ἐκείνην αὐγὴν μία οὐσία ἦν, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος ἀνακλαμένη, τὸ δὲ ἄνθος τοῦ φαινομένου πολυειδές, παιδεύοντος οἶμαι τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς κτίσεως ἡμᾶς, μὴ καιροπαθεῖν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ δόγματος λόγοις, ὅταν εἰς τὸ δυσθώρητον ἐμπεσόντες (l. ἐμπέριμεν) πρὸς τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τῶν λογομένων.*

² Baur's view of Gregory (l. c. p. 453) is inaccurate, because he has not taken into consideration the chief works which bear upon this point. The imperfection of his acquaintance with Gregory is particularly clear, from the judgment contained in the words,—“What he says respecting the unity of ‘man’ is plainly invented in the interest of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.” Nor would he otherwise need to say (p. 451), that he cannot quite make out what Gregory means to teach. The judgment just quoted proves also that Baur has taken no notice of Gregory's work, *περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*; for its fundamental idea (c. 16, 17, ed. Bas. 1567) is, that humanity before God is to be considered as one man. Compare Rupp's “Gregor v. Nyssa,” pp. 175 ff.

it must be carefully borne in mind, that neither Gregory nor his age generally, regarded the Ego as the central feature of the person. He considered human *πρόσωπα* to be formed by the *περιγραφή* or circumscription of human nature, and by the *ἰδικόν*, the principle of individuation or the distinctive characteristic. Men are constituted *ἄτομα* by both together. These *ἄτομα* are not described as Egos, but merely as the centres of unity of the characteristics, which distinguish the one from the other (*συνδρομή τῶν ἰδιωμάτων*, 3, 35). Equally far is he from speaking of an Ego in connection with the divine hypostases; and it is the more unjust to charge Gregory with teaching three divine Egos, as he takes pains to forefend the application to the sphere of the divine, of the series of determinations by which one finite individual is distinguished from the other. If he defines the divine hypostases also to be *συνδρομαὶ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων*, it is in a different sense from that in which he uses the expression relatively, for example, to men; as is very evident from the simile of the rainbow. Had Gregory more carefully examined the matter, he would undoubtedly have arrived at the conviction, that to be an Ego, or to have self-consciousness, is the highest form under which spirit in general can appear; he must therefore have reckoned it to pertain to the *οὐσία* of God (see note, page 313), and have regarded the Ego as the common *ὑποκείμενον* of all three. Gregory does not plainly teach, as did Athanasius, that the eternal self-consciousness of God is brought about or mediated by the trinitarian distinctions; though there are faint traces of such an idea in his writings:—for example, when he appears to represent the Logos as an inner revelation in God Himself (C. M. c. 2); or when he says,—“As a man who has looked upon the expression of his form in a clear mirror, so he who knows the Son has taken up into his heart the distinctive characteristic of the hypostasis of the Father through his knowledge of the Son” (*de differentia*, etc., p. 37).

When we glance backwards at the period through which we have passed, with a view to determining the doctrinal progress made, relatively to the higher aspect of the Person of Christ, we find it to be in the main the following. The two factors, the true *divinity* and the *hypostatical* character, of the higher element in Christ, of which the former had had the pre-

dominance in the Church during the second, the latter during the third century, were destined to unite and coalesce by interpenetration during the fourth century, if things took their orderly course. As it were, in order that this process of interpenetration might be properly accomplished, it happened that each of the two factors found its own representative, the one in the new Sabellians, the other in the new Arians; and that the two confronted each other at one and the same time. The former asserted the true deity, eternal, non-subordinate, and itself the ἀρχή, but conceded no distinct hypostasis to Christ; hence the possibility of a relapse into Docetism or Ebionism. The latter affirmed the hypostasis; but it is one that bears merely the name of divinity, and, as a creature, remains constantly outside of God. Each of these parties, in their mutual antagonism, repudiated the factor affirmed by the other; whereas the Church teachers of the second and third centuries, whilst giving predominance, now to the deity and then to the hypostasis, had always tacitly recognised the non-predominant factor. The consequences of retaining the one factor to the exclusion of the other being thus set livingly and clearly before the mind of the Church, it saw the necessity of combining both together, and prepared to accomplish its task. But it was precisely to this combination that the two heresies above mentioned were equally strongly opposed; for its realization would be their extinction. Earnest attention was devoted to the problem from the commencement of the fourth century onwards, in Alexandria, as we see from the labours of such men as Peter of Alexandria, Hierakas, Alexander, and others. Alongside, however, of this line of thinkers, who alone were occupied with the further development of dogmas, there arose another party which adhered more rigidly to the system of Origen. Partly because it coalesced with elements of the older school of Antioch (that of Lucian); and partly, because, for the one it bridged the way over to Arianism, and for the other to a higher view of Christ, this party speedily attained great influence and dimensions. Eusebius of Cæsarea was its chief representative. For a long time, it looked upon itself as the true golden mean between the two extremes; inasmuch as it actually did bring about an apparent union of the factors, by commingling the Sabellian and Arian principles. Had the great teachers of

the Church, however, contented themselves with this seeming solution of the problem, that sharp separation of principles which was destined to bring about the crisis and to prepare the way for a higher union, would have been a lesson given in vain. Instead of making progress, the Church would then, in the best case, have been forced to fall back on the vague and indeterminate doctrinal condition of the third century. The peace thus established, would have been merely apparent; for the Christ of the Semi-Arians was not in a position to accomplish that work of atonement and deliverance which the Church believed their Christ to have accomplished. The Church was compelled to adhere to its conviction, that the inmost, the veritable divine had been revealed to and conferred on humanity, in Christ; whereas the delusive nature of the solution furnished by Semi-Arianism was demonstrated by the circumstance, that its conception of God was essentially identical with that of Sabellianism and Arianism, and that it was as incapable as they of expressing the fulness of the Christian revelation. This is specially apparent from the position taken up by Eusebius relatively to Marcellus. Marcellus, with a view to establishing the true deity of the higher element in Christ, taught that the Logos was coeternal with God; and, in order to exclude all subordination, affirmed Him to be an *ἀγέννητον* like God. At the same time, in agreement with the Arians, he required of the teachers of the Church, that if they meant to assert the true divinity of the higher element in Christ, they should represent the Logos also, and not the Father alone, as *ἀγέννητον*. By this Marcellus did not merely mean, that the Logos must have true deity (that aseity must pertain also to Him); but in excluding *γέννησις*, he deemed himself also under the necessity of excluding the Sonship and the particular hypostasis of the Logos. To Eusebius, not merely the latter, but also the former, seemed very objectionable. For, even though Marcellus were free from the fault of denying the hypostasis, in his view, to introduce the Logos, after this manner, into the inmost divine sphere, would involve the assumption of a plurality of divine *ἀρχαί*, that is, Polytheism or Dualism (de eccl. theol. 1, 5, 2, 12); from which it is evident, that the hypostasis of the Son, according to Eusebius, is unsuitable to the inner divine essence, and must destroy the unity of God and of the divine

self-consciousness. He cannot, therefore, have regarded Christ as the absolute revelation of the Most High God Himself, but must have believed that God remains shut up in Himself. That Sabellianism also participated, against its own will, in the incommunicableness of God which characterizes Arianism and Semi-Arianism, so far as it did not fall back into Patripassianism, we have seen above.

What position did the teachers of the Church take up in relation to this matter?

I. With the Arians, they advanced decidedly beyond the Sabellian idea of substantiality (the traces of which are still discernible in the *πλατυσμός* of the Monas, taught by Marcelus) to that of causality; in the first instance, with regard to the relation between God and the world. They thus excluded everything of the nature of Pantheism. All that is called world, was absolutely caused by the first *αἴτιον*, which itself has no cause higher than itself. Accordingly, everything truly divine stands over against the *γενητοῖς* (that is, the world), as *ἀγέννητον*, or, more precisely, *ἀγέννητον*. So far they were agreed with the Arians. So also, in conceiving that the higher element in Christ existed in the highest, that is, in the hypostatical form, and neither as mere activity, influence, nor as an indwelling of the entire God in general, which would have involved Patripassianism or Docetism. For this reason, the distinction between *αἴτιον* and *αἰτιατόν*, generator and generated, must not be allowed to sink down into identity.

II. But instead of supposing, as did the Arians, that the highest had been predicated of God when they had predicated *πρώτον αἴτιον* and *ἀγεννησία*, they say,—To describe God as the cause of the world, is not to describe His essence (otherwise He would be merely the substance or the force of the world); nor, when we deny that He is caused like the world, or attribute to Him *ἀγεννησία*, have we described His true essence, for this is a merely negative determination. All that the *ἀγεννησία* does, is to bring the chain of causality to a stand still; it does not bring the cause itself to perfection. And though the teachers of the Church do not view the *ἀγεννησία* positively, as the eternal self-grounding of God, of which no conception can be formed apart from a Trinity, and in which the Son also participates, the distinction just referred to, between generator and generated,

between *αἷτιον* and *αἷτιατόν*, leads to the same result; for it implies that causality has a place also in the divine essence, that God stands to Himself in the relation of cause and in the relation of effect. The emptiness and abstract simplicity of the deistic conception of God they despise, and refuse altogether to allow that the highest in God or His essence is described when we say,—He is the cause of the world, or He has not Himself been caused; their conception of God includes, besides the idea of causality, also the spiritual ideas of love and wisdom. However highly they may estimate the significance of the idea of causality relatively to the world, they assign it but a secondary or subordinate position when they treat of the conception of the divine essence. So is it to be understood when the Fathers say,—The Son is partly not to be subsumed at all under the category of causality, for He does not form part of the world, but is *ἀγένητος*; and yet the category bears a partial application to Him (for He is *γεννητός*, a *γέννημα* of the Father, and this ensures the unity along with the distinctions), though in a subordinate, secondary sense (*συμβεβηκότως*). For that He is caused, is not His essence, otherwise He might be a “contingens” like the world, which, the ground of its existence lying out of itself, has the *μηδὲν* cleaving to it. The essence of the Son is the divine itself, the *ἀγένητον* (as Marcellus teaches); and, compared with this His absolute essence, His relation to the Father, His being begotten (such is the form in which he presents the category of causality), is a secondary feature. The *γνωριστικαὶ ἰδιότητες* are *συμβεβηκυῖαι* in comparison with the essence or with the conception of God, of which the Son forms as necessary a part as God Himself.

III. If, now, that which constitutes the Son (and the Spirit) a particular hypostasis is a *συμβεβηκός* in comparison with His divine essence, a secondary relatively to the common primary, it might appear as though the view propounded by Marcellus, who regarded all distinctions in God as merely momentary, posited for our sake, but not as required by the divine essence itself, were justified. The intention of the Church teachers, however, was not to reduce the Triad in God to something accidental, to something dependent on the will of the Monas. We have seen even Origen striving to advance beyond such a representation: the teachers of the fourth century had decidedly advanced beyond

it (see above, pp. 301 ff.); for they regarded it as necessary to the full conception of the living God, that He should exist in the form of a Triad. We have also already come upon very remarkable attempts to show that the triplicity is a necessary one. But attempts of this nature could never succeed, unless the three hypostases were presupposed to be perfectly equal in dignity; and this presupposition was adopted in the following form:—They are equal in essence, in the fulness of attributes, divinity pertains alike to all; they are included in that unity of the divine essence which must be taken as the point of departure; the eternal diremption of that unity, therefore, with the *ιδιώματα* of the individual hypostases to which it gives rise, can no longer be deemed incompatible with their equal dignity and deity; this stands firm once for all, the *ιδιώματα χαρακτηριστικὰ* are for it something indifferent (*συμβεβηκός*). But they are by no means, in every respect, something accidental; on the contrary, they are required both by the Christian faith and by the Christian conception of God, which has left behind it the lifeless, self-absorbed *Ὀν* of the ages preceding the advent of the Redeemer. The Christian God,—this is implied by the constructive efforts referred to,—opens Himself, in the first instance, in and for Himself (placing Himself over against, knowing and loving, Himself), and then for the world. This height was ascended neither by the Arians, with their idea of causality, nor by the Sabellians, with their substantiality, nor by the Semi-Arians:—indeed, such a conception of God was derivable neither from the Platonic philosophy, nor from any other region of the ante-Christian world. But undoubtedly the Church teachers, in order to be able to place the Son as the objectified divine over against the objectifying Father, must needs partially renounce the conception of hypostasis, which had been frequently laid down in the third century, and by the Semi-Arians, and which was essential to Arianism. To Arians, the main matter was the hypostasis, which they viewed as essentially finite, with whatever lofty predicates they might adorn it. The personality of the Son, so understood, has in it an exclusive, a repelling element, and cannot at all be represented as endowed with the veritable divine nature, without an approximation to Paganism, that is, to Tritheism. It is therefore deserving of all recognition, that from the moment the Church clearly saw that the problem awaiting solution was

the full union of essential deity with the hypostasis, new dogmatical terms were coined, in order to define the word Hypostasis more precisely, and in such a manner as to show its reconcilability with the unity of the deity. Such terms were *διαφοραί*, *διακρίσεις*, τὸ ἑτέρως ἔχειν, τὸ ἰδικόν, *ιδιάζον*, *συνδρομαί* or *συμπλοκαί* τῶν *ιδιωμάτων*, or τῶν *γνωριστικῶν χαρακτηριζουσῶν ιδιοτήτων*, τῆς *ιδιαζούσης ἐννοίας*, τῶν *ἐξαιρέτων ιδιωμάτων*, τῶν *ιδιαζόντων χαρακτήρων*, *σχηματισμός* τῶν *εἰδῶν*, that is, points of unity, foci, or central-points for the marks by which the distinctions are constituted; and starting with this, it was possible to speak of three principles in God, for example, under the image of three connected suns. Further, *τρόποι ὑπάρξεως*, *μορφαί*, ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλα σχέσις τῶν *πρόσωπων*, *εἶδη*, *ιδιότητες*. As the content of the divine essence, its fulness, is common to all three, the distinction can only relate to form, or to the different modes of existence which are eternally contained in, or appertain to, the one deity, and which are the presupposition of God's revelations and their diversity. With all this, these Fathers by no means succeeded in answering the further questions which here suggested themselves; though, as far as lay in their power, they prepared the way for a further development of Christian knowledge. This they would not have done, but, on the contrary, would have stifled all further activity of the Christian mind, under the pretext of the Trinity being an absolute and unapproachable mystery, if, as many seem still to suppose, they had appropriated the Arian, or even the Semi-Arian conception of God, and therewith the problem, that three are no more than one. But, in fact, they objected quite as strongly to subjecting the hypostases to number in respect to their essence, that is, to their divinity, as the entire deity itself, notwithstanding that it has the distinctions eternally in itself. They were as zealous in opposing those abstract and exclusive representations of the Monas, which reduced it to something finite, as against circumscribing the hypostases in a finite manner (*περιγραφῇ*). The consequence whereof plainly was, that the hypostases were approximated more nearly to the divine essence than was possible for Arianism, whilst at the same time, unlike Sabellianism, they did not represent the distinctions as affecting God merely in His relation to the world, or reduce them to mere activities, or, in the best case, to different modes of the divine existence, *in the world*.

It must of course be allowed, that the doctrine of the Trinity, as laid down even by the Nicene Fathers, leaves much to be desired. In one point above all, to wit, that the Father is represented, not merely as the logical commencement of the trinitarian process, but not seldom also, as the root and source of all deity and identified with the Monas. He thus acquires a predominance which necessarily involves the subordination of the Son and Spirit. But it would be a gross misapprehension of the spirit of the Church during the fourth century, to suppose that the subordination of the Son and Spirit therein involved, was distinctly intended; above all, to maintain that it is "the one essential determination, in comparison with which all other determinations must withdraw to the background" (Baur l. c. p. 468). Inasmuch as these teachers of the Church, on the contrary, uniformly resisted everything of an Arian character, and plainly gave decided prominence to the idea that Son and Spirit are of like substance, like honour, like glory, and coeternal with the Father, and deny that they lack any excellence possessed by the Father; inasmuch, further, as they even go so far as to lay down the principle, that the causal relation between Father and Son does not involve the subordination of the Son under the Father, that the Son is as far exalted above originated things as the Father; and make the proviso, that if the causal relation imply that the cause lies outside of the effect, the idea of causality is altogether inapplicable to the Son (compare Basil. c. Eun. 1, 715, D.); and, lastly, when we find that the teachers of the Church in general maintain, that that which distinguishes one hypostasis from the rest (that, therefore, which is peculiar to it, but not to the others), cannot be subsumed under the category of having (*ἔστις*, Haben), and of deprivation (*στέρησις*), that it implies no superiority, but merely signifies the peculiar being, which in all three is of like dignity, and also equally divine; the afore-mentioned predominance given to the Father as the Monas, cannot be regarded as intentional, but simply as an unvanquished remnant of the ideas which prevailed during the third century. The historian, therefore, if he is minded not to mistake the living pulse of the entire dogmatical movement, must at this point take pains to recognise the true nature of the task reserved for the next period, and which demanded the complete separation of the

old, heterogeneous elements. That the complete equalization of the hypostases was, and continued to be, the goal of the collective efforts of the Church, is evident, not merely from the course pursued by the doctrine of the Trinity, during which, by means of the idea of the *περιχώρησις* of the persons in each other, on the one hand, and in the Latin Church, by the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit, not only out of the Father, but also out of the Son, on the other hand, the object aimed at was ever more completely attained ; but, especially during the fourth century, from the circumstance, that the subordinatian consequence undoubtedly involved in that principle was in no instance drawn, whilst, at the same time, the whole of the view otherwise entertained and clearly indicated, expressly stood in the way of the drawing of such a consequence. That position, therefore, was a remnant of the old subordinatian inheritance handed down from the third century, the influence of which was already broken by the development given to the true, permanent idea of the equality of essence which had been received as an inheritance from the primitive Church. We can also clearly see, what it is that prolonged the existence and vitality of that principle,—to wit, its apologetic significance. It was intended, namely, to show that, notwithstanding the triplicity of persons, the unity is preserved, inasmuch as the Son and the Spirit both proceed from, and return to, the one Father. But the moment this proof is found insufficient, and a more satisfactory one is discovered (as, for example, the idea of the immanence of the persons in each other), we shall find the teachers of the Church readily rejecting the one and embracing the other ; and the more so, as they were not in the habit of considering the Father to comprise the entire deity within Himself, and therefore did not designate Him the source of all divinity, in the sense of the other hypostases being merely parts of Him, the whole (compare Eusebius) ; —and this must certainly have been their meaning, had they aimed at saving the unity of God, by representing Him as the source of *all* deity. Two things, however, must not be overlooked in connection herewith :—(1) The more recent of the teachers referred to already arrived at the principle,—The Father is not the source and root of the entire deity ; the Son and Spirit derive merely their hypostases, not their deity, from

the Father; for the essence is one and the same in all. Deity is the element coeternally possessed in common by the three persons. (2) The Church teachers of the period now under consideration say, indeed, that no one of the persons can be cogitated apart from the other, that each suggests the other, and that the idea of God cannot be perfectly grasped, save under the form of a Trinity. But even supposing, as this implies, that the three stand in precisely the same relation to the divine essence, the question still arises, How are they related to each other, so far as they are distinguished from each other, or are hypostatical? And here they were justified in taking the Father as their point of departure, to prevent the three being regarded as three effulgurations, completely independent of each other, and only connected by the common divine essence from which they proceed. For, on the latter supposition, we should have three atoms, or individuals, without inner connection; and the unity would either be reduced to a nominalistic generic idea, or the divine essence, lying at the basis, must be allowed the independence which it has in Tetradism. In this respect, therefore, the teachers of the Church were quite right in describing the Father as the motive principle and starting-point of the process, out of which the hypostases arose. For, logically viewed, the Father must continue the first hypostasis. The only thing, therefore, for which they deserve blame, is that in contradiction to the propositions which say,—Not the Father by Himself, but the Trinity, is the entire God; they occasionally constitute the Father the Monas. This latter fault, however, is partially to be excused, on the ground that they never say,—The Father by Himself is the Monas; their meaning rather is,—The Father is the Monas, so far as He is conceived in His actuality and not as an abstract idea, or, so far as He must be conceived as the principle and starting-point of the hypostatical process; in other words, so far as He does not exclude the two other hypostases from the deity, but so comprises them in Himself that He would not Himself be the Father if He had not eternally possessed the Son and been the principle of the Spirit.

The second defect is, that these teachers determine rather negatively than positively what hypostasis is. What their positive determination would be, may be best ascertained by con-

sidering the claim they make relatively to Christology. Their fundamental presupposition undoubtedly was, that God in Christ was not merely a motive power, nor a mere activity, but a conscious, permanent mode of existence of the deity, distinct from that of the Father. They felt, therefore, that in the incarnation the Most High God Himself was present among men, and that He had not withheld the highest, but had communicated Himself without reserve to humanity in Christ. But Patripassianism having been found worthy of repudiation, the question naturally suggested itself,—How shall we determine the nature of the distinction between the God who became man and the God who did not become man, without destroying the unity of God, on the one hand, or interfering with Christology, on the other? Neither the Council of Nicæa, nor the Church Fathers of the century now under review, satisfactorily answered this question. Instead, then, of complaining, as some do,¹ that a clear and distinct answer to the question,—What is the true conception of hypostasis?—had not been found, it would be more correct and just to pay the tribute of acknowledgment due to the efforts of these “great” men, as they are allowed to be; in doing which, we should perhaps, nay, after what has been advanced above, must discover, that they did their full share towards the accomplishment of the task which they actually did and were necessitated to set for themselves. (Note 54.) Through their labours the pantheistic and deistic conception of God, or the heathenish and Jewish error, was excluded; and a point established, relatively to the divine aspect of the Person of Christ, which it was necessary to take for granted, if the divine and human were to be conceived as having attained to absolute union in Christ :—this aim, moreover, they consistently and consciously kept in view, in opposition alike to Heathenism and Judaism (compare Gregory of Nyssa, *Cat. M. T.* 2, 43 ff.; Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.* 33, and the Homily in Athanasius *adv. Sabell. Gregales*, which may be read also in Basilus, *Opp. T.* 1, 518 ff.). However decidedly they testify, as with one voice, that in the nature of God there are unsearchable depths, they are equally decided in asserting the possibility of, and in endeavouring to attain to, a knowledge of God through the medium of His revelation; and the charge brought against

¹ See Baur *l. c.* 441–470.

them, of taking their refuge in a Platonic, or, more precisely, a Neo-Platonic ignorance of God, is utterly baseless. That God is triune is not merely to be believed, but to be known (compare Gregory Nazianzen's *Πρὸς Εὐάγγριον περὶ θεότητος*, ed. Basil. p. 193). But this knowledge must flow forth, in the first instance, from religious experience, through the medium of the Holy Scriptures. They expressly declare it to be both possible and necessary, that in relation to the cogitation of God as a Trinity, faith should become gnosis. Only the "How?" of the procession of the Son and the Spirit is unsearchable; although, even in relation to this point, they maintained that a knowledge becomes every day more possible, in that we are able to say what the process is not; and such a negative explanation implies a certain positive insight. On the other hand, too, they deserve all praise for the sobriety and moderation which they display, and which give the lie to the opposite reproach, frequently brought against them, of being too much given to formularizing and dogmatizing. The spirit of modesty just alluded to prevented them from treating as settled that which was still unsettled, impelled them to continue their investigations into the true idea of hypostasis, and to give free play to all attempts to further a solution, provided only, on the one hand, the interest of Christology were kept in sight, and, on the other hand, that neither mixture nor separation, neither Sabellianism nor Arianism (or Tritheism), were favoured and aided. In fact, we have found also among the Nicene Fathers, considerable differences in this respect, which both indicate that the field still left open was very wide, and show that these first post-Nicene teachers at once earnestly set about the work left them to perform,—the work, to wit, of determining the precise nature of hypostasis and its relation to unity, on the one hand, and to other hypostases, on the other.

SECTION II.

CHRISTOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE CHURCH TEACHERS PRIOR TO
APOLLINARIS.

WE have already had frequent occasion to remark, how the activity of the Church in connection with Christology abated during the century to which may be given the title of the Trinitarian Century. Indeed, the Christian conception of God was to furnish the groundwork for the construction of a doctrine of the Person of Christ. How this foundation was laid, we have described in the preceding section. We should be very greatly mistaken, however, if we were to suppose that Christological labours had meanwhile been totally suspended: on the contrary, in the case of the thinkers of the Church, Christology was the perennial motive of their trinitarian efforts. These inquiries, however, took precisely the form which they alone could take, and which corresponded to the position held by Christology as the mainspring of the trinitarian movement; they related, to wit, not to the individual momenta of the Person of Christ in their relation to, and movement towards, each other; nor to the question, What are the fundamental elements of this person? but the Person of Christ, in its entirety, was the object of the attention of the Church. What we have in the first instance to recount is not, points which became matter of clear consciousness, in consequence of the solicitations of heretics; not the settlement and defence of a single point, in opposition to single attacks; not the analysis of the momenta of

Christology as a whole ; but the utterances which proceeded from the Church concerning the Person of Christ, when it gave free and unreserved expression to the impression once and constantly made upon it by this person in its entirety. The grand total image of the living Person of the God-man, who includes heaven and earth in Himself,¹ hovered before the eyes of the greatest teachers of the Church, especially in flourishing periods, as, for example, in the time of Irenæus and Tertullian, or at the epoch now under consideration, when the Christian mind gathered up its powers for a full or new exercise on the work set before it. They were not able, it is true, to set forth the entire fulness of that image in a scientific form ; but still we have numerous scattered utterances of theirs, which indicate its nature, and show that the fixed logical forms which they adopted did but faintly reveal the substance that occupied their hearts and minds—a substance which science could only slowly, and perhaps by long roundabout methods, reproduce. As the immediate and original outflow of the Christian mind, this total image of the living Person of Christ deserves special consideration in the present connection ; especially as it throws the true light on the attempts made during the following period, to construct the unity of the person on the basis of two distinct natures. For, on the one hand, it will show us clearly that the existence of this mystical intuition of the Person of Christ, in which the conjunction of the divine and human aspects to personal unity is immediately posited and intentionally anticipated by faith, does not render unnecessary, but rather requires, that full justice be done to the distinctions between the two aspects, in order that an unity may be arrived at based on the recognition and conciliation of the distinctions. It further, also, shows us, that even when the work of discrimination was carried too far, or scientific thought remained entangled in the distinctions drawn, the total Christological possession of, at all events, the better teachers of the Church was not absorbed by such imperfect attempts ; on the contrary, that unity of the person or conjunction of the widely separated distinctions, which they had not been able scientifically to establish, was certified to them in the sphere of faith by the immediate intuition of the image of Christ

¹ *γρηγορί*, compare the Homil. on the Theophan. in the Opp. Greg. Thaum. ; *ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται*, after Paul.

in its totality. That immediate intuition accompanied their mind in its dialectic activity; and as it could not be replaced, so neither was it supplanted, by the scientific process.

This primitive Christian intuition of the Person of Christ, of which we discover frequent traces even in the New Testament, and which is of the highest significance relatively to His redemptive work, to baptism, to the Eucharist, and to the right view of the idea of the Christian Church, we have found repeatedly expressed, in the most fully developed form, however, by Ignatius and the Ep. ad Diognet., by Irenæus and Tertullian. The same remark holds good of the Fathers of the third century also, as we have seen, for example, in the case of Hippolytus, Cyprian, and others.¹ Origen especially lived in it, though it took in his mind a distinct and peculiar character.

The First-born of all creation, says he, the noblest nature, is designated King and Son of the King; the man whom He assumed, was formed by Him in righteousness, and so they are one. For the Redeemer made of two one, in that He united the first fruits of both in Himself.² If God has made Him, who knew no sin, sin for us, we can no longer say that there was no darkness in Him (as there is none in the Father). But He took our weakness upon Himself, our sin did He bear; and the sickness of the soul, the pains of the hidden man of the heart, lay upon Him. On their account, in order to carry them away, He confessed that His soul was troubled and shaken, and, according to Zechariah, put on unclean garments. Because He took upon Himself the sins of the people which believeth in Him, therefore saith He so frequently, as though speaking in our name,—“The account of my sins is far from salvation; Thou knowest my folly, and my sins are not hidden before Thee.” No one can suppose that we thus blaspheme against the Anointed

¹ See Vol. i. 103 ff., 259 ff., 313, 316 ff.; ii. 65 ff., 96 ff., 101 ff.

² Ad Rom. i. 5. Origen designates the Logos “promiscue” Only-begotten and First-born. During the Arian controversy (compare Ath. c. Ar. or. 2, 663), these ideas were more precisely defined as follows: “Only-begotten” refers to the eternity and singularity of His Sonship; whereas “First-born” has reference also to the many brethren, whom He does not lack notwithstanding His own pre-eminence, nay more, whom He gains through it. The designations, therefore, are taken as mutually complementary. The former is the absolute expression for Christ; the latter, the relative, which refers back to the former.

of God. For as the Father alone has immortality, whereas the Lord took our death upon Himself, out of pure love to men, we can only say of the Father, "In Him is no darkness." If God has made Him, who knew no sin, sin for us, we cannot say of Him, "In Him is no darkness." For Christ, *in His love for men, took our darkneses upon Himself*, in order that by His power He might kill our death, and dissipate the darkness of our soul, as Isaiah saith, "The people which sat in darkness, hath seen a great light (τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν διὰ φιλαθροπίας θάνατον τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀνελήφertos,—ἐφ' αὐτὸν τὰς ἡμῶν σκοτίας ἀναδεσγμένου, etc. In Joh. T. ii. 21). His flesh also is termed "sin;" for He came in the form of sinful flesh. It is called sin, because it is a sacrifice for sin; through this sacrifice, which is termed sin, He has put sin to flight and destroyed it (ad Rom. iv. 12; T. iv. 589). Life is stronger than death; righteousness is stronger than sin; the grace is greater than the mischief. For the grace of Christ is more richly and widely poured out than the death of Adam; seeing that it has not merely driven away death, but brought life to dominion; nay more, it has even brought us to dominion through Christ (ad Rom. v. 2). He is the tree of life, into whom we must be implanted. His death becomes the tree of life to us. In this way we can imitate Him in holiness. And the Church is His body (in Joh. T. x. 23, 27); so that the resurrection of Christ embraces the mystery of the resurrection of the entire body of Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34, x. 20). This is the deeper reason why, in all the principal momenta of the history of Christ, Origen sees our history, the history of individuals or of the Church. In this aspect, his allegorical interpretation is not a play with coincidences; Christ he viewed, not as a naked symbol, but as the principle of the process through which the Church must pass in imitation of its Head. For this reason, the thought recurs in the greatest variety of expressions,—His history is our history, and our history is His. The anointing of the Son, the union of the Spirit and of man in Him, denotes the marriage, the commingling, of the believing soul with the Holy Ghost (in Joh. T. i. 30). He gives a similar turn to our crucifixion with Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34), and to the sufferings of believers (ibid., and in Jerem. Hom. 14, 7; 18, 12). In every martyr, Christ is condemned. For if a Christian is condemned, not because of a sin, but because he is a Christian,

Christ is condemned in him. Throughout the whole earth, Christ is constantly suffering from unbelievers and sceptics, who divide Him in sunder. It is foolish to suppose that Christ has been only once scourged, by Pilate. As often as unbelievers persecute Christians, Christ presents His back to the smiters. When Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 28, speaks of the subjection of the Son under the Father, he shows us that all that he means thereby is, the subjection of believers, whom He comprises in Himself.¹ Because Christ is the life in each, the life multiplies itself; for Christ is found in every saint, and for the sake of the one Christ there are born many christs, His imitators, formed after Him, who is the image of God (*Διὰ γὰρ τὸν ἐν ἐκάστῳ Χριστὸν ὄντα ζῶνι πληθύνονται αἱ ζωαί—οἷονεὶ γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστον ἅγιον Χριστὸς εὑρίσκεται, καὶ γίνονται διὰ τὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν πολλοὶ Χριστοὶ, οἱ ἐκεῖνοι μιμηταὶ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν, εἰκόνα ὄντα Θεοῦ μεμορφωμένοι;* in Joh. T. vi. 3). Between this birth of Christians from God, which he conceived to be mediated by Christ, and the birth of the Son from the Father, he finds also a resemblance (in Jerem. Hom. ix. 4). As the Father did not generate the Son once for all, and then send Him forth from Himself, ceasing therewith any longer to generate, but begets Him eternally; so also, if thou hast the spirit of sonship, God begets thee continually in Him, in every work and every thought; and thus begotten, thou becomest a continually begotten son of God in Christ Jesus.

That which gives the humanity of Christ this universal significance, is simply and solely the Logos, who united Himself with it in vital unity. The Logos illuminates everything, even the ideal world, and the logical souls in the real world (in Joh. T. i. 24). As wisdom, He is the beginning and the end; in Him is included the idea of the entire world, so far as He is wisdom in God (i. 22, 34). He is the light for all men and all rational beings, the source of all pure life (i. 28, 29). Christ, the only-begotten One, is all in all, beginning and end. As the

¹ Π. ἀρχ. L. iii, 5, 6: Quid non solum regnandi, verum etiam obediendi venerat reparare disciplinam, in semet ipso prius complens, quod ab aliis volebat impleri, iccirco non solum ad mortem crucis Patri obediens factus est, verum etiam in consummatione seculi in semet ipso complectens omnes, quos subiecit Patri, et qui per eum veniunt ad salutem, cum ipsis et in ipsis quoque subjectus dicitur Patri: dum omnia in ipso constant, et ipse est caput omnium, et in ipso est salus et salutem consequentium plenitudo. Compare above, pp. 134–138.

beginning, He is in the man whom He assumed ; as the end, in the last of the saints. Or otherwise put,—Even in those who are in the middle (between the beginning and the end of the world) is He : as the beginning in Adam ; as the end in the Son of man, the second and *last* Adam (i. 34). Christ is Alpha and Omega. No one knows the Father save through Him ; no one can stand connected with the Father save through Him. And perhaps, as in the temple the steps were many which led to the sanctuary, so is the First-born of God all steps to us ; as reckoning downwards, He is the first and the second, so also the last. His humanity is the first and lowest step. Beginning with it, we pass on through the entire series of steps, so that we ascend through Him, who is also angel and the rest of the powers. Above all, however, He must be to us the Lamb, which takes away our sins (in Joh. xix. 1). In a much diviner way than Paul He became all things to all, passing through all stages, from the angels down to the beings in the nether world, in order to win all. To the angels He became an angel, to men a man. If there exist letters of God, after the reading of which, the saints say that they have read in the tables of heaven, elements through which heavenly things can be read, these are the ideas, which are, as it were, broken into small fragments, to wit, into the Alpha and the following letters to Omega, which is the Son of God. Again, regarded from another point of view, the same Son is as Logos, simultaneously, both beginning and end (in Joh. T. i. 34).

In passages like that just adduced, and in similar ones, the distinction between the first and second creation is not always thoroughly maintained. Sometimes the Logos is represented as the soul of the world, which is broken up into a plurality of beings (*λόγοι*). This by itself would not sufficiently explain why the Logos should become man, angel, and so forth ; for in a certain sense He became man and angel by the creation of these beings : why, then, was a further special act of union with them necessary ? From our previous exposition of Origen's system, however, we know that he considered the participation in the Logos involved in the creation to have been but imperfect, so far as free beings were brought into existence, to whom an abiding and indissoluble connection with the Logos was primarily a task to be accomplished. This is the point at which

his theory, that the Logos must take His place in history, and undergo a regular process of development on behalf of all rational creatures, finds application. He *must* become all rational beings, in order that, as one of them, He may be near to all, may be laid hold of by them as the atoning principle in its totality, and may lead them to the Father. He *is able* to assume all, because all are created by Him; and in them all is but one generic substance of different grades, for there is but one Logos. For this reason, He pervades all the genera of beings as different stages of the λογικόν. But believing as he did, that all rational beings are, as such, inwardly connected with the Logos, and that He, as their common principle of unity, assumed them all, and exhibited all in Himself in their perfection, the way was paved to his doctrine of the ἀποκατάστασις of all things (c. Cels. 8, 12). He set forth all in their perfection by becoming all; but He returned out of them to Himself, by deifying them in Himself. As He passed through all stages, even so must we, strengthened by His power, and, in imitation of His example, advance from stage to stage, till we become one spirit with Him.

In this aspect also, therefore, Origen's Christology may be said to have a somewhat Docetical character. Not because of the universality lent to his view of redemption, by his doctrine of the assumption of all classes of beings; for, as we have remarked, he looked upon angels, not as a different genus of beings, but merely as a different grade of one and the same logical genus. Nor because the historical life of the Logos was blended with and dissipated into His life in eternity, by the doctrine of His assumption of all beings; for He was actually of opinion, that the Logos showed Himself to angels as an angel, and as a man to men, and that men, at a higher stage, will become angels, in consequence of the Logos having first become man for them. Finally, the Docetical element does not lie in his notion, that whilst the Logos was man, He was also the light and vital principle of the entire world; for Origen appears to have connected the two things as follows,—the soul of Christ being indissolubly united with, and fired throughout by, the Logos, was one spirit with Him, and the centre whence He, unhindered by body and space, was universally active. We have seen above, that he regarded the sacrifice of Christ on the

cross as the sacrifice offered in the centre of the world on behalf of the entire world; and to those who expressed surprise that the Pneuma (that is, the Logos) should be sent into a corner, instead of filling all bodies in the entire world, he replied,—“We have enough with one sun; it is for all. This Anointed One made many anointed; Christ is the head; He and the Church are one body. If thou desirest to see many bodies full of the Divine Spirit, look at the Church (c. Cels. 6, 78, 79).” The Docetical element rather consists in his denying to the humanity of Christ constitutive and permanent significance in itself (for example, ad Rom. i. 6, compare Thomasius, pp. 213, 214), even as he denied it to the other forms which he assumed; attributing to them, on the contrary, a merely pedagogical or anagogical significance, as guides to the pure and naked deity. Our perfection, too, will be the termination of our personal existence; and thus the system which made so strictly ethical a beginning, ends by being physical. The utmost that remains is, that a new world may arise through a new apostasy; which, however, must be represented as running through the same course, unless the ideas, respectively, of God and the world, are stripped of their mutually exclusive character.¹

How important was the position held by that image of Christ in His totality, in the system of Athanasius, prior to the Arian controversy, we have seen above (pp. 249 ff.). Arianism necessarily felt inwardly estranged from it; all that it sought in Christ was a teacher and pattern of virtue. Only men like Eusebius of Cæsarea endeavoured to retain their hold on it; in the sense, however, that the Logos in and by Himself, and not first the Logos incarnate, or the God-man, was the First-born of creation, the Head of humanity and of the world (see above, pp. 221 ff.). When the office of mediator or substitute for humanity is conferred on a creature, such as the one proposed

¹ The ideas of Irenæus and Tertullian, which belong to this connection, have been treated above. The important thought, that Christ was the archetype even for the creation of Adam, appears to have been contained also in Methodius' *Συμπόσιον παρθενικόν*, where he remarked,—*ἰσχύουσιν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ὁμοίαν τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κατ' εἰκόνα Χριστοῦ*. The word *Χριστός* might refer, it is true, merely to the Son of God in Himself, for Methodius goes on to say,—*Αὐτός γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα καὶ ὁ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*. Compare Gregory of Nyssa, *περὶ κατασκευ. ἀνθρώπου*, c. 16.

by Arianism, it becomes ethnic and unethical; for only on the ground of an act of deification, and of the curtailment both of our personality and of the task assigned to us, can a mere creature be represented as taking our place, and as holding the position of our representative before God. In the works directed against Arianism, Athanasius constantly recurs to this idea, whenever his object is to confront the entire fulness and weight of true Christianity with the scanty view of it taken by Arianism. It was that intuitional image of the Redeemer in His totality that marked out for Athanasius, during all his controversies, the direction which he ought to pursue; like a never-erring compass, it enabled him to steer safely between heresies wearing the appearance of the full truth, like those of Marcellus and Apollinaris. He employed it against Arianism, not merely when his purpose was to establish the Christian idea of atonement, in opposition to the false deification of man, on the one hand, and his false humiliation and separation from God, on the other; but both he and his friends used the idea principally in order to turn aside Arian objections, which deduced the lowness of Christ's higher nature from the lowness of the declarations concerning Him contained in the New Testament. To a whole series of passages of this nature in the New Testament they applied the canon,—When Christ was troubled unto death, and cried out, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" He spake in our name, because He had put himself into our place, and had taken upon Himself our guilt and abasement.¹ Against Sabellianism they argued, on the basis of this intuition of theirs, that Christianity was not a mere transitory theophany, or an *ἐνέργεια* of God; but that its aim was the perfection of humanity. Now the perfec-

¹ Athan. c. Ar. i. 48; Greg. Naz. or. 29, 18: "Count up, unthankful man, the words, 'My God and your God,' 'greater,' 'created,' 'made,' 'sanctified,' 'servant,' 'obedience,' 'He learned,' 'He was commissioned,' 'He was sent,' 'Of myself I can do, speak, judge, give, will nothing.' Add thereto His ignorance, His subjection, His prayer, His questions, His progress, His being perfected. Add, further, His sleeping, being hungry and weary, His weeping, His trembling and shuddering. Perhaps thou wilt reproach Him also (O Arian) with His death and His cross." Let the answer serve: 'Ενὶ κεφαλαίῳ τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα πρόσωγε τῇ θεότητι καὶ τῇ κρείττονι φουσίᾳ παθῶν καὶ σώματος, τὰ δὲ ταπεινότερα τῷ συνήθει, καὶ τῷ διὰ σε κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ σαρκωθῆναι, καὶ ἀνθρωπισθῆναι. Compare 30, 1, 21.

tion of humanity requires that it be constituted the Church, the body of the Lord, of which He is the Head.¹ How, in the last place, Apollinarism was combated by the aid of this image, we shall shortly see.

Let us now specify a few of the more important passages. In becoming a man Himself, says Athanasius repeatedly, the eternal Son constituted mankind sons and gods; for He set forth in Himself, in the first instance, a man who was God, and now He draws us into fellowship with Him (*υἱοποίησε, καὶ ἐθεοποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γενόμενος αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος*, c. Ar. or. 1, 38).² Neither the Logos was exalted by becoming man and displaying virtue, as the Arians suppose, nor was He humbled (*ἡλαττώθη*) by the assumption of a body; but deification became the portion of the body which He assumed (c. Ar. 1, 40, 42). As humanity is worshipped in Him, the heavenly powers can no longer wonder when they see us, who wear His nature, entering into heaven (c. 42). His humiliation is a fact; but it produced no change in Him. For not physical defect, but the riches of His love, was the cause of His humiliation, and therefore He remained the same, though we were savingly altered (c. Ar. or. 1, 48). He first sanctified Himself in order that He might sanctify us all. "I, the Logos of the Father, give even the spirit to Myself, the Incarnate One, and thus sanctify Myself, the Incarnate One, in order that all may be at once sanctified in Me, who am the truth." Accordingly, He gives as God; He receives as man; but in His person we have made a beginning of receiving. From Him streams forth the Spirit as a precious ointment over the whole of humanity (or. c. Ar. 1, 46—48). C. Ar. 4, 33:—"He wrapped Himself in our first fruits, and married Himself therewith. Taking this perishing man into Himself, He renews him by a stable renewal unto eternal duration." (*Ἐνωται φιλανθρώπως ἡμῖν, τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ἡμῶν περιθεμενος, καὶ ταύτῃ ἀνακραθεῖς.—Εἰ τοίνυν (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) σαθρωθέντα*

¹ Compare c. Ar. 4, 12, 25. The question with which we have to do, is not something epideictical, a *παιδιά*, but the *ἀλήθεια*, which is contained in Christ for the individual and the Church.

² Compare 39, 1, 48. *Οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ· αὐτοῦ γὰρ νῦν λεγομένου ἀνθρωπίνως χρίσθαι, ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ χριόμενοι· ἐπειδὴ καὶ βαπτιζόμενοι αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ βαπτιζόμενοι.* 3, 34.

εἰς ἐαυτὸν λαβόμενος πάλιν ἀνακαινίζει διὰ τῆς βεβαίας αἰπῆς ἀνανεώσεως πρὸς διαμονὴν ἀτελεύτητον καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἐνοῦται εἰς θειοτέραν αὐτὸν ἀνάγων λῆξιν—πῶς οἶον τε—τοῖς ἀποστόλοις—συναριθμεῖν τὸν τῶν ἀποστόλων κύριον;) “The Word became flesh, in order that, as the Logos is Son, God might be termed our Father for the sake of the Son dwelling in us. Whoso, therefore, has not the Son in his heart, of him God cannot be termed the Father” (*Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος γέγονε σὰρξ, ὅ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν υἱὸς, διὰ τὸν ἐνοικοῦντα ἐν ἡμῖν υἱὸν λέγεται καὶ ἡμῶν πατήρ.*—Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν υἱὸς τὸν ἴδιον πατέρα ἐπικαλούμενος καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖ πατέρα καλεῖσθαι. Ἀμέλει ὦν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὁ υἱὸς, τούτων οὐδὲ πατήρ ὁ Θεὸς ἂν λεχθείη, 4, 22). “When the Spirit descended on Him in the Jordan, He descended upon us, whose body Christ bore. When He was washed in the Jordan, we were washed in and by Him (*Εὐδελον, ὅτι καὶ ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ τοῦ πνεύματος γενομένη κάθοδος εἰς ἡμᾶς ἦν γινομένη, διὰ τὸ φορεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα.*—Τοῦ γὰρ κυρίου ὡς ἀνθρώπου λουομένου—ἡμεῖς ἦμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ λουόμενοι, etc., 1, 47). “God calls men, who are created, sons, as though they had been begotten. As they are created natures, they can only become sons by receiving the Spirit of Him who is by nature and truly Son. He who was our Creator becomes our Father, from which it is clear that we are not by nature sons, but the Son who is in us. Nor is God by nature our Father, but the Father of the Word, which is in us. But the Father designates those sons in whom He sees His Son” (2, 59). “Man united with a mere creature could not have been deified, nor could he have ventured to present himself to the Father, had not Christ been the essential Word of God. As man, He is become the beginning of the new creation (*ἀρχὴ καινῆς κτίσεως*); for He is the man created for us. For this reason, this union of the divine and human (*συναφή*) took place in Him, in order that, with that which is by nature divine, He might unite that which is by nature human, and the salvation and deification of the human (*θεοποίησις*) might be firmly established” (2, 70). “As a wise builder does not merely think how to build a house, but also arranges it so that it can be restored if it should receive damage, so the basis of our renewal was laid in Christ *ere we existed*, in order that we might be created again in Him” (2, 77). This

passage appears to represent the connection of our nature with Christ as so essential, that it must have subsisted even if sin had not entered the world.¹ "We must not be surprised, therefore, to find Christ speaking of His image (τύπος), which is in us, as of Himself; for when Saul persecuted the Church, in which was His image and likeness, He said, as though He Himself were the object of the persecution,—Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?" Similar also is the import of the passage, Prov. viii. 22:—He speaks of the creation as of Himself. After explaining in c. Ar. or. 3, 32 f. that the grand thing is, that whatever sufferings are undergone, or works are performed, by a man in Christ, do not concern this man alone, but the Logos also, who makes all things His own (οἰκειοῦ, ἰδιοποιεῖ), he goes on to say,—Inasmuch as the flesh was born of the Virgin (Μαρία θεοτόκος), He Himself was said to have been born, who is the principle of the birth of others, namely, that He might transfer our birth to Himself, and thus obtain the mastery over the principle of death in us.² He regarded the work of redemption, therefore, as already begun with the act of incarnation; the entire finitude to which He subjected Himself, and of which that act formed the beginning, finds its explanation, not in His nature, but in His substitutionary love. (Note 55.)

This leads us to notice a particular class of passages which relate to the sufferings of Christ. (Note 56.) C. Ar. 1, 41: "As man He endured death for us, that so He might present Himself to the Father for us. As He died for us, so also has He been exalted on our behalf, in order that, like as we all died in the death of Christ, even so we might all be unutterably exalted in Him." "He takes our sufferings upon Himself and

¹ His meaning can, however, also be,—The possibility of the incarnation was grounded in the creation itself, because the Logos or the Wisdom of God was informed in the world (compare c. 79); but still merely typically, in comparison with the archetype, wisdom itself.

² "Ἰνα τὴν ἡμῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν μεταβῇ γένεσις, καὶ μὴ κέτι ὡς γῆ μόνῃ ὄντες εἰς γῆν ἀπέλθωμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τῷ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ λόγῳ συναφθόντες εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀναχθῶμεν παρ' αὐτοῦ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάθη τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἀπεικότως εἰς ἑαυτὸν μετέθηκεν· ἵνα μὴ κέτι ὡς ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἴδιοι τοῦ λόγου τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς μετασχωμεν. Τῆς γενέσεως ἡμῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς σαρκικῆς ἀσθενείας μετατίθενται εἰς τὸν λόγον (cf. 2, 69) ἐγχειρόμεθα ἀπὸ γῆς, λυθίσσης τῆς δι' ἁμαρτίαν κατάρτας, etc. Οὐκέτι ὡς γῆινης, ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν λογιθείσης τῆς σαρκὸς διὰ τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, ὃς δι' ἡμᾶς ἐγένετο σάρξ."

presents them to the Father, interceding for us, that they may be destroyed in Him" (4, 6). "Although not weak, He took upon Himself our weakness; although not hungering, He hungered; He sacrifices that which is ours, in order to extinguish it; but instead of weaknesses (which were laid on Him, and through His bearing of them were extinguished), He receives gifts from God, of which those will become partakers who are united with Him" (c. 7). "The death, which is termed His, the death of the Logos, was a ransom for the sins of men, and a death of death" (1, 45). "Laden with guilt, the world lay under the condemnation of the law; but the Logos took the judgment (*κρίμα*) up into Himself, and suffering in the flesh for all, He bestowed salvation on all" (compare Ar. or. 1, 51, 60; 2, 69).

Similar expressions occur repeatedly in the works of the two Gregories and of Basilus. Gregory Nazianzen, after saying, in Hom. 30,—the *ταπεινώτεραι* and *άνθρωπικότεραι φωναί* which are recorded respecting Christ, are to be referred to the *νέος δι' ήμās άνθρωπος*; he proceeds (c. 3),—*τῷ ὄντι ἐδούλευσε σαρκε καὶ γενέσκει καὶ πάθεσι τοῖς ήμετέροις διὰ τήν ήμετέραν ἐλευθερίαν, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς σέσωκεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας κατεχομένοις. Τί δὲ μείζον ἀνθρώπου ταπεινότητι, ἢ Θεῷ πλακῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι Θεὸν ἐκ τῆς μίξεως*; The *θεία εἰκὼν* is commingled with the *δουλική μορφή*. On 1 Cor. xv. 28 (c. 5), he remarks,—Is He not now subject? Did He need, as God, to be subjected to God, like a rebel? *Ἄλλ' οὕτω σκόπει, ὅτι ὥσπερ κατάρρα ἤκουσε δι' ἐμέ, ὁ τὴν ἐμὴν λύων κατάραν, καὶ ἀμαρτία ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἀμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ Ἀδὰμ ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ γίνεται νέος· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀνυπότακτον ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται ὡς κεφαλὴ τοῦ παντὸς σώματος. Ἔως μὲν οὖν ἀνυπότακτος ἐγὼ καὶ στασιώδης, ἀνυπότακτος τὸ κατ' ἐμέ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς λέγεται· ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα (ὑποταγήσεται δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐπιγνώσει καὶ τῇ μεταποιήσει), τότε καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ὑποταγὴν πεπλήρωκε, προσάγων ἐμέ τὸν σεσωσμένον.* The Father subjects all things to the Son, the Son to the Father; the former by His decree, the latter by His deed. Thus, He who subjected it sets forth before God that which belongs to us, as subjected, by appropriating to Himself that which belongs to us (*ἑαυτοῦ ποιούμενος τὸ ήμέτερον*). In like manner, he then further explains the desertion of Christ. He was not left in Himself, either by the Father or by

His own deity, but represented in Himself that which we experience (ἐν ἑαυτῷ τυποῖ τὸ ἡμέτερον). Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἡμεν οἱ ἐγκαταλελειμμένοι καὶ παρεωραμένοι πρότερον, εἴτα νῦν προσειλημμένοι καὶ σεσσωσμένοι τοῖς τοῦ ἀπαθoῦς πάθεσιν. "Ὡςπερ καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ πλημμελὲς οἰκειούμενος τὰ ἐξῆς διὰ τοῦ ψαλμοῦ (Ps. xxii.) φησιν. C. 6 :—So also must we understand the words,—“He learnt obedience,” “He was heard.” As Logos, He was neither obedient nor disobedient, for He was the Lord; ὡς δὲ δούλου μορφὴ συγκαταβαίνει τοῖς ὁμοδόλοις καὶ δούλοις, καὶ μορφοῦται τὸ ἀλλότριον, ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐμὲ φέρων μετὰ τῶν ἐμῶν, ἵνα ἐν ἑαυτῷ δαπανήσῃ τὸ χεῖρον ὡς κηρὸν πῦρ, ἢ ὡς ἀτμίδα γῆς ἥλιος, κἀγὼ μεταλάβω τῶν ἐκείνου διὰ τὴν σύγκρασιν. The perfection will consist in our ceasing to be many, to be as we are now—for now we carry little or nothing of God in our movements and feelings; ἀλλ’ ὅλοι θεοειδεῖς, ὅλον Θεοῦ χωρητικοὶ καὶ μόνου, seeing that Christ is all in all (Gal. iii. 28). C. 14 :—He lives eternally, in order to intercede for us, as a man for my salvation. For He will continue united with the flesh which He has assumed, until He shall have deified me by the power of the incarnation (τῇ δυνάμει τῆς ἀνθρωπήσεως ἐμὲ θεὸν ποιήσῃ). (Note 57.) 30, 21 :—He is called (and is) Man, οὐχ ἵνα χωρηθῇ μόνον διὰ σώματος σώμασιν, ἀλλως οὐκ ἂν χωρηθεῖς διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀληπτου, ἀλλ’ ἵνα καὶ ἀγίασῃ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥςπερ ζύμη γενόμενος τῷ παντὶ φυράματι, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐνώσας τὸ κατακριθὲν ὅλον λύσῃ τοῦ κατακρίματος, πάντα ὑπὲρ πάντων γενόμενος ὅσα ἡμεῖς, πλὴν τῆς ἀμαρτίας, σῶμα, ψυχὴ, νοῦς. Similar passages are contained in the Ep. ad Cledon. 1, 10, 14.

A more complete conception of the mediation, of the representation of the entire race by the God-man, could not be framed than the one given here. Gregory, like Athanasius, did not derive it from the Logos as He is in Himself, but from the Logos incarnate; or from the fact that, as to His humanity, He became the vine-stock, the Head, which, as it is the first, so also is it the principle of the whole,—the whole in its simple, powerful, all-mastering, and all-appropriating unity.¹

¹ Athanasius did not hold Origen's doctrine, that Christ became an angel for angels; but still he believed that the incarnation had some sort of a reference to them also. Previously they had not seen the Logos; but since He has become man, they behold Him, c. Ar. or. 4, 36.

Specially rich in passages of this kind are the works of Gregory of Nyssa. According to him, God, in uniting Himself with one man, united Himself with the whole of humanity, assumed the entire race, because the one man whom He assumed was the *ἀνάρχῃ*, in which all men are potentially or principally included. Humanity is, in his view, one living being, *ἐν ζῶον*; hence the divine power of the Head, which is at the same time an integral member of the great body of humanity, diffused itself through the whole race. And so, in this One all died; and the resurrection and exaltation of this One is the resurrection and exaltation of all. This fact is brought also into the most intimate connection with baptism and the Eucharist. (Note 58.)

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE ARIANS AND OF MARCELLUS, AND ITS REDARGUTION BY THE TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH.

REFERENCE has been already made to the Christology of Arius and of the Sabellianism revived by Marcellus; but we have only given closer attention to it, so far as the view to be taken of one aspect of the Person of Christ depended on the form assumed by the doctrine of the Trinity. We have therefore still a word to say regarding their view of the human aspect, and of the unity of the person.

The First-born of creation, whom the Arians say became man, is a being of another genus than man:—still, however, a creature, which, on the ground of its mutability (*τρέπττον*), of its, in the first instance, merely growing, unestablished virtue, of its imperfect knowledge, and above all, of the freedom of choice attributed to it in common with all finite rational beings, may be described as possessing all the elements strictly constitutive of the spiritual aspect of the humanity of Christ. Arianism was therefore unable to concede to Christ a human soul: for how could two finite beings, two free wills and so forth, be conceived to be conjoined in one and the same person? It consequently attached equal importance to the two principles;—

1. Whenever the spiritual aspect of Christ is spoken of as having humbled itself, it must be referred to the Logos ; 2. Christ had no human soul ; but the bright lucific substance assumed a human body, partially in order to veil itself, partially in order to become visible to men.

The latter principle evidently renders it impossible that Christ should have been the subject of an actual development from youth upwards. The higher, premundane, lucific spirit must have attained to a high degree of virtue, of ripeness in general, ere He became man. Accordingly, it was impossible that He should learn and grow after a human fashion, beginning at the lowest stage ; and the entire process through which Christ is said to have passed, becomes Docetical, unless we resort to the monstrous supposition, that this highest creature reduced itself again to the level of a potency, plunged into Lethe after the manner of the Platonic souls, and metamorphosed itself to an earlier stage of its existence, in order to be able to become man. But if Christ's growth were a mere appearance, His conflicts, His temptations also, were an appearance ; and one cannot understand why He should be rewarded for them. Moreover, what reward could be conferred on Him ? All that Arians could do at this point, was to represent that higher spirit, whom even prior to His incarnation they designate Creator and First-born, as returning to the position He occupied before ; for, as He had no human soul, they could not fairly speak of His humanity being exalted and becoming eternal. But the body by itself could only, strictly speaking, be the instrument of a momentary theophany ; it could not have an eternal significance. We see, therefore, that the Christ of Arianism, who is a higher spirit, walking upon earth, and apparently undergoing a development in a human body, was really a completely mythical shape. At this point, Arianism, which commenced with being jejune and coldly logical, assumes a fantastical character, and reveals an affinity with Gnosticism ; which also we have found to combine within itself the opposite elements of Ebionism and Docetism. In order to reduce the miracle of the incarnation to as low a level as possible, Arianism began with referring all the defects that are attributed to the human nature of Christ to His higher nature ; and now, as though by way of punishment, instead of a miraculous person, it was compelled to adopt a monstrosity,

and the veritable humanity, for which it apparently took up arms, was dissipated into a Docetical seeming. In one word, as frequently occurs elsewhere, Arianism preferred the marvellous to the miraculous, taught by the Church.

This aspect of the Arian system did not remain entirely unnoticed even at an earlier period; but all eyes were at first so completely occupied with its trinitarian aspect, that neither Arians themselves further developed the Christological principles of their system, nor did the Church teachers recognise the real significance of this point. In Antioch alone, soon after the close of the Nicene Council, was a protesting voice raised against the Arian principle, that Christ assumed a body without soul, by the Bishop Eusebius. It would appear, however, that the Arians themselves, in laying down and frequently referring to the principle, were led, not so much by a conviction of its indispensableness to the complete construction of their Christology, as by a feeling that it was a convenient and near-lying middle idea. For, had it once been decided that Christ assumed, not a human soul, but merely a human body, then the conclusion was inevitable, that the lower utterances regarding Christ contained in the Scriptures, referring, as they unquestionably do, to a spiritual, and not to a merely corporeal element, must hold good of His higher nature, which was in reality the only spiritual element in Him. (Note 59.)

We should have expected that, in order to refute this line of argumentation, the Church would have at once fallen back on the ancient doctrine of the soul of Christ, which had never been retracted. So far as we know, however, the only teacher in the East who did so prior to Apollinaris, was Eustathius in Antioch. According to Epiphanius (*de Ancorat.* c. 33), the doctrine, that the Son of God assumed, not a human soul, but merely a human body, had long been held by the school of Lucian. Although Lucian's motive in laying down the principle was probably different from that which influenced his followers,¹—for neither he, nor, at first, Arius, had been specially concerned to represent the Logos as mutable,—still, we must conclude it to have been ventilated for the first time in Antioch, especially as the Arians

¹ Without distinguishing between Lucian and the Arians, between Lucian and Lucianists, Epiphanius (*l. c.*) attributes the Arian motive to both the latter.

appealed very readily to Lucian, and applied to the purposes of their doctrine of the Trinity that which in his hands had probably related solely to Christology. We know not merely that Eustathius disapproved of the Arian denial of the human soul of Christ, but also how far he succeeded in securing to the doctrine thereof a positive and independent significance. (Note 60.)

Marcellus, as we know, conceived the divine in Christ to be the active principle, the human the passive: the human by itself he represented as completely will-less, as a mere organ of the divine *ἐνέργεια*, as passive in the manner in which the prophets were held to have been passive during their ecstasies. He was unable to conceive the human consciousness as awake and alive; indeed, he scarcely conceded it an existence, and therefore stood in the same relation to the question of the human soul of Christ as did the Arians.

Now, the Church teachers refused to content themselves with the doctrine of a divine ray, or of an operation of the Logos from the distance, in the man Jesus (see Note 58; Basilus, Hom. 25), whether supposed to constitute Christ a theophany, or to produce a holy man whom it unites with God. If it were not the Logos Himself who became man; if the incarnation were not that of the Logos; if the doings and sufferings of Christ did not in some way pertain to the Logos as His own; they saw clearly that they were deprived of that which they believed highest and best. Theophanies belong to the Old Testament; under the New, they are Docetical: but if Christ is a mere man, who, although He already existed apart from, was assumed by, the Logos, the saying holds true,—“Cursed is he who putteth his trust in men.” On innumerable occasions, therefore, does Athanasius say,—Our redemption consists in His making His own that which belongs to us. He not merely *had*, but *was*, man. Even the Jews would allow us a theophany; that would be no stumblingblock to them; even to an indwelling little objection would be raised, for the Logos came in former days to the saints who received Him worthily. But concerning none of them was it said, when they were born,—The Logos Himself is born; or, when they suffered,—The Logos Himself suffered. Precisely this, however, must be said of Christ. That He made His own that which was low,—this,

the point of the whole matter, without which the very soul of Christianity is lost—this offends them. Only on that supposition, however, can humanity be said to have been exalted to God in Christ. (Note 61.) Had not the opinion of Athanasius been, that humanity was completely assumed, and that what the Logos assumed He constituted part of Himself, how could he have taught that our entire nature, of which the soul surely forms an essential feature, was redeemed and established in the divine by the Logos?¹

More indefinite descriptions of the mode of being of God in Christ are the following:—The *σὰρξ* was His *οἶκος*, *ναός* (c. Ar. 3, 52, 53); which passage, however, is to be supplemented by 3, 30 (see Note 61). So also the expression,—Humanity was the organ of the Logos, by which He revealed Himself ever more completely,—is merely a relative description. It expresses the relation of the God-man to His work, and the fact that the impulse proceeded from the Logos. This comparison, by itself, however, would reduce the humanity of Christ to a passive, lifeless accident. Hence, the most perfect expression attained by Athanasius is,—The Word did not progress; and, on the other hand, the humanity (*σὰρξ*) was not Wisdom (to the *ἀνθρώπινον* pertains *ἀγνοεῖν*); but it was made the body of Wisdom; that is, it set forth Wisdom in the sphere of actuality (c. Ar. 3, 53. *Τῆς Σοφίας σῶμα γέγονεν ἡ σὰρξ* = *ἄνθρωπος* in 3, 30). The *σὰρξ* was not Wisdom; so far as it was Wisdom, Wisdom did not progress in wisdom; it did not suffer, and so forth, in itself. But it was so one with humanity, that we may fairly say, it progressed *σὰρξ*; for the human in it

¹ We might arrive at a different conclusion if we assumed that Athanasius recognised no other evil than corporeal death, from which men needed deliverance. But, however important the rôle played in his system by such ideas as *θάνατος*, *ἀθανασία*, etc., he does not limit redemption solely to them; for he knows something also of guilt and sin. How could he further say, c. Ar. 3, 53:—*Ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ἢ ἡ σὰρξ ἢ προκόπτουσα, καὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεται, καὶ τοῦθ' ἵνα πάλιν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων προκοπὴ ἀπώστος διὰ τὸν συνόντα λόγον διαμείνη?* Indeed, it is altogether very clear that Athanasius cannot have referred Christ's progress in wisdom to His body (c. Ar. 3, 52, 53), any more than in our case; but it is quite as impossible that he should have referred it to the Logos (c. 51). There is, therefore, no alternative but to say that he presupposed the existence of a soul in the *σὰρξ*, in the *ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει*, etc. (c. Ar. 3, 30): without, however, giving special prominence to it as a constituent element of the complete human nature.

(τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ Σοφίᾳ) advanced, gradually transcended human nature, and was deified (ὑπερاناβαῖνον κατ' ὀλίγον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ θεοποιούμενον καὶ ὄργανον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἐκλαμπν αὐτῆς γινόμενον καὶ φαινόμενον πᾶσι (compare c. 52). Ibid.: *Αὐξάνοντος ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τοῦ σώματος συνεπεδίδото ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τῆς θεότητος φανέρωσις, καὶ ἐδείκνυτο παρὰ πᾶσιν, ὅτι ναὸς θεοῦ ἐστι, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ἐν τῷ σώματι*). The true sense of the words, "He grew in grace and wisdom," is consequently this,—He progressed in and through Himself (*αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ προέκοπτεν*, c. 52), for *ἡ Σοφία ᾠκοδόμησεν ἑαυτῇ οἶκον, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν οἶκον προκόπτειν ἐποίησε*. Athanasius can scarcely have meant that the body of Christ grew in wisdom; he must therefore have included the soul of Christ in the ἀνθρώπινον.

But, however many hints of the doctrine of a human soul of Christ may be found in the works of Athanasius, one thing is lacking—freedom of choice. He lays great stress on it for men, but he never attributes it to Christ. This is perhaps the reason why he, whose system, as a whole, insists on the full and entire humanity of Christ in general, and on a human soul in particular, who, as it would at first sight appear, must have been driven, even by his opponents, to set that forth which would have disarmed them, yet hesitated to give special prominence to freedom of choice. Freedom of choice and mutability occupied so large a place in the system of Arius, that the appearance of Christ bore rather the character of the deed of a finite spirit than of a deed of God. The *τρεπτόν* ascribed to even this person made the decree of redemption and the certainty of its accomplishment doubtful; nay more, it reduced the divine redemption to a self-redemption. Athanasius feared, and not without reason, being compelled to admit of freedom of choice in this sense, if he should give special prominence to the full human soul. In one word, the entire danger to which the stability of the faith and the divine-human Unio were exposed by the Arian *τρεπτόν*, threatened to break forth from the system of the Church itself at another point, if the doctrine of the human soul of Christ were allowed that integral significance which it had in the form in which it last appeared, to wit, in the systems of Origen and Paul of Samosata; unless, indeed, such a conception was formed of it, as should prevent its

freedom of choice from undermining the certainty of the divine decrees and of their accomplishment. (Note 62.)

On the other hand, however, it is quite as evident that the incarnation must remain Docetical as to its main feature, so long as Sabellianism and Arianism had not been confuted in this point also. The great progress made in the doctrine of the divine aspect, or in that of the Trinity, must remain completely without that influence on Christology which it ought to have, if a representation were adopted of human nature, such as rendered it impossible that the hypostasis of the Son, which is of like substance with God, should be conjoined in vital unity with a complete humanity; or, otherwise expressed, Christology would derive no advantage from the labours of the Trinitarian Period, notwithstanding that it gave them their impulse, if decided progress were not made, above all, in relation to the human aspect. To the required advance, the Church was, as it were, driven by Apollinarism.

CHAPTER THIRD.

APOLLINARISM AND ITS OVERTHROW BY THE CHURCH.

AMONGST the most interesting systems occurring in the History of Dogmas, is undoubtedly that of the younger Apollinaris of Laodicea, a man who was distinguished for comprehensive culture, intellectual power and depth, and who enjoyed the reputation of devotedness to the Church and sincere piety. Not only did Athanasius therefore hold him in high esteem, but even Epiphanius treated him with respect and consideration.

He was a remarkable man, if only on one account, namely, that he himself was the turning-point at which the Church ceased to devote that exclusive attention to the doctrine of the Trinity which it had for a considerable time devoted, and began those Christological investigations which engaged its powers unremittedly, especially in the East, during centuries to come. He was, in particular, the occasion of the Church's decidedly affirming the existence of that feature of the humanity of Christ which had hitherto held a precarious position, to wit, His true

human soul. But the question regarding the human soul of Christ at once gives rise to a new problem, that of the unity of the two natures; indeed, the theory of Apollinaris may be regarded as a premature attempt at the solution of the problem. This is, at the same time, the point which gradually compelled the Church to investigate the question,—whether the human nature of Christ is to be conceived as impersonal or personal. In denying the existence of a human soul of Christ, Apollinaris meant to represent His human nature as impersonal; and in this respect, we may fairly assert that the Church, in its later doctrinal inquiries, arrived at the very goal towards which Apollinaris, actuated by regard for the unity of the divine-human person, believed it necessary to strive; with the difference, however, that the coarser form of a denial of the human soul of Christ adopted by the latter, in order to avoid the assumption of a double personality, was exchanged by the former, for the finer form of teaching, that Christ had a human soul, but an impersonal human nature.

The sources of information respecting Apollinarism are pretty copious (Note 63); but it has been hitherto impossible to make clearly out what Apollinaris' own opinions were, in several important respects. That the school of Apollinaris fell into inconsistency with themselves, and became untrue to their master, in some points, is certain. But it is less certain whether Apollinaris was always self-consistent in his teachings. There will be no reason, however, for doubting the matter, if it can be shown, that those who charge him with changing his views, as, for example, Theodoret, were unable to perceive that opinions which seemed self-contradictory, and to belong to different stages in his intellectual history, are really very compatible with each other. Confusion seems to have been introduced into the view taken of the principles of Apollinaris, specially through the unhesitating ascription to him of ideas, which bore a distant or closer family resemblance to his system, notwithstanding they made their appearance prior to, and in total independence of him. By Apollinaris himself they were probably never adopted; but first by a portion of his school, which appears unquestionably to have identified itself with these earlier tendencies, in consequence of a certain affinity with them. These tendencies were in part of a patripassian character; though the doctrine

of a suffering or a change, undergone by God, had been meanwhile modified by the doctrine of the Trinity, and had been restricted in its application to the Son: connected therewith, however, was a partial revival of Gnostic elements, such as the doctrines of a heavenly humanity of Christ, of a merely apparent birth, and so forth. These reviving tendencies might derive a certain support from the great stress laid by Apollinaris on the unity of Christ, and his decided antagonism to the duality of the natures: and so, vice versa, they afforded a certain support to the idea of Apollinaris. For both the one and the other of these suppositions—both the supposition that the divine nature became human, and consequently underwent conversion; and the supposition that the human nature was derived from the divine, and the humanity was a heavenly one—appeared favourable to the doctrine of the unity of the two natures. Our object, however, must be to separate Apollinaris from those tendencies, and to view him simply as he was in himself. For, in the nature of the case, greater weight must be laid on the distinct hints given by ancient writers, that Apollinaris taught an actual birth from Mary, and repudiated the notion of a conversion of God into humanity,—hints which Epiphanius in particular repeats (l. c.),—than upon the confusion of the view really entertained by Apollinaris with theorems set forth by his school, and by men who were totally independent of him—a confusion so very possible, where the acquaintance with his system was but superficial. (Note 64.)

Athanasius (Ep. ad Epict. 2) gives the following account of the views pertinent to this matter, which were at that time entertained in Corinth, and which he drew from a work written by a member of the party, apparently under the title of *ὑπομνήματα*. In order to retain the unity of the Person of Christ (this question was really the motive principle of their inquiries), whilst conceding to Him a specific dignity, they derived His humanity from the essence of the Logos; and in so far entertained the notion of a heavenly humanity. The body born of Mary was *ὁμοούσιον τῇ τοῦ λόγου θεότητι*; consequently, in their view, there was no duality of natures in Christ. The body, say they, is not younger than the deity of the Logos, but coeternal with it (*συναιδίων αὐτῷ διὰ παντὸς γεγενῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Σοφίας συνέστη*). If the humanity of Christ be re-

garded as an independent whole, instead of being derived from the Logos, His exaltation would be the introduction of a Tetrad, instead of a Trinity, into God; inasmuch as the human also is represented as raised to God in Him. But, however decidedly they asserted that the humanity of Christ was derived from the essence of the Logos, they could not immediately identify it with His deity; for then the humanity would have had no existence at all, and the Docetism to which they in other respects tended would have gained the upper hand. For this reason, by way of more carefully defining the notion of the heavenly humanity, which is derived from the Logos, they supplemented it as follows,—The Logos formed a body capable of suffering, out of His own substance, by conversion (*μεταποίησε*); as to one aspect of His essence, He renounced His immutability, fell away from His own nature (*ἡλλάγη τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως*), and thus converted Himself into flesh, bones, and an entire body. In this way, the deity of the Son, which is of the same substance with the Father, curtailed itself and reduced itself from perfection to imperfection (*ἀτελής γέγονεν ἐκ τελείου*).¹ Accordingly, they were able to say both, that which was nailed to the cross was not so much a body like ours, as the *δημιουργὸς οὐσία* of Wisdom itself, that is, the *nature* in God the Logos, by which He also created the world: and, that Christ who suffered in the flesh, and was crucified, was not the Lord and God, not the Son of God; for that in Him which, in the stricter sense, was divine and unchangeable, could not become man and suffer, but merely that which, in one aspect of His being, He became and set forth, to which He humbled Himself, into which He converted Himself. It cannot be denied, that, on this supposition, apart from all other considerations, precisely that which was, in the strict sense, divine in the Logos did not become man: or, to use the words of the teachers of the Church,

¹ Besides the forerunners of Apollinaris, with whose names we are not acquainted, mention should here be made of a part of his school, which Theodoret (*hær. fab. 4, 9, cl. 8*) is candid enough to distinguish from the master himself. 4, 9 :—Πολέμιος (elsewhere also called Polemo) καὶ συνουσίωσιν λέγει γεγενῆσθαι καὶ κρᾶσιν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τοῦ σώματος. (Hence the name Synousiasts given them by Diodorus and Theodoret.) Καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ἐκ τῆς Ἀπολιναρίου συναγωγῆς ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἔφασαν κατακληθῆναι τοῦ κυρίου τὸ σῶμα. Διάφορα δὲ εὐρόντες ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου συγγράμμασι δόγματα οἱ μὲν τούτοις, οἱ δὲ ἐκείνοις ἠρίσθησαν.

such a view would throw us back on the Gnostic duality of Christ.

Inconsistent with the theory just set forth seems the last feature thereof, as reported by Athanasius :—The Word entered into a holy man, as into one of the prophets ; He Himself, however, did not become man when He assumed the body from Mary, but Christ was *one ; another*, the Logos of God, who existed before Mary and before the *Æons*, and who was the Son of the Father. For whence the holy man, *into* whom the Word entered, if the said man was nothing more than the Logos, who had converted Himself into a man, as to the one aspect of His being ? The explanation of the discrepancy appears to be the following :—That that which we may designate nature in the Logos is first distinguished from, and then again combined with, that in Him which, in the strict sense, was deity and spirit. In the view of the advocates of this theory, the fact of its derivation from the Logos seemed to secure the unity of the entire Person of Christ ; but it is derived from Him in different ways. Its physical aspect was the nature of the Logos, converted, transformed into a man ; the proper deity of the Logos did not become man. On the other hand, it gave this man a share in itself, in that it animated him spiritually after the manner of the prophets. Thus the elements contained in the Logos may, in a certain sense, be said to have been in the man Jesus, though in a reverse order ;—namely, on the one hand, that which in the Logos was merely a potency, to wit, the capability of converting Himself into a man, had become in Jesus an actuality, and formed the basis of further developments ; and, on the other hand, that in the Son of God which was an actuality, to wit, the deity, was in Jesus a mere potency or power. In a word, the poles in the conception of the Son changed places, as it were, and the result of this change was the incarnation.

With this theory the assumption of an actual body derived from Mary would seem to be incompatible. And, in point of fact, the heretics whom Athanasius had in view, notwithstanding the stress they laid on the concrete humanity of Christ, probably did not themselves teach that Jesus had a body derived from the substance of Mary.¹ The same remark may, in all

¹ Ad Epist. 2 :—Οὐκ ἐκ Μαρίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας μεταποιήσας ἑαυτῷ σῶμα παθητὸν ὁ λόγος.

probability, be made regarding the heretics whom Basilus attacks.¹ But that such a view must necessarily lead back to the long-repudiated Docetism is so very self-evident,² that we can understand how efforts might, nay more, must be made, to combine the theory referred to with the idea of Christ's deriving His humanity from the substance of Mary. And this we find in some of the heretics mentioned by Hilary (see Note 64). According to the eleventh canon of the Synod of Sirmium, besides the form referred to above, according to which, the Word converted Himself into flesh, and set forth this flesh out of Himself, there existed another, according to which, already existing flesh was received or assumed by the Word, in the sense, namely, that He converted Himself into the material which He found already existing (the Son "*demutationem sustinentem carnem accepisse*"). In a similar manner, Tertullian speaks of a twofold possibility in relation to the bodies of the angels who appeared in Old Testament times, to wit, that they either gave themselves bodies out of themselves, or took them from the æther. The latter also may be termed a conversion, in so far as the angels constituted the, in itself, foreign material, a form of manifestation of themselves, and thus a mode of their own existence. Such a doctrine of conversion, however, necessitated the giving up of the notion of a humanity whose substance was heavenly. This latter theory approached considerably nearer the doctrine of the Church; for the Church also held that the Logos appropriated from Mary a substance essentially foreign to Him, and constituted it a form of His self-manifestation. Its advocates, however, probably meant to go further; at all events, if their prime aim was to preserve the unity of Christ. That they should consent to representing the material taken from Mary as something foreign to the Logos, was impossible; their only course, therefore, was to lessen the distance between the Logos and the humanity, into which He converted Himself, either by the enhancement of the human, on the ground of the divinity of human nature in general, and consequently of the nature of Mary and the material taken from her; or by the

¹ Οὐράνιον σῶμα ἔχοντα τὸν Κύριον παραγενέσθαι. Further, they say:—*ἐκ' αὐτὴν τὴν θείτητα τὰ ἀνθρώπων διαβαίνειν πάθη*. Basil. Ep. 65, T. 3, 104 f.

² As is remarked by Athanasius in the Epistle above referred to, and by Basilus.

depreciation of the Logos. As they do not appear to have adopted the former plan, like some later writers, for example, in the period of the Reformation, nor to have derived the material in Mary, along with the whole of external nature, from the nature of the creative Logos, there only remained to them the latter alternative—the alternative of approximating the Logos to the flesh, on whose full humanity, derived from Mary, they were resolved to insist. And accordingly they said,—The Logos converted Himself into a form which rendered it possible for the growth and sufferings of humanity to pass over and pertain to Him without hindrance; and thus what belonged to the flesh was able to become in a fuller sense His. When He abased Himself, and renounced divine glory and immutability, He acquired the capability of taking up humanity with its affections into Himself, and constituting it a part of His own being. On this view of the matter, the body must evidently be regarded as the main feature of the humanity of Christ; and the divine Logos alone is the soul or centre; as Apollinaris taught afterwards. Another view of the matter of a more Ebionitical character we have already noticed above (see Note 64; Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 18, 20, 21). It also takes its start with the idea of the conversion of the Logos, in its endeavours to diminish the distance between the divine and human natures; but succeeds better in showing that Christ's body and soul were of like substance with us, than in demonstrating the unity of the two natures. The reason whereof was, that they derived the body and soul of Christ from the Adamitic humanity, and reduced the Logos to the rank of a potency animating the man Jesus. But, as Athanasius frequently remarked, every theory of conversion must end in Ebionism, if it follow out its principles to their legitimate results, and say,—The Logos who converted Himself into man ceased thereby to be Logos, ceased to be what He was. For then, in fact, nothing remains but the holy man Jesus; and instead of an union of the divine and human natures in the incarnation, we have the absorption of the former in the latter. The Ebionism thus arrived at is different indeed from the old, rigid, dialectical form thereof; it brings the divine and human aspects into flux, but without being able to combine their unity with their distinction. The man who was brought into existence by the conversion of the Logos into a

man, may be converted again into God ; in such a manner, however, that the humanity then ceases to exist. In each we discover the presentiment of its union with the other, but not of that unity which, by preserving the distinctive characteristics of each aspect, does equal justice to both. On the contrary, it is such, that now the one and then the other aspect suffers. When it was the turn of the humanity, the deity was excluded ; and when it was the turn of the deity, the humanity was excluded. The aspect which at one time excludes, is afterwards punished by being itself excluded ; but this punishment of error is not identical with the truth. A system which does nothing but alternate between two extremes, inclining first to Ebionism, and then to Docetism, cannot lay claim to being the truth, which is fixed and abiding ; for truth, instead of substituting the one error for the other, must exclude both, and this is only possible if the truth contained in the two extremes is combined to form a higher unity. It is this higher unity which minds that had arrived at the stage of vacillation just mentioned were already seeking ; and this is the explanation of the frequent occurrence at this time of theories which had had a partial existence before ; for now the day was approaching when the intellect of the Church must apply itself to the task of combining in unity the two aspects of the Person of Christ. (Note 65.)

The theories just considered, which, as in the third century, were only set forth in rough outline, and which inclined backwards, now to Ebionism, and then to Gnosticism, acquired in the hands of Apollinaris a new form, characterized by greater refinement and greater freedom from the old heretical excrescences.

To take our start with the antagonistic element which determined the form of his system :—it was not the doctrine of the Church with which he felt himself in conflict ; but, from the state of the Church's Christology in his day, there is every reason for judging that he believed himself to be in harmony with its spirit and meaning, and desired to express himself as it required. The element to which he felt himself in antagonism was rather, in the first instance, Arianism ; and Arianism conditioned the form assumed by his ideas and expressions. We know what a high significance Arianism attached to the position,—The Son of God is mutable, is a *ῥεπειρόν*, which was able to be either good or evil, and which decided for the good by a

free act of will. This position, ascribing as it did freedom of choice to the Logos also, and thus subjecting Him to the laws of a finite development, set the seal to His finitude, and gave such predominance to the moral over the religious point of view, that we may fairly regard it as the central feature of the Arian polemic against the doctrine of the Church. We can, therefore, easily understand that the speculative mind and religious soul of a man like Apollinaris, must feel itself intensely revolted thereby.

Still, the objection felt to the position by Apollinaris must have been of quite a different character from that felt by those Church teachers who devoted almost exclusive attention to the doctrine of the Trinity, and little or none to Christology. Not that the principle was more objectionable in his eyes than in the eyes of the other teachers of the Church, because it endangered the doctrine of the Trinity, which he also entertained; but he saw more clearly than the rest its Christological consequences. If in Christ everything depended on the free will of a finite being, redemption is not a divine work at all, but a finite being made himself redeemer by his own free act. On this supposition, He who is termed Redeemer rather shows us how it is possible for a finite being to redeem himself than redeems us; the redemption of Christ Himself becomes vacillating and uncertain; nay more, no such thing as a Christology can exist, for a Christology necessarily presupposes the presence and action of God in Christ.

Hence the point against which Apollinaris directed his chief arguments was the *ῥεπρόν*, or the idea of freedom of choice in Christology. One might readily suppose that he must exclude freedom of choice from the higher nature of Christ; but why did he not concede it to His humanity? The other teachers of the Church, also, were reserved in relation to this, as yet little considered, point (see above, pages 350 f.); the more naturally, therefore, could Apollinaris follow out the inclination he felt, to exclude every trace of the *ῥεπρόν* from this person. He had, moreover, really the strongest occasion for doing so in the circumstance, that his aim was to construct a Christology on the basis of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. He was the first who endeavoured to turn to account for Christology the results attained in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity.

With the greatest decision he takes his start from the principle, that the higher element in Christ must be conceived, not as a mere power, but as an hypostasis, as an independent *ὑποκείμενον*. An incarnation has not taken place at all, if the Logos was present in Jesus merely in the form of an animating power, as in the prophets, or if He merely joined Himself on to a perfect and personal man. For, on the former supposition, He merely worked, He did not personally dwell, in the man Jesus; on the second supposition, the Logos can, it is true, be more correctly said to have been present in Jesus. At the same time, inasmuch as He is omnipresent, and we live and move in Him, nothing specific is left for Christ; and we can no more speak of an incarnation in this case, than we can describe His omnipresence as an incarnation. (Note 66.)

Christ must be one person; He cannot have merely assumed, He must have become, man. If the divine, the Logos, dwelt personally in Him, there cannot have been a second human person in Him; for in that case Christ must have been a monstrosity, rather than an unity.¹ If the humanity of Christ also possessed its own living, spiritual centre, we should have to attribute to Him two wills; and as freedom of choice pertains essentially to the human centre, we should be driven to assume the existence of an immutable will (that of the Logos) and a mutable will (that of the man Jesus), in one and the same subject. Such a result can only be avoided by denying to Christ the human *νοῦς* or the human *πνεῦμα*, in which freedom of choice has its seat; not, however, as though this person had no *νοῦς* whatever, but the Logos constituted Himself the *human νοῦς* in Him. By thus excluding *νοῦς* and the *τρεπτόν*, he supposed that he had not merely laid a firm basis for the unity of Christ's person, but also that the way was cleared for a specific and personal indwelling of the Logos, and, as a natural consequence, for the acknowledgment of the full reality of the incarnation.

The principle that, on the assumption of an usual human *νοῦς*, the incarnation would be an impossibility; and that, on the other hand, if we deny a human *νοῦς* to Christ, the Logos

¹ L. c. c. 49, p. 257: *Εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐκ τριῶν* (compare c. 35, 46, p. 248; c. 48, pp. 254 f.) *αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκ τεσσάρων, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπόσιος*. Unless, says he, this person is half man and half God, which would be no unity, but a monster, like a *τραγέλαφος*, *μινόταυρος*, *κένταυρος*, *ἱππίλαφος*.

as He is in the Father, first attains a personal existence in the man Jesus, His incarnation can be acknowledged to have been a reality,—Apollinaris establishes in the various ways.

In his work entitled, "Proof of the Divine Incarnation in the Image of Man," he says (compare Gregor. Antirrhet. adv. Apollinar. c. 6): Paul of Samosata, Marcellus, Photinus, represent Christ as a man in whom God was, as a God-animated man, *ἄνθρωπος ἐνθεός*. He is not, however, a man of the earth; but it is testified of Him, that He came down from heaven, the Son of man. He is the man who came down from heaven, although in another respect He was born of Mary. Christ must not be described as a man who carried God within Himself (*ἐνθεον*), as though one being had been in another, different being; but the Christ who was incarnate in human flesh, had God for His *πνεῦμα*, had God in Himself as His *νοῦς* (p. 143: *Κελεύων, ἐνθεον ἄνθρωπον μὴ λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν, Θεὸν ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὡς ἄλλον ἐν ἄλλῳ—τὸν σαρκωθέντα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ σαρκὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ Θεὸν τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχειν*).¹ If, alongside of God, who even in Himself is *νοῦς*, there was also a human *νοῦς* in Christ, the work of incarnation was not at all accomplished in Him (l. c.: *Εἰ μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, φησιν, νοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ, οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιτελεῖται ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς σαρκώσεως ἔργον*; c. 38, p. 220); for, in that case, the man must have remained by himself, and God also by Himself. We should then have two persons (*πρόσωπα*), God and the man assumed by Him (c. 35).² If the divine *νοῦς* was not in Him in the flesh, He was merely the wisdom which enlightens the spirit of man; and, inasmuch as this wisdom dwells in all men, the advent of Christ was not the dwelling of God amongst us, but simply the birth of an ordinary man (c. 36, p. 215). C. 43, p. 237: "If he who receives

¹ Compare, further, c. 9, p. 142: *Τὸ δὴ πνεῦμα, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸν νοῦν Θεὸν ἔχον ὁ Χριστὸς μετὰ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος εἰκότως ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ λέγεται*. C. 7, p. 137: *Θεὸς μὲν φησι, τῷ πνεύματι, τῷ σαρκωθέντι, ἄνθρωπος δὲ τῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, προσληφθείσῃ σαρκὶ*.

² *Δύο πρόσωπα λέγουσι (our antagonists) τὸν Θεόν, καὶ τὸν παρὰ Θεοῦ προσληφθέντα ἄνθρωπον*. On the contrary, we ought rather to speak of the *σαρκωθείς*, who *οὐκ ἑτερός ἐστι παρὰ τὸν ἀσώματον*, but the same *καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέρας ἐν σαρκὶ ζωῆς*. The passage, c. 36, p. 215, see Note 66.—C. 43, p. 237: *Εἰ ὁ Θεὸν δεξάμενος Θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀληθινός, πολλοὶ ἂν εἶεν θεοὶ, ἐπειδὴ πολλοὶ δέχονται τὸν Θεόν*.

God into himself is very God, there must be many Gods, for many receive God into themselves;" consequently, no specific dignity can be assigned to Christ. If the perfect God was united with a perfect man, there must have been two. Wherefore, the human race could not be saved by the assumption of the *νοῦς* and of the whole man, but solely by the assumption of the *σὰρξ* (*οὐκ ἄρα σώζεται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος δι' ἀναλήψεως νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ προσλήψεως σαρκός. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ τελείῳ συνήφθη Θεὸς τέλειος, δύο ἂν ἦσαν.* Compare c. 34, 35). Gregory of Nyssa replied, indeed (c. 39), How can the imperfect, the *σὰρξ*, combine with its antithesis (the Logos) to form an unity? For the perfect in union with the imperfect rather forms a Dyad, a Dualism. Why does the divine *νοῦς* shut out the human? But Apollinaris had already given a reply (c. 40). Because the human is a *νοῦς τρεπτός*, mutable in virtue of its freedom of choice; whereas the divine is immutable. But the work of redemption demanded for its accomplishment an immutable spirit, which would not succumb to the flesh, by reason of the weakness of its knowledge; but which would be able harmoniously to accommodate and annex the flesh to itself without violence. He cannot save the world who is himself subject to the universal corruption of men; no one can break the curse of sin who is not essentially a sinless man (c. 51). Now, men generally, and angels, are free to choose; and for beings endowed with freedom of choice to be no longer free to choose, is destruction. The Redeemer, therefore, could not share freedom of choice, accessible as it is to evil; nay more, this freedom of choice must not be supposed to have existed, and to have then been annihilated by the Logos, for no nature is destroyed by Him who created it. This man was rather destitute of freedom of choice from the very beginning. And, notwithstanding this lack, He was man. Man consists of three elements,—flesh, soul, and spirit (*νοῦς*, c. 8, p. 141; c. 46, p. 248); in proof of which, he appeals to 1 Thess. v. 23. But Christ also consisted of three elements,—*πνεῦμα, ψυχή*, and *σῶμα* (Note 67). He did not, of course, derive His *πνεῦμα* from men; nor was it fitting that He should do so; for then He would not have been the second Adam from heaven, but like the earthly Adam. If the man from heaven had been in all things like us who are earthly, even to the possession of

the same *πνεῦμα* as we the *χοῖκοι*, He would not have been the heavenly man, but rather the mere lodging-place, the receptacle (*δοχείον*) of the heavenly God. Of the Church teachers, some supposed the souls of men to be a direct creation, and not to be derived from the race (compare Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 20). Were this to be accepted as true, connection of blood with the race must be concluded to be unnecessary to the truth of the humanity of the soul; all that is necessary is, that it should proceed from God. Taking his stand on this principle, Apollinaris might have argued,—Christ cannot be fairly said to belong to a different genus from other men, because the *Logos* became His *νοῦς*; for all souls proceed directly forth from God, and are not derived from the race. He does not appear, however, to have adopted this course (compare Hilar. ed. Maurin. p. 1047, Not. e). According to Nemesius, he held that souls are generated by souls, as bodies are generated by bodies. But this idea also presented to him a new outlet, nay more, a new argument for his theory. That which arises in the way of propagation, is not in the full sense *πνεῦμα*, but merely soul; Adam became a living soul, but he lacked *πνεῦμα*, which was first brought to him by Christ, the Man from heaven. What Adam did not possess, he was naturally unable to propagate. Now, although the creation of man did not attain completion till the divine *πνεῦμα* assumed the highest place, the hegemony in him,—for the first time in Christ, through the incarnation, when the *Logos* became the *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* of the individual man Jesus; afterwards in believers, who become by grace what He was by birth;—Jesus, possessed as He was of body and soul, was a man, even apart from the *πνεῦμα*; for no one hesitates to call Adam a man, notwithstanding he was not yet endowed with spirit, but was merely a living soul (*ψυχῇ ζῶσα*, c. 12). Apollinaris appears to have thought that, with the incarnation and regeneration, a new third element was super-added, without which man is not quite complete; for, to the full idea of man belong three elements, although it is right to term him man even before the addition of the third element. According to this theory, therefore, those who lived prior to Christ, or who now live out of Him, are not yet actual persons, but mere generic beings, individuals who stand in the relation of accidents to the genus that produces them. First,

when a higher element than that which the kind can bestow unites itself with them, and constitutes itself the central-point of their essence, do they become persons; and then every other part of their being stands in the relation to the higher element (the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*) of the subject to the ruler. The inner man becomes the kernel of the essence; the outward man, on the contrary, is something almost accidental, merely determined by the inner man. In Christ, the Logos assumed the place of the inner man.¹ Whereas in Adam there was at the very utmost a *νοῦς*, which was the servant of the *σὰρξ*, and was compelled to make the flesh its content, but never passed out of its potential and impotent existence to actuality and dominion; in Christ, on the contrary, because the Logos was His *νοῦς*, there came an all-prevailing holy principle. No evil thought could arise in the inner being of Christ; however seductive the flesh might be, it found a ruler instead of a response, in the *νοῦς* of Christ. But if Christ never had even an evil thought, and if His spirit never carried an evil thought into execution by means of the body, sin found no place in Him, however strongly the flesh, with its *ψυχή*, may have been opposed to the *νοῦς*. For only that can be called evil in which the *νοῦς* takes part (Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2).²

From what has been advanced, we may see that Apollinaris might without hesitation have designated Christ a composite person (*σύνθετον*), after the example of the Church;³ save that he most decidedly protested against representing the factors as anything else but elements of the one, indivisible person: a composition of the person out of two persons, to which the opinion of many of the teachers of the Church seemed to lead, he felt compelled entirely to repudiate. To his mind also, the duality of the *φύσεις*,—if the *φύσεις* are to be conceived as complete,—was equivalent to a duality of *πρόσωπα*. For if Christ's human nature had a *νοῦς* and an *αὐτεξούσιον* like other men from Adam, according to Apollinaris, it was an independent *πρό-*

¹ Ath. c. Apoll. 1, 2: 'Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ· ὡς γὰρ ὁργανικῶς κίχρηται σχήματι τῷ περιέχοντι· οὐ γὰρ οἶόντι ἢ τέλειον ἀνθρώπου αὐτὸν γίνεσθαι. Δύο τέλεια ἐν γένεσθαι οὐ δύναται.

² Compare Gregor. 1. c. p. 273, c. 55; Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2.

³ But still he only believed in μία φύσις σύνθετος. Compare A. Mai 7, 301 f.

σωπον. For this reason, he deemed it necessary to refuse conceding even a duality of *φυσεῖς*. We see, therefore, that the favourite phrase of the later Synousiasts, *μία φύσις Θεοῦ λόγον σεσαρκωμένη*, belonged to him also as to its sense. On the other hand, the preceding exposition shows that it could occasion him no difficulty to represent the humanity of Christ (*σῶμα* and *ψυχὴ* without *νοῦς*) as something appropriated from Mary, to designate it *ἐπίκτητον*.¹ To teach a conversion of the deity into humanity and its *τρεπτόν*, could by no means be his intention; for the very obvious reason, that in order to avoid the *τρεπτόν*, and to secure unalterable virtue and wisdom (*φυσικὴ*) for this man, he represented the Logos as his *νοῦς*. By doing so, he would unnecessarily have posited the very thing which he had made every effort to avoid. Without giving up His being and undergoing conversion, God cannot become man, says he, save in the sense of His taking the place of the *νοῦς* in the man (Jesus).²

The features hitherto mentioned, give us, however, but a superficial view of the theory of Apollinaris. Were that all, the charge of teaching a Christ who does not at all belong to our genus or class of beings, repeatedly brought against him by Gregory of Nyssa, would be, without any restriction, well founded. For in the case of men, the new divine principle connects itself with a *νοῦς* which is human, although it may be merely an impotent or subject potency until the *πνεῦμα* comes, which proceeds from Christ: in the case of Christ, on the contrary, no trace whatever of *νοῦς* would appear to have been derived from the humanity. On this supposition, the charge of positing as one, things which are two and cannot be one, brought by Apollinaris against the doctrine of the Church, would recoil upon himself; for the humanity which he attributes to Christ is something external to the personal centre therein, like a garment, or like the house in which any one dwells. In point of fact, although he saw that to represent the human as the mere

¹ Compare Gregor. l. c. p. 230; p. 222, c. 29; p. 207, c. 34; p. 240, c. 44.

² Πῶς, Φησι, Θεὸς ἀνθρώπος γινεται, μὴ μεταβληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ μὴ νοῦς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κατίστη, l. c. c. 56, p. 277. Both Theodoret (see above, page 355, note) and Epiphanius discharge him of intending to teach such a conversion, as also of the doctrine of a heavenly *σάρξ*. Athanasius also (c. Apol. 1, 2) speaks of the different theories which had been worked out relatively to this point.

δοχεῖον of the Logos did not exhaust the idea of the incarnation; notwithstanding, further, that he frequently condemns the *ἄνθρωπος ἐνθεός* as a meagre representation, the propositions adduced above do not give us anything more than the notion of a God present in a human shell, unquestionably impersonal; which is very far from an incarnation, and is rather a mere theophany. We must, however, at the same time, not forget to mention that the Church teachers of his day had not really advanced any further.¹ They were even undecided whether the man Jesus, so far as a human soul is to be attributed to Him, ought not to be conceived as personal by Himself; in which case, seeing that the Logos could only influence Jesus from without, either Christ must have been a double person (whose unity falls more into the subject and its presuppositions than into the object),² or God was not present in Him in any specific sense; and consistently they ought to have gone back from the idea of a theophany as far as Ebionism (compare A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 20 a).

But what makes the theory of Apollinaris specially interesting, is the mode in which he overcomes this difficulty, in which he represents the composite person as an indivisible unity, and in which he aims at assigning to the Logos, as the substitute for the human *νοῦς*, not an external and foreign position, but one which constitutes Him the truth of the humanity, and gives His incarnation its reality.

"The humanity of Christ," says he, "is that which is moved, the deity is the mover; the former, which was not a perfect living being by itself, in order that it might be a complete being, was compounded to an unity, was conjoined with its hegemonical principle. It was united with, and made part of, the hegemonical principle from heaven, as to its *passivity*; and it in turn received the divine, which was constituted its own, as to its

¹ The less can we be surprised to find Apollinaris sometimes using also the simile—Humanity was the temple of the Logos. A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 203. John does not say that the Logos became *σάρξ* and *ψυχή*, *ἀδύνατον γὰρ δύο νοεῖν*, *καὶ θελητικὰ ἐν τῷ ἅμα κατοικεῖν*, *ἵνα μὴ τὸ ἕτερον κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀντιστρατεύηται διὰ τῆς οἰκίας θελήσεως καὶ ἐνεργείας*. The Logos, therefore, assumed, not a human soul, but merely Abraham's seed, *τὸν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος Ἰησοῦ καὶ προδιέγραψεν ὁ ἄψυχος, καὶ ἄνους, καὶ ἀθελῆς τοῦ Σολομῶντος παῖς*.

² Deren Einheit schon mehr in das Subject und seine Voraussetzungen, als in das Object fällt.

activity. And so one living being was formed of the moved and the mover, and not two beings; nor one being out of two complete, self-moved beings."¹ In the Holy Scriptures, we find no separation whatever made between the Logos and His humanity; but it is one being, one hypostasis, and one activity (*Οὐδεμία διαίρεσις τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς θέλαις γραφαῖς· ἀλλ' ἔστι μία φύσις, μία ὑπόστασις, μία ἐνέργεια*; A. Mai l. c. p. 73). A disciple of Apollinaris, Julian, writes to another, Polemon, as follows:²—"Alone, and for the first time, did our father Apollinaris give utterance to, and clear up, the mystery hidden from all; to wit, that Christ became one being and a composite nature, constituted out of the moveable and the immoveable; which nature alone, moved by the one will, by one activity accomplished the miracles and the sufferings." Apollinaris himself also was very well aware that the Church teachers of his time made too light of Christology, and he set for himself a higher and truer goal, in that he aimed at attaining a living intuition of the unity of this person, and at an understanding of how the same subject can be designated both God and man; whereas (as he objects) the teachers of the Church contented themselves with merely saying what belonged to a complete humanity, and what to a complete deity, but troubled themselves little with the question of how the two can become one person. And yet this question was just the principal thing; for unless it be answered, the incarnation cannot be shown to have really happened, and all previous labour has been in vain. They who, under the cloak of faith, take up a

¹ A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 801 :—"Ἡ σὰρξ ἱερακίνητος οὐσα πάντως ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουντος καὶ ἀγοντος, ὁποῖός ποτε ἂν εἴη τοῦτο· καὶ οὐκ ἐντελής οὐσα ζῶον ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ γίνεσθαι ζῶον ἐντελής συνθεθεμένη πρὸς ἐνότητα τῇ ἡγεμονικῇ συνήλθεν, καὶ συνετίθη πρὸς τὸ οὐράνιον ἡγεμονικόν, ἐξοικειωθείσα αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ἑαυτῆς, καὶ λαβοῦσα τὸ θεῖον οἰκειωθὲν αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργητικόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ζῶον ἐκ κινουμένου καὶ κινήτου συνίστατο, καὶ οὐ δύο, ἢ ἐκ δύο τελείων καὶ αὐτοκινήτων· διόπερ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἑτερόν τι ζῶον πρὸς Θεόν, καὶ οὐ Θεός, ἀλλὰ δούλος Θεοῦ, καὶ οὐρανόθεν ἢ τις δύναμις, ὡσαύτως ἔχει· σὰρξ δὲ, Θεοῦ σὰρξ γενομένη, ζῶον ἐστὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συνθεθεῖσα εἰς μίαν φύσιν.

² A. Mai l. c. p. 70 :—"Ἐκ κινήτου καὶ ἀκινήτου, ἐνεργητικοῦ τε καὶ παθητικοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν σύνθετον, ἐνὶ τῇ καὶ μόνῃ κινουμένῃ θελήματι· καὶ μιᾷ ἐνεργείᾳ τὰ θεάματα πεποιημένοι καὶ τὰ πάθη, μόνος καὶ πρῶτος ὁ πατήρ ἡμῶν· Ἀπολιναρίου ἐφθίγγετο, τὸ κεκαρυμμένον πᾶσι καταφωτίσας μυστήριον.

position, with which the incarnation is as good as incompatible, are chargeable with entertaining ante-Christian views, either of an heathenish or of a Jewish kind. But such a position is taken up by those who teach two self-moving (*αὐτοκίνητα*) beings, a twofold *νοῦς*, a twofold will; for these can never be made one. (Note 68.) The human aspect of Christ must rather be so conceived, that it shall of itself point to the divine as its complement, and not be represented as a perfect thing, standing side by side with another perfect thing. Consequently, the only satisfactory course is to represent the divine as the active element, the human as that which is moved by the hegemonic divine principle, not as moving itself. In this way, he considered, we can understand that the two together first constituted the one person. For that which is moved presupposes, and of itself suggests, that which moves; and, on the other hand, the divine that moves would continue shut up in itself, a lifeless principle, if it did not display its motive power on something that is moved; indeed, without an object moved, the Logos would have no organ by which to manifest Himself.¹ Mover and moved are correlative ideas: a mover is inconceivable without a moved; and vice versâ, a moved is inconceivable without a mover; and so, deity and humanity, as belonging in this respect inwardly to each other, combined to constitute one actual, indivisible divine-human life.

Apollinaris, however, endeavoured to gain a still more complete conception of this personal unity. It is true, he represented the humanity of Christ, considered by itself and apart from the Unio, as an imperfect being; but the deity which took the place of the soul and of the human *νοῦς*, was not something alien to the human essence; but the human essence, which tends, as it were, towards the perfection of itself in the form of a person, acquired it for its own: and, in like manner, the Logos made the human His own, constituted it a determination of Himself. As it is an imperfect description to say,—I have, or am the vehicle and bearer of a body or a soul, seeing that the connection of the two with my essence is not accurately expressed till

¹ He designates humanity an organ, A. Mai l. c. 302, and p. 20 b. :—
"Ὅργανον καὶ τὸ κοινοῦν (l. κινουῦν) μίαν πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἥ δὲ
μία ἡ ἐνέργεια, μία καὶ ἡ οὐσία· μία ἄρα γέγονεν οὐσία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς
σαρκός. (From his work against Diodorus.)

having is supplanted by *being*; Apollinaris felt that merely to speak of God bearing a man in Himself, or of God having a man as His organ or husk, was not to do justice to the idea of the incarnation. Accordingly, his aim was to show that each of the two, humanity and deity, stood in the position of a determination of the being of the other, both belonging together. In these genuinely speculative efforts, he was guided by the most important practical and religious interests. "If there was in Christ one being and another being, unity and sameness of worship must be condemned; for the Creator and the creature, God and man, may not be worshipped after the like fashion. But the worship paid to Christ is one, and therefore God and man are included under one and the same name. Consequently, we must not say that in Christ there were two essences, God and man; but one undivided being, constituted by God's conjunction of Himself with an human body.¹ And as it would involve the division and destruction of the object of Christianity, the Person of Christ, to maintain that He ought to be worshipped as to one aspect of His being, and not as to the other (which we certainly must maintain, if the humanity were not in some way or other a momentum of the deity); so also would it involve the breaking up of the unity of His own consciousness (A. Mai 7, 301). 'Αδύνατον, τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ προσκυνητὸν ἑαυτὸν εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ. 'Αδύνατον ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεόν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, ἀλλ' ἐν μονότητι συγκράτου φύσεως θεϊκῆς σεσαρκωμένης. Further, the idea of the incarnation is weakened, and we fall back into long-repudiated heresies, if we teach merely an activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of the Logos in a complete man, instead of teaching that an human element formed part of the Logos Himself.²

¹ A. Mar. l. c. 16:—"Ἀλλης καὶ ἄλλης οὐσίας μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν προσκύνῃσιν ἀθέμιτον, τουτίστιν ποιητοῦ καὶ ποιήματος, Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου. Μία δὲ ἡ προσκύνῃσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἐνὶ ὁνόματι νοεῖται Θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος. Οὐκ ἄρα ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη οὐσία Θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μία κατὰ σύνθεσιν Θεοῦ πρὸς ὥμα ἀνθρώπινον. Compare *ibid.* the fragment from the letter to Jovian.

² A. Mai l. c. p. 20:—"Τὰ σαφῶς ἐληλεγμένα καὶ παγκοσμίως ἐκτετηρυγμένα νῦν πάλιν ἀνανεοῦσθαί τινες ἐπιχειρήκασιν, καὶ τὸν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ διέτερον ἄνθρωπον παραδεδομένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐκ γῆς ἄνθρωπον εἶναι οἶον τὸν πρότερον βλασφημοῦσι, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοῦ λόγου εἰς ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ μεταβάλλοντες. (From the work of Apollinaris entitled, *περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως*, c. 12.)

Finally—and this he deemed of chief importance—a perfect union of the divine and human appeared to him indispensably necessary to the accomplishment of the redemptive work of Christ.¹ Against the doctrine of the Church he brought the charge of having merely human sufferings in the sufferings of Christ; remarking, that the death of a man could not be the death of death (Greg. Antirrh. c. 51, pp. 263 ff.). Gregory saw clearly enough the importance of the objection, and sought to show that the Logos was truly humbled and truly took part in sufferings; but all he really succeeded in doing, was to represent Christ as reckoning to Himself the sufferings which, strictly speaking, belonged solely to His humanity, on the ground of the humanity belonging to His person. Apollinaris, on the contrary, maintained that the unity of the Person of Christ was not secured, unless we can say,—Our God was crucified, and man is exalted to the right hand of God: the Son of Man was from heaven, and the Son of God was born of a woman (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. c. 6; A. Mai 7, p. 73 :—*Ἰουδαῖοι τὸ σῶμα σταυρωθέντες* (leg. *σταυρώσαντες*) *Θεὸν ἐσταύρωσαν*). And the work of uniting God and man is first accomplished when God puts Himself completely in the place of humanity, and man is exalted to God.

But how does he bring the two together? We have already remarked, that whilst representing the humanity of Christ as imperfect apart from the incarnation, he refuses to allow that, on this ground, the humanity contained in the Person of Christ was imperfect; for the Logos, so far from being foreign to, constitutes rather the proper perfection of, the humanity. This he expresses as follows,—The *πνεῦμα* in Christ was human *πνεῦμα*, although divine (c. 27). Nay more, he says also, the divine *πνεῦμα* or the Logos, which in Christ was human *πνεῦμα*, was eternal, and existed before the incarnation. The Logos must therefore have existed as man also, prior to the incarnation, and His deity was in itself man from the very beginning. Gregory took the words to mean, that Apollinaris held the flesh of Christ

¹ Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. p. 131 ff., c. 5. His entire aim in the *λογογραφία* on the incarnation is to show,—*τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τῆς θεότητος, καὶ οὐχὶ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ τὸ πάθος δεξασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπαθὴ καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον φύσιν πρὸς πάθος μεταστίαν ἀλλοιωθῆναι*.—C. 27: The doctrine of the Church allows Him who was crucified nothing divine in His *οὐν* nature, not even the best, that is, *πνεῦμα*. C. 26, p. 185; c. 54, p. 271.

to be eternal; and inasmuch as he, notwithstanding, represented Mary as the mother of Christ, therefore, concludes Gregory, he must have conceived Mary also to be eternal. He posits coarse composite matter as eternal. But Apollinaris never taught this; nowhere did he assume an heavenly humanity in this sense. But he viewed the *πνεῦμα* or the Logos in Christ as the eternal humanity;¹ probably on the ground of His being the archetype of universal humanity. To him the Logos was both God and archetypal man; and that in the sense of His having been eternally destined to become man, in an historical form. The Logos thus revealed that which had been latent in His nature from the very beginning.² It is possible that, in his mind, he connected therewith the Platonic doctrine of a *κόσμος νοητός*, in which the archetypes (*εἶδη*) of all things are ideally or potentially contained, though as yet by no means possessed of phenomenal, external actuality; hence also the incarnation of the Logos. Of this tendency are undoubtedly the words attributed to him by Gregory, *οὐράνιον τι σαρκὸς εἶδος ἀναπλάττει περὶ τὸ θεῖον* (c. 42, p. 234, compare c. 6); which, however, cannot by any means have been already the principle of the material element of the humanity of Christ, but merely the form or plastic power. At all events, regarding the Logos as he did, not as something foreign to, but as the truth of, the humanity itself, he was able to say,—The primal grounds of the incarnation lay, not in the Virgin,³ but in the eternal Logos

¹ P. 149, c. 13:—*Προὔπαρχει, φησὶν, ὁ ἀνθρώπος Χριστός, οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρου δντος παρ' αὐτὸν τοῦ πνεύματος, τοῦτ' ἔστι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ Κυρίου ἐν τῇ τοῦ θεανθρώπου φύσει θείου πνεύματος δντος.* He existed as a man *πρὸ* τῆς φανερώσεως, to wit, αὐτὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότητα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, that is, in Himself, in essence, but not in appearance.

² C. 14:—*Ὅπερ ἦν τῇ φύσει, τοῦτο ἐφανέρωθη νῦν.* C. 15, p. 154: *Τὸ λαθάνον θεῖον κατὰ φύσιν δν, τοῦτο τῇ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἐφανέρωθη καιρῷ.* Compare below, page 372, and notes.

³ *Ἡ θεία σάρκωσις οὐ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς παρθένου ἔσχεν*, c. 15, p. 153. But he cannot have added,—the humanity of Christ, which existed from the beginning, before Abraham and the creation *τοιαύτη πάντως ἦν, οἷα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἰωρᾶτο σιὸν ἁββᾶ.* However strongly Apollinaris may have expressed the identity of the eternal *εἶδος* of Christ, in the central-point of the *κόσμος νοητός*, he cannot have transferred the earthly corporeality of Christ to heaven; for otherwise the *κόσμος νοητός* would have been *αἰσθητός* and not *νοητός*. That he did not hold the humanity out of Mary to be eternal, we shall show hereafter (see page 373 ff.).

Himself, who, by His essential nature, is the eternal archetype of humanity, and bears within Himself the potency of a real incarnation. The divine nature is humanity (*ἡ θεία φύσις σὰρξ ἐστὶ*, c. 18, p. 163); of the man in Christ, he says—He was the brightness of the Father's glory, and in Him the essence of God acquired a form.¹ His humanity was of one substance with God (*ὁμοούσιος, σύμφυτος*)² prior to the birth on earth, yea, prior to the universe, and was the companion of God (c. 28). Now, although, fixing our eye on the latent potency of incarnation, humanity was far from being something merely accessory in relation to God (*ἐπικτητον, ἐπιγιγνόμενον*), seeing that it belonged to the eternal idea of the Logos; and although, further, humanity, as realized in the unity of the Person of Christ, cannot be termed accessory, and is therefore *συνουσιωμένη, σύμφυτος* (c. 17, p. 160) with the deity; we may still say, the equality of Jesus Christ with the Father was eternal, and preceded the incarnation, but His resemblance to men is something superadded.³ For the rest, believing as he did the humanity of Christ to be essentially one with the Logos, Apollinaris was in a far different position from the Church teachers of his time for providing for the eternal continuance of the humanity; and of his superior facilities in this respect, he was well aware. For him there was no necessity, indeed no reason, for allowing the humanity to disappear in the Logos, whether by conversion or absorption into the divine glory; for he deemed it to be a determination of the Logos coeternal with the Logos Himself. On the other hand, the more strongly the Church teachers were compelled to feel that they had not taken sufficient care

¹ C. 19, p. 164 :—*Τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δόξης ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐν τῷ σαρκινῷ Θεῷ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπόστασιν χαρακτηρίζεσθαι.*

² C. 18 :—God designates (Zech. xiii. 7) the Shepherd whom the sword strikes, *ἄνδρα σύμφυλόν μου*; which Apollinaris refers to the humanity of Christ. P. 161 :—*Ἔστι δὲ ἐν τούτοις καταφανές, ὅτι αὐτός ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ λαλήσας ἡμῖν τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεός ἐστι ποιητὴς τῶν αἰώνων, ἀπαύγασμα δόξης, χαρακτηρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, ὅτι δὴ τῷ ἰδίῳ πνεύματι Θεὸς ὢν καὶ οὐ Θεὸν ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἕτερον παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτός ὁ δι' ἑαυτοῦ, τουτέστι διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς καθάρσις κόσμον ἁμαρτιῶν.* Compare c. 28.

³ C. 17, p. 160 :—*Οὐκ ἐπικτητος* (as, for example, Eustathius had said) *ἐπὶ τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ γίνεται ἡ σὰρξ τῇ θεότητι, ἀλλὰ συνουσιωμένη καὶ σύμφυτος.* C. 21 :—*Ἰδοὺ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἡ πρὸς πατέρα ἰσότης πρὸς πᾶν ἀρχόντα, ἡ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁμοιότης ἐπιγιγνόμενη.* Compare p. 231, c. 41.

to secure the unity of the Person of Christ prior to His exaltation, the greater prominence they gave it at the termination; so that, in fact, they frequently fell out of Dualism into a false identification (Note 69). They regarded Christ, indeed, as a man, but neither before nor subsequently to the time of His earthly sojourn: consequently, the incarnation was reduced, in their hands, to a theophany of a somewhat longer continuance. It is true, the God-manhood is *represented* as continuing in that glorifying consummation of humanity which took place at the end of the theophany; but sufficient grounds are not assigned for the representation. Apollinaris, from his point of view, was far better able to assign an eternal place for the humanity, by the adoption, namely, of a reverse method;—in order to be able to conceive the humanity as eternally united with the Logos a parte post, he persists in asserting that, although in a latent state, it pertained to the essence of the Logos a parte ante.¹

Gregory of Nyssa, it is true, looked upon Apollinaris as teaching the existence in Christ of an eternal, realized humanity, or, *νοῦν ἔνσαρκον ὄντα τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς τεχθῆναι, οὐκ ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ σάρκα γενόμενον, ἀλλὰ παροδικῶς δι' αὐτῆς διεξελθόντα, οἷος πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἦν, τότε φανερωθῆναι αὐτὸ τὸ φαινόμενον, σαρκινὸν ὄντα Θεόν, ἢ καθὼς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζει, ἔνσαρκον νοῦν* (c. 24, p. 180). In the latter clause, however, Gregory himself says that he has not quoted the exact expressions of Apollinaris, but merely given his own impression of his real doctrine. Had he attributed to Christ real flesh prior to His birth from Mary, and merely represented Mary as the channel through which the already complete Christ passed into visibility (after the manner of the Valentinians), how would it be reconcilable with the statement of Gregory, that Apollinaris deemed the incarnation to form a highly important event in the history of Christ's person? For he did not ascribe to Him suffering and toil (*κόπος*) prior to the incarnation, but He became incarnate that He might undergo suffering and toil. Nay more, Gregory

¹ He objects to the doctrine of the Church,—*μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν, παρ' ἧμιν λέγεσθαι ὥστε τὸν λόγον εἶναι Θεόν*, that is, undoubtedly, so that the *ἀνθρώπινον τοῦ λόγου* (A. Mai 7, 20) was excluded, and the Logos was altogether indistinguishable from God, because His eternal and essential relation to the incarnation remained unnoticed.

himself had previously (c. 13) so distinctly recognised that Apollinaris believed Christ to have been born of Mary, that he could hit upon no other method of reconciling therewith his doctrine of an eternal humanity, than by fastening upon him the notion, that the Virgin also had existed in eternity. But this latter charge must free him from the earlier. He could not have attached so great importance to the earthly birth from Mary, if he had conceived the humanity of Christ to have been complete even prior to the incarnation. How very differently, too, would the teachers of the Church have treated him, had they really been able to point out Valentinian passages in his writings! Further, where does Apollinaris speak of a double body of Christ? And yet without a double body he could not have attributed to Him a real body prior to, and have represented Him as acquiring a body capable of suffering by means of, the incarnation. Not only, therefore, must the view taken by Gregory undoubtedly be pronounced incorrect, but we can very easily explain how he came to entertain it. For when Apollinaris regarded humanity as an essential and eternal determination of the Logos, and taught that the historical incarnation brought to light simply and solely what the Logos had always been in Himself, nothing could seem more natural than to suppose that Apollinaris held the notion of an eternal, real body. From which it followed at once, that the birth from Mary was merely an apparent one. The true opinion of Apollinaris, however, probably was,—In Himself, or latently, Christ, it is true, had always been man, for the Logos was the archetype of humanity in general, and the primal man; moreover, He had always carried within Himself the potency, or even the destiny to become flesh; that is, besides the eternal humanity, which is attributable to Him as the archetype, to assume that form thereof which is like us; but His historical humanification first became a reality (*πεῖρα*) when He was actually born of Mary.¹ After this explanation, it will be clear how Apol-

¹ C. 25:—Θεὸν ἑνσαρκον πρὸ αἰώνων ὄντα μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ γυναικὸς τετίχθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν παθημάτων πείραν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκην ἰλθεῖν. Apollinaris did not say, διὰ γυναικὸς (compare c. 25, p. 183), but that is Gregory's own view of the matter; the position of Apollinaris rather was, τὸν Θεὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς τεχθέντα. For this reason, also, he cannot have designated Him Θεὸς ἑνσαρκος πρὸ αἰώνων, or, at all events, only in the sense,

linaris was necessitated to refer the humiliation of Christ to His humanity, agreeably to the charge brought against him by Gregory.¹ If the Logos Himself was the eternal archetype of humanity; if He sets forth humanity as to its principal part and centre, the πνεῦμα; and if the humanity accordingly was the ἀπαύγασμα of the divine δόξα; the birth from Mary, the assumption of our form, of the form of a servant, must be regarded as an act of condescension, as an humiliation of His humanity (σάρξ, c. 23); having for its object the making of the new humanity, which eternally existed in the Logos, a reality on earth, and a common possession of the race.² Full light is thus thrown on the title of the treatise by Apollinaris, Ἀπόδειξις περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως τῆς καθ' ὁμολώσιν ἀνθρώπου, and it now becomes quite intelligible. If the creation of man was completed, and the idea of humanity realized, in Christ, we should have expected that Apollinaris would describe the incarnation as the realization of this archetype, as the quadrature of the humanity to its archetype (after the manner of Irenæus and Tertullian). Instead thereof, he describes it as an assimilation of Christ to men, by which he means the form of our humanity. This now acquires a meaning when he asserts Christ to have been a man even in eternity, κατὰ πνεῦμα, or as the archetype; for, in that case, the historical incarnation, and the becoming like men in their actual state, was an act of condescension on the part of that humanity, which in itself is Logos. But in becoming like, He did not become identical with us; for as He remained the Logos, so also did He remain the archetype of

that that which first became a reality through the birth from Mary, pertained to Him eternally, in so far as the destiny to incarnation by birth from Mary formed part of His full idea; an idea which was intended to be realized in time.

¹ C. 23, p. 178: Apollinaris teaches that the κένωσις related to the σάρξ, that is, to the humanity. He said, Through the σάρξ He humbled Himself, ταπεινώσαντα (-θέντα) σαρκί, ὑπερυψωθέντα δὲ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ (consequently as to His humanity) τὴν θείαν ὕψωσιν. C. 24, p. 179: Δοξάζεται γὰρ, φησιν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἐξ ἀδοξίας ἀναβαίνων (p. 183) δόξαν δὲ ἔχει πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ὡς Θεὸς προὔπαρχον τῶν αἰώνων.

² C. 22, p. 174: Κύριον ἐν δουλικῷ φανέντα σχήματι, and τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδοξίαν φορέσαντα μορφὴν. Compare the passage quoted in Note 1, p. 371. C. 13, p. 149: Προὔπαρχει, φησιν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς οὐχ ὡς ἴδιου ὄντος, παρ' αὐτὸν τοῦ πνεύματος, — ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ κυρίου . . . θείου πνεύματος ὄντος.

humanity, though He assumed our form of humanity in order to exalt it and to transform us.¹ This He was able to do, because, as πνεῦμα or ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος, He was in Himself also Divine Logos. Hence, too, the condescension of His eternal humanity to our form was a divine deed (θεῖα σάρκωσις). A further evidence of the correctness of the view we have presented, is in particular the circumstance, that whereas the theories of a heavenly humanity of Christ were strongly marked by Manichæan or Docetical features, and aimed, on the one hand, at raising Christ as much as possible above earthly lowness, and, on the other hand, at reducing His earthly humanity to a non-essential, transitory thing, with the design, as they fancied, of thus giving a worthier representation of Him; the tendency of Apollinaris was precisely the contrary one,—to use the expression employed by Gregory, the ultimate purpose of all his writings was to represent the divine nature as mortal, that is, to vindicate for it as complete a participation in suffering as possible. This leads us to the other aspect of the matter. In the foregoing, we have seen how he endeavoured to conjoin deity and humanity to a perfect unity, by maintaining at all events the κυριώτατον of man, his πνεῦμα, to be an eternal determination of the Logos Himself; nay more, by positing the incarnation as a latent potency of the Logos. In addition to this, it must also be mentioned, that he tried to bring the deity as near as possible to humanity; and that not merely to the eternal humanity which he asserts the Logos Himself to be (for therein would merely be involved the immediate or essential unity of the two), nor merely by means of the Platonic εἶδος of the σὰρξ, but also to humanity in its temporal form. To take note hereof was the more necessary, as at

¹ So is it also clear that Apollinaris says,—οὐκ ἄνθρωπος,—ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος, διότι οὐκ ὁμοούσιος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον. C. 35, p. 212 :—'Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναι, φησιν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον (that is, only like, not identical with, a man of the same nature as ourselves;—as to His inner essence, setting forth the true idea of man, the ἴσω ἄνθρωπος, which is to become our true personality also; as to His appearance in time, on the contrary, like, but not equal to, our present humanity, as it exists apart from Him) ἀνουν, ἰσαρκον ὄντα. His favourite expression was,—Christ is νοῦς ἰσαρκος, not λόγος ἰσαρκος. For νοῦς seemed to him to express the eternal point of unity of the divine and human; and this νοῦς became ἰσαρκος.

this point a gap, or, if we will, a break, was discoverable in the system of Apollinaris. The Logos, or the eternal *πνεῦμα*, which he also designates the eternal man Christ, is supposed to contain the potency of an incarnation in time. This thought appears to require that the historical humanity of Christ be regarded as the exposition of the eternal potency contained in the Logos. But how can His assumption of a *σῶμα*, and of the *ψυχὴ ζωτικὴ* from Mary, be reconciled therewith? According to the former idea, consistency would appear to necessitate him to derive the earthly humanity of Christ also from the essence of the Logos or the *πνεῦμα*; according to the latter, the earthly humanity was derived to Him from Adam through Mary. In the former case, the Logos is conceived as productive; but what becomes, then, of the birth from Mary? In the latter case, He is conceived as receiving, assuming (*ἀναλαμβάνων*); but what becomes, then, of the unity, the identity of the Logos with Himself in the earthly humanity of Christ, which is not derived from His own essence? In point of fact, Apollinaris betrays here a certain degree of uncertainty. He frequently condemns the notion of a mere "assumption" of humanity; for he desired to advance beyond the category of "having" to that of "being," and to regard the Person of Christ as a veritable unity, of which humanity as well as deity was an integral, constitutive element, and not a mere external addition. But, on the other hand, unless he were prepared to give up the doctrine of the birth of Christ from Mary, he must allow the presence in His person of something received, appropriated from without (an *ἐπίκτητον, ἐπυγενόμενον*).¹ For he is far from adopting the principle referred to above, and which may be termed pantheistic, to wit, that human nature generally, *σῶμα* and *ψυχὴ*, pertained to and was

¹ As he also does; see note 1, p. 365; cf. note 3, p. 372. According to a fragment preserved by Theodoret, Dialog. 1, p. 70, he said;—*Εἰ δὲ προσλαμβάνει τις, οὐ τρίπεται εἰς τοῦτο, προσλάβει δὲ σάρκα ὁ Χριστὸς, ἄρα οὐκ ἐπάραται εἰς σάρκα.*—*Καὶ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ἡμῖν εἰς συγγένειαν ἰχαρίσατο διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σώσῃ. Μακρὸν δὲ κάλλιον τοῦ σωζομένου τὸ σώζον μακρὸν ἄρα κάλλιον ἡμῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ σωματώσει· οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἦν κάλλιον εἰς σάρκα τραπεῖς (-έν).* P. 71:—*Προσκυνοῦμεν δὲ Θεὸν σάρκα ἐκ τῆς ἀγίας παρθένου προσλαμβάνοντα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπον μὲν ὄντα κατὰ τὴν σάρκα, Θεὸν δὲ κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα.*—*Ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου γεννηθεῖσθαι, οὐκ ὑνύματι ἀλλ' ἀληθείᾳ προσλαμβάνοντα ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου σάρκα.*

the external realization of the *φύσις* of the Logos. How then does he combine the two? In one way alone;—not indeed by asserting the Logos to be eternally *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*, in the same sense as he asserted Him to be essentially and eternally *πνεῦμα*; but by regarding it as an essential and eternal determination of His being, to yearn for the assumption of both, to be susceptible of that which meets and is offered to it by the already existing humanity. If, then, there was in Him an essential and eternal inclination to this humanity, we are warranted in saying, that in receiving and assuming the human element from Mary, He was receiving that which belongs to His own complete idea, or, in other words, the potency of incarnation contained in Him is capable of becoming an actual, visible reality. What He thus received was something lower, something suffering, not something higher: the receptivity which thus appropriated the lower was therefore in reality an *act*, an act of love; or, regarded from another point of view, He gave far more than He received, when human nature was given to Him; for, through being assumed by the Logos, the human nature became participant in divine nature. Still, this deed is not a deed of productive or creative power or majesty; but being an act of condescending love, it implies that the Logos by love had constituted Himself susceptible of the lower element from Adam's stem, and to His humiliation or condescension belonged His actual assumption of that humanity from Mary. Inasmuch, therefore, as He lovingly assumed our lower humanity, instead of creating a humanity afresh, or setting it forth and producing it out of Himself, the real earthly incarnation is converted from a physical into an ethical process undergone by God the Logos. For this reason, it was possible for two things which, prior to the act of incarnation, were separate, to wit, the Logos and the Adamitic nature, to coalesce to a personal unity, provided only, that on the part of the Logos, there was a susceptibility to that in respect to which the humanity was, as it were, a giver and actor; and that, therefore, the presentation to the Logos of the human elements of Jesus, by the Adamitic nature, was simply as it were the fulfilment of His eternal yearning to become man. Humanity and deity are perfectly capable of combining to form a personal unity, because the idea of each points to the other from the very beginning. We have seen above, that, according

to Apollinaris, when the Adamitic humanity received the divine *νοῦς*, it received its true ruler, the ruler which its very φύσις compelled it to demand, in order that it might pass from an imperfect to a perfect form (which *νοῦς*, however, it could not beget out of itself); and that the two in combination set forth the unity of the moving principle and the object moved, or, in other words, the movement of life in its normal state. Even so, do we find on the part of the Logos a susceptibility to that which the humanity has to communicate to Him,—a susceptibility resting, however, on an ethical basis;—accordingly, in this aspect also, it is clear both that the conjunction of humanity and deity to a complete personal unity was a possibility, and that that which the Logos in the first instance received from without, might become verily His own and a momentum of His being. It is therefore possible that Apollinaris himself may have taught, what his school certainly taught, that through its union with the uncreated, the flesh also became uncreated; that is, the idea of creation passed in this instance into that of being (compare Ath. c. Apoll. 1, 4). For it not merely became the property of the Logos by the Unio, but was brought to sameness of nature (c. 5), and was made coeternal with the nature of God;—naturally, not in the sense of eternal pre-existence, but of post-existence.

These observations will throw light on that which Apollinaris says regarding the participation of the Logos in human, particularly in suffering, conditions. He maintains that we ought not to teach merely that Jesus was born as to His humanity; and characterizes it as an Hellenic and Jewish error to form so incorrect a conception of that unity of the divine-human person, which first gave the incarnation its truth, as not to admit of God being represented as born of a woman.¹ As far as concerns the suffering in particular, according to Gregory, his intention was to teach, not merely that the deity of the Only-begotten took suffering upon itself in its humanity, but also that the divine nature converted itself to participation in suffer-

¹ C. 25, p. 183:—"Ἕλληνες γάρ, φησι, καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι προφανῶς ἀπιστοῦσι μὴ καταδεχόμενοι Θεὸν ἀκούειν τὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς τεχθέντα. C. 36, p. 215:—Εἰ μὴ νοῦς, φησιν, ἑσαρκὸς ἔστιν ὁ κύριος, Σοφία ἂν εἴη, φερίζουσα νοῦν ἀνθρώπου, etc. (see Note 66); but then οὐκ ἔν ἐπιδημία Θεοῦ ἢ Χριστοῦ παρουσίᾳ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου γέννησις.

ing.¹ Gregory's account would lead us to believe that he made the Logos Himself die. But that this cannot have been his meaning is plain, even from the observation directed against him by Gregory,—“One cannot say that He died as to *one part* of Himself, and therefore not as to the other, for He was without parts, and uncompounded; what He is termed He was entirely, not this to one part and that to another.” Apollinaris himself grants that the Son is the Father's wisdom, power, and so forth (p. 133); but if He is such, and yet, on the other hand, ceases (in death) to be what He was, everything dies with Him. Being indivisible, He must either die entirely or live entirely: if He die, everything dies, for everything depends on His deity, which is supposed to have died. From this it is clear, as Gregory himself also acknowledges afterwards, that Apollinaris had no intention of absolutely representing the Logos as dying; but he distinguished in the one Logos two aspects (Gregory says “parts”), as to one of which He was susceptible of receiving what humanity was able to communicate, whilst as to the other He was and continued immortal.² It must be possible to refer sufferings to the divine nature of the Logos; otherwise Christ did not really put Himself in our place, and could not have conquered sin, for then it would have been a mere man that suffered (c. 51, 54). “If Christ were united with the Father even prior to the resurrection, why can He not have been united with the God in Him? The Redeemer suffered hunger, thirst, weariness, conflicts, and sadness. But how could He be at the same time God? He is not two persons, as though God were one, man another. Accordingly, God suffered; and that suffered, which, properly speaking, admits no suffering into itself, not by a necessity of its nature altogether inde-

¹ C. 5:—Θνητὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τὴν θείτητα, καὶ οὐκ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ τὸ πάθος διέξασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπαθῇ καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον φύσει πρὸς πάντους μετουσίαν ἀλλοιωθῆναι.

² Gregory (ibid.) brings against him the charge,—ἀναπλάττει ἄλλην δύναμιν (along with the aspect which was susceptible of receiving the communication of the human, of the passible) ἀνακαλουμένην ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου, that is, in the aspect which was and continued immortal, was contained, according to Apollinaris, the power to overcome death, and to reunite with itself, the aspect of His essence, which had as it were been given up to death along with the body.

pendent of the will, but in agreement with the arrangement of its own substance; that is, the deity did not suffer immediately or by physical necessity, but in consequence of a free impulse given it by the Logos, who willed to sympathize with, or participate in, the sufferings of men.¹ From the words of Christ concerning the corn of wheat that dies (John xii. 24), Apollinaris concluded,—Christ's dying could not have brought so much fruit if it had been the death of a mere man, instead of the suffering of the deity. But the Church, in its doctrine, does not leave to Him who was crucified anything divine in His own nature; not even in His noblest part, in the *πνεῦμα*, was the human at the same time also divine.²

If, in the view of Apollinaris, the Logos did not, properly speaking, take the place of the usual human *νοῦς*, as something foreign to humanity; and if, on the contrary, He who became flesh (*ἔνσαρκος*) set forth true humanity, and was the *πνεῦμα* in Christ, he had no alternative but to represent this human *πνεῦμα*, which was at the same time Logos, as actually man, and as participating in all human qualities. We discover at once, however, that this *πνεῦμα* presents two aspects: one, as to which it is Logos or God, and absolutely immutable; the other, as to which it is finite, and is able really to humble itself and sympathize with our sufferings and conflicts. This duality of aspects in the one Logos necessarily leads to a distinction being drawn between the Logos and the Father (see Note 1, page 373); and, in fact, he consistently persisted in referring the words *ἐμὸν θέλημα*, which occur in Luke xxii. 42 ("not My will, but Thine be done"), not merely to the human will of Christ, but also to the Logos,—that is, so far as the Logos was united with the man.³ The will of the Logos in the man, says

¹ C. 58, p. 283:—*Εἰ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἦνται ὁ Χριστὸς πρὸ ἀναστάσεως, πῶς πρὸς τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ Θεὸν οὐχ ἦνται; ὁ Σωτὴρ πίπτοντι πείναν, δίψαν καὶ κάματον καὶ αγωνίαν, καὶ λύπην. Τίς ὦν ὁ Σωτὴρ; ὁ Θεός, φησιν, (:) οὐ δύο πρόσωπα, ὡς ἑτέρου μὲν ὄντος, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Οὐκοῦν ὁ Θεὸς πίπτοντι, καὶ πάσχει τὸ ἀπαράδεκτον πάθος, οὐκ ἀνάγκη φύσεως ἀβουλήτου, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθίᾳ φύσεως.*

² C. 27. Compare c. 51, 52:—*Αἰτιᾶται τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν λόγον, ὅτι περὶ ἄνθρωπον θεωροῦμεν τὸ πάθος· ἀνθρώπου δὲ θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον, οὐδὲ ἀνίσταται ὁ μὴ ἀποθνήσκων.*

³ C. 81:—*Οὐ μνημονεύουσί, φησιν, ὅτι τὸ θέλημα τοῦτο ἰδίον εἴρηται οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἐκ γῆς, καθὼς αὐτοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ καταβάλλοντος*

he, did not therefore come into conflict with that of the Father; for, even when He was not heard, not to be heard was His will, and consequently, in any case, His will was done. Accordingly, the Logos and His will were rendered by His humanity different from, but not antagonistic to, the Father: the truth of the humanity of Christ manifested itself in this difference (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον Χριστοῦ ἐδείκνυτο θέλημα). One can easily understand how, with such principles, he came to be charged with Arianism; for Arius also taught that there was a *τρεπτόν* in Christ different from the will of the Father. But apart from the consideration that the *τρεπτόν* posited by Arius involved the possibility of sin, whereas Apollinaris represented it as an outflow of the unchangeable *love* and essential sinlessness of Christ, those who brought this charge forgot that Arius attributed immutability to the Father alone, and mutability alone to the Son. Apollinaris was far from intending to do this: he represented the Son also as unchangeable as to His deity, but believed, notwithstanding, that by His incarnation the Logos made Himself unequal to Himself, though He restores Himself again to His original equality with Himself,¹—an equality which always continued to be potentially His. He is much rather chargeable, therefore, with entertaining patripassian principles in relation to the deity of the Son, than with Arianism. But even this would not be correct, for he totally repudiates the idea of a conversion, nay more, of a passibility of the Logos;² on the contrary, he regards His suffering, as in the last instance an *act* of love, as *ἐνέργεια*. Not merely the adjustment of the *διαίρεσις*, but even the submission thereto, the *κένωσις*, was an act of the eternal and ever self-identical love of the Logos. It is true, the first product of this love was suf-

ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, τὸ εἰς ἑωσιν αὐτοῦ προσειλημμένον. A. Mai 7, 203:—Εἰ δὲ ἰσοσθιῆς καὶ ποιμανὸς τῆς πατρικῆς οὐσίας ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸν σταυρὸν ἐρχόμενος ἦν, πῶς ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ γενόμενος προσήυχτο παρελθεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ ποτήριον, καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ τὸ θέλημα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς; τί δὲ καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἔχρην τὸ τοῦ εὐχομένου θέλημα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀσύμφωνον Θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;

¹ C. 29:—Διαιρῶν μὲν (Χριστὸς) τὴν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ σάρκα, ἐξισῶν δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἔχει τὴν ἐν δυνάμει πάλιν ἰσότητα, καὶ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα τῆς ἐνεργείας διαιρεῖται· καθ' ἣν, φησιν, οὐ πάντας ἐξωποιοῖσιν, ἀλλὰ τινας, οὓς ἠθέλησεν.

² Compare c. 56, p. 277:—Πῶς, φησι, Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, μὴ μεταβληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ μὴ νοῦς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κατίσθη;

fering, was a feeling of pain, resulting from the conjunction of the Logos with the suffering Jesus; but if the Logos could not lovingly have sympathized with humanity, even whilst in the humanity of Christ, His divine nature would not have been in harmony with, but would have stood in the way of, His love; and therefore the physical categories in the conception of the Logos, instead of being subject to, would set a limit and restraint to the ethical, or, in other words, to His love.

Gregory Nazianzen directs special attention to this inequality of the Logos, who is at the same time the archetypal man, with Himself.¹ He says,—The words, He was begotten, tempted, He hungered, thirsted, slept, was weary, they (that is, the Apollinarists) refer to the human aspect; but that He was glorified by the angels, that He conquered the tempter, and wrought miracles, they attribute to the deity. The question, "Where have you laid Lazarus?" belonged to our weak nature; but when He cried, "Lazarus, come forth," and raised him from the dead, that belonged to the nature which is higher than ours.² When He struggled with distress, was nailed to the cross, and buried, it affected the outward husk; that He rose again and ascended to heaven, was due to the inner treasure.³ But when Gregory Nazianzen asserts, that thus the very fault is committed which was charged upon the doctrine of the Church, and that it involves the assumption of two mutually conflicting natures, he overlooks, in the first place, that at that time the Church had not seen as clearly as did Apollinaris, that Christ must be regarded as one indivisible person, and that we must not take such a view of His humanity as would constitute it a second person; and, in the second place, that, as we have shown, Apollinaris believed the human and divine aspects, which he never describes as natures, to be contained in each other. The inequality of Christ to Himself, referred to above, did not affect merely one of the two aspects, but both, each by and in itself. In the first place, humanity was present in Christ in its complete form; the archetype, the eternal *πνεῦμα*

¹ Ep. ad. Cledon. 2, 7, or Or. 52.

² Compare Athan. Tom. ad Antioch. 7. But see also Note 65.

³ Compare Athan. c. Apoll. 1, 3, where the same is designated by *ἰουθεὶν ἀνθρώπου*. He speaks also, in c. Ap. 1, 12, of men who say,—*Ὅτι ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ παθὼν νύξ and ἄλλος ὁ μὴ παθὼν*.

was there; but it passed into inequality with itself, by assuming the form of our humanity. That eternal *πνεῦμα* in Him was, further, and at the same time, the *deity* of the Logos; consequently, the deity also passed into inequality with itself, in the suffering God-man. (Note 70.)

In that Apollinaris thus represented the divinity of the Logos as having, in itself, an aspect turned towards, yea, even appertaining to, the humanity (even as humanity has an aspect turned towards the divine), we can understand how it was possible for Gregory Nazianzen further to charge him with introducing a "scala" into the divine (Ad Cledon. 1, 16). He constructs the Trinity, says Gregory, by representing it as compounded of a great, a greater, and a greatest.¹ This can only refer to the circumstance of his attributing to the Logos, besides His perfect deity, an aspect turned towards finitude; and of his using similar words respecting the Holy Spirit, so far as He dwells in believers, groans in them, as Paul teaches, is grieved, and so forth. But this œconomic Subordinationism is as widely removed as possible from Arianism; for it might very easily have the doctrine of the Council of Nicæa, the ontological Trinity, for its presupposition (Mansi 3, 461). Furthermore, on the basis thereof, by the application of ethical principles, it was possible for him to teach an humiliation, that is, a self-emptying of the Son and the Spirit, in the sense, namely, both of their making themselves unequal to the Father, and, as we have shown above, of their making themselves each unequal to Himself. This, however, must be evident from what has preceded. We have also express testimony to the effect that he adhered firmly to the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. (Greg. Nyss. l. c. c. 52, p. 264, says,—“He established *μίαν τῆς Τριάδος θεότητα*, in opposition to the Arians;” Theodoret himself (l. c.) was compelled to testify,—“In some of his writings we find also the Church doctrine of the Trinity, *ἐν ἐνλοις συγγράμμασιν—ὁμοίως ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν μίαν τῆς θεότητος οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ἐκήρυξεν*.) Apollinaris believed, further, that the power to adjust that *διαίρεσις* was always inherent in

¹ Compare also Theodoret, Hær. Fab. 4, 8: *Αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἵστιν εὐρημα τὸ μέγα, μείζον, μέγιστον*, or the *βαθμοὶ ἀξιομάτων ὡς μεγάλου μὲν ὄντος τοῦ Πνεύματος, τοῦ δὲ νιῶ μείζονος, μεγίστου δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς*. Then we should have the reproach of Sabellianism.

Christ; and that the perfect adjustment would take place in the thousand years' kingdom, when the glorified person of the Redeemer, having attained to complete unity, will dwell and walk among men on earth, in a form which shall be at once adequate to the deity, and perfectly human. (Note 71.)

The remarks just made throw light on an expression of Apollinaris which has occasioned much surprise. The man Jesus Christ, says he, is one, as God the Father is one; this belongs to the idea of an essence. This same unity is, in like manner, predicable of the compound being which stands in the middle between God and man (*ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο φύσεως συνθέτου μεταξὺ οὐσης Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου*). In his Syllogisms, Apollinaris had said,—If different qualities concentrate in one, there arises a kind of middle thing; for example, spring is a middle thing between winter and summer. No middle thing, however, includes within itself the points of both extremes in completeness, but merely partially. Wherefore, the middle between God and men, in the Person of Christ, is neither completely man nor completely God, but a commixture of God and man.¹ At first sight, this passage does not at all seem to fit into Apollinaris' system; this *μεσότης* appears to merit being charged with the same fault as he himself had brought against the doctrine of the Church (see Note 1, p. 360). Indeed, Gregory of Nyssa already makes the same observation (c. 49, p. 257). The doctrine of the Church does not desire a half, but *τέλειον Θεόν* and *τέλειον ἄνθρωπον* in Christ; Apollinaris, on the contrary, presents us with a mutilated man. But that he omits the one *ἀκρότης*, the human *προαίρεσις*, the human *νοῦς* from his conception of Christ, is certain; and equally certain, that he allows the *λόγος* during Christ's life on earth to become unequal to Himself, and does not allow Him to exhibit His proper *ἀκρότης*. The *μεσότης* resulting herefrom fits perfectly into his system, provided it remains eternally; the more so, as with this "temperamentum," which the God-man sets

¹ A. Mai 7, 310: *Μεσότητες γίνονται ἰδιότητων διαφορῶν εἰς τὴν συνελθουσῶν, ὥς ἐν ἡμίονῳ ἰδιότης ὄνου καὶ ἵππου, καὶ ἐν γλαυκῇ χρώματι ἰδιότης λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, καὶ ἐν αἵρῳ χειμῶνος καὶ θεροῦς ἰδιότης ἡαρ ἔργαζομένη· οὐδεμία δὲ μεσότης ἐκατέρας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρότητας ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, ἀλλὰ μερικῶς ἐπιμεμειγμένας. Μεσότης δὲ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἐν Χριστῷ, οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ἀνθρώπος ὅλος, οὔτε Θεός, ἀλλὰ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μίξις.*

forth on earth, well consists an idea to which Apollinaris attached great importance,—the idea, namely, that the Logos, or the eternal πνεῦμα, was a determination of humanity, and that, on the other hand, the σὰρξ was a determination of the deity thus approximated to it.

Christ therefore is *μία φύσις*, one essence ; by which he understood both the unity of the person and the essential unity of the two aspects, the divine and the human. To the unity of the person corresponds unity of volition and of thought.¹ The hegemony in this unity is constantly in the hands of the Logos who became νοῦς ἑνσαρκος. For this reason, Christ was raised above all necessity of practice (*ἄσκησις*) ; and only on the condition that He was raised above practice, both as to knowledge and virtue, could He be the Redeemer. Without learning, He must needs be wise and holy from His very birth.² He worked His miracles, not like a prophet by the power of God, but by His own power (Cat. Cord. p. 255 ; Greg. Antirr. c. 29, p. 196.—Cat. Cord. pp. 384, 329). He spake not by revelation, but was Himself the lawgiver. Consequently, the inmost core of His personality remained untouched by that inequality or diremption (*διαίρεσις*) ; this core was not merely a principle, but the complete inner man, the perfect πνεῦμα or the Logos.

It is, further, particularly interesting to bring under consideration the relation of believers to Christ. The principal term employed by Apollinaris to designate it is *μίμησις*. Möhler has coarsely interpreted the word to denote a mechanical copying or mimicking. With a Protestant colouring, this is repeated also by Baur (pp. 635 ff.), who finds in the word a species of Pela-

¹ Compare A. Mai 7, 70. The passages from Apollinaris, Polemon, and others, p. 20 : *μία ἐνέργεια, μία φύσις*. P. 16 :—*μία φύσις σύνθετος, σύγκρατος, σαρκική καὶ θείκη*. *Ω καινὴ πίστις, exclaimed Apollinaris, *καὶ μίξις θεοπαΐα, Θεὸς καὶ σὰρξ μίαν ἀπετέλεσε φύσιν*.

² Greg. Nyss. c. 38. Εἰ τι πλέον ἑτέρος ἑτέρου κομίζεται, τοῦτο δι' ἀσκήσιν γίνεται· οὐδεμία δὲ ἀσκήσις ἐν Χριστῷ οὐκ ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινος. C. 28, p. 192 :—*Τίς φησιν, ὁ ἅγιος ἐκ γενετῆς* ; (Therefore, in order that it might be sinless, it was necessary for Christ's humanity to be deity : thus was it equal to the enemy.) *Τίς ἀδίδακτος σοφός* ; Compare especially c. 51. A man subject to the common corruption of men, even to the *τρεπτόν*, could not help. Only a perfectly sinless being could take away the curse of sin. Compare Cat. Cord. in Joh. 8, 38, where he designates this essential knowledge of Christ *γνώσις φουσική*.

gian idea of imitation, which would involve the laying of a false stress on the moral example of Christ. Against such a supposition, his antagonism to the Antiocheians, especially to Diodorus of Tarsus, ought alone to have protected him.¹ Still more, the importance he attached to the death of Christ (compare, for example, the Cat. Cord. on Joh. xix. 17). Apollinaris' fault was rather that of allowing the ethical to fall into the background, as compared with the religious. The passage quoted by Athanasius (c. Apoll. 1, 2), indeed, of which the men above-mentioned seem alone to have taken notice, does not show us clearly what Apollinaris' real opinion was. All it reports is,—*σαρκὸς μὲν καινότητα Χριστὸς ἐπιδέδεικται καθ' ὁμοίωσιν* (that is, Christ exhibited the new humanity in likeness to us) *τοῦ δὲ φρονούντος ἐν ἡμῖν τὴν καινότητα, διὰ μιμήσεως καὶ ὁμοιώσεως καὶ ἀποχῆς τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἕκαστος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιδείκνυται* (that is, the novelty of him who thinks in us, each one shows by imitation, resemblance and abstinence from sin). More light is thrown on the matter by Ep. ad Cledon. 2, 3, where the complaint is made against the school of Apollinaris (Gregory alludes particularly in the letters to Vitalis, for whom, in other respects like Epiphanius, he entertained a very high regard, Ep. ad Cled. 2, 5), that it gives a different explanation of the words, "We have the spirit of Christ" (1 Cor. xi. 16), from the Church, understanding by the spirit of Christ, His deity. This, however, first becomes quite clear from several passages preserved in a Catena to the Gospel of John.²

How far removed he was from Pelagianism, we may judge from his remarks on John iii. 5:—The Lord leads Nicodemus to true knowledge by attributing regeneration to grace, which is accomplished by the service, indeed, of water, which cleanses the body, but by the energy of the Spirit sanctifying the soul and filling it with deity. If He dwell in us as a pledge and first fruit, the perfect kingdom of God will come, and the fulness of the deity fill us.³ On vi. 27, he remarks,—The eternally enduring food is

¹ Compare p. 232, c. 42, where he protests against the Antiocheian distinction between *υἱὸς φύσει Θεός* and *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* (see Note 63).

² Compare Cat. Corder. 1630, p. 89, on John iii. 5; on vi. 27, p. 180; ver. 28, p. 181.

³ *Ἀναβιβάζει πρὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἔννοιαν, τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀναγέννησιν ἀποτιθεῖς, ἥτις ἐπιτελεῖται δι' ὑποργίας μὲν ὕδατος, δι' ἐνεργείας δὲ πνεύματος, τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγιάζοντος καὶ πληροῦντος θεότητι, οὗ δὲ κατοικήσαντος νῦν ἐν ἡμῖν*

the faith that makes alive, by which we are assimilated to the body (the humanity) of Christ, and are sealed by the Father with the power of God.¹ On vers. 28 f.:—Faith is a holy, perfect work; for which reason, it both justifies and sanctifies without human works, seeing that it contains within itself the noblest energy, and is not slothful and inactive.² On viii. 56:—What day did Abraham see? Christ, the true light, the Sun of righteousness, appeared to Abraham, in that He illuminated him with His rays in virtue of his faith. This faith was counted to him for righteousness, and so he exulted with joy to have seen the day of God in the ideal world (*τὴν νοητὴν Θεοῦ ἡμέραν*). (Note 72.) These passages show that Apollinaris had attained a deeper insight into the nature of faith. Through faith we are made partakers of the deity of Christ, which is at the same time humanity (*πνεῦμα*); in other words, we are made partakers of the principle of the divine-human life. Hence righteousness does not come from works, but through God, and becomes the portion of faith, which is not merely passive, inactive, but the highest energy. Christ works faith, in that He sets forth virtue and wisdom through the medium of His humanity as an organ; through His meekness and humility He attracts us to Himself, and works upon us until we decide either for or against Him—in the latter case, the decision is a rejection, not excusable on the ground of passion, but conscious.³ In another passage still ex-

ὡς περ ἀβραάμνος καὶ ἀπαρχῆς ἡ τελείως ἤξει βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, πλήρεις οὖσα θεότητος ἐν ἡμῖν.

¹ Αὕτη δὲ (the true τροφή) ἥν ἡ πίστις ἡ ζωοποιός, καθ' ἣν ἐξομοιοῦνται πρὸς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ κυρίου, τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐσφραγισμένην τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει.

² Ἔργον τὴν πίστιν ἀποφαίνων ἱερὸν τε καὶ τίλειον. Διὸ καὶ ἀνευ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔργων εἰκότως δικαιοὶ τε καὶ ἀγιάζονται, ὅτι καλλίστην ἐνέργειαν ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀργίαν τινὰ καὶ ἀπραξίαν. This reminds one of Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans.

³ On John xii. 36:—Ἐφύλαττε δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ παντελῶς ἀφιστηκώς θρασυτήτος, ἀχρι τοσούτου παριών εἰς μίσον, ἀχρι τοῦ διαμαρτυρῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ γὰρ ὀργῆς τόλμημα κατὰ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἔργον αὐτῶν ἴδιαι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κακίας βούλευμα· ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰς κατάρσεις ἀπαν τὸ ἐξ ὀργῆς τοιμώμενον ἀκρον δὲ ἐν κακίᾳ τὸ μετὰ βουλῆς πονηρεύεσθαι. Verse 40:—But the hardness brought on by God is not therefore the work of holy power, but a permission of the divine judgment and the work of the evil, hostile power. For (see on xiii. 21) evil also continues subject to God, and must serve the good; and the devil has power only through the evil that already is in men (compare on xiv. 30).

tant, he expressly explains what he understands by that *μίμησις*. His unity with the Father is an unity of nature (*φυσικὴ*); His unity with the Apostles is a matter of grace. Nevertheless the latter resembles the former, and that which is natural is imitated by that which is the work of grace (*ὁμολογία ἐκείνου καὶ μίμησις τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ κατὰ χάριν*),—to wit, by means of faith. Christ accomplished His miracles by a natural power, not by faith in the Father; the Apostles, through faith in the Son; wherefore also the Son is worshipped, the Apostles not. We owe to the Lord what He demands, says he in another place; but He gives what He claims. (Note 73.) We are to love Him, because He loved us. As I, says Christ, belong to the Father as to My deity, and yet am at the same time loved by Him as one who has raised Himself out of the circle of men (*ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀναστὰς*), so are you, who belong to Me after the flesh, loved by Me (on John xv. 8). By His ascension to the Father, He set forth the righteousness which pertains to believers. For it is this that justifies men, to wit, that our flesh and the human form ascended in Him the throne of heaven, sat down at the right hand of the Father, and was exalted higher than the human eye can reach.¹ Although we are called upon to imitate Him in thought and deed, to be in harmony with Him, as His spirit and will are in harmony with the Father, we can do nothing without Him; separated from Him, we dry up like branches cut off from the vine. In our own firmness (*ἀνδρεία*) we cannot confide; for in us there is nothing solid, nothing unchangeably good (*στεβρὸν, ἀτρεπτον ἀγαθόν*): He, on the contrary, says,—My invincible power is a sure source of courage for all those who participate in Me (in John xvi. 33; xv. 7). All human virtue and perfection prior to Christ remained imperfect for lack of Him; but, on the other hand, the divine deeds and care for men first attained completeness through the redemption in Christ. In Christ, therefore, both humanity and the revelation of God were perfected.² Man was both raised above him-

¹ Τοῦτο γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἰδικαίωσι τὸ σάρκα ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ εἶδος ἀνθρώπινον ἐπιβῆναι θρόνου οὐρανοῦ καὶ καθισθῆναι παρὰ Πατρὶ, κ.τ.λ. Compare on xx. 18, p. 455. "Through Me, God will be your Father, ὅταν ἀναβῶ τὴν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἀνάγαν ἀπαρχήν."

² On John xix. 30. He says, "It is finished," and justly, πάσης μὲν τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρετῆς προειργασμένης ἀτελοῦς μενούσης ἀνεν Χριστοῦ, πάσης δὲ

self, and made like Christ, and thus perfected.¹ A new and wonderful birth was introduced by Christ: it is attended by inexpressible pains; but the suffering is followed by the resurrection, and brings a joy which will no more change, and which cannot be taken away; for through the resurrection of the new man ye stand as new men, and obtain free access to God. Ye will rejoice when ye shall witness the birth of the child which was unknown to the world, and which is exalted above death and corruption; and that is He in you.³ These propositions are plainly fitted to establish the *ὁμοουσία* of Christ, if not with the human race in general, at all events with perfected men, with Christians.

It cannot be denied that Apollinaris' doctrine of faith is a logical development of his Christology; and that, on the whole, his system is governed by one principle. Faith corresponds to the fact of the incarnation: by the incarnation Christ became like us; by faith we become like Christ. As the divine *νοῦς* was the hegemonic principle in Christ, so is the Spirit of Christ in us. And as that divine *νοῦς* was not something foreign to humanity, but rather the true, the eternal man, the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*; even so are we perfected by our reception of the *νοῦς* of Christ, although we are thereby at the same time exalted above ourselves. Prior to the coming of Christ also, it is true, human nature appeared as a relatively independent being: it had a relative centre of unity, a *νοῦς*, in which the powers were conjoined to unity. But this was not yet the true *νοῦς*; for, *ὑπὸ Θεοῦ περὶ ἀνθρώπους γενομένης προνοίας ἐν τῇ παρὰ Χριστοῦ σωτηρίᾳ τὸ τίλειον ἀπολαμβανούσης.*

¹ On John xvii. 13:—"These things speak I in the world." *Σαφῶς ἐν τούτῳ διαιρεῖ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.* He, namely, is not of the world; His disciples also are not of the world: the former is clear, for He did not descend from heaven. *Οἱ δὲ ἀπόστολοι κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν Χριστοῦ μετεβίβησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου.* They became strangers to me, *διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴν.* Through their *οἰκισίτης* with Him also, they were estranged from the world.

² On John xvi. 21:—*οὕτως ἀποβήσεται ὑμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ καινοῦ καὶ θαυμασίου τούτου τοκετοῦ.* *Νῦν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν κόσμον γεννᾶται ἐκ παραδόξων ὧδινων, καὶ λύπην μὲν ὑμῖν αἱ περὶ τὸ πάθος ὧδινες προσοίσουσι, χαρὰν δὲ ἡ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἀνάστασις.*—*ὅτι διὰ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τοῦ νιου ἀνθρώπου νιοὶ καταστάντες εἰς τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ἡξέτε παρήρσιαν.* *Χαρήσεσθε γὰρ ὅταν ἤδητε (ἰδ.) ξίνον τῷ κόσμῳ παιδίων ἀποτεχθὲν ἀφθαρτὸν τε καὶ αὐόλιθρον, ἑαυτὸν δὲ δηλονότι φησί.*

much as it lacked a divine content, its content was sensuous, and thus all was disfigured. The *νοῦς* in Christ ruled, and was no longer merely mutable, elective, or psychical (1 Cor. ii. 14); it was the hegemonical spirit; and through faith the same thing takes place by grace in us. We also need the *ἀρετὴν* for our perfection, the *πνεῦμα* as a new principle, which must be our essential righteousness; we, however, attain to it by grace. This, like many other ideas of Apollinaris, reminds us strongly of the system of Andreas Osiander, of his "*justitia essentialis*."

Apollinaris has, notwithstanding, left a discrepancy in his system. Men, even apart from Christ, have *νοῦς* in themselves; but it is, as it were, merely the form or the possibility thereof, it is *δεκτικὸς* for good and evil, *τρεπτὸς*, and so forth; in reality, however, the servant of sin. Christ, on the contrary, has no *νοῦς* at all which is derived from the Adamitic nature; and, therefore, His equality of essence with men suffers. Had Apollinaris been minded to carry out the parallel between Christ and men strictly, he must have maintained, *either* that believers have no *νοῦς*, no *πνεῦμα*, before they believe; and that it is first created in them by Christ. But although Apollinaris sometimes inclined thereto, he could not be prepared to carry the notion out strictly; because men prior to Christ would thus be degraded almost to the rank of beasts, and redemption and completion would be a new creation, instead of a renovation; especially as the new element superadded by creation, the *πνεῦμα*, constituted, in the view of Apollinaris, the inmost centre, the very kernel of the human personality itself. *Or*, on the other hand, as it was impossible to carry this out, he must have attributed a *νοῦς*, a human soul, to Christ as to His human nature, the nature assumed from Mary; at all events, in the sense that this *νοῦς*, so far as it owed its existence to the first creation, was a *νοῦς δεκτικὸς*, neither filled with the sensuous nor with the divine, but still endowed with the possibility of both. In the incarnation itself, however, he must have conceived it filled and appropriated by the divine *νοῦς* or Logos, as was required by the idea of a true incarnation and a true development. At the same time, justice would thus be done to the deep, speculative insight of Apollinaris into the fact, that the Logos who fills this human soul, and conjoins it with Himself, is not a something foreign to its essence, but that which it had, as it were, yearned for and expected, be-

cause it could not attain to its true shape and form until it had been filled with its true content;—in other words, it was compatible with the view in question, to hold the Logos to be the truth of human nature. We have found previously that Irenæus, pursuing a course of thought similar to that of Apollinaris, endeavoured to avoid the fault just mentioned, by distinguishing in the human soul between possibility or susceptibility, and realization or fulfilment: attributing the former to the human aspect of Christ derived from the Adamitic nature, which the Holy Ghost had prepared and consecrated for the scene of the incarnation; the latter to the Logos;—and believing, on the one hand, that the human nature, because pure, tended towards union with the Logos; on the other hand, that the Logos, out of love, strove towards an incarnation. Apollinaris, however, did not do this, because he reckoned to the Adamitic nature, not merely opposed possibilities in the form of a double susceptibility, but also an independent power to take opposite resolutions, the *αὐτεξούσιον*. If he necessarily regarded an human *νοῦς*, possessed of independence, as an hindrance to the incarnation, it was still more the case, because he appears to have attributed to the soul derived from Adam's race, as others had done to the body, a natural bias to evil, and because he deemed it impossible that a human being with freedom of choice should remain without sin. His only resource, therefore, was to shut out this human *νοῦς*; which he then futilely endeavoured to make good by designating the *νοῦς ἐπουράνιος* or *λόγος*, also *ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος*.

However greatly, then, the Church teachers may have misunderstood Apollinaris, and however lightly they may have estimated the elements of his system which were speculatively of main importance, they were justified in charging him with a curtailment in Christ Himself of the human nature, which He came to heal and perfect; supposing that the only way to secure the unity of the divine-human person was to let fall the truly human soul, instead of so defining it that it should be able to be conjoined in unity with the Logos, without being tainted with sin, and without having a separate personality of its own. A God in a human body with animal life (*ψυχὴ ζωτικὴ*), they say to him therefore, is a mask, but not a God-man. Apollinaris, it is true, constantly exclaims afresh,—Christ cannot have

so entirely become that which we are as to have lost the ability to make out of us that which He is. He says, in particular, influenced by his antagonism to Arianism, a human *νοῦς* of the first creation must necessarily possess freedom of choice, and thus an uncertainty and an impotence against sin would have attached to Christ, that must have rendered it impossible for Him to fulfil His vocation of Redeemer. But they replied,—That which was not assumed by Him remained unhealed (*τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον*). They asked,—Is not the soul precisely the highest in man? and would not, therefore, an incarnation without soul be Docetical in the main point?¹ Or, did the body alone stand under sin and condemnation? and did the soul need no redemption?

To this he might indeed have answered,—The work of redemption consisted precisely in the perfection brought by Christ, or in the completion of the creation of our nature; and it becomes unnecessary to lay special emphasis on the redemption. For if through faith the *νοῦς* of Christ enters into us and becomes our hegemonical principle, we become thereby new persons, pleasing to God, sinless. Plainly, however, the second creation thus comes into conflict with the first, inasmuch as the second neither recognises nor seeks a living link of connection in the first. And even if he recognised the existence of such a point of union in believers, and thus escaped a magical creation of a new constituent of human nature, he did not acknowledge its existence in Christ; otherwise, as we have just shown, he must have attributed to Him a human *ψυχὴ*, which was susceptible to the active divine *νοῦς*. This also floated before the minds of the teachers of the Church when they remarked,—His theory renders the incarnation more difficult, instead of explaining it. For, through denying the human soul, he lost that middle link, by means of which it was possible for the deity to appropriate the body and its sufferings.² It is true, Apollinaris professes

¹ Greg. Nyss. l. c. c. 33, p. 204, charges him with teaching a rootless man, *ἄνθρωπον ἀρριζόν, καὶ ἀσυνεχῆ πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν*. 212 :—*ἐκφυλὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως*. He teaches strictly two species of men :—an earthly, consisting of body, soul, reason; and an heavenly, consisting of body, soul, God. Christ, therefore, stands over against us as *ἑτεροούσιος*, and is not *ὁμοούσιος κατὰ τὸ κυριότατον*, in relation to the highest element of the Adamitic humanity.

² L. c. p. 256, c. 48 :—He proceeds *ὡς οἰκιοτίρας παρὰ τὸν νοῦν τῆς σαρ-*

that it was necessary for Christ, in order to exhibit virtue, to walk among men as a man. But if His humanity was a body without rational soul, His virtue was not human virtue. Nay more, says Gregory of Nyssa, if He had no freedom (*αὐτεξούσιον*), His virtue was no virtue.¹

This curtailment of the human nature in itself has a Docetical character; but that Apollinaris was tainted with Docetism, shows itself still more clearly in the circumstance, that (as, indeed, might consistently be expected) he was unable to attribute growth in wisdom and grace, learning, exercise, temptation, to the human soul of Christ. But if He was not the subject of actual growth, and merely revealed to others in ever increasing measure the inner treasures of His being, which remained in themselves ever the same, and, being complete and closed, were susceptible neither of enlargement nor diminution, He did not pass through a truly human course of life. The cause of this fault, was his assuming the human *πνεῦμα* of Christ to be *immediately* of like nature with the eternal Logos. Instead of positing merely the possibility of the incarnation in the eternal Logos, distinguishing therefrom every actualization of this possibility, and representing the possibility as becoming an actuality, by an ethical process (that is, through the love of the Logos, which impelled Him to the act of *κένωσις*, and by the ethical process which Christ underwent), he posits the humanity as eternally complete, *κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον*; he represents it as the Logos Himself. Prior to the incarnation, it is latent merely in relation to men; in itself, it is eternally complete. On this view, however, the childhood of Christ was necessarily mere appearance. He cannot be a moral example, but the physical or metaphysical process of the incarnation of God, begun in Him, is simply continued in believers, who receive, in the place of their earthly *νοῦς*, His *πνεῦμα*, or the victorious principle of that union of the divine with the flesh

κὺς οὐσης πρὸς τὴν τῆς θεότητος ἑνώσειν. C. 41, p. 299: The assumption of the *σὰρξ* by the Logos becomes more intelligible, if the *νοῦς* formed the transition to the God *λόγος*.

¹ Ibidem:—How can the *σὰρξ* have virtue without the *ἐκούσιον*? And the *ἐκούσιον* is impossible without a *νοῦς*. C. 41:—*ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ νοῦς τίς ἐστίν.* How, then, could Apollinaris say,—Man, in whom is no *νοῦς*, μεταλαμβάνει τῆς καθαρᾶς ἀρετῆς? Τὸ ἀπροαίρετον can neither be *αἰσίματος* nor praiseworthy, although it may be without sin.

which was archetypally realized in Christ. Apollinaris seems to have had not the slightest notion, that even if the Redeemer did assume a human soul, and with it subject Himself to a process of development through freedom of choice, His victory and work of redemption were notwithstanding sure; and, besides, that only on this supposition could His virtue be human virtue and be tested. Freedom he believed to involve sin, at all events for a soul of Adam's race. Such notions may not be directly branded Manichæan; but, at all events, the notion that freedom of choice is not fit for appropriation by the Logos, whilst at the same time it is an essential constituent of the nature of men and angels, involves a complaint against the first creation. This complaint is the more unjustifiable, as, in the further course of his system, a representation is given of the essential nature of man, according to which freedom of choice by no means forms part of its eternal idea, but merely appertains to man at a lower stage; for he maintains that Christ was the perfect man, and the process of the "Unio" of the *πνεῦμα* with the *σὰρξ*, undergone by Him, is continued also in those who believe on Him. To Christ, however, he ascribes no freedom of choice; and so likewise believers, in his view, are first raised by the Christian principle above mutability. In accordance herewith, therefore, instead of saying, the first creation was not suitable in its completeness for appropriation by the Logos, he ought rather to have expressed himself as follows:—The first creation itself was still imperfect; it was marked by unfixity and mutability: the true idea of creation was first realized in the man, who was raised above all freedom of choice. It would thus have appeared as a mere defect or transition-stage, as the not yet existent divine fixity. But this he did not wish to teach; he regarded freedom of choice as something *positive*, which, though derived from God, was incompatible with the full goodness of the world, seeing that it was not even capable of aiding in the realization of this goodness. Accordingly, Apollinaris is undoubtedly chargeable to a certain extent with Manichæism. On such a theory, redemption must of course consist, above all, in deliverance from that freedom of will which naturally tends to evil, and in the informing of the fleshly man with a higher principle, with the third factor of the true human essence. This leads us to the other aspect of

the matter. Apollinaris had no conception of an historical mediation, of an historical process, but believed that the whole result was brought into existence at one stroke. His strength lay alone in describing magnitudes already complete, in their mutual connection and simultaneous existence. Accordingly, the idea of perfection predominates over that of reconciliation and redemption; and, strictly speaking, he can only attribute activity to the divine aspect;—for the human aspect he has no essential place, no mediatory significance. The human aspect, selfless in itself, has the office of showing, of revealing, the divine—nothing more; it is simply the organ moved by the divine.

The preliminary decision arrived at by the Synod of Alexandria, in relation to the question of the human soul of Christ, in the year 362 (see above, pp. 985 ff.), was adhered to by the Church teachers, Athanasius, the Gregories, Basilus the Great, Amphilochius Damasus (Mansi l. c. 488 f.), and others. That they also justly regarded the incarnation, in and by itself, as the principal completion of the reconciliation between heaven and earth, we have shown above (Chapter I.). But precisely on that account, Apollinaris was unable to satisfy them. For, although he appeared to be able to charge the Church with arriving rather at an *ἄνθρωπος ἐν θεῷ*, or a double person, that is, at a monstrosity, than at an incarnation, if a complete man and complete deity are to be supposed to have met in Christ; they in return might justly reply, that precisely he, with his repudiation of a human *νοῦς*, could never show the possibility of an incarnation. For *ψυχὴ* and *σὰρξ* do not constitute, they are merely momenta of, a man: they could only form the *δοχεῖον* or temple in which the Logos dwelt. On the other hand, *νοῦς* forms part of man; but He is not supposed to have become an human *νοῦς*; consequently, He did not become man. It is true, he maintains that the Logos was eternally man in Himself, *κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον, τὸ πνεῦμα*; but inasmuch as *σὰρξ* and *ψυχὴ* belong as essentially to the idea of man as the *πνεῦμα*, both which he is supposed to derive from Mary, Christ, as mere *πνεῦμα*, was not yet a complete man. One might suppose, indeed, that He found His complement, and became a complete man, through the appropriation of *ψυχὴ* and *σὰρξ*; but the *πνεῦμα* or *νοῦς* differed too widely from these two to be

able to constitute with them one living unity. The *νοῦς* was complete, eternally perfect, identical with the *Logos*, so that a divine person appeared and dwelt in an human living body; but to represent this as the accomplishment of an incarnation is inadmissible, for the simple reason, that a complete and perfect *νοῦς* can only stand in a purely external relation to a body that must grow ere attaining to completion. And if, for the purpose of avoiding this fault, Apollinaris had posited the *νοῦς*, which connected itself with the *σὰρξ*, as imperfect, inasmuch as the *νοῦς* was at the same time the *Logos* becoming incarnate, he would have fallen out of Docetism into Arianism or Ebionism. If, further, the work of redemption could not be accomplished unless Christ passed through all the stadia of human development, sanctifying and honouring them all, it must necessarily be mutilated by a theory which does not allow of such a development of the human soul in the case of Christ, and represents Him as commencing His career with a complete spirit (*νοῦς*), which was also the *Logos*.¹

The Church teachers must be allowed to have rightly perceived that the first and most important thing to be done, was to lay the foundations completely, prior to thinking of further tasks. What profit would be the appearance of bringing out the unity of the Person of Christ more completely with Apollinaris, if it were purchased at the price of the completeness of the incarnation? First of all, it was necessary to recognise the elements constitutive of incarnation in their completeness, and then it might be permissible to ask how they could be united in the Person of Christ. The Fathers, therefore, acted rightly in decidedly affirming that Christ had a human soul; and that in defiance of the great difficulties pointed out by Apollinaris—difficulties which they thus took upon themselves, and which he had pronounced insoluble. The problem of reducing two complete magnitudes, the *Logos* and man, to unity,

¹ Compare Theodoret, H. E. 5, 3:—*Τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐστερηθῆναι τῆς γεγεννημένης ἔφησε σωτηρίας. Οὐκ εἰληφώς γὰρ ταύτην κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ὁ Θεὸς λόγος οὔτε ἰατρείας ἤξιωσεν, οὔτε τιμῆς μετέδωκεν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τὸ γήινον (man) ὑπὸ τῶν ἀοράτων προσκυνεῖται δυνάμεων (that is, in Christ); ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ (ours) ἢ κατ' εἰκόνα θείαν γεγεννημένη κατὰ μετέπειτα τὴν τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀτιμίαν περικειμένη. Ib. 1018: Flavian's expression,—τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἡμέτερον τῆς σωτηρίας ἀποστερεῖς.*

may be much more difficult than that of uniting two magnitudes which are incomplete and tempered ; but faith demands that the humanity be complete, because, otherwise, the work which it feels to be complete, must be confessed to be incomplete ; and because Christ could not work upon us at all, if He were not of like substance with us. Accordingly, the alternative lay before them, either to let fall the incarnation itself, or to take up the more difficult problem, which faith assured them must be soluble. In connection herewith, it is deserving of special remark, that they did not allow themselves to be driven to the opposite extreme by their opposition to Apollinaris. Because they assumed that Jesus had a human soul along with His body, they were by no means disposed to reduce the incarnation to a *besouling* or *bespiriting* (Beseelung, Begeistung) of this man : they repudiated the notion that Christ was merely an *ἀνθρώπος ἐν θεῷ* ; they refuse to hear anything of such a predominance of the human aspect as would reduce the divine aspect to an accident of the human hypostasis. Their wish rather was, that the Logos in hypostatical form should be there, as a perfect man. With equal firmness also, they rejected an error nearly allied to the truth just set forth, to wit, the doctrine of a double personality, of the *υἱὸς θεοῦ* side by side with the *υἱὸς Θεοῦ φέρεται*. The two complete aspects of the nature of Christ must constitute, they taught, a living personal unity. In this respect, they approved of and directed their own efforts to the same goal as Apollinaris ; and they were far from falling into the mistake of later Christian thinkers, who laid great stress on the distinction between the two natures, but did not bestow equal care on showing how they could be united in one person.

When we review more carefully the attempts made plainly to set forth the union of the two complete natures, our attention is above all attracted to Hilarius of Pictavium, who flourished about A.D. 350 :—we feel the more drawn to him, because he does not appear hitherto to have met with the consideration he deserves.

Hilarius is one of the most difficult Church teachers to understand, but also one of the most original and profound. His view of Christology is one of the most interesting in the whole of Christian antiquity. But in order to form a proper estimate of this theory, we must bring to mind the tendencies to which

it was opposed. In the first place, Sabellianism had been revived in a new form; and the older patripassian doctrine of conversion had also been resuscitated, with the difference that now—at all events by some—it was referred to the trinitarian Son. The former (compare Hilar. Comm. in Matt. xi. c. 9, De Trin. 10, 50 ff. 18 ff.) regarded the incarnation of the Logos as a mere operation of the divine power and wisdom, not as a personal existence thereof in a man, and thus naturally fell into Ebionism; for the obvious reason, that the incarnation was unavoidably reduced to the level of a mere extension or continuation of the divine power of the Logos into the man Jesus: the latter also arrived at an Ebionitic result; for if the Logos so far fell away from, as to lose Himself, and if, in particular, by emptying itself and submitting to weakness, the Word became a human soul, then there remained nothing but the man in Christ.¹ We have seen above, that even Arianism, which as to its inmost essence was Ebionitical, by availing itself of the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, and of the forgetfulness which resulted from their earthly birth, was able to arrive at the same result, as this latter view. In opposition to these errors, it was necessary to demonstrate the existence of a truly divine and a truly human aspect, or, if one will, the duality of the natures in the Person of Christ; in other words, it was necessary to draw as clear a distinction as possible between the divine and the human.

¹ De Trin. 10, 50, 52:—*Plures eludere dictum apostolicum, quo ait Christum Dei Sapientiam et Dei virtutem, his modis solent: quod in eo ex virgine creando efficax Dei sapientia et Virtus exstiterit, et in nativitate ejus divinæ prudentiæ et potestatis opus intelligatur, sitque in eo efficientia potius, quam natura Sapientiæ.* De Trin. 10, 50:—*Per quod etiam illud vitii adjungitur, ut Deus Verbum tanquam pars aliqua virtutum Dei quodam se tractu continuationis extendens hominem illum, qui a Maria esse coepit, habitaverit et virtutibus divinæ operationis instruxerit, animæ tamen suæ motu naturaque viventem.* C. 51:—*The power of the Word who thus extended Himself from without unto Jesus, strengthened him to perform deeds of power after the manner of the prophets: thus also may be explained the words, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" Jesus, namely, was again also a Dei Verbo contracta rursum protensione desertus.* De Trin. 10, 50:—*defecisse omnino Deum Verbum in animam corporis volunt, ut—de se defecerit Deus Verbum, dum corpus officio animæ vivificat.—51: ut Deus Verbum anima corporis per demutationem naturæ se infirmitatis exstiterit, et Verbum Deus esse defecerit.*

In the *second* place, there were not wanting men who, it is true, took their start from this duality, and thus left room for an act of grace, nay, even for a personal appearance of the Son of God in the sphere of Adamitic humanity ; but, through resting in the duality, did not attain to a living unity of the person. To this class belonged that part of the Arians which did not accept the idea of a conversion of the Logos into the soul of Christ, nor of a substitution of the Logos in the place of the human soul ; but taught that there was an human soul, nay more, an human Ego alongside of that of the Logos.¹ Further, all those who, in the predominance they gave to the bare understanding, were the forerunners of the school of Antioch, and believed it necessary to be more on their guard against commixture than against separation, and objected less strongly to a double Christ than to theories like that of Apollinaris and his predecessors. In opposition to these separators, it was necessary, on the contrary, to make every effort to point out the solid unity of the person. For, independently of these, the doctrine of the Church itself, as we have seen in the case of Apollinaris, was threatened with the danger of the God-man being reduced to an *ἀνθρώπος ἐν θεῷ*. But if this task presented great difficulties for Apollinaris, whose doctrine of the divine *νοῦς*, which took the place of the soul of Christ, appeared to lessen it ; still more difficult must it appear, when a human soul also was reckoned to the humanity of Christ. It deserves remark, that even prior to the public appearance of Apollinaris, Hilarius had most decidedly upheld the true human soul of Christ ; and that he had continued both the doctrine of Tertullian (with whom he had otherwise many points of affinity) and that of Irenæus in Gaul. A denial of the human soul of Christ would have appeared to him a Docetic confusion of the human and the divine. So much the more desirous, therefore, must we be to learn what he had further to say. The more widely he separated the two aspects, above all, the more distinctly he affirmed, and the more sharply he defined, the completeness of the human nature, whilst at the same time quite as jealously asserting for the divine aspect, everything that pertains to its full idea ; the more interesting is it to observe, that he displayed quite as intense an anxiety to demonstrate the

¹ Valens and Ursacius (compare Hilar. de syn. 79 f.) assumed a *compassio Filii Dei*, which involves the duality.

unity of the clearly discriminated aspects. By the combination of these two tendencies, Hilarius evinced himself to be, in the true sense, a teacher of the Church.

As to the former:—Hilarius, who was one of the most resolute defenders of the cause of Athanasius, developed the doctrine of the eternal divine Son, who exists alongside of the human aspect, by, above all things, bringing more decidedly into play than others the creative activity which pertains to the Son of God, in connection also with the act of incarnation, though, as we shall soon see, only in order afterwards to convert the category of creation more completely into that of incarnation. It was not the human race or Mary that gave body and soul to the Person of Christ; but if we distinguish accurately, the creation of the human soul of Christ was a deed of the Logos. In the view of Hilarius (*Tract. on Ps. cxviii., Lit. x. pp. 298 ff.*), it is an error to suppose that the souls of men spring from Adam in the way of propagation. They have a higher nobility, a worthier origin; they are of a heavenly, God-related nature, and their nature in itself is not stained with earthly material. In the case of Adam, indeed, we know that his soul was created before the body, which is of the dust. The dust, when reduced to form, was not yet man, but matter; the giving a form to the rough matter was not a creation, but a moulding of the already existent dust. It was fitting that a creative hand should show itself in connection with this highest work, and that it should not be a mere forming of what already existed. Hence the origin of man is divided into several acts. The first is indicated by the words, "Let Us make an image, which shall be like Ourselves." This refers to the creation of the soul, which was called into existence to be an image of the First-born. The second was the formation of the earthly image out of the dust. Whereupon followed, as the third act, the conjunction of that soul with this material, by the Spirit of God, in consequence of which the soul acquired a body, the matter was animated, and the unity, the living man, became an actuality. However strange this theory may appear at first sight, Hilarius seems to have regarded it as typically teaching what takes place at a higher stage in connection with the incarnation. In the case of Adam, he fixes the material and spiritual aspects each by itself, and separates them as widely as possible from each other, in order then

to conjoin them the more firmly to an unity in man; and such also is his course of procedure with the total humanity of Christ, on the one hand, and the deity, on the other. The theory described has also a further significance for him: by its means, the share taken by Mary in the work of incarnation is reduced to its proper limits. She did not give Jesus His soul, otherwise His soul would have been sinful, like that of Adam; and yet His soul was of like substance with the souls of men, for they also are created immediately by the Logos. Nor, further, did she give Jesus His body, if we speak strictly; for a body is first formed out of the material by the accession of the enlivening, animating soul, which she did not give. Not by themselves, but through the soul, have the members of our body their sensations. As soon as the soul ceases to have anything further to do with the body, as soon as it ceases to feel the body with its sensations, it has already become alien from it, and, properly speaking, no longer belongs to it. As a consequence, the body soon corrupts, and must be cast aside. If, then, the soul first constitutes the material a body, and if the material without soul is an unformed mass, we can only partially say,—Christ derived His body from Mary; for, strictly speaking, Christ's body first became a body through the soul, and His soul He did not derive from Mary. For this reason the Son of God, or the "Spiritus Dei," is termed the "conditor" of the body.¹ The God-man derived His origin from Himself, and not from Mary, even as to the corporeal aspect of His being. Hence also was His body consecrated and pure from the beginning, through His God-descended soul. And as His soul was most intimately united with the heavenly Son, Hilarius did not hesitate to use even the expression,—The body of Christ was of heavenly origin.²

¹ De Trin. 2, 5:—*Humani generis causa Dei Filius natus ex virgine est et spiritu sancto, ipso sibi in hac operatione famulante, et sua, Dei videlicet inumbante virtute, corporis sibi initia concevit et exordia carnis instituit.* 10, 16:—*Non enim corpori Maria originem dedit,—inasmuch as without the Spiritum Sanctum and the Verbum Dei no man would have been brought into existence. By the potestas Verbi is the caro initiata et condita.* C. 18:—*Ipse corporis sui origo est.* C. 22:—*Si conceptum carnis, nisi ex Deo, virgo non habuit, longe magis necesse est, anima corporis, nisi ex Deo aliunde non fuerit.* C. 25:—*Ipse quidem per virginem ex se natus homo.* To exactly the same purpose, Gregor. Nyss. Antirrhēt. c. 54, pp. 271 ff.

² De Trin. 10, 78:—*Caro illa de coelis est.* C. 15:—*Corpus coeleste.*

This has been understood as though he denied Mary to have been the actual mother of Christ *κατὰ σάρκα*; as though he left her merely the function of the bringing forth, or of the nourishment and reception in her womb, of an human germ, implanted into her from without,—a germ which was derived, as to soul and body, from the essence, or, at all events, from the creative power, of the Logos; and to which Mary, therefore, stood, as it were, in the relation of foster-mother.¹ This view, however, notwithstanding many passages appear to justify it, is incorrect. Rather did the Son of God, by becoming incarnate, appropriate something which was foreign to Him (*quod alienum a se erat*), even as Adam's body also was not created, but was formed out of a substance that already existed. From God the soul, from the Virgin the earthly material of the body. Whatever a child derives from its mother from the beginning, that Christ's humanity derived from Mary. (Note 74.) If Hilarius derived the body of Christ from the essence of the Logos, or even, as to material, from the creative power of the Logos, how could he have conceived the God-man to be so completely united and interwoven with collective humanity as he evidently did? His entire doctrine of the "evacuatio," for the sake of assuming the "forma servilis," would then be useless, unintelligible. For if the Logos had produced the "forma servilis" out of His own substance, or had lowered Himself thereto, the "evacuatio" would be identical with the "forma servilis;" whereas he draws a clear distinction between the two. And if He did not derive His body from Mary, He was a stranger in the human race, and was neither born into humanity nor rebare humanity in Himself. The Son of God, considered in Himself, had no "caro," although He possessed the power to acquire "caro." He did acquire it, in that He "*se ex alto defixit in limo profundi*" (in Ps. lxxviii. 4). Rather by His human birth, therefore, was "*nova natura in Deum illata*" (de Trin. 9, 54), which previously was not in God. The Son really received something from humanity, which He previously had not, to wit, the "forma servilis," and

¹ Baur l. c. p. 686, says:—"The Divine Logos became man by creating out of Himself the human nature which consists of body and soul." Even the writer of the very thorough treatise prefixed to the Benedictine edition of the works of Hilarius, and which Dr Baur does not take the trouble to favour with a refutation, took a more correct view of the matter.

what pertained thereto. Nevertheless, His birth and rise were not like those of other men : without the divine act of the Son, who united Himself with the soul, which He created, and who by this soul animated the material which became the body of Christ, that material would not have become a body, much less would a man have been produced. The grounds or causal principles of this origin lay not in humanity ; the stamina or elementa of this person lay in God alone ; for without the divine act, Mary would not have given birth to anything at all.¹ If we ask after that which was originally active in connection with the generation of Christ, we must go back, not to Mary, but to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.² The material contained in Mary was but the means employed by the Logos for the realization of His will of incarnation. What Mary gave, was simply the mass susceptible to the divine act of appropriation through the Logos. Substantially she gave the same for the generation of the second Adam, as the earth gave for the first Adam, with the sole difference, that the second was born into our race.³ The "caro" thus acquired by Christ was able to experience pain and change; the divine aspect, on the contrary, is "indemutabilis;" it can neither lose its dominion, its omniscience, and so forth, nor fall away from, nor lose itself.

The parts taken by the human and the divine in the work of incarnation having been thus set as far apart from each other as possible, the second problem presented itself for solution ; and to this Hilarius devoted himself with equal earnestness. The Person of Christ is of the earth, of the "limus" of Adam ; but it is also from heaven. How are the two things compatible ? How can heaven enter into such close union with

¹ De Trin. 10, 35 :—*Maria licet sexus sui officio genuerit, tamen non terrene conceptionis suscepit elementis. Genuit enim ex se corpus, sed quod conceptum esset ex Spiritu.*

² De Trin. 2, 27 :—*Initia nascendi Spiritus sanctus superveniens (cf. 2, 26) et inumbrans Virtus Altissimi moliuntur.* 10, 35 :—*Corpus illud spiritalis conceptionis sumit exordium.*

³ Compare Hil. on Ps. lxxviii. c. 4 :—*Ineuntium passionum non aliunde, quam ex assumptione carnis et virtus est, et potestas. Non enim incidere in Deum hic infirmitatum nostrarum terror valebat, aut exserere se nisi in carne corporis nostri tanquam in subjacente materia, potuerant passionibus.—Primus homo de terre limo : et secundus Adam in hujus limi profundum de cœlis descendens se ipsum tanquam ex alto veniens defixit.*

earth, and earth with heaven? Hilarius found means to combine the two, on the one hand, by venturing to attribute to humanity a great capability of being exalted; and, on the other hand, by forming a full enough conception of the loving condescension of the Son. The second point claims our attention first, as the motive power of the entire process lies on the side of the divine. At the same time, we may precursoryly remark, that Hilarius shows peculiar skill in setting forth the factors in the act of undergoing their process, and declines accepting any unity until justice has been done to the distinctions, and the distinctions have been conciliated by the process.

Hilarius frequently makes the remark, that if in Christ the Son had still retained His divine form, He could not at the same time have had a truly human form, for the humanity which He had to assume was in the form of a servant. The divine form and the servant's form cannot subsist together in one and the same person, at one and the same time.¹ In addition to this, it must be remembered that the Logos was necessitated to take the servant's form into Himself; only thus could a personal unity of the divine and human be brought to pass, and the weakness of humanity be converted into divine power. To his mind, the incarnation had accomplished nothing, unless the entire person was as truly God the Word as the man Jesus; that is, unless God was also man, and man was God.² If, then, he were compelled to demand such an intimate "intus-susceptio" of the human into the divine, and of the divine into the human, that each belongs to the other, and is necessary to its completeness; we see also that it devolved on him to show that the introduction of the servant's form was compatible with

¹ On Ps. lxxviii. c. 25:—*In formâ hominis existere, manens in Dei formâ qui poterat. De Trin. 9, 14*:—The "*concursus utriusque formæ*"—that is, "*et Dei et servi*"—became Him not; not merely because it would have been a logical contradiction, but because the reality of the state of humiliation would thus have been done away with, the divine condescension would have been reduced to a mere show, or else the Person of Christ would have been split up into a duality.

² In *De Trin.* 10, 52 ff., he speaks against the division of the one Christ. C. 52:—*Totum ei (ecclesiæ) Deus Verbum est, totum ei homo Christus est retinens hoc in sacramento confessionis suæ unum, nec Christum aliud credere, quam Jesum, nec Jesum aliud prædicare, quam Christum. C. 22:—Ut totus hominis filius sit. C. 54, 55.*

the idea of the divine nature, and that the latter does not by its inherent glory and majesty exclude the former. At this point Hilarius brings forward his doctrine of the "*evacuatio formæ Dei*." The Son of God emptied Himself of the divine form, in order that He might exist in the servant's form of men.¹

Now, wherein consisted this self-renunciation or self-evacuation of the divine nature? He resigned the "*forma Dei*;" but the "*forma Dei*" is identical with countenance. By the "*forma Dei*," in the case of the Son, therefore, we may understand the full actuality or personality, as stamped in the countenance, and by which the Spirit appears for others.² Consequently, the subject of the "*exinanitio*" or "*evacuatio*" was the form of the Son which shone in eternal glory. He renounced His own countenance, His "*substantia*" (*hypostasis* ?), in order that, during the period of His earthly humiliation, the "*forma servilis*" might be His countenance, until, by glorifying humanity and its "*forma servilis*," the Logos should have restored the glory of His countenance in the perfected God-man. This implies, therefore, regarded from another point of view, that the incarnation was not complete from the very beginning; that the Logos did not all at once enter into humanity with His entire essence, but kept back His majesty in Himself, and perfectly exhibited His countenance or His personality in the man Jesus, for the first time, at His exaltation. In his view, then, the human countenance, the servant's form, occupied the foreground during the earthly life of Christ; this, however, must not be confounded with the human Ego, for to the Ego he never alludes. On the contrary, the deity of the Son, which, having renounced its glory, had been able to unite itself perfectly with

¹ On Ps. lxxviii. c. 25:—*In formâ servi veniens evacuavit se a Dei formâ. Nam in formâ hominis existere manens in Dei formâ qui poterat? De Trin. 10, 50:—Erat enim (sc. Christo) naturæ proprietās, sed Dei forma jam non erat, quia per ejus exinanitionem servi erat forma suscepta. On Ps. liii. c. 8, 14:—Cumque accipere formam servi nisi per evacuationem suam non potuerit, etc.*

² On Ps. lxxviii. c. 25:—*Forma et vultus et facies et imago non differunt. C. 4:—The divine nature semet ipsam exinaniens transit, ut ex Dei forma in formam servi decideret. This is also described as follows:—Substantia ei non fuit, infixo in limo profundi. The substantia existed quæ assumpta habebatur; that existed no longer nec jam videbatur restare, quæ in aliud se evacuando concesserat.*

the servant's form, continued to be the ruling power in Christ and His soul. At the same time, he constantly repeats, that the Son Himself remained the same even in the "exinanitio;" that He was constantly, by His own deed, by His own will, in "exinanitio;" which, of course, implies, that the same will which maintains the "exinanitio" so long as it is necessary, possesses in itself the latent power to return to full and entire actuality.¹ This he often expresses as follows:—The divine *natura*, although not the "substantia" (that is, probably, *ὁμοστασις*), not the "forma (or "facies") Dei," remained unalterably His. The limit of the "exinanitio" was, that it could never advance to a renunciation of the "divina natura," or to the point when the "forma servi" alone would remain in Christ without the "divina natura." That would be Ebionism; nay more, on that supposition, inasmuch as the Son would have lost Himself and disappeared in the servant's form, the very purpose of His self-abasement would have been frustrated. Moreover, to the attainment of the end in view, it was necessary that the divine should be introduced right into the servant's form, or into the humanity, in order then to accomplish its work of exaltation as from within.² Besides, the "exinanitio" could not then be regarded as a continuous deed, as an expression of might or power, but solely as a suffering. Had

¹ De Trin. 11, 18 :—In forma enim Dei manens formam servi assumpsit, non demutatus, sed se ipsum exinaniens et intra se latens (sc. in Dei formā) et intra suam ipse vacuefactus potestatem, dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani, ne potentem immensamque naturam assumptæ humilitatis non ferret infirmitas, sed in tantum se virtus incircumscripta moderaretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis obedire. Tract. in Ps. lxxviii. 4.

² On Ps. lxxviii. 25 :—Aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum servi esset forma, non potuit. Ipse enim est et se ex formā Dei inaniens et formam hominis assumens. Evacuatio non est divinæ naturæ interitus. Fragm. ex opere hist. c. 32 :—Incircueo immutabilis et inconvertibilis filius Dei, ut in assumptione hominis corruptioni potius gloriam intulerit, quam labem æternitati. De Trin. 9, 14 :—Obedientia mortis non est in Dei forma, sicut nec Dei forma inest in forma servi. Per sacramentum autem evangelicæ dispensationis non alius est in forma servi, quam qui in forma Dei est although the evacuatio takes place. It does not abolish the identity of the subject: non alius atque diversus est, qui se exinanivit et qui formam servi accepit. Accepisse enim non potest ejus esse qui non sit.—Ergo evacuatio formæ non est abolitio naturæ, quia, qui se evacuat, non caret sese, et qui accipit, manet.

He lost Himself, He would not have been able to assume humanity. For the assumption of humanity must also be considered as a deed following upon the "evacuatio."

We now come to the second momentum, the "*assumptio formæ servilis*." In the view of Hilarius, the "evacuatio," so far from being identical with, was merely the condition of, the incarnation, on the part of God, to which corresponds a further condition on the part of man. The Son of God laid aside His divine form so far as He did, in order that in Him there might be no obstacle in the way of His making the servant's form to such a degree His own, that it might be counted as forming part of His own existence. For the same reason the humanity was not swallowed up through its union with the Logos, or its essence done away with (de Trin. 11, 48; see Note 1, page 407). But as the divine nature, on the one hand, rendered itself, as it were, susceptible of the "*intus-susceptio*" of the humanity, which, though originally a foreign element, it was the divine will should be appropriated; even so was it necessary that humanity should possess a capability of being exalted to unity with the Son of God. How Hilarius conceives this to have been brought about we shall shortly see. As far as relates to the divine aspect, he makes the "*assumptio formæ servilis*" follow upon the "evacuatio," as the second momentum in the act of incarnation. The "evacuatio" proceeded so far that the way was prepared for the "*assumptio formæ servilis*," but by no means so far as in itself to constitute the servile form. That would have been a falling away of the Logos from Himself, a conversion; suffering would thus have been introduced into the Logos. We can only avoid this passivity, this self-losing, of the Logos in the servant's form, by supposing the assumption thereof to be a new, distinct act of the Son, who thus showed that even in the "evacuatio," He had maintained and had retained power over Himself. (Note 75.)

That which belonged to the divine *Natura* could not be lost by the Son: the "*potestas generis sui*" He retained (9, 51; 11, 48). The divine essence is not something void and indeterminate; but contains a fulness of attributes: these attributes, therefore, pertained to the Son whilst He was in the "*forma servilis*," because the "*natura Dei*" remained His. Nor did they lie inactive; but were operative and benefited humanity,

which was to be raised to God. (Note 76.) This leads us to notice Hilarius' doctrine of the susceptibility of human nature for God.

We have, in the first place, to remark in general, the high estimate he formed of the nobility of the human soul. It is not of foreign substance, like the body, which is taken from the earth; but springs from God, and is a likeness of the image of God (*imagineis Dei exemplum*), of the First-born of creation. By its thoughts and their infinite speed, the spirit imitates the omnipresence of God. It is true, the souls of men have laden themselves with guilt; but when they proceed forth from God, they are pure, and so also continued the soul of Christ. It was therefore spiritual, and of heavenly, yea, of divine origin, shining with its natural brightness.¹ The body, on the contrary, is not directly from God, but "*ex aliena substantia.*" The souls of men are all defiled by their entrance into the body. So also must it have happened to the soul of Christ, if His body had not been conceived of the Holy Ghost. He sanctified the inner being of the Virgin, and, breathing therein, united Himself with the nature of the human flesh. And in order that no discrepancy might remain by reason of the weakness of the human body, through which the "*Unio*" would have been rendered impossible, the power of the Highest overshadowed the Virgin and strengthened her weakness. In this manner, her corporeal substance was prepared for the implanting activity of that Spirit, which was to enter into her (of the Son).² His body thus became, indeed, different from ours,—that is, as to its attributes, not as to its substance. So far is the integrity and excellence of the body of Christ from being opposed to the idea of the human body, that we rather are to participate in its glory: and first, when we are conformed to

¹ Although Hilarius speaks of different kinds of souls, he has laid down nothing particular relative to the "*species*" of the soul of Christ. On Ps. cxli. (c. 4), he says,—"*Anima Christi signis et factis Deum se probaverat.*"

² De Trin. 2, 26. For the commencement of this passage, see Note 74. It proceeds as follows:—*Atque ut ne quid per imbecillitatem humani corporis dissideret, Virtus altissimi virginem obumbravit, infirmitatem ejus veluti per umbram circumfusa confirmans, ut ad sementivam ineuntis Spiritus efficaciam substantiam corporalem divinæ virtutis inumbratio temperaret.*

the glory of the body of God (that is, of Christ), will that image of God be completely formed in us, to which regard was had from the beginning. (Note 77.)

The advantages which accrued to the humanity of Christ from the consecrating and sanctifying power of the Divine Spirit, who prepared it for assumption by the Logos, are still further enhanced by the assumption itself, or by the activity of the incarnate *Son of God*. According to Hilarius, to Christ pertained corporeally also, natural immortality, freedom from pain, from want, etc. This must not indeed be understood to signify that He was incapable of dying, of suffering, of hungering, etc. His history shows the possibility thereof, by the actuality; and He also grew, passing through the different ages (de Trin. 2, 24; see Note 78). On the other hand, we should not quite hit the view entertained by Hilarius, were we to suppose that the divine Sonship of Christ, and the union of humanity therewith, merely gave Him the power at every moment to rise even physically above all suffering and need, if such were but His will. For that would be to represent the humanity of Christ as in itself needy, mortal, and so forth, even subsequently to its assumption by the Son of God; out of which passive condition it could only be raised by a particular act of will in each particular instance. Indeed, on the contrary, by the incarnation, the humanity of Christ was, strictly speaking, so completely raised above everything of the kind just mentioned, that no assaults of hostile powers could harm it or involve it in actual suffering, save when, by a special act of will, He laid Himself open to their operation, and voluntarily submitted Himself to suffering. Hilarius' great aim was totally to avoid representing the weakness or the perfection of Christ as a physical determination and necessity; and, on the contrary, to view all His sufferings as deeds, that is, as ethical. As he refused to allow that the Son of God, by His act of self-abasement, as it were, lost Himself and reduced Himself to a fixed condition of humiliation, the necessary and physical consequence of that act (for, on the contrary, His self-abasement was the effect of continuous loving acts of will, and He remained at every moment in possession of power over Himself); so neither, on the other hand, did the humanity assumed by Him, ever in any instance impose on Him the necessity of suffering or dying. Far from

that, conceived as it was by the Holy Ghost, and personally united with the Son of God, it was in itself raised above every necessity of the kind. Indeed, in the view of Hilarius, such a necessity never did pertain to the true idea of humanity in itself, but merely to the form of humanity embodied in us. But, on the other hand, the same free will of love, which was the cause of the "evacuatio" of the Son of God, and which went through the entire period of Christ's earthly existence, must then have become the will of the entire God-man; consequently it must have gone on to the more concrete determination, that the God-man should freely *will* that which, because of the perfection of His humanity, was not a matter of *necessity*, to wit, the keeping back of the deification and the laying Himself open to suffering and need. That this was Hilarius' meaning, is most apparent where the sufferings of Christ attained their climax. For Christ not to have been able to suffer at all, would have been an imperfection, would have been a limit imposed on His love; His ethical would have been restrained by His physical nature. On the other hand, the necessity for His death must not be sought in His own spiritual or physical nature; the ground thereof lay outside His perfect nature, in us, to whom it was His will, and it was necessary, He should become like, if He were purposed to redeem us,—like, not merely in general, as a man, but also as a man in the servile form, in the present form of our humanity. For this reason He gave Himself up, by a free act of will, to suffering and death: His very death was an act.¹ He who in Himself was exalted above all subjection to hostile powers from without, allowed them to force their way to Him, conceded them power, in order to conquer them, in order that they might, as it were, exhaust themselves on His person. In this way He demonstrated, even in suffering, His power and dominion;—primarily, His power over His own nature, which He constituted passible, that is, accessible by suffering (for thereto also was His *εἰσβολή* necessary, John x. 18); and then in the triumph which He gained over the hostile powers by His patient endurance of suffering. But if every part of the suffering of the God-man was, in the full sense, an ethical deed, He must at every moment have had power over Himself and over His sufferings, and never have been passively lost therein. Hilarius was therefore able to

¹ De Trin. 10, 57, 61, 62; specially c. 11.

say,—In the mystery of the Son of man, who is also the Son of God, we have this, that He ruled even whilst dying; and, although ruling, died (De Trin. 10, 62, 48). It is self-evident that, as Hilarius held the suffering of Christ in its inner essence to be a deed, he was able to concede to the divine nature also a participation therein; and even in regard to this matter, to uphold the unity of the divine and human aspects. His suffering was not merely voluntary; it was His joy: it pertained to His blessedness, for the head loves the members.¹ This delight in suffering love passes over also to His members: through love, the pain which is undergone for the honour of God or for the brethren, is scarcely felt, but is forgotten;—the less felt and the more forgotten, the more completely love in all its fulness enters into the very depths of suffering for others (De Trin. 10, 44).

We find also in the writings of other teachers of the Church—for example, Epiphanius, Athanasius, etc.—substantially the same notion of the glorification or deification of human nature in Christ, resulting from the “*assumptio*,” which was a reality from the very beginning. And even if they did not all agree in teaching that the humanity in union with the Logos experienced no needs, but went, in this respect, some farther than others, they were all one in the conviction that the humanity of Christ *by itself* was subject to the necessity of death, even as is ours. Death does not belong to the idea, but merely to the present form, of humanity. Had death been a physical necessity for Christ, He would not have been the perfect man, and His death could not have had redeeming efficacy. They therefore assert merely the ethical necessity, as of the birth, so also of the suffering and death of Christ; and persist in maintaining, that, even after the act of incarnation had taken place, it lay at every moment in the power of Christ, in virtue of the indwelling of the Logos, the advantage of which felt to the humanity also, to rise above sickness and death, suffering and sorrow; in other words, His servile form was at every moment the work of His free will. Hilarius carried out this thought further, not

¹ Tract. in Ps. cxxxviii. c. 26 :—Domino itaque passio ista delicis sunt, dum portas areas confringit, dum vectes ferreos conterit, dum omnem potestatem despoliat, dum de his in se triumphat dum eum, quem ad imaginem suam fecerat, redimit, dum deliciis paradisi restituit. In his igitur passionis oblectamentis atque deliciis nox ei illuminatio est.

merely in an anti-Arian interest, but also in order that the unity of the Logos with the humanity thus assimilated to Him might be at every moment a present fact. Whatever judgment may be pronounced on his manner of carrying it out, the rigidity with which he adhered to the ethical point of view deserves so much recognition, that we ought not to be too ready with the charge of Docetism, especially as the ethical basis on which he stood enabled him to acknowledge that Christ truly suffered and really died;—the only difference between Him and us being, that in His case they were free acts, whereas in our case they are the result of a necessity of nature. As is evident from his doctrine of the “*evacuatio*,” and from his frequent use of expressions like “God was born; God died,” he was so far from shrinking, after the manner of Docetists, at the idea of the incarnation of the Logos and of the closest unity of the two natures, that he might rather be charged with adopting the idea of God-manhood too quickly, and without the necessary intermediate steps. For one might undoubtedly ask,—Why is the glorificatory influence of the Logos on the humanity with which He was united conceived to have been from the very beginning so great, that it could in no instance undergo suffering without a special act of self-abasement, if this same glorification had to be immediately resumed again for the sake of the work of redemption? To posit a thing which must immediately afterwards be done away with, seems to be an useless labour; and the view laid down by Hilarius comes into conflict, not merely with the passages in which Christ declares Himself to be ignorant,¹ but quite as much with all true development on the part of His humanity; which he persists indeed in attributing to it, though he fails to find a fit place either for it or freedom.²

The more does it deserve mention, that Hilarius himself also recognised this defect, and endeavoured to solve the problem. He sought, namely, to show not merely that there were moments

¹ “Non sibi nescivit (horam), sed nobis” (9, 51, 71); such is the turn which he found himself compelled to adopt.

² De Trin. 2, 24:—*Dei imago invisibilis pudorem humani exordii non recusavit, et per conceptionem, partum, vagitum, cunas, omnes naturæ nostræ contumelias transcucurrit*; in de Trin. 9, 50, he speaks of the “libera voluntas” of Christ, but understands thereby merely will and power, like other Church teachers of this period—for example, Gregory Nazianzen.

of "exinanitio," by which the "exaltatio" of humanity, which began with the "assumptio," was interrupted, but also that there was a "status exinanitionis," a "servilis habitus;" at the same time avoiding all curtailment of the idea of the God-manhood. In attaining this end, all depended on the incarnation being conceived, not as absolutely completed in one act, but as undergoing a process. This process, again, required to be so viewed that space was left for a stadium during which the *idea* of God-manhood came into inequality with itself, only, however, to restore itself from the inequality to the true equipollence of the ideal and factual. It is at this point that Hilarius displayed in a particular manner the speculative character of his mind.

He by no means wished to represent the idea of the God-manhood as adequately realized all at once, but demanded for that purpose a longer process. Nor does he refer the process to the human aspect alone, but also to the divine, which submitted itself to the "evacuatio" and fell into inequality with itself, in order afterwards to restore itself to itself, in unity with humanity. Humanity in itself, in its idea, is not inadequate to the divine: had it been possible for a perfect humanity to have been at once assumed, the "evacuatio" of the divine nature would have been unnecessary. Inasmuch, therefore, as he asserts that the "evacuatio," which ceased at the end, was necessary at the beginning, he must have regarded the *status* of the humanity assumed by Him as really imperfect at first, and therefore have intended to restrict the afore-noticed glorifying influence of the Logos within certain limits. The real purpose of the idea of the "evacuatio Verbi" was to enable him to conceive the Logos as so intimately united with the man Jesus, even whilst He was in the "forma servilis," that the progress of the man might appear as an ever increasing return of the Logos into equality with Himself, even as the humiliation attendant on the servant's form was a lagging behind His true reality and glory on the part of the Logos. We see that on this view everything was common to the entire person at every moment, though to each aspect in its own distinctive manner. The entire person entered into inequality with itself: the actuality of each aspect, during the state of humiliation, fell short of its idea—of the idea of the Son, of the idea of the perfect man, of the idea of the God-man. It was not merely the human aspect that was at first inadequate

to the divine; for, through the medium of the voluntary "evacuatio," it dragged down the divine nature also, so far as it permitted it, into its own inequality. "Non conveniebat forma utriusque (Dei et servi) concursus" (de Trin. 9, 14). As room was to be left for the "forma servilis," the "forma Dei" must needs become latent. "Decedere ex Deo in hominem nisi ex forma Dei Deus evacuans non potuit" (de Trin. 12, 6). Seeing, then, that by means of the "evacuatio" the Son of God appropriated to Himself the "forma servilis," a diremption, a disturbance of the unity (amissio, offensio unitatis) with the divine nature, found its way into this person. (Note 79.) Not, indeed, in the sense that the unity of the Son with the Father was entirely done away with, or even interrupted; for otherwise the Word could not have attained the end for which He emptied Himself. He entered into humanity in its low estate, in order that God might be born into humanity:¹ consequently He must have retained within Himself the potency of that which He was to bring and to bestow. Only, however, by becoming like us, and unlike or unequal to Himself, that is, by entering into a state inadequate to Himself, into the "forma servilis," was it possible for the Word to do away with the inequality of humanity with itself and its idea, to make it like Himself, in the glory to which the Son should restore Himself. To this glory, however, He returned not merely as the Logos, but as the God-man; that is, created humanity was in Him and through Him translated into the sphere of the divine essence. Christ, therefore, in the state of humiliation, was "dividuus a se;" He had taken up into Himself the inadequate element humanity, in order that it might be reborn in Him; but, notwithstanding all these "sacramentorum diversitates," He never so far fell away from Himself as no longer to be the Son and Christ, possessed of power over Himself.² For this reason, also, it was possible for

¹ De Trin. 10, 7:—Namque cum in hominem Deus natus sit, non idcirco natus est, ne non Deus maneret, sed ut manente Deo homo natus in Deum sit. Nam et Emanuel nomen ejus est, quod est,—nobiscum Dominus; ut non defectio Dei ad hominem sit, sed hominis profectus ad Deum sit. Vel cum glorificari se rogat, non utique naturæ Dei, sed assumptioni humilitatis hoc proficit. (But to this belonged also the evacuatio formæ Dei.) Nam hanc gloriam postulat, quam ante constitutionem mundi apud Deum habuit.

² De Trin. 10, 22:—Cum Jesus Christus et natus, et passus, et mortuus et sepultus sit: et resurrexit (that is, by His resurrection He manifested

Him finally to restore Himself to equality with Himself (*æqualitas*); into which equality human nature, too, is taken up.¹

The distinction between the last and the preceding stadium becomes especially clear, when we consider that Hilarius designates the third again a *birth*.² The *first* birth of the Son was the eternal one out of the Father, on the ground of which He was equal to Him in all things, even in glory. The *second* is His birth into humanity, and into the humble form of a servant, through which, by a free act of love, He acquired a different mode of existence; He sunk Himself into humanity, in order to raise it up out of its depths into Himself. And yet, even during this relative separation from the divine unity, to which He subjected Himself by His union with humanity, He retained sure hold upon Himself. The overreaching power of the divine essence perfected the humanity, created a "*forma Dei*" out of the "*forma servilis*;" and so, with the perfection of the humanity, the Son was again restored to Himself. (Note 80.) And that was the *third* birth. The day of resurrection was the birth-day of His humanity to glory; and thenceforth He was, as a whole (as the God-man), that which He had been before time as Logos. Although He was born to that which He had been before time, still, He was born in time to be that which He previously was not: henceforth, however, the Son of man is to be seen at the right hand of power; for humanity having been made partaker of glory after the resurrection, advanced onwards to the brightness which the Logos had previously enjoyed; and the Son of man, enthroned at the Father's side, the mortality of the flesh having been swallowed up in immortality, celebrated His birth as the living, never-dying Son of God.

Taking a survey of the whole, we find that Hilarius considered the eternal Son, who created the souls of men as images of Himself, to be naturally the archetype of these souls, and,

the divine Natura which had ever remained His). Non potest in his sacramentorum diversitatibus ita ab se dividius esse, ne Christus sit.

¹ De Trin. 9, 54:—Si nativitas hominis naturam novam intulit, et humilitas formam demutavit sub assumptione servili; nunc donatio nominis (Phil. ii. 10) formæ reddit æqualitatem.

² De Trin. 9, 6, and Ps. cxxxviii. 19, he distinguishes a threefold state of Christ: ante hominem, in homine, post hominem.

therefore, to stand in an original relationship to them; hence the possibility of the incarnation. Because of the entrance of sin, the Son, the archetype, manifested His love by being born into the servile form of the image: our archetype made itself like us. This is his predominant mode of looking at the matter. But, as Hilarius was as far as possible from regarding the assumption of humanity as a mere transitory theophany, or as a mere means of redemption, but believed humanity to have attained to eternal and permanent perfection in the glorified God-man; he arrives, at the close of the process, to the conviction, that in the God-manhood the full idea of humanity was first realized, and in Christ the creation of our race fully accomplished. The necessity for the God-man, previously demonstrated from the existence and nature of sin, was now traced back absolutely, and for all stadia, to the idea of our nature. Henceforth, not the Logos alone by Himself is our archetype, but the entire God-man, with body and soul,—He who took upon Himself the likeness of our servile form, in order that we might bear the likeness of His divine form. Into that divine form were swallowed up primarily, in His person, the mortality and weakness of humanity, to the end that we also might be converted into the image of the Creator, agreeably to the idea which God had even at the creation of the first man.¹ Believers also participate in this divine-human life. By faith they become, not merely morally like or one with Him, but essentially.² All believers have put on the one

¹ Compare de Trin. 11, 49 (see Note 77); specially the words,—“*Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque conformis effectus gloriæ corporis Dei, in imaginem Creatoris excedit secundum dispositam primi hominis figurationem.*” According to this, even the first man was created under the idea of the God-man; and the idea of the “*imago Dei*” is first completely realized when man becomes conformed to the God-man. Comment. in Matt. c. 3, § 2:—“*Expectatum Deo Patri manus hominem, quem assumerat, reportavit.*”

² De Trin. 8, 7, 9, 12; 11, 19. Compare, in connection with what follows, the Præfatio (pp. 24 ff.) to the Opp. Hilar. ed. Maur.; de Trin. 8, 13:—“*Eos qui inter Patrem et Filium voluntatis ingerunt unitatem, interrogo, utrumne per naturæ veritatem hodie Christus in nobis sit, aut per concordiam voluntatis? Si enim vere Verbum caro factum est, et vere nos Verbum carnem cibo dominico sumimus, quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est qui et naturam carnis nostræ, jam inseparabilem sibi, homo natus assumpsit, et naturam carnis suæ ad naturam æter-*

Christ, and have become the same. We put Him on in baptism; but the holy Eucharist is of special significance to Hilarius, in this respect.

Christ is in the Father through His divine nature; we, on the contrary, are in Him through His corporeal birth, and He is in us through the sacraments. In this way, a gradually ascending, perfect unity is brought about. We remain in Him, He in the Father; but, remaining in the Father, He remains also in us, so that we also advance onwards to unity with the Father; for in Him, who by His nature, on the ground of birth, is in the Father, we also dwell by our nature, even as He dwells in us by His nature. Hilarius employs the strongest and boldest expressions to designate the universal significance of the incarnation of Christ, in relation to our entire race, maintaining that therewith something was potentially done, not merely for, but to us all; because human nature, in its entirety, was reborn and united with God in Him. Tract. in Ps. li. c. 16: "*Ut et Filius hominis esset Filius Dei, naturam in se universæ carnis assumsit, per quam effectus vera vitis genus in se universæ propagationis tenet.*" (Note 81.) His humanity is the city on the hill; in Him, as in a city, the human race is gathered together; accordingly, He who thus gathers us together in Himself is the unity of many, the "*civitas*;" we, bound together in Him, participating in His body, are the inhabitants of the city, we are one in Him. For our sake the Son of God Himself laid the foundation of His humanity, in order that, having become man, He might take to Himself, out of the Virgin, the nature of the flesh, and that, by means of this marriage and union, the body of the entire human race might be sanctified in Him. As His will in assuming a body was to see all rooted in Himself, so was it His will to give Himself back to Himself in all, by means of His invisible nature. Not that He, through whom man was created, needed to become man; but we needed that God should become flesh and dwell in us, that is, that He should take up His abode in the inmost essence of humanity in general, by the assumption of one man (*carnis unius*).

nitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandæ carnis admiscuit? Ita enim omnes unum sumus, quia et in Christo Pater est, et Christus in nobis est. Quisquis ergo naturaliter Patrem in Christo negabit, neget prius naturaliter vel se in Christo, vel Christum sibi inesse." C. 15.

As might be anticipated, we find Hilarius taking a corresponding view of the work of redemption. Having assumed our sinful body, Christ bore our sin (*de Trin.* 10, 47). All the weakness which He took upon Himself, He bore voluntarily, translating Himself into our nature and its weaknesses. This weakness, therefore, can only be understood when its substitutionary significance is recognised. We have previously referred to this point. But He did not merely wish to stand in our stead; no, we died in Him; in Him humanity as a whole sits at the right hand of the Father; in Him all peoples behold their own resurrection and perfection; every momentum of His history becomes, as it were, an active potency to reproduce the same history in men. (Note 82.)

It is evident, therefore, that Hilarius, equally with Apollinaris, aimed at showing the union of the two aspects of Christ to be so intimate, that one should be warranted in saying,—“*totus hominis filius totus est Dei filius*,” and vice versa; that is, this person is entirely man, or the perfect man, and it belongs to His perfection to be also God; and vice versa,—this person is entirely God; in other words, His humanity was not a mere possession or dwelling-place of the Logos, but a momentum of Himself, apart from which no complete and exhaustive conception could be formed of Him. At this point we see very clearly that his aim almost coincided with that of Apollinaris, only that he goes to work more carefully, and does justice to the distinction, ere attempting the union of the two aspects, as, in fact, an union is nothing, if it be not the union of elements that are distinct. Quite as clear is it also, that there is a very wide difference between the Christology of Hilarius and that of a later period, when, on the one hand, the distinction between the two aspects was exaggerated, and, on the other hand, their union was effected solely by the subjection of the human aspect; that is, by curtailing it relatively to the divine. In short, Hilarius had not yet, like a later age, repudiated the truth lying at the basis of Monophysitism. Having the same object in view as Apollinaris, to wit, the unity of the person, he showed his superiority to him particularly by attaining it in more complete measure, and without the sacrifice of the human soul. On the contrary, he employed the soul for the purpose of denoting the personal unity of Christ. Furthermore, he did not, for the

sake of the unity, resort to the representation of the humanity of Christ, that is, the πνεῦμα, as eternal, complete, and immediately identical with the Logos. He maintained that the human created nature was susceptible of being so appropriated by the Logos, that creation might pass over into the incarnation of the Logos. The Logos, however, brought this to pass, in that He stripped Himself of His actual glory by an act of His loving will; having done which, He became capable of incarnation—a work which was demanded indeed by love, but was not physically, immediately, eternally accomplished.

Undoubtedly, however, the unity of the Person of Christ, as delineated by him, although settled as to its main outlines, bore no reference to the question raised in connection with Apollinaris,—Can the human soul of Christ be conceived without freedom of will? And if not, how can the unity of the person be preserved, if a human will, possessed of freedom of choice, existed alongside of the divine hypostasis?¹

This question was taken into partial consideration by the other Church teachers of this age, though hesitatingly. We do not find in their writings the doctrine of the two natures in its later form; for they also demanded that the human aspect of the Person of Christ should be regarded as a determination of the Logos Himself.²

Athanasius demands neither freedom of choice nor a duality of wills for the God-man (compare c. Ar. 4, 30–34; see above, p. 350). He says,—Christ appeared in order that the flesh ἀντι-δεκτον ἁμαρτίας δείξαι, which Adam, from being innocent, had made δεκτικὴ ἁμαρτίας. Ταύτην ἀνίστησι κατὰ φύσιν ἀναμάρ-

¹ Hilarius speaks, indeed, in de Trin. 9, 50, of Christ's free will, but only as in opposition to constraint. In his view, Christ had freedom of will, even as the Father has it. Of a "dissentire" between the "voluntas" of Christ and that of the Father, there was no trace, for the Son was "sic liber in voluntate, ut, quod volens agit, factum sit paternæ voluntatis.—Et cum Filius voluntatem Patris facit, docet per naturæ indifferentiam, naturalem sibi voluntatem esse cum Patre, cum voluntate ejus sit omne quod faciat." He regards, therefore, the volitional unity of the God-man with the Father as immediate, as grounded in the very "natura," whereas other men have the capability of choosing between good and evil. Compare Tract. in Ps. cxviii.; Lit. 22, 4, in Ps. ii. 16.

² Athan. c. Apollin. 1, 8–12, and above, Chapter Second, pp. 349 ff. Greg. Naz. ad Cledon. 1, 9.

τητον, ἵνα δείξῃ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναίτιον τῆς ἁμαρτίας, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχέτυπον πλάσιν τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως κατεστήσατο ἵνα αὐτὸς ᾖ τῆς ἀναμαρτησίας ἡ ἐπίδειξις. Here the Logos is represented as the archetype of human nature : the archetype, which could not sin, entered into its production, in order to exhibit Himself in actuality, and thus to complete His work. On this view, Adam is the not yet completed creation ; the archetype was necessary to the completion, to the definite and stable perfection of creation. The humanity of the first Adam was not indeed merely animal life, but was also soul ; and the Logos was in Christ not as a mere power, but as a person. And yet there were not two persons in Christ ; for, even in Christ, the soul, considered in relation to what was below it, was power,—in relation to what was above, was void form or susceptibility, which acquired its determinate actuality through the incarnation. The first Adam stood under the power and nature of the soul, and was therefore psychical ; but the body of the second Adam stands with its soul under the power and nature of the πνεῦμα, and is therefore pneumatical. For God the Logos is πνεῦμα (c. 8). That a duality of wills, etc., would not fit in with this view, seems to me evident. Athanasius speaks much also of an *ἔνωσις φυσικὴ* of the divine and human in Christ (c. 10, 12,—*ἀσύγχυτος φυσικὴ ἔνωσις τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ γενομένην σάρκα*. The *σὰρξ κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίᾳ ἐγένετο*, and so forth). Never, indeed, can the flesh become equally eternal with the deity, *ὁμοούσιος* ; never substantially one therewith, *καθ' ὑπόστασιν* : that would be a commixture, a confusion (c. 10), which would border on the heathenish. Undoubtedly, however, the divine nature made the human its own, and a physical union took place ; by which he appears to understand that they met in one being, in which they were indissolubly conjoined, though they continued to be two distinct momenta (*διχῶς νοούμενα*, c. Ar. 4, 31), and were never commingled. The *φύσις* through which they were indissolubly one can neither be merely divine nor merely human, consequently, in particular, not merely the divine Ego as such. It can only be the divine Ego so far as the divine Ego was the archetype of, and therefore could at the same time be reckoned to, the human. To say that an union *κατὰ φύσιν* is equivalent to an union in the person, is a too superficial solution of the question. Why should not Athana-

sus, then, have used the term *πρόσωπον*? On the contrary, we ought rather to say,—Our idea of person had no existence at all in his day, and first arose out of the ideas, being, essence, substance; and the bridge between the two was the use of these latter terms to designate a single or individual being, essence and the like, and not merely *in abstracto*. Whereof the natural consequence was, vagueness or even confusion of usage, until a distinct expression had been formed for the idea of the Ego, and thus the meaning of *οὐσία*, *φύσις*, substantia, essentia, natura, had been more accurately defined. At the time at which Athanasius wrote, this had not yet taken place; for example, he opposes *φύσις* to *οὐσία*; nor, further, did the word *ὑπόστασις* denote to him quite as much as our word hypostasis. In his usage it still signified the nature (c. Apoll. 1, 12), that is, the particular divine nature of the Son.

With this particular divine nature now, he supposed the humanity to be united; but he neither represents it as imperfect, nor ever directly terms it impersonal. At the same time, he neither wished to confound the two natures, nor to place them unconnectedly outside, and alongside, of each other, as though they were two persons. What, then, could be more natural for him than to leave the question of the personality for the time on one side, and to devote attention exclusively to the essence, that is, to the idea of the Logos and of humanity, endeavouring to demonstrate that as to essence each belonged to, and required, the other? Accordingly, the import of the expression *φυσικὴ ἔνωσις* probably was,—the human *φύσις*, even apart from the incarnation, is, it is true, a rational unity, which governs the powers subordinated to it; but that which, relatively to what is below it, is power and rule, relatively to what is above it, is simply susceptibility. Bearing the image of the Logos and destined for Him, humanity arrives at the actuality of its possibility, at the substance of its form, in a word, at its perfection, when the Logos enters into vital unity with it. And so, on the other hand, we have found Athanasius, even prior to the Nicene Council, treading in the footsteps of Irenæus and Tertullian, and teaching that, as its archetype (*ἀρχέτυπος*), one aspect of the Logos' own essence stood in affinity with humanity, and that the archetype called for manifestation (*ἐπιδειξις*) in actuality. This momentum of actuality was acquired by the Logos when,

having connected Himself with the man Jesus, He set forth in him the perfected humanity. Accordingly, the *ένωσις φυσική* is that union which is demanded by the essence or conception of both, and in which the idea of both first attains realization ;—humanity, because its nature remained imperfect, its creation as it were incomplete, without the incarnation; deity, because even its nature, to wit, its ethical nature, could not satisfy itself till it became man. For the rest, we see clearly that Athanasius thus approximated very closely, without therefore denying the human soul of Christ, to that which was the great aim of Apollinaris' efforts. For it was the notion of the inner or essential connection of the two natures which mainly decided Apollinaris to abide constantly by the *μία φύσις*, and to reduce the two natures to two momenta or aspects of the one nature of the God-man, that is, of His essence or idea. They are one nature as to their idea; for no perfect conception can be formed of either of them, save in essential connection with the other. That Apollinaris left out the human soul was a mistake, and involved him in misunderstandings; his system did not require him to do so, although he fancied it did. He supposed this, because he could form no conception of a human soul without attributing to it such a degree of freedom of choice as would have co-ordinated the humanity to the Logos as a second completely independent potency, as a second *πρόσωπον*. The Church teachers also, as we may well imagine, had no intention of teaching that there were two persons in Christ; but they did not therefore let fall His human soul: the one, because they did not consider freedom of choice to be necessary to the truth of the human soul (freedom of choice they would undoubtedly have held to involve a second Ego, co-ordinate with the divine); the other, because they believed it possible to attribute to Christ a free human will, without a particular human Ego. Thus Gregory of Nyssa, who understood by the free will of Christ mainly the *τρεπτόν*, that is, mutability, but not the power of self-determination. But capability of development belongs also to the *τρεπτόν*. Had Apollinaris, like the above-mentioned teachers of the Church, been able to conceive of freedom of choice without an human Ego, or of a soul which had no power of choice, and was yet human, pertaining to the first creation, he would not have resorted to the second and completing creation in the

manner in which he did, nor have found himself compelled to substitute the eternal archetype, the *Πνεῦμα*, in the place of the human soul, whose actual existence and susceptibility are the necessary presupposition to the manifestation and realization of the eternal idea of humanity or of the *Πνεῦμα*.

Taking this as the basis of the difference between Apollinaris and the doctrine of the Church, we see also, that although the unanimous assertion of the true human soul of Christ, by all the more prominent Church teachers, was perfectly right, the question which must necessarily arise, after the completeness of the two aspects—the divine as well as the human—had been recognised, still remained unanswered. The teachers of this period thought it possible to avoid all dissonance, and to secure the unity, by assigning to the divine aspect overpowering and sole-dominating power. Above the lower, the human, above soul and body, stands the hegemonic divine and encompasses it. Against this course of procedure, the school of Apollinaris continued to protest, saying:—If you assume the existence of a true human soul, derived from the first creation, you must also allow it freedom of choice, and therewith such a degree of independence over against the Logos as to render impossible that encompassing, and as it were overpowering of the human, as the lower, by the hegemonical, the higher, as to cause the unity of the person at once to disappear. And from an entirely different direction, another important theological power in the Church, to wit, the school of Antioch, concurred in this same protest. This school opposed Apollinaris and agreed with the Church, in so far as they assumed the existence of a truly human soul in Christ; they opposed the Church, however, in so far as they asserted for the human soul, freedom of choice.

The view which we have set forth as that of Athanasius, was further developed by Gregory of Nazianzen (ad Cled. 1, 19) as follows:—When we teach that both, to wit, the humanity and the deity, are complete or perfect in Christ, we do not mean to say that two absolutely perfect beings are united in one, for then one of them must inevitably give way to the other. Because a thing is perfect in its kind, it is not therefore perfect as compared with other things, for example, a hill as compared with a mountain, a mustard-seed as compared with a bean. The former are respectively less than the latter, even though they

may be greater than other hills and mustard-seeds, and may be perfect in their kind. So likewise is our spirit (relatively) perfect, and has dominion, that is, over body and soul: but it is not therefore perfect in an absolute sense; for it serves God, is subjected to Him, and is not the sharer of His rule and majesty. Even as Moses also was termed Pharaoh's God, whilst at the same time he was God's servant. The stars brighten the night, but disappear before the sun, so that by day we do not even know that they exist. When a little torch is thrown on a great burning pile, it is not extinguished, nor does it give light, nor does it remain separate; the whole forms one pile, one flame, in that that which is the stronger overpowers the rest. To similar purpose, he uses the image of a ray and of the sun, of moisture and a river:—it is not necessary that the rays should give way, in order that there may be room for the light of the sun; the separate rays remain, although they are as it were absorbed in the entire light of the sun, and can scarcely any longer be said to exist; that is, they become momenta of the whole.¹ This passage, taken together with similar words of Athanasius, throws a very instructive light on the conception, still formed at that day, of the relation between God and humanity. They were by no means considered to be two essentially different natures, as at a later period by the Dyophysites; and this was undoubtedly an advantage of the earlier over the latter time, which materially facilitated the construction of a Christology. On the other hand, however, the distinction between the two was very imperfectly defined. According to the images above referred to, the human is a part, the divine is the whole; the distinction between the two, therefore, is simply a quantitative one. The Christian mind, therefore, had arrived at a point, in relation to Christology, identical with that at which it had previously stood for a time, in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity. But as the Church found itself compelled to desist from applying the merely physical category of the whole and part to the relation between God the Father and the Son, and to advance to more spiritual determinations; so also was it unable to rest satisfied with a Christology based on a mere *Unio of the whole and the part*. If the Logos in Himself is the whole, humanity in its

¹ Compare Ullmann, "Gregor v. Naz. der Theologe," 1825, pp. 396 ff., 410 ff.

positive aspect is in no respect distinguishable from the deity. The latter, therefore, has, from the very outset, such a predominance in the person, that the human, if not exactly a mere "accidens," can only be regarded as a gradually disappearing momentum of the divine: a foundation was thus laid for a Docetical predominance of the divine. If, further, the Logos in Himself is the whole, to what purpose an incarnation besides? What can He gain by an incarnation? Or regarded from another point of view:—if a part of the Logos was brought to view in humanity, and the entire Logos in the incarnation; then human nature in general must be a part of the Logos. In which case, the creation of man is not specifically distinguishable from the incarnation, but was itself a commencement thereof as to body and soul. In conflict therewith, however, was the doctrine of the Trinity which had been arrived at; for it secured the idea of God against every species of immediate identification with the world.

In point of fact, also, the Church teachers did not lose sight of the distinction between creation and incarnation; and, as is evident from their polemic against the Apollinaristic predicate *ἀκτιστον*, given to the human nature, they demanded that in Christ, the first creation should be presupposed instead of being negated, and now be appropriated by the Logos as His own. They were of opinion, that, along with the unity of the person, there was a subordination of the human aspect; in other words, whilst believing human nature to have been appropriated by, and raised to a participation in, the Logos, they allowed it a certain independence of existence. Whereas, if the category of part and whole had been strictly adhered to, the homogeneous part must have been held to disappear with the introduction of the whole, although its relative independence is imperiously required by the state of humiliation, as indeed, in general, by the idea of a truly human development.

Hilarius, as we found, devoted his attention principally to the state of humiliation. In connection therewith, he arrived in one instance at the idea of an incarnation which first reached completion when Christ rose from the dead, and was consequently able, like Athanasius, to leave room for a truly human development (p. 349). Furthermore, he advanced far beyond the mere Unio of the part and the whole, in that, unlike most

others, he did not endeavour to describe the humanity as a momentum of the Logos Himself, as the Logos Himself existing in outward actuality, by adopting the principle,—“*totus Christus filius Dei est* ;” but ventured to lay down the reverse principle,—“*totus hominis filius totus est Dei filius*.” At the same time, it must be remarked that the process of the union of the two aspects advances according to his representation much too rapidly, as is clear from his expressions regarding the earthly body of Christ and His knowledge, but especially from his inability to assign to the free will of Christ any mediatory significance in connection with the advancing incarnation of the Logos. He thus curtails the human aspect also, and, contrary to his own intention, leaves room for Docetical elements. He resorts to the boldest measures for showing that the Son of God really united Himself with the servile form, that is, with that which did not form an essential part even of the idea of human nature in itself, but pertained solely to humanity in its fallen state: he takes far less notice of those momenta which are really constitutive of humanity in general. By his doctrine of the “*evacuatio formæ divinæ*,” he left room for a truly human development: he never used it, however, for this purpose, but merely for the appropriation of the “*forma servilis*.” Had merely an incarnation in general been required, and not a “*forma servilis*,” no place would be left for the “*evacuatio*,” or for that temporary “*cohibere formam divinam intra semet ipsum* :” humanity would have been at once deified, and in total independence both of a “*forma servilis*” and of growth, would have at once in itself set forth the “*forma or facies divina*,” the full actuality of the Logos under a mundane shape. The principle, that the entire Son of man is the entire Son of God, which could not acquire its full truth till the God-man had attained completion, he really applies, with the aid of his doctrine of the “*evacuatio divinæ formæ*,” to every stage of the divine-human life, from its commencement onwards; not sufficiently considering that the Son of man Himself could not be completely Himself from the beginning, and attributing to the glorifying divine nature, even whilst on earth, too great an influence,—an influence which interfered with the relative independence of the humanity and of its development.

We see accordingly, that precisely at the moment when the

Church took a great step in advance, as regards the human aspect of the Person of Christ, by expressly repudiating Apollinaris at the Synod of Constantinople in the year 381, and thus recognising the existence of an human soul, it became more clearly than ever absolutely necessary to assign to the entire human aspect a position of relatively greater independence and certainty than it had hitherto occupied within the one Person of Christ. (Note 83.) Attention having been engaged on the Person of Christ in its relation to the Trinity or to God, the turn came for considering its relation to man; and the conflict with Apollinarism formed the transition thereto. We are thus set into the midst of the questions which stirred the Christian mind during the fifth century. It deserves remark, that just about this time the Western Church, in consequence of the struggle between Pelagianism and Augustinianism, began to apply itself vigorously to the consideration of anthropological questions. In harmony with its entire character and tendencies, the Eastern Church arrived at anthropological questions through the medium of Christology, and therefore also contented itself, in a narrower circle of view, with the dogmas objectively laid down, and with more indeterminate utterances relatively thereto. The vocation of the West, which had adopted as its own the Eastern inheritance of dogmas, was, after passing through a long intermediate and preparatory course, the independent development of anthropology to a point of clearness and fixity, at which it should react on the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ, and contribute specially to the completeness of the latter. To follow the further course of Christology in this direction, will be the task of the Second Part of this work.



APPENDIX.

NOTES.

NOTE 1, page 4.

ΕΠΙΦΗ. l. c. 1 :—*καὶ οὗτοι τὰ στερεὰ τοῦ κηρύγματος μεμισή-
κασιν.* C. 32 :—*τί ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς ἢ τοῦ Ἰωάννου Ἀποκάλυψις ;*
Whether they rejected the doctrine of the Logos altogether, or
not, is not quite clear from what Epiphanius reports. It is true
he designates them (c. 3), *πανταπασιν ἀλλοτρίους τοῦ κηρύγμα-
τος τῆς ἀληθείας* ; but, from the connection, we should judge
him to refer to their rejection of the Gospel of John. Besides,
the name Alogi was given to them, not because of their rejection
of the doctrine of the Logos, but because they rejected the
strongest witness for it in the canon,—a course the more irra-
tional, as, apart from this critical point (c. 4), *τὰ ἴσα ἡμῶν
πιστεύειν δοκοῦσι*, and as they protested against being at all
charged with the Ebionism and Docetism of Cerinthus. They
represent Cerinthus as the author of the Gospel which they
repudiate. Epiphanius was quite justified in entertaining a low
opinion of such criticism. The isolated voices which in recent
times have attached importance to this criticism, have given in
their adherence, not to its positive, but solely to its negative
aspect, that John was not the author of the Gospel which bears
his name. But the two things cannot be separated. On the
contrary, an attentive reading of Hær. 51 shows that, in their
view, the beginning of the Gospel—which passes so rapidly from
the *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο* to the calling and witness of the Bap-
tist ; contains no reference to a history of the childhood of
Christ ; at once brings the Incarnate One into connection with

the Baptist; in chapter i. 6 (compare i. 11) appears to represent the Baptist as having made his appearance prior to the incarnation, and first mentions the act of baptism supplementarily,—was fitted to favour the heresy of Cerinthus. This is the abrupt feature, the feature favourable to Docetism, which they supposed themselves to find in the Gospel of John; and the contradictions which they discover between the fourth and the other three Gospels may be all reduced to this one point. Herein lies the reason of their doctrinal criticism; and it is useless for Heinichen to attempt to show, on *a priori* grounds, to wit, from the malice of Epiphanius, and so forth (pp. 42 ff.), that the Alogi attributed the Apocalypse alone to Cerinthus. If they followed the example of others in regard to this latter point, it is easy to see that they might the more strongly incline to use similar language relative to the Gospel; nay more, I should be almost surprised if modern critics did not adopt this view of the prologue, and, with the Alogi, find Cerinthianism in it. What they otherwise say,—namely, that according to the first three Gospels, one Passover alone took place during the official life of Christ; according to John, two,—does not give a very favourable idea of their ability for historical criticism. For the first they derived not from the Synoptics, but from a false explanation of the passage relating to the gracious year of the Lord, rather usual at that time; and the second is false, for, according to John, more than two Easter festivals occurred during the interval between the baptism and the death of Christ. Finally, also, their doctrinal acuteness must have been very limited, or else they could never have so completely failed to see the relation of the Gospel and Epistles of John to Docetism and Ebionism. The Alogi appear to have laid chief stress on the practical intelligence, not without a certain degree of superficial illuminism. Compare Neander's "Church History" 2, 908 (Germ. ed.). They cannot be shown to have had Marcionitic tendencies. We may remark by the way, that the Alogi did not venture to describe the Gospel of John as a new work; but completely harmonized with the tradition of the Church in relation to the date of its composition. Indeed, Cerinthus was a contemporary of the Gospel of John. This testimony, given as it was about the year 170 after Christ, deserves notice. Had they had before

them a single trace of the recent origin of the Gospel of John, they must certainly have made it the chief basis of their attack.

NOTE 2, page 6.

It may be justly questioned whether this Theodotus did deny the supernatural birth of Christ. At all events, the words of Tertullian, in "de præscr. hæret." 53, imply the contrary,—he maintained that Christ was a mere man, and denied that He was God, though he believed Him to be born of the Holy Ghost from the Virgin Mary, "*sed hominem solitarium atque nudum, nulla alia præ cæteris nisi sola justitiæ auctoritate.*" Theodoret also says (Hær. fab. 2, 5),—"He taught the like doctrine with Artemon." The testimony of Epiphanius, who attributes to him the words (Hær. 54),—"Christ was born of the seed of a man,"—cannot prove the contrary. For, in the first place, Epiphanius makes the same remark concerning his school, which, so far as we are acquainted with Theodotus the Argentarius, is not correct. In the second place, it does not follow, from the denial of the birth from a virgin, even if it should be attributed to the elder Theodotus, that he therefore denied the supernatural birth of Christ. For Theodotus might still have assumed a divine act in connection with the origin of Jesus; nay more, he did assume this, according to the testimony of Epiphanius himself. He says that Theodotus appealed to the circumstance of its being written, not "the Spirit of the Lord will be in thee" (*γενήσεται ἐν σοί*); but, "the Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee" (Luke i. 35): by which he intended, on the one hand, to acknowledge the action of God in connection with the birth of Christ; and, on the other hand, to exclude the incarnation of the Holy Spirit (compare Epiph. 54, 3), or of the Logos, if with Justin Martyr we understand *πνεῦμα* and *δύναμις* to signify the *λόγος*. He deemed Christ to be the prophet who mediates between God and men; retaining hold, however, solely on the humanity of Christ, and appealing merely to Deut. xviii. 15; Jer. xvii. 9; Isa. liii. 3; Acts ii. 22; 1 Tim. ii. 5. His mediatorship he undoubtedly regarded as grounded in His higher divine gifts, and, above all, in His righteousness. Nay, further, when we consider that, according to Epiphanius, he was a learned man, who stood in connection with many heretics, and when we remember, besides, that his disciple Theodotus the

Money-changer evinced an affinity with the Valentinians, and was the founder of the Melchizedekians, we may very fairly raise the question, whether Epiphanius did not misunderstand the position, "Jesus was born of human seed," if he really did lay it down. For, in the *Excerptis Theodoti* in Clemens Alexandrinus (whose doctrinal principles Neander, for example, in his "*Genetische Entwicklung, etc.*," p. 189, attributes to the Money-changer, and which certainly belongs to this school), much is said of the σπέρμα ἀρρήνικόν (see 2, 21, 39, 40), from which the elect souls are derived, and Christ in particular (17). In this case, however, the σπέρμα ἀρρήνικόν is said to denote Christ's origin from the σοφία.

NOTE 3, page 7.

Theodoret, *Hær. Fab.* 2, 6:—Τοὺς δὲ Μελχισεδεκianoὺς τμήμα μὲν εἶναι τούτων (the Theodotians) φασί, καθ' ἓν δὲ μόνον διαφωνεῖν, τὸ τὸν Μελχισεδέκ δυνάμιν τινα καὶ θεῖαν καὶ μεγίστην ὑπολαμβάνειν κατ' εἰκόνα δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν γεγενῆσθαι. Ἦρξε δὲ τῆς αἵρέσεως ταύτης ἄλλος Θεόδοτος ἀργυρομοιβὸς τὴν τέχνην. Tertull. de præscript. hæret. 53:—Alter post hunc (after the Byzantine Theodotus) Theodotus hæreticus erupit, qui et ipse introduxit alteram sectam, et ipsum hominem Christum tantummodo dicit ex spiritu sancto ex Virgine Maria conceptum pariter et natum, sed hunc inferiorem esse, quam Melchisedech.—Nam illum Melchisedech præcipuæ gratiæ cœlestem esse virtutem, eo quod agat Christus pro hominibus, deprecator et advocatus ipsorum factus: Melchisedech facere pro cœlestibus angelis atque virtutibus. Nam esse illum usque adeo Christo meliorem, ut ἀπάτωρ sit, ἀμήτωρ sit, ἀγενεαλόγητος sit, cujus neque initium, neque finis comprehensus sit aut comprehendere possit. Christ is, therefore, merely compared with Melchisedek in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

NOTE 4, page 8.

As further disciples of the elder, we find mentioned Asclepiades, Hermophilus, Apollonides, Natalius (Euseb. l. c.). So completely do these later Ebionites betray their connection with Gnosticism, which had notwithstanding despised the human aspect of the Person of Christ, that the Theodotus mentioned by Clemens Alexandrinus (*Exc.* 2) gave even to baptism a similar

meaning to that given it by older Gnostics, in order to be quite certain of describing the human aspect of Christ as that which presented the *οὐσία*. Instructive in relation to the conception of *οὐσία* at this period, is the fragment of Clemens Alexandrinus in Fabric. Opp. Hippolyti, T. 2, 74. The fundamental idea is τὸ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ὑφεστὸς, whether it be inorganic or φυτὸν, or ἔμφυχον αἰσθητικὸν, ζῶον, or, in addition to the latter, λογικὸν also, like man. *Οὐσία*, therefore, is always the essential element of a thing, its substance. Hence we can see how, in certain circumstances, *οὐσία* might be used to denote that which we understand by Ego or personality; only that *οὐσία* then stands for the completely undefined notion of personality. In the Trinitarian Controversy, during the fourth century, *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* were separated. Compare also Ang. Mai Collectio nova, T. 7, 52 ff.; Suicer. Thesaur. s. v.

NOTE 5, page 12.

Baur l. c. pp. 297 ff. attributes greater importance to the moral perfection of Christ in connection with His glorification, than the authorities warrant him in doing. Nay more, in opposition to his own account (according to which, on the one hand, divine Wisdom exerted a permanent influence on, and heightened the spiritual and moral power of Christ, and on the other hand, there dwelt in the man Jesus a divine principle, developing itself in Him, p. 298), he remarks in conclusion (p. 305),—"The divine Logos works, it is true, upon the man, but the Logos is properly and essentially merely the inner man himself" (nowhere does Paul go so far, but merely compares the Logos in Christ, in so far as He is a mere quality and not hypostatical, with another common personification, the inner man, which also simply signifies a *ποιότης*); "and man therefore can, by himself, through the progressive development and perfection of his moral power, arrive at divine dignity." Such an universalization of the divine Sonship cannot be historically established; nor can the idea of the man Jesus raising Himself to perfection by moral power. On the other hand, Neander, in avoiding these faults, has wrongly overlooked the moral element in Christ's *προκοπή* and *μάθησις*.

NOTE 6, page 12.

In other respects also, Paul evinced little honesty. Eusebius styles him *κρυφίνους, ἀπατηλός* (7, 29). In the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity, he endeavoured to accommodate himself to the Church expressions, Holy Ghost and Word. Thus he teaches also a *λόγος προφορικός*. Anacephal. 2, 146 :—*λόγον προφορικὸν αὐτὸν (τὸν Χριστὸν) σχηματίσας* (comp. Theodoret. Hær. Fab. 2, 8). Naturally, this *λόγος* is impersonal; He is merely God conceived in a particular *ἐπινοία* or activity. Eusebius tells us (7, 29), that at the Synod of Antioch, held in the year 269 on Paul's account, a learned presbyter, by name Malchion, compelled him to give utterance to his real opinions, after he had for a long time taken refuge behind ambiguities. At this Synod there were present, besides a great number of other teachers, Firmilian from Cappadocia, the brothers Gregory Thaumaturgus and Athenodorus, and so forth (see Eusebius 7, 28, 30). They all agreed in describing Paul's doctrine as an innovation, a revival of the already condemned heresy of Artemon;—indeed, their confession contained already a more fully developed, far higher doctrine of the Son of God and of Christ. Paul, on the contrary, held an isolated position in the discussions of the Synod. In this respect, there was a marked difference between his age and that of Arius. Artemonites there undoubtedly continued to exist, but they did not hold a position within the Church (Euseb. 5, 28; and 7, 30, ed. Heinichen l. c. p. 404). Still, Paul does not seem to have entirely lacked disciples, although they too were excluded after the Synod of Antioch (compare Athan. de Synod. c. 26). It is simply one of that scholar's daring, but historically unjustifiable propositions, when Baur (l. c. p. 305) maintains that Paul's view, and that too in the form in which he gives it (see Note 5), is to be regarded as a general type of a determinate doctrinal system. It is true, he was Bishop of Antioch, where we shall find kindred views subsequently upheld by Lucian, but still Lucian himself was very different from Paul.

NOTE 7, page 19.

Compare, besides the above, Melito in Routh 1, 115;—he taught *Θεὸν ὁμοῦ τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον τέλειον, δύο οὐσίας* : further—

τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἀφανταστὸν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. Further, may be compared Socrates, H. E. 3, 7:—οὕτω γὰρ πάντες οἱ παλαιότεροι περὶ τούτου λόγον γυμνάσαντες ἔγγραφον ἡμῖν κατέλιπον καὶ γὰρ Εἰρηναῖός τε καὶ Κλήμης, Ἀπολινάριός τε ὁ Ἱεραπολίτης καὶ Σεραπίων ἔμψυχον τὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα ἐν τοῖς ποιηθεῖσιν αὐτοῖς λόγοις ὡς ὁμολογούμενον αὐτοῖς φάσκουσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διὰ Βῆρυλλον τὸν Φιλαδελφίας τῆς ἐν Ἀραβίᾳ ἐπίσκοπον γενομένη σύνοδος γράφουσα Βηρύλλῳ τὰ αὐτὰ παραδέδωκεν. Ὡριγένης δὲ πανταχοῦ ἐν τοῖς φερομένοις αὐτοῦ βιβλίοις, ἔμψυχον τὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα οἶδεν. Eusebius and Pamphilos testify that Origen, he goes on to say, was not the first to lay down the principle; ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας μυστικὴν ἐρμηνεύσαι παράδοσιν. These words, like the commencement of the chapter, in which he believed it necessary as it were to justify Athanasius and the bishops of the Synod of Alexandria who taught that Christ had an human soul against the charge of innovation, sufficiently prove that that doctrine had not, up to this time, been completely adopted by the Church;—neither as to all the momenta thereof, nor with sufficient insight into the full consequences of its denial.

NOTE 8, page 20.

Adv. Prax. 20, 26. When Baur (l. c. p. 254) maintains that the polemic of these Monarchians (as also of the Alogi) against the Church's doctrine of the hypostatical Logos is incompatible with the supposed fact of the Gospel of John having already long been in existence and operation in Asia, I can only say, that I am surprised, and that it betrays a misapprehension of the course of development run by the doctrine of the Logos.—What was it not possible for heretics to do, who, to use the words of Irenæus, like bad wrestlers, were accustomed to lay convulsive hold on one member of the truth? Finally, like Theodotus of Byzantium, Praxeas also recognised the Gospel of John, though he at the same time clung to his theory; not to mention other more recent and more pertinent cases (compare adv. Prax. 23-25). As to the Romish Church, that is, the pretendedly Ebionitical Church,—if it had been really Ebionitical, it must plainly have taken the greatest offence at Praxeas. Whereas, on the contrary, we know from Tertullian that at first

he found in Rome much sympathy, even with the Bishop himself. How is it possible, then, to regard the favourable reception accorded to Praxeas as a proof of the Ebionism of the Church at Rome in the second century? Supposing the Church did incline to Patripassianism prior to the coming of Praxeas, they must have believed that the Most High God Himself appeared in Christ, though not a particular hypostasis;—for regard to the divine unity prevented them believing the latter. If we take into consideration, that the teachers who at that time taught most definitely that the Son was a distinct hypostasis, did not free themselves from a certain measure of Subordinationism, which was favourable to Arianism or Ebionism, we are compelled to say,—Patripassianism was really further from Ebionism than these teachers of the Church; and that, what was intended to prove the Ebionism of the Romish Church, is a proof to the contrary. A fresh warning not to treat the ideas, “Judaizing Christianity” and “Ebionism,” as interchangeable. Judaizing the Patripassians may be termed, because they clung so rigidly to the unity of God in the Old Testament sense; but they were not therefore Ebionites. For the one God in whom they believe, does not abide shut up in Himself, but manifests His essence in the form of actuality; appears in, nay more, becomes, a man.

NOTE 9, page 23.

The passage runs as follows (c. 27):—“*Et de hoc quærendum, quomodo sermo sit caro factus. Utrumne quasi transfiguratus in carne, an indutus carnem? Immo indutus. Ceterum Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut æternum. Transfiguratio autem interemptio est pristini. Omne enim, quodcunque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse, quod fuerat, et incipit esse, quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse.—Si ex transfiguratione et demutatione substantiæ caro factus est, una jam erit substantia Jesus ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu mixtura quædam, ut electrum ex auro et argento, et incipit nec aurum esse, i. e. spiritus, neque argentum, i. e. caro, dum alterum altero mutatur et tertium quid efficitur. Neque ergo Deus erit Jesus, sermo enim desinit esse, qui caro factus est; neque caro, i. e. homo, caro enim non proprie est, qui sermo fuit. Ita ex utroque neutrum est,*

aliud longe tertium est, quam utrumque." Hippolytus informs us that this was the view held by Beron. My opinion is not that Praxeas actually taught the view in question; but that it appeared to Tertullian a possible and nearly-lying deduction from his theory—nay more, to constitute a proper termination thereto. We may here beforehand direct attention to the circumstance, that Beron in Hippolytus, and at a later date Apollinaris, arrived at similar conclusions from similar premises. Servetus and Schwenkfeld are examples of the same thing in recent times.

NOTE 10, page 28.

Epiphan. hæc. 57, 8. *Τί οὖν ἐρεῖ Νοητὸς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀνοησία; μὴ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σὰρξ ἦν;* and so forth:—which words are partially borrowed by Hippolytus (c. Noet.),—*Τί οὖν ζητεῖ . . . ; μήτι ἐρεῖ, ὅτι ἐν οὐρανῷ σὰρξ ἦν;* C. 17:—*οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἡ τροπήν, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος ἦν.* It would seem, therefore, that the theory of Noetus contained, though in vague outlines, the doctrine of the *μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη* advanced at a later period; naturally, with the difference, that he repudiates the Trinity, and consequently refers the incarnation, with the *παθητὸν*, etc., not to the Logos, but to the Father Himself. At this point, therefore, it becomes for the first time clear, that even now it was necessary to oppose the *ἄτρεπτον ἀναλλοίωτον, ἀσύγχυτον* of the two natures, although not in these precise terms, to those who aimed at constituting the Father and humanity an unity without distinction in Christ. At a higher stage, the very question which now occupied the Church in relation to the *Father*, was raised again in relation to the *Logos*. Had this position of the matter been properly understood, the chief objection against the genuineness of Hippolytus' work against Beron must have fallen to the ground of itself.

NOTE 11, page 29.

Compare "Hippolytus contra Beronem et Helicen" (*κατὰ Βήρωνος καὶ Ἡλικῶς*), in Fabric. 1, 225, who conjectures that we ought to read, *καὶ ἡλικωτῶν αἰρετικῶν*. I consider the work from which these fragments were taken, and which bore the title *περὶ θεολογίας καὶ σαρκώσεως*, to be genuine. The eight frag-

ments relating to Beron appear to me to be taken from the larger work of which the treatise against Noetus formed a part:—indeed, the Biblioth. Max. iii. 261 introduces the treatise against Noetus with the similar title, “De Deo trino et uno et de mysterio incarnationis.” Its commencement also shows that it formed part of a greater whole. The work appears, too, to have been designated “Memoria Hæresium” and “adversus omnes hæreses.” The arguments against its genuineness, so far as they deserve consideration, are the following (compare Christ. Aug. Salig’s “De Eutychianismo ante Eutychen.” 1723, pp. 26 ff.; Hännell’s “De Hippolyto Episcopo,” 1828, p. 41):—

1. His style of representation is heavy and obscure; his proofs are philosophical, not exegetical:—both which things are opposed to the manner of Hippolytus. But the work, although requiring thought, is not more difficult to understand than, for example, many passages of the treatise against Noetus. In the latter, in particular, the entire discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity is quite as difficult, and its tone quite as philosophical. Besides, it must be borne in mind, that we only possess fragments of the work against Beron, selected for a particular purpose, and relating to a subject which is comparatively little fitted for an exegetical treatment.—
2. The work presupposes a definite heresy, which reminds us of Apollinaris and Eutyches (Hännell, p. 42); nay more, the word *ἐνέπρεια*, which plays so great a part here, reminds us of the Monotheletic controversies. And we cannot suppose the author to have refuted an heresy which had not yet been devised.—We have already subjected this reason to a preliminary examination in Note 10. Only those can attach importance to it, who fail to perceive how necessary it was in the development of Christology that, *prior* to the determination of the doctrine of the Trinity, the same synusiastic theories should make their appearance, as were set forth at a higher stage, and in a more fully developed form, subsequently to the Council of Nicæa. After the Nicene Council, it was regarded as a settled point, that the divine in the Person of Christ was the Logos, who is decidedly distinct from the Father; but there were not a few (as the Monophysitic controversies from the time of Apollinaris onwards show) who knew of but one method of securing the divine-human unity of the Person, to wit, by clinging to the unity of nature; for though, in itself,

it consisted of two momenta, they represented these momenta as passing over into each other. Was it not necessary, then, that prior to the Nicene Council,—at a time when, though the conception of the divine in Christ in its relation to the Father was still a very indeterminate one, the unity of the Person of Christ, the union in Him of the divine and human, was unquestionably recognised,—there should be preludes of the attempt to view the divine and human aspects of the Person of Christ in each other? Is not the history of Christology even during the præ-Nicene period full of such attempts? But a simple reference to what has preceded is enough to show, that Beron by no means stood alone in the first half of the third century. Tertullian, as we have previously shown (p. 23 f.), makes frequent allusions to heretics, who endeavoured to establish the unity of the Person of Christ by representing the one nature as passing into the other (*transfiguratio*; in Hipp. c. Noet. 17, *τροπή*). The objection which is derived from the word *ἐνέργεια* scarcely deserves a refutation. If the expression *θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*, or some such other one, had been used, it might be suspicious; but no such expression can be found in the fragments. Indeed, I cannot understand how it is possible to find anything particular in the word, when we know from the writings, for example, of Origen and Paul of Samosata, that it was in common use at that period.—3. The argument drawn from Theodoret's not adducing any testimonies from this work in his refutation of the Apollinarists, is allowed to be feeble even by Hänel himself; but it completely loses its force when we take into consideration the fragments preserved by others from the work "*de Theologia et Verbi incarnatione*" (Fabr. 1, 235; 2, 45; A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 7, 14, 68), and which harmonize completely with the otherwise well accredited doctrine of Hippolytus.—4. What does Hänel mean by denying the first of these fragments (Fabr. 2, 45) to be the work of Hippolytus, because the words, *τὸ θέλειν ἔχει ὁ Θεὸς, οὐ τὸ μὴ θέλειν*, do not seem to him to betray the lover of philosophy? Does not the fragment in Fabr. 1, 280, from the "*Cantic. trium puerorum*," harmonize most fully with this theory of the freedom of the will? Does not the decided protest raised against all *τρεπτόν* in God, in the first fragment c. Beron, agree perfectly with the procedure of Hippolytus, in attributing merely volition

and refusing to attribute non-volition or permission to God, for fear of introducing a *τρεπτόν* into His essence?—5. That, further, Hippolytus most decidedly opposed the duality of the natures to every species of *σίγγυσις* thereof, and that the terms *σίγγυσις*, *ἄχραντος*, *τροπή*, *ἐνέργεια* (c. Beron, Fragm. 5, 8, 1), were certainly familiar to him, is plain, for example, from c. Noet. 17, and Pfaff's fragment in Fabr. 1, 282. No less is the early character of the work evident from the circumstance, that where later writers say *ὁμοούσιος*, it uses the terms *ὁμοφύης* and *ὁμόφυλος*; whereas *ὁμοούσιος* never occurs at all. See Note 4.

NOTE 12, page 41.

Baur's view (l. c. 284 ff.) does not square with the words of Eusebius. For how could Beryll have taught that the *πατρικὴ θεότης* (not merely *δύναμις*) was in Christ, if his conception of Christ were Ebionitical, essentially the same as Artemon's? We should then have expected a totally different description of Beryll's views, and a totally different polemic against them: moreover, it is scarcely likely that an Ebionite would have so readily yielded ground to Christian truth as Beryll is said to have done. Baur translates as though, according to Eusebius, Beryll denied the *θεότης* of Christ; but he merely denied the *ἰδίᾳ θεότης* prior to the incarnation, that is, the hypostatical Logos with pre-existence, scarcely, however, His post-existence. For, as Fock justly remarks, the passage in Eusebius constantly uses the present of the Redeemer, and alludes to Him as one still present. Besides, he was not charged with error on this point; and from our statement of his views it will be evident, that he could have had no ground for representing the Person of Christ as transitory, but that, in his case (as already in that of Beron), Patripassianism had taken the forward step of ensuring the eternity of the humanity of Christ. If it could be affirmed, in the manner in which Baur affirms it, that Beryll believed the humanity to be the personific element in Christ, and conceived the divine to be a mere power, he must have laid the greatest stress on the soul of Christ, because, without it, a human personality would be inconceivable. Instead of that, we find that the Synod, which addressed an epistle to Beryll, gave special prominence to the

soul of Christ (Socr. H. E. 3, 7). Grammatically, also, this interpretation is inadmissible. 1. The most natural explanation is, that the words, *θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν*, have the same subject as the preceding words—*τὸν κύριον μὴ προῦφαστάναί*. Now, in the latter, *κύριος* evidently stands for the higher nature of Christ; for Beryll would not have merited blame for denying pre-existence to the human nature or to the divine-human unity. Consequently, the higher nature of Christ must also be the subject of the words, *θεότητα ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχειν*; and the meaning cannot be that which Baur brings out, to wit, “the humanity of Christ had no *ἰδία θεότης*” (where *ἰδία*, moreover, would be completely superfluous); but, “the higher nature of Christ had no *ἰδία θεότης*, as had the Logos or Son;” the divine in general, the *θεότης πατρική* alone was in Him. Only when we thus take the *ἰδία θεότης*, in agreement with what precedes, as equivalent to *ἰδία*, that is, *τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότητα*, does the antithesis *πατρική θεότης* become clear.—2. Baur takes the word *ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι* in the sense—“to be a citizen alongside of a citizen;” that is, the expression implies that the *πατρική θεότης* merely dwelt, as it were, side by side with another citizen, to wit, the personal humanity of Jesus; from which he deduces the further conclusion, that Beryll conceived the indwelling of God in Christ, under the category of influence and moral union. But, even supposing the explanation were lexicographically justifiable, the conclusion referred to would be too hasty. For, inasmuch as, on the explanation adopted, two persons must be supposed to have co-existed in Christ; why should this be reduced to a mere influence of the divine *power*? Baur ought rather to have attributed to Beryll the assumption of a double personality in Christ. Besides, the works of Hippolytus (which Baur, it is true, has left unnoticed) show us, that the word *ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι* was used in an entirely different sense. As *ἐπιδημία* was employed even at this time to denote the incarnation, so the Church, which repudiated the notion of a duality of persons, and of the separate personality of the human nature, in Christ, adopted the term *ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι*, which, with its dative, was used as about an equivalent to *ἐνανθρωπεῖν* (compare, for example, adv. Noet. 12 with 4). So that this word can by no means be regarded as having an Ebionitic stamp.—3. Finally, as regards the word *περιγραφή*, a more careful con-

sideration of the writers of this period shows us, that we must be very cautious in transferring our idea of personality, in the sense of the Ego, to them. Our idea of personality, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, presupposes very complicated processes of reflection; and we shall altogether fail to see that the Church's doctrine of the Person of Christ and of the Trinity made real progress, if (as I did myself in the first edition of this work, and as Baur repeatedly does) we start with the presupposition, that our idea of personality was familiar to every period, instead of regarding it as a result of the conflicts of many centuries. Only by keeping these remarks in view can the changes in the use of such terms as *οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον*, be understood and followed. For example, "own proper personality," is not a correct rendering of the words, *ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφή* (although such is Neander's opinion; see his Church History l. c. 1020, Note 1, German Edition); they signify rather simply, "circumscription," "determination," and contain directly no trace of the "Ego." In the formation of this expression, on the contrary, we find an unmistakeable reflection of the point from which ancient thinkers started in seeking the idea of human personality, to wit, limitation through the body, or individuality. See Note 4; and compare Nägelsbach's "Homerische Theologie," Section Seventh. Of course there is an analogous specific distinction between those who regarded the divine, and those who regarded the human, as the proper substance of the Person of Christ, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between those who represent the divine nature alone, and those who represent the human nature alone, as the personific element; only that, until a determinate idea of personality has been arrived at, he who says merely, "Christ was filled with divine power or *θεότης*," might mean the same as he who says, "God dwelt personally in Christ,"—namely, if the former does not apply the word personality also to the humanity. For the rest, the word *περιγραφή* was applied already at an early period to God, or the pre-existent Logos. Compare above in connection with Theodot. Excerpt. 10, 19; Orig. in Joh. 1, 42, Vol. iv. 47. There it is equivalent to *ὑπόστασις*. On the other hand, in Hippol. c. Ber. Fragm. 1, we read,—*Ὁ λόγος—φυσικῆς σαρκὸς περιγραφῆς ἀνασχόμενος—πάσης ἔξω περιγραφῆς μεμένηκεν*. Fragm. 4: *Ἡ θεότητος*

ἐνέργεια πάσης ἐκτὸς κατὰ φύσιν περιγραφῆς διαμένουσα διέλαμψε διὰ σαρκὸς φύσει πεπερασμένης· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε περιγράφεσθαι γεννητῇ φύσει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγέννητον. There, *περιγραφῇ* is not equivalent to *ὑπόστασις*, but signifies "limit."

NOTE 13, page 43.

The same ambiguity characterizes his doctrine also, according to the account given of it by Eusebius. It contains the contradiction that, on the one hand, in the interest of Monarchianism, the pre-existence of the Logos and His *ἰδία θεότης* are denied, and no step is taken in advance of the simple divine or *πατρικὴ θεότης*: on the other hand, the entire mode of expression would lead us to suppose that, precisely like the Beron of Hippolytus, he represented the divine itself as made subject to limitation, through the incarnation. For if, with Baur, we were to take the words *ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφῇ* with *πατρικὴ θεότης*, as though Beryll meant to say,—“Christ was a man who was the subject of special divine influence,” the expression for this very obvious thought would be too forced and prolix. For that a man is an *ἰδία οὐσίας περιγραφῇ*, and that as a mere man he has no *ἰδία θεότης*, is self-evident. Neander, therefore, appears to me to have approached in the main nearer the truth, and still more Schleiermacher; though Baur is probably right when, in opposition to them, he urges that Beryll attached greater significance to the humanity of Christ than is commonly supposed. But it seems to me impossible to form a clear conception of this significance, if, as it has almost become customary to do, we make it our aim to strip this line of thought as much as possible of all trace of Patripassianism; for it must have been stirred by both religious and speculative considerations, when it represented God as a suffering God, and asserted His intimate participation in finitude. The defect was simply that Patripassianism unavoidably tended, even against its own will, towards an ethnic mutability of God, because it did not take its stand definitely enough on the ethical idea of unbounded participative love. In one aspect, indeed, the line of thought which we have considered is the proper continuation of that principle of love which Marcion had more energetically brought to light and advocated. But the view taken of these unquestionably difficult questions is still bungling. In consequence

of the lack of the intermediate links, the love which they set forth threatens constantly to become a merely physical thing, and the entire tendency acquires a pantheistic character, shared also by Monophysitism, which was the revival thereof at a higher stage. Nay more, the Manichæism which made its appearance some few decennia after Beryll or Beron, was a degenerate pagan form of this same tendency. For the rest, this age was so stirred by such questions, that theories of this nature were probably developed in much greater variety than has been commonly supposed. Indeed, traces enough of their actual existence are discoverable, though we must not make it our aim, as some do with a confidence that I cannot share, to reduce back all doctrines which bear any resemblance to each other, and are anonymously handed down, to one common source. For example, when Origen (see his Comm. in Joh. T. ii. 2) speaks of those who, out of anxiety for the unity of God, denied to the Son an independent subsistence of His own (*ιδιότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς*), and distinguished Father and Son merely in name, he is said to refer to the same party with the Patripassians (as in the above-mentioned passage from the Apology of Pamphilus, T. iv. 22; or as in his Comm. in Joh. x. 21, Vol. iv. 199, and c. Cels. 8, 12, Vol. i. 750). But when in the first quoted passage (in Joh. ii. 2) he mentions, as the second class, *ἀρνούμενους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ, τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ιδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσιν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρὸς*; and in the further passage, cited by Pamphilus,—“Sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum præcognitum et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem, ne illos quidem sine periculo esse, ecclesiæ numero sociari;” or when Greg. Thaum. (A. Mai l. c. 7, 171) alludes to men who, though they conceived Christ to be filled with deity, really allowed no distinction between Him and the saints and prophets, but approximated to heathenism or Judaism by offering worship to a man endued with divine power; for it is heathenish *πληρωθέντα θεότητος σέβειν*, Jewish, to regard Christ as a *κτίσμα*:—there is undoubtedly a relationship between them, but we can scarcely be warranted in identifying them all, either with each other or with Beryll, or with any other

teacher. The passage cited from Origen by Pamphilus reminds us of what Eusebius says respecting Beryll, and may very well relate to him; for it does not attribute Ebionism, but rather the contrary, when it speaks of the "deitas Patris:" which is further evident also from the mild and rather warning character of the judgment pronounced by him. Still its identity with Beryll is by no means certain; for we miss an essential feature noticed in the account given by Eusebius, namely, that when it became incarnate, the *πατρική θεότης* took up into, or posited in, itself a limitation, a *περιγραφή*. Through the omission of this feature, the description becomes vague and indefinite enough to suit many others, for example, the Alogi. At the same time, this feature may lie in the first passage (in Joh. ii. 2); for the party there mentioned, posited the *ιδιότης τοῦ υἱοῦ*, and said,—His *οὐσία* is *κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς*. But they again denied the *θεότης*, and not merely the *ἰδίᾳ θεότης*, of the Son; they would therefore appear to have been Ebionites, and cannot have been identical with the previous ones. Schleiermacher also (l. c. 532), and with him Fock and Rossel, seems to hint at the same view of the matter. The words of the latter passage can only be referred to Beryll, or better to those who resembled him, if we understand them to deny the *θεότης* of the Son not absolutely, but "ad tempus," or on the ground of the *κένωσις*, by which God posited Himself as a man. In favour of which meaning might be adduced the consideration, that otherwise in this connection also the following words, from *τιθέντες δὲ* to *πατρός* (see above), would have far too wide a scope, if they were merely intended to state that Christ was a man, and indeed a man whose *οὐσία κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἑτέρα παρὰ τ. τ. π.*; for the latter point would only have been regarded as too self-evident by Ebionites. Whereas, on the contrary, these wide-reaching words acquire their full and sufficient import if we suppose them to set forth an opinion which, according to the account given in the text, resembled either that of Beron or that of Beryll. They would then refer, namely, to a form of their doctrine, in which fuller development had been given to the very nearly related element, to wit, that by the *κένωσις* a distinction, a section (*ἀποκοπή*) of the divine essence in general, or a second *πρόσωπον* in addition to that of the Father, was

brought to pass (compare Orig. in Joh. T. xx. 16 : de princip. 4, 31) ; a form with which Gregory Thaum. also was acquainted, and which constituted a point of transition to Subordinationism (see Note 1, page 34). But I should be unwilling to lay any particular stress on this explanation. It must always be a perilous thing, supplementarily to give definite names and shapes to the authors of systems which have been anonymously and vaguely handed down. Nor would Baur have been able so confidently to refer the passage in Joh. T. ii. 2 to Beryll, if he had considered that Origen began his commentary on John as early as A.D. 219, and that, according to in Joh. vi. 1, and Euseb. 6, 24, the first five tomes thereof were ready before A.D. 231 ; whereas the discussion with Beryll took place far later, to wit, in the year 244 ; although I, for my part, should by no means decidedly conclude from this circumstance, that Beryll could not be meant. For Origen had been even at an earlier period in Arabia ; and in that land, where mystical and theosophic movements were the order of the day (see Ullmann, p. 8), might easily long before have become acquainted with the opinions entertained by Beryll or those related to him, especially as Beryll must have attained to an advanced age about the year 244, and was then designated Bishop. For this reason, also, it is not improbable that Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus Romanus, in Arabia, named Abulides in the East, may have had fruitless discussions with Beryll prior to 244, although we have no information to that effect, unless where Beron is mentioned we ought to understand Beryll. Eusebius also (see his H. E. 6, 20) sets Beryll and Hippolytus together. Completely indefinite is the description given by Gregory of those who worshipped a man filled with deity. It looks like what we know of Paul of Samosata and his followers ; but, as we shall soon see, might also have belonged to the school of Sabellius.

NOTE 14, page 59.

He had this realistic tendency, and therefore also substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity, even prior to his adoption of Montanism. Indeed, he gives utterance to it already in his Apologeticus, c. 21. In the Adv. Prax. he gives the "*Regula Fidei*," which contains the belief in a real Trinity, and says, — "*Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse probabit*

novellitas Praxeæ hesternæ." "*As always*, so now more than ever, instructed by the Paraclete, who leads into all truth, we believe, indeed, in one God, but agreeably to the divine order which we call œconomia;" c. 2, 13, 30. Tertullian himself, therefore, in a work intended to justify Montanism, and to confute its opponents, confesses that, prior to coming under the influence of Montanism, he held, with the Church, substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity as he now expounds. Indeed, altogether apart from what has been previously advanced, it must in itself be much more likely that the later Montanism was modified and rid of its character of abruptness by the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity settled by the Church, was purified by the principle of gradualness and order defended by Church teachers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus or Irenæus, and was brought to the recognition of the divine œconomia and its orderly course, than that the Church was led to the doctrine of the Trinity through the influence of Montanism.

NOTE 15, page 83.

Baur also, in his large work on the Trinity, has left him entirely unnoticed; and Hänell gives an inaccurate and incomplete picture of him (l. c.). Reuter has justly directed attention (see the "*Berliner Jahrbücher*," 1843) to the importance of the man, who was not only ranked among the first by his own age, but stood high in the esteem of Eusebius, was much used by Epiphanius (for example, Hær. 31), and on the ground alone of his work, *πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς αἰρέσεις* (Euseb. H. E. 6, 22; Photius Cod. 121), occupies a high position as an Hæresiologer. We know from Photius that the work commenced with Dositheus, ended with Noetus and the Noetians (Phot. l. c.), and discussed the Nicolaitanes, Montanists, Cainites, Marcion, and Valentine. The Valentinian sect (of which the Beron referred to in the text was an offshoot) appears to have made an effort at the beginning of the third century to enter into closer connection with the doctrine of the Church. We have previously remarked the same course of procedure adopted by the school of Marcion. This is proved, after his fashion, by Apelles, who inclined towards Valentinianism; by Alexander ("Tertull. *de Carne Christi*" 15, 16), who taught that Christ truly suffered; and by the afore-mentioned Beron. For the rest, in considering

the question of the genuineness of the writings of Hippolytus, we must take our start from the fragment of his work against the heresies, entitled "Against the Heresy of Noetus." That the hæresiological work with which Eusebius was acquainted, and which Epiphanius used, was identical with that read by Photius, no one will doubt. But as the work seen by Photius concluded with Noetus, and the fragment extant on Noetus, which was invariably attributed to Hippolytus, not only concludes in a manner suitable to the termination of an entire work, but begins also in such a manner as to show that it is a fragment, and not a homily, as the title of the Vatican manuscript represents it; nay more, the fragment of a work in which other heresies had been spoken of, consequently of an hæresiological work,—we have every reason for assuming it to be the last part of the work with which Eusebius and Epiphanius were acquainted. To this must be added, that Gelasius, Bishop of Rome (Fabric. 1, 225) adduces a passage which is identical with c. 18 of our fragment, the commencement being taken from c. 11 and 12 or 17. Still more striking are the inner grounds. For the views of the author are so peculiar, that they could no longer have been put into the mouth of an orthodox teacher of the Church even in the fourth century. They set before us the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity at a stage at which it had not yet been warned by Arianism of the consequences of teaching that the Son first attained an hypostatical existence outside of the divine sphere, at the creation of the world. The author still adhered to that more harmless form of Subordinationism, the very inner inconsistency of which impelled it to further progress and to the exclusion of all inadequate elements; and there could be no doubt whatever that, when the time arrived for deciding between Athanasius and Arius, he could not possibly feel drawn towards the latter. He had not yet reached the stage at which Origen stood; on the other hand, we find that, as compared with Tertullian, he took up a more decidedly antagonistic position relatively to the continuous patripassian movements. The work, therefore, of which this fragment formed a part, must be concluded, on inner grounds, to have been written between Tertullian and Origen; and this would exactly suit Hippolytus, who is said, by Gelasius, Bishop in Arabia, to have addressed a letter to the wife of Philiprus

Arabus. This fragment shall furnish us, to use one of his own figures, with the warp into which we shall weave our image of Hippolytus. I further believe myself justified in describing as genuine, among the works bearing upon Christology, that which treats of Antichrist. As he occupied himself greatly with chronological studies, and wrote a commentary on Daniel (compare Fabr. 1, 272); and as the Catenæ on the first three Gospels (compare on Matt. xxiv.; Luke xxi.) show that he had bestowed much thought on the subject of Antichrist; and, finally, as the style and thoughts are both archaic (Photius makes the same remark),—there seems to me to be no ground for doubting the genuineness of the work. Further, in it Hades plays a great rôle (c. 11, 45); hence also the work, *λόγος πρὸς Ἑλλήνας*, of which the treatise entitled *κατὰ Πλάτωνα* (Fabr. 1, 220 ff.) formed a part, and the fragment in A. Mai's Coll. Nova (7, 12), may very fairly be assigned to him. With the Christological principles of the treatise against Noetus, and of the work on Antichrist, harmonizes also the *λόγος εἰς τὰ ἄγρια θεοφάνεια*: compare c. 6 with c. Noet. 18. Chapter Third of these homilies appears indeed to contain the doctrine that Mary remained a virgin even subsequently to the birth of Christ, against which Tertullian strongly protests. But, in the first place, even the discourse at the Feast of Epiphany, attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, contains this doctrine; in the second place, perhaps Tertullian's serious defence of the true view may be a sign that an antagonistic view was beginning to be taught; and, in the third place, another explanation of the passage seems to me to be more probable than the one referred to (see Note 3, page 95). This doctrine may have been first taught by Docetists, who were willing to recognise the birth of Christ,—for example, by the Valentinians,—and have then commended itself to the Church of this age on other grounds. Indeed, the history of Montanism shows a similar course of things. The teachers of the second century, and in particular Tertullian, were concerned to assert the complete truth of the incarnation of Christ on quite different principles from Hippolytus, as we shall soon see. As far as concerns the remaining fragments, that of Mai 7, 134, is preserved in Latin by Leontius (Fabr. 1, 266), in greater compass; that of Mai, p. 68, we possessed previously in Greek (c. Beron. Fabr. 1, 227). The fragment (Fabr. 1, 266)

from his commentary on Genesis is attested by Jerome; and the fragments, Fabr. 1, 267-269, by Theodoret. The remaining Christological fragments from the commentary on Genesis (Fabr. 2, 22-31), and the "Demonst. c. Jud." (Fabr. 2, 2-5), are as far from causing difficulty as the trinitarian and Christological fragments, 1, 267 to 281. Doubt may be thrown on the fragment 1, 282, because of the superscription taken in conjunction with its doctrine of the Eucharist. On the other hand, the work *περὶ χαρισμάτων* is above suspicion, with the exception of the uncertain title; though there is nothing in it of importance for our purpose, if we except the confession of faith (246), which is brief, simple, and archaic in its character. Spurious, on the contrary, is that communicated by Joannes Antioch. (Fabr. 2, 32), which is completely Monophysitic in tone, and contradictory of all the accredited Christological views of Hippolytus.

NOTE 16, page 89.

Herewith Hippolytus aimed at showing that he was justified in giving to the Logos also the name Son. It is very remarkable that the Monarchians, to whom he was opposed, raised no objection to the use of the word Logos, nor even against the position that the Logos became flesh. But they protest, as against an innovation, a *ξένον*, against identifying the Logos with the *υἶος*, in that they explain the word *λόγος* so that it retains no hypostatical significance, and assert that this was the sense in which it was used by John. *Ἰωάννης μὲν γὰρ λέγει λόγον, ἀλλ' ἄλλως ἀλληγορεῖ.* Two things herein are remarkable. Firstly, we see again the groundlessness of Baur's argumentation, that Patripassianism furnishes an indirect but powerful testimony against the authority or genuineness of the Gospel of John, seeing that the doctrine of the Logos plays a great rôle with John, and that it was rejected by the Patripassians. For, inasmuch as both understood how to get over the difficulty, by adopting a peculiar interpretation, John could by no means have brought about a collision. On the contrary, the adherents of this tendency believed the Gospel of John to furnish the strongest scriptural proofs in their favour. In the second place, the assertion of the opponents, that it was something new to identify the Logos with the Son, and thus to

ensure to the Son a premundane hypostatical existence, if it deserve credit, introduces us very plainly to an age in which all alike were thoroughly convinced that the higher nature of Christ was of one substance with God; but in which also the inclination to assert for that higher nature an hypostasis of its own, which we found so strong and lively at the commencement of the second century and subsequently, had almost died out in the neighbourhood of Noetus. The reason whereof being, that the Christian mind had laid firm hold on that which it considered preliminarily to be the main point; to wit, that the person of the eternal God Himself had drawn near to men in Christ, which seemed possible, without ascribing to the Son an independent hypostasis of His own. Even the Patripassians could say, The wisdom, the understanding, the omnipotence of God, became man in Christ; and, in point of fact, they recognised the eternity of the hypostasis which appeared in Him even more fully than the Church teachers whom we have noticed, for they conceived the one hypostasis acknowledged by them—that is, God Himself, the Father—to have personally appeared in Christ. Therein lies also a further evidence of the high antiquity of this work, nay, even of its composition during the first half of the third century. For, as the indifference to the hypostasis of the Logos and of the premundane Son, which was so markedly a characteristic of Tertullian, presupposed the entire course of the doctrine of the Logos depicted above, so, on the other hand, no later writer could have made the concession made by Hippolytus (c. 15 init.), that the identification of the Logos with the Son, who had always been conceived to be hypostatical, was a new thing, although justified by Paul and Apocalypse xix. 11. When we ask historically, what was new and what was old, we must undoubtedly reply,—It was *new* to employ the word Son, in this distinctly doctrinal sense, to denote the momentum of personality; for at an earlier period the term, Son of God, had been applied, not merely to the pre-existent second hypostasis, but also to the entire earthly personality of Christ—a thing which now, when writers aimed at greater precision, was no longer suffered, or suffered solely out of regard for the higher nature of Christ. This clearly defined use of the word owed its rise to the necessity (a necessity whose grounds we have previously pointed out) of establishing

the *hypostasis* of the Son by other means than by the doctrine of the Word and the Sophia, the union of which in the Logos, after the manner indicated, sufficed solely to establish the divine *essence* of the Son. The perception of this necessity impelled the Church to endeavour to seek another basis of the hypostasis of the Son; but it was tempted to aim at securing this object, in the first instance, by connecting the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son with the genesis of the world: thus, of course, gliding into thoughts of an Arian tendency,—not, indeed, in relation to the essence, certainly, however, in relation to the personality of the Son. That from the days of Tertullian onwards, stirred especially by the influence of Patripassianism, the Church aimed with renewed energy at asserting for the Son a distinct hypostasis,—this was *old*; for that the higher nature of Christ was a pre-existent divine hypostasis, had long been allowed to be a fact, although, as we have remarked, less attention had been bestowed on it from the end of the second century onwards. But the mode of establishing that He was or became a person was new; for earlier writers had not gone so far as, out of regard to the divine unity, to remove the hypostatical element in the Son outside of the inner divine sphere. This new feature soon became antiquated, it is true, and passed away; indeed, those who insisted on it could not avoid falling into the Arianism which they did not desire to adopt. To the praise, however, of the Church teachers whom we here have in view, it must be said, that they did their best to oppose that Arian tendency, which threatened to reduce the hypostasis, and not merely the hypostatical element, of the Son to a mere creature. And that not only by always requiring truly divine essence to be attributed to the Son, but also by endeavouring to bring the Son, although outside and alongside of God, yet into the most intimate relation to the inner Logos of the Father. Tertullian, as we have seen, aimed at pointing out the existence of the potency of Sonship and incarnation in the inner, eternal essence of God, the inner Word; Hippolytus appropriated to the λόγος ὁσαυτως in God, also the name of Son, in particular on account of His destiny to incarnation,—a course which he himself, as we have said, allows to be to a certain extent an innovation, but which was at the same time in agreement with Scripture. Its adoption may be taken as an indication that he

was unwilling, and very justifiably, to be content with an hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, whose origin and subsistence lay outside of the inner essence of God; and that he felt compelled to give it a seat in the inmost sphere of the divine. This effort, as, on the one hand, it was evidently closely allied to the tendency which prevailed in the earlier days of the Church's existence (a thing to which Patripassianism also, in its peculiar way, testifies), so, on the other hand, it was the forerunner of that doctrine of the Trinity which was laid down by the Fathers of the Council of Nicæa, and which made its appearance in the course of the third century, so soon as the Arian elements contained in the systems of the Church teachers, above referred to, began to be consolidated to an independent and self-consistent whole. The remark just made remains true, although we should have to grant that the attempt to unite the hypostasis of the Son with the inner Logos could not realize its object, so long as no other basis of the doctrine of the Trinity was discovered in God Himself than the illusory one of the multiplicity of the divine attributes (for example, wisdom). That this was insufficient, is clear alone from the consideration, that a Trinity does not result at all, if the divine attributes are to be taken as so many potences of hypostases. In that case, to reply to Hippolytus with Hippolytus himself, God is *πολύς*, not a Trinity. Furthermore, until the conception formed of God had been transformed, and thus a different foundation laid for the distinctions of the Trinity, that connection of the wisdom and omnipotence of God with the mundane Son involved a partial retrocession to the very ground which had just been quitted, with the design of establishing the hypostasis of the Son on a surer footing than the doctrine of the Logos was able to afford. But although we perceive here a remainder of the obscuration of the insight which we have praised above, this defect is fully counterbalanced by the consideration, that the reduction of the mundane Son back to the inner divine essence, thus commenced, was also the commencement of the rejection of creatural and Arian features from His hypostasis. So that the very same thing which we found accomplished during the second century in relation to the *essence* of the Son, we now find accomplished in relation to His *hypostasis*. For, in the second century, the Logos was brought far nearer to the

essence of the created world than was the case in the third ;—He was conceived to be *immediately* (that is, without the mediation of ethical categories) the world itself, in its ideal aspect, the *κόσμος νοητός* ; on which view, justice could not be done to the idea of creation. That was cast aside towards the end of the century through the acquisition of the “stamina” of the Christian idea of God, during the conflict with the many forms of Gnosticism ; and although we can trace the influence of the earlier theory in Tertullian, who regarded the inner divine Logos as also the idea of the world ; and although the entire distinction between the inner Logos and the mundane Son bore a certain analogy to the doctrine of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικὸς* rejected by Irenæus, we must not forget to notice the step taken in advance, in that the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικὸς*, in its new, higher potency, was no longer represented as containing the idea of the world, both as resting in God and as actually realized, but was rather taken to denote the inner divine reason on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the reason after it had become hypostatical, or a Son. In other words, the distinction now drawn between Logos and Son, instead of relating as heretofore to the product, in the idea of the world, related to the idea of God Himself ; although, in the first instance, a precipitate resort was made to the world, in order to secure the *hypostasis*—not the divine *essence*—of the Son.

NOTE 17, page 97.

Patricians of the earlier kind failed also to advance beyond the idea of a theophany. So that the result described above in connection with the Trinity, reappears also in connection with Christology :—the teachers of the Church at this period still stand on the same basis as their opponents. Clinging as they still did to their premises, they were unable to attain the mastery over them. It is instructive to observe how the doctrine of the absolute unchangeableness of God led the teachers of the Church to the like theophanical result, as the doctrine of the immediate passibility of God, held by their opponents of the so-called Patrician school. Both were necessitated to regard the humanity as impersonal, as a mere husk of God. We have already indicated that the idea of God,

which on both sides was still dominated by physical categories, only needed to be taken in an ethical sense, in order to the doing of full justice to the immutability of God on the one hand, which the Patripassians misapprehended, and on the other hand, to open up the prospect of a much more intimate participation of God in the finite, without endangering His divine essence, than Hippolytus judged admissible.

NOTE 18, page 110.

De princip. 1, 2, 2:—"Quomodo extra hujus sapientiæ generationem fuisse aliquando Deum Patrem vel ad punctum momenti alicujus quis potest sentire vel credere? Aut enim non potuisse Deum dicet generare sapientiam antequam generaret, ut eam, quæ ante non erat, postea genuerit, ut esset; aut, potuisse quidem et, quod dici de Deo nefas est, noluisse generare, quod utrumque et absurdum et impium esse omnibus patet, id est, ut aut ex eo, quod non potuit, Deus proficeret ut posset, aut cum posset, dissimularet ac differret generare sapientiam. Propter quod nos semper Deum Patrem novimus unigeniti Filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola apud semetipsam mens intueri solet, et nudo ut ita dixerim intellectu atque animo conspiciari. § 4: Est namque ita æterna ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatus ex luce. Non enim per adoptionem spiritus Filius fit extrinsecus, sed natura Filius est. § 7: Deus lux est; Splendor hujus lucis est unigenitus Filius ex ipso inseparabiliter velut splendor ex luce procedens. § 10: Pater non potest esse quis si filius non sit. The Father is not omnipotent prior to the birth of wisdom; per filium omnipotens est pater. Ever created thing *accidentem* habet justitiam vel sapientiam, et quod hoc quod accedit, etiam decidere potest, gloria ejus sincera et limpidissima esse non potest. Sapientia vero Dei, quæ est unigenitus Filius ejus, quoniam in omnibus inconvertibilis est et incommutabilis et substantiæ in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari atque converti nunquam potest, idcirco pura ejus ac sincera gloria prædicatur. 4, 2, 8: Sicut lux nunquam sine splendore esse potuit, ita nec Filius quidem sine Patre (Pater sine Filio?) intelligi potest, qui et figura expressa substantiæ ejus et Verbum et

Sapientia dicitur. Quomodo ergo potest dici, quia fuit aliquando, quando non fuit Filius?" Compare in Joh. xiii. 25.

NOTE 19, page 113.

Compare the de princ. 1, 2, 7 :—"Splendor est gloria Dei et figura expressa substantiæ ejus, capable of leading us to the light of the Father." Ib. § 9-13. I Joh. T. xxxii. 18 :—"Ολης μὲν οὖν οἶμαι τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπαύγασμα εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν,—φθάνειν μέντοι γε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπαυγασματος τούτου τῆς ὅλης δόξης μερικὰ ἀπαυγασματα ἐπὶ τὴν λοιπὴν λογικὴν κτίσιν οὐκ οἶμαι γάρ τινα τὸ πᾶν δύνασθαι χωρῆσαι τῆς ὅλης δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπαύγασμα, ἢ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. Ibid. on Joh. xiv. 9 ("Whoso seeth Me, seeth the Father also"): Θεωρεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὄντι Θεῷ καὶ εἰκόνι τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀοράτου ὁ γεννήσας αὐτὸν πατὴρ, τοῦ ἐνιδόντος τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ εὐθέως ἐνορᾶν δυναμένου καὶ τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ τῆς εἰκόνος, τῷ πατρὶ. Everything besides Himself is created by Him, or comes into existence through Him, even the Holy Spirit, to whom he ascribes hypostasis and wisdom (see in Joh. T. ii. 6), and who notwithstanding does not belong to the world (ibid.). C. 29,—"John says, He is in the midst of you." This Origen refers to the Logos, and takes occasion therefrom to set forth the uniqueness of His relation to the world :—"Ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ παντός εἶναι σώματος τὴν καρδίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ τὸν ἐν ἐκάστῳ λόγον, δύναται νοεῖσθαι τὸ μέσος ὑμῶν ἑστηκεν, ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε. Compare de princ. 4, 28 :—Supra omne tempus et supra omnia sæcula, et supra omnem æternitatem intelligenda sunt ea quæ de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto dicuntur. Hæc enim sola Trinitas est, quæ omnem sensum intelligentiæ non solum temporalis verum etiam æternæ excedit. Cætera vero, quæ sunt extra Trinitatem, in seculis et in temporibus metienda sunt. Compare Note 1, page 116.

NOTE 20, page 119.

Compare Huet's "Origeniana" in de la Rue's Ed. iv. 150. In Ad Rom. L. i. 5, he speaks of the eternal Evangel which will be manifested when the shadow passes away, when death is swallowed up, and the truth has made its appearance. In Joh. T. i. 29 :—"Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι ἢ παρα τῷ πατρὶ, μὴ φθάσαντα, πρῶτον κάτωθεν ἀναβαλόντα,

ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότητα, δι' ἧς τις χειραγωγηθῆναι δύναται καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πατρικὴν μακαριότητα, θύρα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἀναγέγραπται. Specially characteristic is the classification of men given in "in Joh." T. ii. 3. The highest class Θεὸν ἔχουσι τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν οἱ δὲ παρὰ τούτους δεῦτεροι ἱστάμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ· καὶ τρίτοι οἱ τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον, etc., which is indeed an error, but far better than idolatry. In Joh. T. xix. 1 (towards the close) we read,— "The knowledge of the Son is not the same as that of the Father, for an ἀναβαίνειν takes place ἀπὸ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν τοῦ πατρός: but the Father cannot be seen otherwise than in the Son (μὴ ἄλλως ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν πατέρα [δύνασθαι] ἢ τῷ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν υἱόν).—Καὶ ὁ θεωρῶν τὴν σοφίαν, ἣν ἔκτισεν ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, ἀναβαίνει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγνωκέναι τὴν σοφίαν ἐπὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτῆς. Previously, however, must Wisdom or the truth be recognised, ὥς οὕτως ἔλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐνιδεῖν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἢ τῇ ὑπερέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ φύσει τοῦ Θεοῦ. Καὶ τάχα γε, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸν ναὸν ἀναβαθμοὶ τινες ἦσαν, δι' ὧν εἰσῆγει τις εἰς τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων, οὕτως οἱ πάντες ἡμῶν ἀναβαθμοὶ ὁ μονογενὴς ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναβαθμῶν ὁ μονογενὴς ἐστὶ πρῶτος ἐπὶ τὰ κάτω, ὁ δὲ τούτου ἀνωτέρω καὶ οὕτως ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ ἀνωτάτω, οὕτως οἱ μὲν πάντες εἰσὶν ἀναβαθμοὶ ὁ σωτήρ· ὁ δὲ οἶον πρῶτος κατωτέρω τὸ ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῦ, φ' ἐπιβαίνοντες ὁδεύομεν, Καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς αὐτοῦ ὄντα τὴν πᾶσαν, ἐν τοῖς ἀναβαθμοῖς ὁδόν, ὥστε ἀναβῆναι δι' αὐτοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἀγγέλου, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δυνάμεων. In "in Joh." T. xx. 7, he expresses his belief that the end will come (1 Cor. xv. 28) when glorified spirits shall see the Father Himself as He is seen by the Son, and no longer know Him merely in the Son (ὄψονται τὰ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ οὐκέτι διὰ μεσίτου καὶ ὑπηρέτου βλέποντες αὐτά.—"Οτε ὡς ὁ υἱὸς ὁρᾷ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ—οἶονεὶ ὁμοίως τῷ υἱῷ αὐτόπτης ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρός—οὐκέτι ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκόνης ἐννοῶν τὰ περὶ τούτου, οὐ ἡ εἰκὼν ἐστὶ). Yet he adds in the previous passage,—The first thing is, that He became to us also the Lamb, which bears our sins and sanctifies us; then, having been cleansed, we eat His flesh, which is the true food. Compare contra Celsum 6, 68.

NOTE 21, page 120.

Baur (l. c. 204 ff.) gives it as his opinion, that Origen vacillates between a generation out of God's will, and a generation out of God's essence; and refers to "in Joann." T. xx. 16, as containing the former view. The point, however, is to discover the cause of this vacillation. Had Baur taken this course, he would perhaps have been able to confine the vacillation within very narrow limits. Neander starts with the view—one with which I am unable to agree—that the doctrine of the identity of the essence of the Son with that of the Father was gradually arrived at, and first clearly taught in the West, during the third century; that, on the contrary, Subordinationism had its home in the East, from the days of Origen onwards; and that, in order to exclude Emanatism, Origen assumed that the Son originated from the will of God. The first-mentioned point is contradicted both by Patripassianism and by a whole series of Church teachers of the second century; and the Subordinationism of Tertullian and Novatian, so far from being weaker than that of Origen, is, taking all things into consideration, stronger. As far as concerns Emanatism, Origen, it is true, was opposed to it in its coarsely sensuous forms; he could neither allow of a division in God (*ἀποκοπή*), nor of a "fatum" above God, necessitating the Father to the generation of the Son. But he was not therefore obliged to represent the generation of the Son solely as a matter of the "liberum arbitrium" of God. He did not even trace the origin of the world to that "liberum arbitrium." On the contrary, he held that the divine will was the unity of freedom and necessity. If, however, it should be replied,—The existence of the Son is undoubtedly not accidental, in the sense, namely, in which the world's existence is not accidental; but still the Son, no less than the world, owes His existence to that divine will in which freedom and necessity are combined; out of the divine essence, on the contrary, neither the world nor the Son is derived;—we shall shortly give it closer consideration. Ritter (see his "Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie" i. 493, 501) represents the Son as brought forth by the will of the Father, though out of His essence. He justly recognises that the essential tendency of Origen's teachings was to show that the entire fulness of the Deity dwelt in the Son;

and that the Son is not to be regarded as a creature, but as the creative spirit, the true Mediator, of equal perfection with the Father. The subordination of the Son and the appearance of a commixture with creatures did not attach to the doctrine which he really meant to teach, but merely to the imperfect development thereof: they were a remnant of the sensuous ideas, which prevented him from seeing the difference between the dependence of the Son as generated, and the dependence of creatures. The assumption of the imperfection of the creation must also have reacted on the conception he formed of the creative power of God (that is, of the Son, or Word). Possibly, however, a certain degree of subordination may be shown to be grounded in Origen's conception of God; but no less also His equality with the Father.

NOTE 22, page 129.

The chief passages relating to this personification (Personwerdung) of the divine will in the Son, who proceeded independently eternally forth from the divine "Mens" (Augustine uses the word "memoria"), through the self-duplication of God, are collected in Note 1, page 125. In the "de princ." 1, 2, 6, he teaches, that to describe Him as the image of God, is to affirm "*naturæ ac substantiæ patris et filii unitatem. Si enim omnia, quæ facit pater, hæc et filius facit similiter, in eo,—imago patris in filio deformatur, qui utique natus ex eo est velut quædam voluntas ejus ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror, quod sufficere debeat voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod vult pater. Volens enim non alia via utitur, nisi quæ consilio voluntatis profertur.*" It might appear as though, in the last words, he returned completely to the stage at which Tertullian and Hippolytus stood, apportioning all to the will instead of to the essence of God. We must not, however, overlook the "ideo," which refers to what has gone before. God's will being of such a nature that it can personally objectify itself in the duplication of God, therefore, says he, it appears to me unnecessary to resort to anything else than the will; in other words, if the divine will were merely creative, we should have to leave it out of consideration in the present case. If Origen had intended, as Baur maintains (l. c. p. 207), by the mention of the will, to represent the origin of the Son as the work of a kind of divine

caprice, he must have contradicted his own position, that for the Father to have a Son, a perfect image, was a good; and that to bring forth the Son belonged as truly to the essence of the Father as brightness belongs to light. Moreover, Origen does not allow the existence of such a thing as caprice in God. But he does not even content himself with a creation of the Son by the will of the Father, grounded in rational necessity or rational freedom. For, apart from the consideration that the idea of an immediately creative will of the Father was something foreign to his conception of God, he says (see Note 1, page 116, and Note 19, Appendix), He was the divine Will proceeding forth from the divine "Mens;" He was the will as proceeding; how can He have been created by this will? The words "*consilio voluntatis profertur*" exclude all caprice; though, at the same time, they are an outflow of the defect already mentioned, of conceiving the Father to be self-conscious in and by Himself, and not in and with the Son. But the idea of purpose, of decree, cannot lie in the word "*consilio*;" for that would involve His being a creature, and contradict Rom. i. 5, according to which the Son cannot be the object of a divine decree. In the original Greek probably stood *γνώμη*, which was intended to set forth the divine will, which emanates and becomes a person, as conscious; that is, it was intended to set aside the passivity and unconsciousness which attach to the common Emanatism. With this explanation harmonizes the immediately following polemic against such emanatistic doctrines. "*Magis ergo*," he concludes, "*sicut voluntas procedit e mente* (this favourite expression of Origen's shows that he deemed the so-called generation of the Son to be quite as truly His own act as the act of the Father) *et neque partem aliquam mentis secat neque ab ea separatur aut dividitur, tali quadam specie putandus est Filium genuisse, imaginem scilicet suam, ut sicut ipse invisibilis est per naturam, ita imaginem quoque invisibilem genuerit.—Imago ergo est invisibilis Dei patris Servator noster; quantum ad ipsum quidem patrem, veritas, quantum autem ad nos, quibus revelat patrem, imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem.*"

NOTE 23, page 140.

We can scarcely do otherwise than characterize it as play, when some make the play on words in which Origen indulges

the corner-stone of his doctrine, deducing from his derivation of *ψυχή* from *ψύχω*, and his supposition that *ψυχή* denotes cooled down *πνεῦμα*, the conclusion that he conceived Christ's soul also to be not entirely free from impurity. When Baur—not very confidently, it is true—gives utterance to this conjecture, he overlooks the numberless passages in which the perfect sinlessness of the soul of Christ is maintained in the strongest terms (compare ad Rom. 3, 8; 6, 12; in Joann. T. xx. 17; de princ. 2, 6, 3, 4, 5; 4, 31), and has not properly considered Origen's course of thought; otherwise he would have seen that the accessibility of the soul to suffering, and its subjection to finitude, as taught by him, was based, not on the guilt, but on the love of Christ, which condescended to us and became a curse for us. In Paul also was a reflection of this love, which neither vanishes nor cools down, in that it is ready to become a curse for others, but during its humiliation remains what it was as love, though, instead of enjoying the blessedness naturally belonging to it, sympathizingly makes the unhappiness of the brethren its own (compare the passages quoted, page 134 f.). In general, moreover, Origen did not understand *ψυχή* to mean merely something cooled down, but frequently something substantially good; nor did he regard the human soul as a mere cooled down *πνεῦμα*. Thus he calls the Logos the soul of God, speaks very frequently of holy souls, and therefore uses *ψυχή* in its usual sense of an individual spiritual being, which also, as such, may proceed forth from the hand of God: compare ad Rom. iii. 8. The soul of Christ was foreordained to be a sacrifice; de Martyr. 47; λογική ψυχή. In Joann. T. xiii. 25, *ψυχή δικαία*; xiii. 3, *θειοτέρα ψυχαί*; T. x. 16, *δύναται καὶ φύσει ἱερὸν εἶναι ἢ εὐφύης ἐν λόγῳ ψυχή διὰ τὸν συμπεφυκότα Λόγον*: 13, 43; 20, 7. The *ἄστρο* also are *ἐμψυχα*, and the Logos *ἐμψυχος*. In Joann. T. ii. 25, xiii. 25.

NOTE 24, page 141.

Compare de princ. 2, 1, 2; 3, 3; and the passage quoted above, 2, 6, 3, 5; 3, 5, 7, 8; c. Cels. 8, 72; ad Rom. L. 5, 10. Origen's conception of freedom was by no means so formal as appears commonly to be supposed. His doctrine of a final *ἀποκατάστασις*, after all possible delays, relapses, purifications, shows clearly that he looked upon grace as a power which over-

arches even freedom, without, however, exercising physical constraint. He regards not merely choice or caprice as freedom, but whatever stress he lays on the middle momentum or stadium of the idea of freedom, represents it as preceded by the *essential* connection of the spiritual nature with the Logos, or by essential freedom; and, on the other hand, in that perfect love which is the goal, he sees neither the possibility of evil nor unfreedom, but rather the union of freedom and ethical necessity. At all the lower stages, says he, ad Rom. L. v. 10, a relapse is possible; but where there is the love of the whole heart, it preserves from the possibility of a fall. If, as the Apostle says, nothing can separate us from the love of God, *the faculty of choice cannot separate us*. It remains, it is true; but the power of love is so great, that it draws all powers and all virtues to itself, especially since the love of God manifested itself as prevenient. The free grace which apparently renounces the law, establishes the rule of love in opposition to caprice and to freedom of choice.

NOTE 25, page 147.

The correctness of the above exposition, which starts with the conviction that Origen is by no means chargeable with vacillation in his teachings regarding God, but, on the contrary, remained in the main self-consistent throughout,—that, in agreement with this his conception of God, he always, and very distinctly, assigned essentially the same position respectively to the Logos, to Christ, and to the world,—and that he by no means at one time conceived the entire divine essence to be present, for example, in Christ, and at another time regarded the Logos as a mere creature,—finds confirmation in the circumstance, that it appears to furnish an explanation of his strange doctrine of several worlds successively following upon each other. As God is the goal of the world, and His inmost essence abstraction from all multiplicity and finitude, the world is threatened, the nearer it approaches perfection, the more with complete absorption into God: nay more, in order to attain perfection, it must be raised above its own nature; in other words, it must really cease to exist. Feeling this, Origen was driven to seek for a counterpoise, especially as he held the existence of the world to be a great good for God Himself. For this reason,

he keeps the world as long as possible undergoing processes of purification,—processes which he represents as continuing even after the resurrection. On the same ground, also, he leaves the matter open, and conceives it as a possibility, which may become an actuality, that freedom should, by renewed apostasy, prolong that relative independence of God, which he was able to deem perfect solely outside of God, not in Him. And thus the unreconciled antagonism between finite and infinite in his system assumed the form of a doctrine of objective alternating worlds; and the same thing assumed subjectively the form of an alternation between mystery and revelation (see Martensen's "Meister Eckart"). With this is further intimately connected another point. Corporeality he represents at one time as the product of sin, or at all events as the seal of imperfection, the existence of which is therefore threatened when it approaches perfection: at another time, he deems it to be that through which the ideal world first becomes a reality; and accordingly posited its existence as eternal. That perfection would bring at once the most intimate union with God, and the most complete confirmation of individuality, Origen was as yet unable to see; because he neither viewed individuality as a work of God, nor reckoned it as a part of the divine creation. He regarded it as grounded, not in God's idea of the world, but solely in the freedom of man. Thus viewed, however, it had a very doubtful existence. The eternal and true element in the idea of the world does not extend to the concrete and individual, but is merely the potential creation, the *κόσμος νοητός*. The actual world, on the contrary, in his representation, hovers constantly, so to speak, between existence and non-existence; and accordingly very much that he posits at one time, becomes at another time doubtful. This alternation between position and negation, however, which characterizes his system at so many points, was grounded, not in caprice and unsteadiness, but in his conception of God, which still suffers from the contradiction of constituting the lowest and most abstract determination the inmost essence and highest element of God, though Origen himself elsewhere saw clearly enough that the spiritual determinations are the highest. It was reserved, however, for the teachers of a later period to perceive the erroneousness of Origen's notion, that the divine essence contained within itself a fulness of

qualities, of which those embodied in the divine volition and knowledge are but a feeble copy; and to acknowledge that spiritual love is itself the inmost essence of God, His uncreated being; and that consequently the Son, if He be actually in relation to will and intelligence of a truly divine nature, may also be of one substance with the Father. The task then becomes to establish the distinction between the Father and the Son in another way; for this distinction could not be established without subordination and modalistic vacillations, so long as the Father was identified with the ungenerated divine essence, instead of the same essence being attributed to the Son equally with the Father. If we take for granted at the very outset that the true distinction cannot be established unless we suppose that the Father, for the sake of knowing Himself, objectified His knowledge and will eternally in the Son, we find Origen far removed therefrom; for he believed the Father to know Himself in Himself, and not in the Son, His image. Still we may say,—Origen also represents the Father as becoming objective, and, as issuing forth out of the inner depths of His being, in the Son, who is His *ἐνέργεια*; but He did not contemplate *Himself* in the Son as in the mirror of Himself, but merely an imperfect image, not equal to the one only archetype, Himself.

NOTE 26, page 153.

Baur has rightly directed attention to the fact, that Marcionitism (which even during the fifth century, to judge from Theodoret's letters, had many adherents in the East, and, according to the above exposition, was intimately allied with Patripassianism) subsequently passed over into Manichæism. The occasion thereof was the rigid antagonism posited between Law and Gospel. But Sabellianism also offered a point of connection for this antagonism, in that it represented the earlier revelations as disappearing when a new one was given; for example, the law disappeared when Christ came. Athanasius also (c. Ar. 4, 23) charges it with dividing the Testaments (*διαίρειν τὰς διαθήκας, καὶ μὴ τὴν ἑτέραν τῆς ἐτέρας ἔχειν—Μανιχαίων—τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα*). Manichæism proper, which arose about the year 260, like Patripassianism, subjected the divine in the world to physical suffering, to wit, through matter; and

its doctrine of the "Jesus patibilis omni suspensus ex ligno" (see August. c. Faust. 20, 2; compare Baur's "Das manichäische Religionssystem," pp. 71 ff.) may be regarded as a cosmological extension, though also a dissipation, of Patripassianism with its more soteriological character. Only in one aspect, it is true; for though both alike attribute suffering in the physical sense to God, Patripassianism represents Him as subjecting Himself thereto by assuming an external, visible shape; whereas Manichæism teaches that the sufferings of the pure lucific principle arise from an antagonistic primal dark principle. We shall find afterwards that Sabellianism was finally driven to Dualism, and that, with its rigid conception of God, it was unable to allow even of a creation, and was compelled to fall back on an eternal $\epsilon\lambda\eta$; but the presages of this course of things are discernible even in the earlier forms of this tendency. For, so far as the one God converts Himself into corporeality, as they in part teach, notwithstanding that they retain their Monism, and only their conception of the one God comprises contradictory elements, the reality of the incarnation and of the birth from Mary was threatened. Now, when the adherents of this system, with a view to escaping the danger of Docetism, represented God as assuming from without that which constituted Him passible, to wit, His body, we have an entrance of God into passible matter, similar to that which Manichæism sets forth in its "Jesus patibilis," or its $\delta\upsilon\lambda\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\theta\eta\tau\iota\kappa\eta$. The more, then, all obscuration and darkness are removed outside of the pure divine essence, that is, the more the pure divine essence is fixed in its immutability, the more, as we shall see, does the Sabellian system become affected by Dualism, until at last it is unable to allow the one Divine Being to be even the cause of the world, and is therefore necessitated to represent the world as having its principle in itself, and as a second primal principle standing over against the first. Clearly, however, Sabellianism contained this Dualism merely in the form of a consequence, of which its adherents were partially unconscious, whereas it was the constitutive principle of Manichæism. Sabellianism differs essentially, not only from Manichæism, but also from the milder Platonic form of Dualism, in that it scarcely occupied itself at all with the question of the creation of the world, and limited

its inquiries entirely to the already existing world; the other two systems were decidedly cosmogonical. The same remark may be made also of the Sabellianism of Schleiermacher. This is not the place to give a more detailed account of the Manichæan Christology. Compare Baur, who says (l. c. p. 407),—"The Christ of Manichæism has nothing but the name in common with the Christ of Christianity." It is an expression catachrestically, traditionally adopted. The Manichæan Christ is the universal lucific Spirit, enthroned in the sun and moon, the pure efflux of God, represented perhaps as the pure archetypal man, between whom, however, and their "Jesus patibilis," or the seed of light enchained and suffering in every plant, etc., there is a clear difference. The latter is bound and commingled with matter (*δύναμις παθητική*). For whereas the second divine *δύναμις*, the *δημιουργική*, the world-forming *δύναμις*, is only able to set limits to the dominion of matter by bringing the world into order, but was unable to rescue the light-germs confined in it; a third power, Christ, the form which is enthroned on the sun, draws all related elements out of matter upwards to the light of the sun. Baur. l. c. pp. 205, 291. This Christ, therefore, cannot be born; for birth would bring with it the loss of the purity which gives Him redeeming power. In general, that physical and cosmical process of redemption is by no means connected with the person of the historical Christ, although the Manichæans frequently use Him as an allegory of the Christ on the sun, to wit, so far as the inmost essence of Jesus, which came to light at His transfiguration on the mount, like the essence of every "Electus," may undoubtedly be designated pure and divine. But quite as truly, and even more fully, is the historical Christ a mere allegory of the "Jesus patibilis," who himself needs redemption in his sufferings. On the Christology of the Priscillianists, who diffused Manichæism in the East from the fourth century onwards, compare Lübker's "*de Hæresi Priscillianistarum*," 1840, pp. 25-29. Similar phænomena manifest themselves in connection with the Bogomils (compare Gieseler's "*de Bogomilis Comment.*") and the Cathari. According to Augustine (ad Oros. c. Priscill. et Orig. C. 4, T. x. 735, ed. Maur. 2 a.), the Priscillianists were Sabellian in their doctrine of the Trinity. It is also allowed that the Sabellians made use of the Gospel of

the Egyptians, which contains dualistic elements. Augustine says (l. c.),—"Priscillianus Sabellianum antiquum dogma restituit, ubi ipse pater, qui Filius, qui et Spiritus S. perhibetur." Similarly Orosius, Leo the Great, and others. Leo's terming them, besides, Patripassians, is plainly explicable from the character of their Christology. But when he entitles them also Arians, he is certainly chargeable with inaccuracy, especially in view of the position—"Christum innascibilem esse," which probably related to His divine nature, which it was thus intended to put on a level with the Father (Conc. Tolet. Reg. fid. Anath. 6); though, as Lübker justly observes (p. 25), it may undoubtedly be explained from the Emanatism which, according to the same Council, the Priscillianists combined with their Monarchianism, as did also the Arians. "Credimus," says the Council (Anath. 14), "Trinitatem indivisibilem indifferentem; præter hanc nullam credimus divinam esse naturam." The Priscillianists are charged with entertaining the opinion, "esse aliquid, quod se extra divinam Trinitatem possit extendere." It is not likely, however, that they represented these emanations as condescending into definite hypostases. A canon of the Synod. Bracarenensis says,—"*Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem alia nescio qua divinitatis nomina introducit dicens quod in ipsa divinitate sit Trinitas Trinitatis, sicut Gnostici et Priscilliani dixerunt, anathema sit.*" How it was possible for Sabellians to arrive at propositions concerning a double or triple Trinity of this nature, which had been already laid down by Neo-Platonists, for an explanation see Note 31. As the Priscillianists looked upon the body as the seat and work of the devil, they could not attribute an earthly body to Christ; hence the charge of Docetism brought against them by Leo. According to the Conc. Tol. Anath. 6, they denied also the human soul of Christ. Had they remained simply content with denying to Christ both human body and human soul, they would not have deserved even the title of heretics, for they would have cast aside the fundamental idea and fundamental fact of Christianity. (See Note U, vol. i., on the true conception of Heresy.) With this, however, it does not harmonize to say that they maintained "*Deitatis et carnis unam esse in Christo naturam*" (l. c. Anath. 13). These words, namely, imply, that they assumed the existence of something analogous to

matter in the divine nature itself, of which they took a physical view. In harmony therewith is also the further charge of teaching "*Deitatem Christi convertibilem esse et passibilem*" (l. c. *Anath.* 7), which, with their Monarchianism, caused them to be blamed for Patripassianism. This admission of finitude into the nature of God, indicates undoubtedly that the original Dualism had begun to be conciliated and weakened down; but even the old Manichæism had done the same with its "*Jesus patibilis*." For this reason I consider unsatisfactory the view to which Lübker inclines (l. c. pp. 27, 28), plainly through not paying sufficient attention to the many appearances which speak of a *τροπή* of God, or of an origin of the body of Christ from the essence of God,—to wit, that this conversion was not objective, but merely subjective, symbolical or Docetical; the effect of which would be, contrary to his own intention (p. 28), to reduce the entire historical appearance of Christ to a mere illusion. There is the more reason for accepting this supposition, as, according to Leo, they taught the birth of Christ from the Virgin; not, indeed, as Neander rightly remarks, in the sense of the doctrine of the Church, but still in the sense that He passed through Mary with the glorious body which He brought with Him from above, and which He derived from God. They may indeed have supposed that this heavenly or divine body appeared to be sensuous to the sensuous, to the spiritual, spiritual, according to their different power of apprehension; but still a real and objective union of God with the "*caro*" took place. How far they admitted suffering also into this divine "*caro*," is difficult to say; at all events, it contains the element of finitude. As they denied the resurrection of Christ, they must have denied either the susceptibility of His body to injury, or the continuance of His corporeality. Against the latter alternative is the objection, that they can scarcely have been willing to give up a body derived from the divine nature to the kingdom of earthly matter. But in that case, Christ's body, which is supposed not to have needed resurrection, cannot have experienced injury and death; in the place of the resurrection must be substituted the ascension; and, accordingly, His sufferings must undoubtedly be deemed Docetical.

NOTE 27, page 158.

Decidedly favourable thereto is Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25 (see Note 1, page 153). Contrary thereto appears to be the passage 4, 13, where we read,—*Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γέγονε τριάς, ἡ δὲ μονὰς ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ, τριάς δὲ πατήρ, υἱός, ἄγιον πνεῦμα· πρῶτον μὲν, πλατυνθεῖσα ἡ μονὰς πάθος ὑπέμεινε, καὶ γέγονεν ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν*,—to wit, *σῶμα*—ἐπλατύνθη γὰρ οὐκ οὐσα πλατεία. *Ἐπειτα, εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ μονὰς ἐπλατύνθη εἰς τριάδα*,—ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα πατήρ γέγονε καὶ υἱὸς καὶ πνεῦμα κατὰ *Σαβέλλιον* ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἡ λεγομένη παρ' αὐτῷ μονὰς ἄλλο τί ἐστι παρὰ τὸν πατέρα. *Οὐκ ἔτι οὖν πλατύνεσθαι* (sc. αὐτὸν) *ἔδει λέγειν* (al. *λόγον*) *ἄλλ' ἡ μονὰς τριῶν ποιητική, ὥστε εἶναι μονάδα, εἶτα καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα*. But even it does not prove, either that Sabellius consistently carried out the distinction between the Monas and the Father, or that he gave distinct utterance to it (for otherwise Athanasius could not have spoken so doubtfully regarding it); the utmost it proves is, that Sabellius sometimes verged towards the distinction (compare Neander's "Church History," ed. 2, vol. ii. pp. 1024 f., German Ed.). Baur, on the other hand, following the example of Schleiermacher, is of opinion, that Sabellius distinguished the Monas very clearly from the Father. Sabellius's designating the one God *υἱοπάτωρ*, Son-Father (Greg. Nyss. Or. c. Ar. et Sabell. in A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 8, Appendix p. 1), does not decide the matter; for we do not know whether to translate,—“The Monas became *υἱοπάτωρ*, that is, both Father and Son;” or, “The Father as unity becomes also Son.” The prefixing of *υἱὸς* seems to be opposed to the former translation; whereas it is very intelligible if we adopt the latter. This also was the view taken of the matter by Gregory of Nyssa.

NOTE 28, page 158.

The words of Hilarius in his “de Trin.” 7, 39,—“ut in assumpto homine se filium Dei nuncupet, in natura vero patrem,” etc., might be taken to imply, that as Sabellius designated God in the incarnation Son, so he designated God in nature Father. But “in natura” may also signify “by nature;” for this notice is too isolated, and is too little accredited by Greek Fathers, to permit us to build any argument upon it. Even Athanasius

did not know in what relation the *πλατυσμοὶ* stood to the creation. C. Ar. 4, 14. If, says he, the self-expansion of God did not exist from the very beginning, He must have had a reason for passing over into expansion. What was this reason? After inquiring whether this reason could be that the Father might acquire a Son, or that the incarnation might take place, he says,—*εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ κτίσαι ἐπλατύνθη, ἄτοπον*. For the Monas cannot have become powerful in consequence of the expansion, but must have been powerful already in itself. Moreover, on that supposition the world would cease to exist when the *πλατυσμός* was withdrawn. Athanasius quotes elsewhere expressions of Sabellius verbatim (for example, 4, 25). And yet even he was unable to say whether or no Sabellius conceived creation to be one of the purposes of the expansions of God. Against this supposition may be pleaded, too, that he represented God as arriving at a new revelation only after withdrawing from the earlier: this may be carried out to a certain extent in the relation between legislation and Christ, and between Christ and the Holy Ghost; that is, if the significance of Christ is conditioned solely by sin. But how can Sabellius have supposed that the creation would cease, if the revelation begins with the incarnation? (Compare pp. 160 f.)

NOTE 29, page 159.

Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25:—To the Sabellians the Father must be both Logos and Spirit, in that, *πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐκάστου ἀρμοζόμενος*, to the one He is Father, to the other Logos (that is, Son), and so forth. *Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ παυθήσεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, τῆς χρείας πληρωθείσης*. Basil. Ep. 210,—*Τὸν αὐτὸν Θεὸν ἓνα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστοτε παραπιπτούσας χρείας μεταμορφούμενον νῦν μὲν ὡς πατέρα, νῦν δὲ ὡς υἱόν, νῦν ὡς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διαλέγεσθαι* (a passage without doubt quoted verbatim). Ep. 214,—*Ἐνα μὲν εἶναι, τῇ ὑποστάσει τὸν Θεόν, προσωποποιεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς διαφόρως, κατὰ τὸ ἰδίωμα τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἐκάστοτε χρείας, καὶ νῦν μὲν τὰς πατρικὰς ἐαυτῷ περιτιθέναι φωνὰς, ὅταν τούτου καιρὸς ᾗ τοῦ προσώπου, νῦν δὲ τὰς υἱῷ πρεπούσας νῦν δὲ τὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑποδύεσθαι προσωπεῖον*. Ep. 235,—*Τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστοτε παρεμπίπτουσαν χρείαν μετασχηματίζεσθαι*. August. Tract. in Joann. 53,—“Pro diversi-

tate causarum ipsum dici Filium, ipsum dici Spiritum Sanctum." Of the Son, in particular, Epiph. Hær. 62, 1 ;—*Πεμφθέντα τὸν υἱὸν καιρῷ ποτε, ὥσπερ ἀκτῖνα, καὶ ἐργασάμενον τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀναληφθέντα δὲ αὐθις εἰς οὐρανόν, ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου πεμφθεῖσαν ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν.*

NOTE 30, page 160.

Whether the speaking of God, through which the world was brought into existence and still exists, is conceived as an actual creation, and the trinitarian self-evolution of God as therefore taking place on the basis of a world distinct from God ; or whether God Himself is the plurality which attaches to His works (for Athanasius repeatedly asserts that God Himself *is*, that to which He expands Himself) ; or whether the creation also was represented as a self-evolution of the Monas (a view which Athanasius frequently attempts to fasten upon him ; see c. Ar. 4, c. 11–14), is not quite clear. As he certainly held the trinitarian revelation to be a self-continuation of the speaking Monas or Logos—which is very clearly evident in connection, at all events, with the incarnation ; and as the standing designation of the incarnation is self-evolution ; we might refer the same expression to the creation also. The views of Sabellius would thus acquire a certain unity, in that all the relations of God to the world would be classed under the one type of self-expansion. It is possible, however, that Sabellius may have shrunk from the pantheistic consequences contained in the term “self-expansion,” have limited it to the sphere of spirit, and have conceived it as a gradually intensified informing, by God, of a world which already existed in distinction from Himself. And, indeed, this charge of Pantheism was not brought against him ; a circumstance which ought to be noted. The charge of Dualism lay much nearer. For he represents the impulse to the divine movements within the world, as arising solely from that which for God already had existence ; and conceived that God needed a given material, an eternal *ὑλη*, for His work of creation. His view may have resembled that of Hermogenes. (Compare Leopold’s “Hermogenis de origine mundi sententia,” 1844, pp. 8–22 ; especially note 9.) Dionysius of Alexandria also demonstrated the impossibility of

an eternal *ὄλη*, in opposition to Sabellius (Euseb. Præp. Evang. 7, 19). Further, if Sabellius had held that God Himself became the world, he could not have retained the unity of God, which it was his purpose to retain; the distinctions would then have existed in the divine life itself, and not have first owed their rise to the world. Creation, redemption, and sanctification would then be three momenta or stadia of the development of His life: and Sabellius would thus have given up the efforts he had been making to combine the objectivity of revelation with the unity of God and the indivisibility of His essence. Instead of saying,—For the sake of the *ἰδιότητα*, of the peculiarity of the need of the world, He purposed to assume the mode of existence of the Son, although it stood in no essential and necessary relation to His own inner being; he was now compelled to say,—The vital evolution of God took the course of evolving itself into a world, and so forth. And if, in the view of Sabellius, it was essential to the idea of God, that He should be not merely a silent, but also a creative or a world-forming God, even so essential must also have been the other revelations. The correct view to take of the matter is, probably, that Sabellius accepted and presupposed the doctrine of the Logos traditionally; though neither in the strictly hypostatical form given it by Origen, nor in the sense that the world is clearly and purely distinguished from the Logos. But just as some of the older writers,—for example, several of the Apologists, Clemens Alex. and Tertullian,—held that the world was immediately contained in God, and conceived the distinction between the Logos and God as He is in Himself to have been first fully accomplished at the creation of the world, without therefore intending to be pantheistic; so may it have been with Sabellius, with the difference, that inasmuch as he assumed an eternal *ὄλη*, he identified merely the idea or the forms of the real world with the Logos, and more distinctly than Clemens let fall the hypostasis of the Logos:—indeed, strictly viewed, to represent the world as immediately contained in the Logos, is to exclude His hypostasis. It is also deserving of remark, that in combating (c. Ar. 4, 11) the Sabellian doctrine of the Logos, Athanasius really combated all those older teachers of the Church who conceded to the Logos, prior to the creation of the world, at the utmost a latent and inactive existence in God

(compare Note 1, page 154), and an actual existence merely subsequently to the creation.

NOTE 31, page 161.

The Fathers of the Church adduce no evidence to show that he believed that the world would one day perish. It is in itself improbable that he held such an opinion, and is very likely a mere conclusion drawn from the transitoriness of the members of the Sabellian Trinity. It would undoubtedly be correct if the Father, as the first member of the Trinity, were the Creator. In that case, however, creation must have disappeared with the appearance of the Son in the incarnation, even as the law also was then done away with; which may again be an indication, that Sabellius did not attribute creation to the first member of the Trinity. As concerns the Spirit, Sabellius neither demonstrated nor proclaimed a new revelation after Him; nay more, he did not even teach that He would some time cease to confer His gifts: indeed, this would have been far from harmonizing with the continuance of the world, which he undoubtedly assumed. Nor did he maintain that the *πρόσωπον* of the Spirit would cease to exist, unless we accept the words of Gregory, quoted in Note 32, as true. He might, accordingly, have held that history terminates with the age of the Spirit. If he held that God *began* to create as the speaking God, we might suppose that creation would attain its perfection in the age of the Spirit (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 11,—*σιωπῶν μὲν [Θεὸς] οὐκ ἠδύνατο ποιεῖν, λαλῶν δὲ κτίζειν ἤρξατο*). The intervening sin would then be set aside by the revelation in the law and the incarnation (*λειποταξία*; see the passage from Gregory of Nyssa, quoted on page 712); humanity would be led back to the beginning, to the *τάξις* in the Holy Ghost, *in a higher way*; thus the Holy Spirit would have brought in a new and permanent element. It is more probable, however, that he believed the Holy Ghost to lead men back merely to a perfection which they had at the beginning. At all events, Epiphanius says,—The Holy Ghost is sent into the world to every one who is counted worthy of receiving *again* life and warmth (*ἀναζωγονεῖν δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀναξέειν*); with which agrees also the passage above quoted from Gregory of Nyssa. Accordingly, he was able to represent the *πρόσωπον* of the

Holy Spirit, so far as it was directed against sin, as ceasing to exist, whereas the positive element in His gifts remains, to wit, the life in God, which is represented as the life in Paradise. The period of perfection would then no longer stand under the special *πρόσωπον* of the Holy Spirit, but would be the return to the undivided life in God, without its being necessary that the world, or even the gifts of the individual revelations, should cease to exist; the work of the Holy Spirit would then be to lead back out of division, and out of the individual revelations, to the undivided God. Man is then again what he was, and God also is again what He was (compare Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12, 22, 25), prior to the entrance of sin, and to the Trinity, which it had rendered necessary.

NOTE 32, page 162.

In relation to the Father, notice is further deserved by the following passage from the *Expos. Fidei*, which may indeed have been in great measure wrongly attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, but still does not need to be placed below the fourth century (compare Neander 2, 1243). It was first edited in Greek by A. Mai (Nov. Coll. 7, 170 ff.). After saying that Sabellius refused to allow that the three persons were real, and rather introduced an *ἀνυπόστατον πρόσωπον*, that is, masks instead of hypostases, he goes on to say,—*ἀποφεύγομεν τὸν Σαβέλλιον λέγοντα τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα, τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν πατέρα μὲν γὰρ λέγει εἶναι τὸν λαλοῦντα, υἱὸν δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ πατρὶ μένοντα καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν τῆς δημιουργίας φαινόμενον ἔπειτα μετὰ τὴν ἀπάντων πλήρωσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς Θεὸν ἀνατρέχοντα· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος λέγει.* This hitherto unnoticed passage is plainly very favourable to Neander's view of the relation between Monas and Father. For the Monas, as speaking, is decidedly designated Father. Now, this is not merely more closely in accordance with the mode of thought common at that time, which regarded the Father as the supreme Unity, as the speaker in relation to the spoken Logos, as the Father in relation to the Son; but it furnishes also an explanation of the circumstance, that many of the Church teachers represent Sabellius as holding the Father and the Monas to be one. According to this passage, the silent God would be the Monas in itself; the speaking God, or the speaking Monas, would be

the Father; the spoken word (naturally conceived to be impersonal), or the discourse of God, would, as thought, be primarily in God, manifesting itself, however, in its effects in the creation of the world: it might also figuratively be termed Son; indeed, we find even Celsus giving this name to the world. From this we see that Sabellius did not regard the already created world as the first basis and occasion of the Trinity; but, though he described Father and Son as one hypostasis, considered them to be two eternal and essential aspects of the divine nature, to which the Spirit was added as a third. There thus remained a place for the historical Trinity, which Sabellius is well known to have taught, and on which doubt cannot be cast, though the passage in question gives but a superficial and imperfect hint of it. If, namely, the speaking God be the Father, and that which He speaks (that to which, according to another image, the *Monas* expands Himself) be the *Logos*, or figuratively the Son, this relation might be conceived as recurring twice (or more frequently); first, in the external creation, and then in the spiritual world. As the Father, indeed, thinks in Himself, though first through the spoken word, the *φαινόμενος λόγος*, the creation of the world, is a reality (the *δημιουργία*); so also in the domain of spirit the ideal exists, it is true, in the law, but God is therein merely as speaking, and that in such a manner, that the spoken word of the law still yearns after or proclaims the reality, is consequently conceived as Father; whereas the law acquires reality in the incarnation, first in Christ, and then through the Holy Spirit in the Church.¹ The God-man is the spoken God, or God in the form of actuality. It would then be the Holy Ghost who raises the first creation to the rank of the second, by means of the tendency towards God which dwelt in it from the beginning; which tendency in the first creation might be termed the work of the Holy Spirit. So far, then, we should have to maintain that it is essential to God to be, (1) not merely silent, but also to speak; (2) not merely an idea, but also an objectifying real principle; (3) the One who leads back the objectivity into Himself: we should have three principles in God, which, though relating essentially

¹ "Wie der Vater zwar in sich denkt, aber erst durch das gesprochene Wort, den *φαινόμενος λόγος*, die Welschöpfung dasteht (die *δημιουργία*), so ist auch auf dem geistigen Gebiete, etc."

to the world of revelation, are objectively distinct and eternal—principles which were gradually set forth in history, an eternal Trinity of revelation, as some recent writers have termed it. But as this passage is not particularly marked by accuracy, and stands very isolated, much stress cannot be laid on it. The sense may also be,—Sabellius reduces our Father, who begets the Son, to the merely speaking God, and out of our Son he makes a thought or a word. But still it is remarkable, that here the distinction between Father and Son is reduced back altogether, and consequently also for the entire revelation, to that between the God who speaks and that which He speaks; which, be it remarked, must not be confounded with the distinction between the silent and the speaking God; for the latter Dyad is the necessary presupposition to every species of Sabellian Trias. (Compare Neander's "Church History" *in loc.*)

NOTE 33, page 167.

Athanasius also saw clearly (l. c. c. 21) that Sabellianism could not permanently occupy the point of view at which it then stood. He argues against it as follows,—If the man Jesus by Himself cannot be designated Son and Only-begotten One, but, as they urge, both united, the Logos and the man; the question arises—Which of the two is the cause of the other, and constituted Him Son? Did the man constitute the Logos Son? If so, the man would be the Only-begotten One, the Creator, the Redeemer; for all these things are attributed to the Son in the Scriptures, identifying Him as they do with the Logos (cf. c. 20), and we should be baptized into the name of a man. But if the man Jesus is called Son because of the Logos, the Logos must have been Son apart from the incarnation, as the Church maintains. And because He was the true Son, He was able to make other sons (c. 22). If, finally, we say that the Son became Son neither through the one nor through the other separately, but through the union of the two, we must assume a cause of the union of these two; this cause was above and prior to both; consequently the principle of Sonship must have preceded, and this precedent cause ought to be termed Son. Hence, in whatever aspect we consider the matter, Sabellius had no alternative but either to go over to the doctrine of the Church, or to allow a false predominance to the human aspect. He

himself also failed not to see that, in such a case, the Son would be derived from the world, that consistency would require His being conceived ebionitically, and that He could not redeem the world (c. 20).

NOTE 34, page 167.

We have already conceded above, that Sabellius, strictly speaking, believed the entire God to be present in the revelation of Christ, under a particular mode of existence. But although this revelation of the Son may be something objective and new in relation to the previous and to the succeeding revelation, that which characterizes it is not, in the strict sense, the entire God, but merely a momentum in Him, which He set forth specially to view for the sake of men ; and the means for leading souls to the Monas in His entirety. A part of God therefore remains outside of Christ, be it the resting, or even the active Monas. Indeed, the creative and sustaining activity of God existed outside of the revelation in the law, as Sabellius will not have denied. Nowhere do we find him representing the entire Monas (*totam totaliter*) as absorbed in a single revelation ; indeed, to have done so, would have necessitated a denial of objective distinction to the revelations. He must then have made all progress purely subjective, and therefore have regarded the history of religion merely as the progressive knowledge of God who, in Himself, remains ever the same and unmoved, and not as a course of divine deeds, which, though without the inherent significance involved in having their end in themselves, were still necessary as the means whereby that knowledge should be conducted to its eternal goal. But as he does not do so, and on the contrary (not very consistently, it must be allowed) believes God Himself, the movements of the divine life, to be in that which he represents as mere means, we are compelled to conclude, that he conceived the differences in the revelations to arise from the entire God not being present in each one of them. Sabellianism, therefore, was necessarily driven on to say, that in each of the three revelations, merely some portion of God was manifested. This now is the point from which Sabellianism, if it refused to accept the Nicene doctrine of simultaneous distinctions in God, might pass over to the notion of the gradual emanation of powers out of God—a notion which must have commended

itself, specially on account of the Person of Christ, in which was contained a constant and fixed circumscription of a portion of the divine essence. At the same time, even as Tertullian held that the entire sun meets the eye in a single ray, so might Sabellius have conceived the entire God to be present in the ray which was in Christ. The idea of emanation was not strange to Sabellianism, but it manifests itself frequently in the History of Dogmas, as the middle link between Sabellianism and Arianism or Ebionism. So, for example, in the fourth and the sixteenth centuries. For this reason, it was not unjust to direct attention to the danger of a false separation from, and a false division of God, to which Sabellius was exposed. Not to mention Athanasius (l. c. c. 12, cll. Expos. Fid. init.), who remarks concerning the position assigned by Sabellius to the Logos, relatively to the Monas,—that if the Logos was in God *prior* to His generation, He must be *outside* of God, that is, a mundane being, subsequently thereto; the Arians, in particular, frequently drew attention thereto. See Theodoret. H. E. i. 3, T. ii., P. 2, p. 743, ed. Schulze:—*Καὶ εἰς ἓνα υἱὸν Θεοῦ μονογενῆ—γεννηθέντα οὐ κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ὁμοιότητος, ταῖς τομαῖς, ἢ ταῖς ἐκ διαιρέσεων ἀπορρόλαις, ὥσπερ Σαβελλίῳ καὶ Βαλεντίνῳ δοκεῖ.* Compare also Note 1, page 156, and Note 38 in the Appendix.

NOTE 35, page 173.

Later ages appear to have added new portions to the work *ἡ κατὰ μέρος πίστις*, as often as circumstances appeared to them to require it (in the Greek in A. Mai Coll. Nov. 7, 170–176). Whether any portion is genuine or not, is hard to make out. Individual parts—as, for example, those which betray antagonism to Paul of Samosata, to patripassian and Sabellian principles—might be genuine, but Gregory's doctrine cannot with certainty be deduced from these fragments. Otherwise we should have, at the very commencement (l. c. p. 170), express proof that, like Origen, in whose writings also the terms *κτίσμα*, *ποίημα* occur, he held the doctrine of eternal generation. There is some resemblance between the commencement and what we read of Theognostus in Athan. de decr. Nic. 25. The discourse for the Feast of Epiphany is spurious (ed. Paris, pp. 30–37); besides also the 12 *Κεφάλαια περὶ πίστεως*. The Ep. Canonica and

the *Metaphr. ad Eccles.* are genuine, but contain nothing Christological. On the other hand, however, A. Mai (*Spicil. Rom.* 3, 696–698) has published a fragment of Gregory's from an Arabian Codex in the Vatican Library, which is remarkable, because it designates the divine persons "nomina." Different beings bear different names, even when they have the same substance and belong to the same class of natures: so is it with Father, Son, and Spirit. These names, it is true, are not something superadded, as in the case of men, but realities (*subsistentiæ*). Even in the case of men, however, the distinction arises not from the humanity, but from the name; for example, Adam, Abraham, and so forth, are names. "*Sed divinæ personæ sunt quidem nomina, nomina tamen sunt personæ.*" The persons first designate that which is, and subsists; and that is the "*essentia Dei.*" According to this, he would appear to have conceived the divine essence to have first become a reality, in the three "*nomina*;" even as man first becomes a concrete man, when he receives his name. This does not necessarily contain a Sabellian element; for, on the contrary, he says afterwards,—The Logos is neither a merely cogitated word (*κατ' ἐννοίαν*), nor merely a word spoken by God (like the *λόγος προφορικὸς*, which was spoken to the prophets), nor merely an *ἀρθρικὸς*, an articulate human word, but "*substantiale Verbum, etc.*" Still, if the fragment is genuine, the designation of the person of the Logos by the totally unusual term "*nomen*" may have given rise to the appearance of Sabellianism, of which Basilus (l. c.) speaks. Much more probable, however, is the following. According to the letter of Basilus, the new Sabellians appealed in Neo-Cæsarea to the words of the baptismal formula, "*in this,*" urging that they denote that we ought to read, "*baptize unto the name,*" not "*unto the names.*" Consequently, it is one person unto whom we are baptized. Basilus, therefore, endeavours to show that baptism unto three names is required; and uses in this connection the unusual designation "*three names*" for the "*three persons.*" As those Sabellians appealed to the *ἐκθεσις πίστεως* of Gregory Thaumaturgus, which for the rest appears to have been a disputation, and therefore certainly comprised passages which sounded rather Sabellian than Arian; and this may have been the occasion of ascribing the above fragments which treat of the names to Gregory, with the idea of securing

him as a witness against the Sabellian view of the baptismal formula. On the various Confessions of Faith which were attributed to Gregory, the *Ἐκθεσις πίστεως κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν* (translated already by Rufinus), the "Confessio Fidei ad Ælium" (Basil. Ep. 210), and the longer one, the Greek text of which is contained in A. Mai Coll. Nov. 7, 170–176, compare Hahn's "Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der apostolischen Kirche," 1842. With Walch, Hahn regards the first as genuine, with the exception of the conclusion, which may be suspected to be an anti-Arian addition; although even Origen in his day had to do with such antagonists. It runs as follows:—*Εἰς Θεὸς πατὴρ λόγου ζῶντος σοφίας ὑφεστῶσης καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ χαρακτήρος αἰδίου, τέλειος τελείου γεννήτωρ πατὴρ υἱοῦ μονογενοῦς. Εἰς κύριος μόνος ἐκ μόνου, Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, χαρακτήρ καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς θεότητος, λόγος ἐνεργὸς, σοφία τῆς τῶν ὄλων συστάσεως περιεκτικῆ καὶ δύναμις τῆς ὄλης κτίσεως ποιητικῆ υἱὸς ἀληθινὸς ἀληθινοῦ πατρὸς, ἀόρατος ἀοράτου, καὶ ἀφθάρτος ἀφθάρτου, καὶ ἀθάνατος ἀθανάτου καὶ αἰδίου αἰδίου. Καὶ ἐν πνεῦμα ἁγίον, ἐκ Θεοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχον, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πεφηνὸς δηλαδὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰκὼν τοῦ υἱοῦ τελείου τελεία, ζωὴ ζώντων αἰτία, ἀγιότης ἀγιασμοῦ χορηγὸς, ἐν ᾧ φανεροῦται Θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ Θεὸς υἱὸς ὁ διὰ πάντων, τριάς τελεία δόξη καὶ αἰδιότητι καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένη μηδὲ ἀπαλλοτριουμένη. Οὔτε οὖν κτιστὸν τι ἢ δοῦλον ἐν τριάδι, οὔτε ἐπέισακτον, ὡς πρότερον μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρχον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπεισελθόν. Οὔτε οὖν ἐνέλιπέ ποτε υἱὸς πατρὶ, οὔτε υἱὸς πνεῦμα, ἀλλ' ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος ἡ αὐτὴ τριάς αἰεῖ.* In favour of the genuineness speaks the Origenistic form of the sentences before the conclusion, the vagueness with which the question of the essence of the Son is treated;—it was a characteristic feature of the age of the Arian conflict, to return from the subject of the personality to that of the essence. Suspicion may be entertained relatively to the last words, concerning the Holy Spirit; because they already teach His eternity. But compare Note 1, page 173.

NOTE 36, page 181.

In his first work against Sabellius, Dionysius of Alexandria said (Euseb. Præp. Evangel. 7, 19),—*Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγέννητον ἔστιν ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὐσία ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ ἀγεν-*

νησία, οὐκ ἂν ἀγέννητον εἴη ἡ ὕλη; in other words, not to be generated is represented as the essence of God, after the manner of the Arians. But if that be the essence of God, then must the Son, whom he probably described as generated in this work also, stand outside of the divine essence. To this, however, we may reply,—In the passage referred to, the unbegottenness of *God*,—not of the Father,—is opposed to the ὕλη as begotten, not to the Son. Besides, we never afterwards find any trace of such a view in the Alexandrian Bishop. He only retained subordination in the sense in which the teachers of the Church long continued to hold it,—in the sense, to wit, that the Father is the source of deity, which would imply that He is at one and the same time the whole and a member of the Trinity (compare de Sent. Dionys. c. 18, 22, 23). To this connection belongs also, perhaps, the fragment of the work of Dionysius, *περὶ ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀπολογίας*, in A. Mai's "Coll. Nov." T. 7, 96 :—*Ἀναρχία μᾶλλον καὶ στάσις, ἢ ἐξ ἰσοτιμίας ἀντιπαρεξαγομένη*; from which it is evident that he was an opponent of Tritheism.

NOTE 37, page 181.

Προείρηται μὲν οὖν, says Dionysius, ὅτι πῆγή τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχέμενος ὁ υἱὸς ἀναγέγραπται· ἀπόρροια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος (the Word). Καὶ ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων εἰπεῖν ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου ὁ διὰ γλώσσης νοὺς προπηδῶν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔμεινε προπέμψας, καὶ ἔστιν οἷος ἦν ὁ δὲ ἐξέπτῃ προπεμψθεὶς καὶ φέρεται πανταχοῦ· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος ἐν ἐκατέρῳ, ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου· καὶ ἐν εἰσιν, ὄντες δύο· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἓν καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλεχθήσαν εἶναι. Another passage runs as follows (ibid.) :—Ὡς ὁ ἡμέτερος νοὺς ἐρεύγεται μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν λόγον—καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἐκάτερος ἕτερος θατέρου, ἴδιον καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ κεχωρισμένον εἰληχῶς τόπον, ὁ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης καὶ τοῦ στόματος οἰκῶν τε καὶ κινούμενος· οὐ μὴν διεσθήκασιν, οὐδὲ καθάπαξ ἀλλήλων στέρονται, οὐδέ ἐστιν οὔτε ὁ νοὺς ἄλογος οὔτε ἄνους ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ γε νοὺς ποιεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ φανείς· καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐγκείμενος, ὁ δὲ λόγος νοὺς προπηδῶν καὶ μεθίσταται μὲν ὁ νοὺς εἰς τὸν λόγον, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸν νοῦν εἰς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἐγκυκλεῖ, καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοὺς διὰ τοῦ λόγου ταῖς τῶν ἀκούοντων ψυχαῖς ἐνιδρύεται συνεισιῶν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν οἶον

πατήρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ λόγου, ὡν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δὲ καθάπερ υἱὸς ὁ λόγος τοῦ νοῦ· πρὸ ἐκείνου μὲν ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἔξωθέν ποθεν σὺν ἐκείνῳ γενόμενος, βλαστήσας δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὁ πατήρ ὁ μέγιστος καὶ καθόλου νοῦς πρῶτον τὸν υἱὸν λόγον ἐρμηνέα καὶ ἄγγελον ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει. This exposition reminds us of Origen and Hippolytus; but it bears a still closer resemblance to the Logology of the Apologists. Still the step taken in advance since Tertullian's time, which consisted in discriminating the Son from the λόγος = νοῦς, is not given up. It is true, the Son is spoken of as νοῦς here also; not, however, as such, but as the νοῦς which had assumed another mode of being (μεθίσταται ὁ νοῦς εἰς τὸν λόγον). Thus through this μετάστασις of the καθόλου νοῦς into the hypostatized Word he arrives at an objectified νοῦς, or a duplication of God; for in speaking of a μετάστασις, he by no means intends to teach a conversion in which God the Father should cease to be what He was.

NOTE 38, page 183.

De Synodis 16;—Σαβέλλιος τὴν μονάδα υἰοπατέρα εἶπεν. Compare Hilar. de Trin. 4, 12; 6, 5, 11. Hilarius adds in the latter passage,—“Divisæ a Sabellio unionis (that is, of the Monas) crimen exprobrant, cujus unionis divisio non nativitate intulit, sed eundem divisit in virgine.” Schleiermacher finds these words obscure; but the meaning probably is,—There would be no objection to be made against a distinction, still less against the division of the Monas, if it preceded and were the principle of the birth of Christ; but they rather divide God in the Virgin; that is, the birth and humanity of Christ are the principle of a division in God, and since the incarnation the person of the Son stands over against that of the Father. We find exactly the same thought also in the work adv. Sab. Gregal. c. 3. When the objection was brought against the Sabellians, that the Scriptures so frequently distinguish Christ and the Father as two persons, they replied,—We also recognise two hypostases; the one is God the Father, the other is the Son, who is a man (καὶ οὕτω δύο ὑποστάσεις φαίνεσθαι, ἓνα τὸν πατέρα Θεόν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν υἱὸν ἄνθρωπον); to which it was again answered,—In that sense Paul of Samosata also recognised two hypostases. Here is, at the same time, the weak point of the Sabellian system, at which Patri-

passianism might again be resuscitated; even as, through the incarnation, an ἀποκοπή might be introduced into God. The same thing is clear also from c. 6 and 12, where Sabellians, in order apparently to meet the demand for a Trinity, are said to have resorted to the evasion,—when they conceded distinctions, they wished at all events that God (so far as He reveals Himself in the world) should be compounded of three things (σύνθετος ἐκ τριῶν πραγμάτων).

NOTE 39, page 183.

Some difference remains here between the two Dionysiiuses. The Roman Dionysius develops nothing that resembles a duplication, a self-objectification of the νοῦς, and must therefore either have conceived the Father in Himself, apart from the Son, as without power and wisdom, or have regarded the Son in the light of an attribute: and it is not probable that he intended to do either. Whereas the Alexandrian Dionysius reckoned, even at a later period, power and wisdom to the essence of the Father; for he held the Father Himself to be the λόγος as ἐγκείμενος (see page 180). This was more correct in itself, and was also accepted by later teachers of the Church, in order that the Son might not be reduced to a mere attribute of the Father, and that there might not be attributes of which the Father was destitute. The Alexandrian Dionysius probably intended thus to characterize the Father as perfect in Himself, even apart from the Son; whereas the Roman Dionysius, with his doctrinal form, intended to say, that apart from the Son only an imperfect conception could be formed of the Father. His aim, therefore, was to connect the Son more distinctly with the divine essence itself. Still this formula always threatens the hypostasis of the Son, in the manner of Sabellianism. And, in point of fact, the Roman Dionysius does not appear to have expressed himself so strongly against Sabellianism as against the Tritheites and Subordinationists of the above kind.

NOTE 40, page 196.

For the sake of completeness, we will here devote a word to Victorinus, who, as a Greek by birth and yet a Latin Bishop, occupies a middle position between the East and the

West. We have a tolerably long fragment of his, entitled "de Fabrica Mundi" and "Scholia in Apocalypsin" (compare "Victorini Petavionensis in Pannonia superiore episcopi opera" in Gallandii Bibliotheca Vett. PP. T. 4, pp. 49-64). The genuineness of the fragment is unquestionable; but it is in part scarcely intelligible, owing to its bad Latin and the writer's awkwardness in the use of language, with which even Jerome also seems to have been struck. These faults are somewhat less glaring in the other work, which may possibly be due to the copyist. In the fragment we not merely read,—*"Verbo domini cœli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum; —sic dicit Pater ejus; eructavit cor meum verbum bonum : and John,—in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum—omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine eo factum est nihil,"*—but he also assigns to the incarnation so high a place, in virtue of mystical numbers (in use also by earlier writers), that he regards it and the history of Christ as the idea that dominates the universe. The Son with the Father, he holds to be the unity of the seven spirits of Isaiah; in the six days of creation these spirits successively revealed themselves. He completes the number seven by representing the Son as revealing Himself to the human race in two principal forms:—firstly, as the principle of the fear of God; secondly, as the principle of blessing and sanctification. Further on, however, the six days' work is typically employed for the parallel with the history of Christ, and particularly with the week of the Passion (c. 2, 6). For example:—As Christ came (in carnem conversus) that Adam might be created anew, He assumed human nature on the same day of the week on which Adam was created, He suffered on the same day on which he fell, and so forth. At the basis hereof lies the idea of a full "recapitulatio,"—an idea which we have already found set forth by Irenæus. With this fragment, whose conclusion also treats of the Apocalypse, the other work has the most unmistakeable affinity, both in style and thought. For example, the "septem spiritus" are very frequently employed for the explanation of apocalyptic passages; the mystic numbers of the fragment occur also in the Scholia, especially the construction of the history of the world according to the number seven,—a procedure which has drawn upon its author the unjust

charge of Chiliasm (for example, from Cave); whereas the conclusion of the Scholia expressly protests against the supposition that the completed kingdom of Christ will endure only 1000 years, and not for ever. Both monuments undoubtedly lay very great stress on eschatology, on the judgment through Christ, and on the perfection at the last day. These scholia supply far fuller Christological data; but as the work has probably suffered from interpolations, doubt is thrown on the elements just referred to. So, for example, the number 666, Apocalypse xiii. 18, alongside of earlier and more absurd explanations (*τετραν*, *Diclux*), is referred also to a “verbum gothlicum Γενσήρικος.” The words, “He who is, and who was, and who is to come” (Apocalypse i. 4), he explains as follows,—“*Est*, quia permanet, *erat*, quia cum Patre omnia fecit, et nunc ex virgine initium sumpsit, *venturus est*, utique ad judicandum.” He redeemed humanity by His sufferings (1, 5; 5, 4; 12, 1–4). Death is the “debitum” of every descendant of Adam; not, however, of Christ (qui de semine natus non erat, nihil morti debebat, propter quod eum devorare non potuit, id est in morte detinere). He became “agnus;” but “tanquam leo confregit mortem” (5, 5). Thus was he made *heir* (“hæres Domini,” not “Diaboli”), “ut possideret substantiam morientis, i. e., membra humana (5, 4, 5). Ut sicut per unum corpus omnes homines debito mortis suæ ceciderant, per unum etiam corpus universi credentes renati in vitam resurgerent.” The higher nature of Christ is here also described as the unity of the seven spirits (Apol. 1, 4; 5, 6); but on c. xi. 1 he remarks,—“Patrem esse dicimus et hujus Filium Christum ante originem seculi apud Patrem genitum, hominem factum in anima vera (?) et carne,—morte devicta et in cœlos cum corpore a Patre receptum effudisse Spiritum Sanctum.—Hunc per prophetas prædicatum, hunc per legem conscriptum, hunc esse manum Dei et Verbum Patris ex Deo, per omnia Dominum et conditorem Orbis.” The author is specially zealous in his attacks on Dualism, because it aims at rending asunder the Old and New Testaments. The Word was the founder of both Testaments. Everything in the Old Testament is treated by him as a type of Christ. But the type still resembles an unbroken seal, a shut temple; nay more, one seal has been added to the other in the Old Covenant. The opening of the seals (Apocalypse

v.), which no one could accomplish save the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of the stem of Jesse, is the opening of the Old Testament (v. 8, 9); by Christ all the seven seals are broken at once. He is the opened temple of God (compare Apoc. v.). The new song which is sung after the breaking of the seals by His death, is the confession of the new element in Christianity. New is it, that the Son of God should become man (whose Head is God, Apocalypse i. 14); that He should ascend up to heaven in the body (which He united with the spirit of His glory, Apocalypse i. 12); new, that He forgives our sins, and so forth (Apoc. v. 8, 9). In accordance herewith, he explains the woman, which is adorned with the sun and travails in birth, to be the old Church of the fathers and prophets, of the saints and apostles (prior to its union with Christ). This old Church "*genitus et tormenta desiderii sui habuit, usquequo fructum ex plebe sua secundum carnem olim promissum sibi videret Christum ex ipsa gente carnem sumsisse.*" He deemed the incarnation, therefore, to be the uncovering of the divine mystery, on which the noblest minds of the old period had toiled with earnest longings. He then naturally conceives this humanity to be permanently united with the Word. Because of His incarnation, says the Scholium to Ap. i. 16, is He appointed judge of the world. The Father intended to show, "*quoniam verbo prædicationis judicabuntur homines*" (compare on Apocalypse vi. 1, 2, 5), that only the highest revelation of God can judge men.

NOTE 41, page 196.

The unity of Christ, *εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα πολλαῖς ἐπινοίαις ἐπινοεῖται*, is expressly defended. Pamphilus, however, found it necessary to answer the charge of teaching two Christs, which was the fifth brought against Origen (Apol. c. 5). Now, as Paul of Samosata did not teach two Christs, but a Logos and a man, representing the latter, however, as becoming Christ, through His union with the former, the words of the Confession of Faith (Hahn's "Bibliothek," etc., p. 96) will not refer to him; unless we suppose that here also Paul had spoken dishonestly of the generation of the Logos, in order to make it appear as though he attributed an hypostasis to the Logos (even as to the man Jesus), either prior to the creation

of the world, as the spurious letter of Dionysius of Alexandria maintains; or at the incarnation, as Ehrlich thinks, when the *ἐνέργεια*, which had hitherto been impersonal, became a person. This view bears some analogy to that of Tertullian and others, according to whom the Logos became a person at the creation, but it was not Paul's; compare Schwab's "*de Pauli Samos. vita atque doctrina dissert. inaug.*," 1839, § 12, pp. 64 f.

NOTE 42, page 197.

Eusebius, who gives us long fragments of the discussions of this Synod (H. E. 7, 27-30), says also, that a doctrinal portion was recorded in writing; but he has not preserved it. The Confession of Faith directed against Nestorius, discovered amongst the Acts of the Synod of Ephesus, is spurious (see Hahn l. c. p. 129); for it contains the word *ὁμοούσιος*, whereas we know that the Synod of Antioch avoided it, because of the abuse made of it by Paul. On the other hand, with Hahn and Walch, I consider that recorded in Mansi 1, 1035, Hahn, pp. 91 ff., to be genuine. It neither contains the term *ὁμοούσιος*, nor any other determination which does not completely suit the period to which it is attributed. The vagueness which characterizes it in important points, and of which the Arians took advantage, would be inexplicable if it had been framed subsequently to the Council of Nicæa. But precisely because of this remnant of vagueness, that other Confession of Faith appears to be a spurious changeling.

NOTE 43, page 226.

More particular mention is here deserved by a man who exerted a great influence on many Orientals of the Nicene generation, to wit, Lucian of Antioch, the martyr. That he was like-minded with Paul of Samosata, is an unfounded suspicion cast upon him by the heresy-hunters, with which it is inconsistent that the Arians appealed to him as a witness in favour of their views (Epiph. Hær. 48). But quite as far am I also from believing that Lucian's affinity to the Arians is the result of a falsification of his writings by that party, as Athanasius surmises. On the contrary, there is no reason for throwing doubt on the declaration of the Semi-Arian Synod of Antioch, held in the year 341, that the Confession of Faith which they

adopted as their own (the so-called Second Antiocheian Formula) was that of Lucian the Martyr (see Sozomen. H. E. 3, 5, cll. 6, 12). It runs as follows (according to Athanas. de Syn. Arim. et Seleuc. § 23, T. i. p. 2, 735),—"We believe in one God, the Almighty Father, the Former and Creator of the universe, and the Provider; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, His only-begotten Son, the God through whom are all things (*δι' οὗ*), who was begotten of the Father before all *Æons*, God of God, a whole of the whole (*ἐξ ὅλου*), an only one of the only one (*μόνον*), a perfect one of the Perfect, a King of the King, a Lord of the Lord, who is living Word (*λόγος*), living Wisdom, true Light, the Way, the Truth, the Resurrection, the Shepherd, the Door, immutable and unalterable (*ἀτρεπτόν τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον*); the unchangeable image (*ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα*) of the deity, of the essence (*οὐσίας*), of the will, of the power and glory of the Father, the First-born of all creation, who was in the beginning with God, as God the Word, according to the Gospel;—who in these latter days came down from above, and was born of a virgin, according to the Scriptures, and became man, Mediator between God and men, the Apostle of our Faith, the Captain of our salvation, as He saith, 'I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me;'—who suffered for us and rose again the third day, ascended up to heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, from whence He will come again, with power and glory, to judge the quick and the dead;—and in the Holy Ghost, who is given for the comfort, sanctification, and perfection of believers; as the Lord commanded to baptize into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matthew xxviii.). Since the Father is truly Father, the Son truly Son, and so also the Spirit truly Spirit, and the names are not empty and idle, but for each of the afore-mentioned exactly denote the hypostasis, the order and the glory (*τάξιν καὶ δόξαν*), so that there are three as to hypostasis, but one in harmony (*τῇ συμφωνίᾳ δὲ ἓν*). In this faith, which we hold from the beginning and to the end, we condemn all heretical false faith; and if any teach in opposition to the sound true faith of the Scripture, saying, There was an interval, a time, or an *Æon*, before the Son was generated, let him be anathema. And if any call the Son a creature, like one of the other creatures, or a production or work, like one of the

other productions or works, and refuses to teach each one of the afore-mentioned points, one after the other, as the Holy Scriptures have handed them down, and teaches other than as we have received, let him be anathema," etc. This Confession of Faith, with the exception perhaps of the close, which does not really belong to it, accords exactly with the Præ-Nicene period, and is marked by the following noteworthy features: 1. The Father is identical with the one God (*εἰς Θεός*); He represents the *μοναρχία*. The Son, therefore, is termed, not coeternal with the Father, but the image of His essence and of His attributes; He is not equal to the Father, but stands in *τάξις* and *δόξα* under Him. We can, accordingly, understand why Athanasius was not quite satisfied with the Confession, and why Arian falsifications were surmised. 2. On the other hand, however, the Son is designated God of God; His perfection, singularity, immutability, and exaltedness above time, are asserted with a decision which proves how offensive Arianism must have been to those whose doctrinal convictions were firmly established, and tolerably developed. Lucian therefore (he died A.D. 311) occupies substantially the same point of view as Eusebius. Measured by a strictly scientific standard alone, both of them are more closely related to Arius than to Athanasius. For, without question, if the Father is the one God by Himself alone, nothing remains for the Son but to be a creature, and there is no place for a Trinity. To posit a middle thing between God and a creature, is unquestionably a contradictory procedure, and an expedient of the resort to which Eusebius and his adherents had already anticipatorily deprived themselves, by representing God as too exalted to enter into any immediate connection whatever with the world, and therefore with that which resembled the world. But to do this, would be to measure them by a scientific standard foreign to them. For such a middle being, which is for us an incogitable thing, seemed to them not only cogitable, but even the solution of the difficulty. They are consequently not to be measured by the more perfect scientific standard; for, according to it, they ought, without doubt, consistently to have gone on to Arianism. But precisely because their theory was in itself so far from meeting the requirements of science, it is necessary to refer back to their Christian consciousness, as the second factor,

which alone furnishes an explanation of their procedure. Indeed, with men like Eusebius, this second factor was so decidedly the earlier and more powerful of the two, that if they had become aware of the results to which their theory, scientifically considered, must lead, or if they had been compelled to choose between the doctrine of Arius and that of Athanasius, they would not merely have declared themselves against Arius, as in fact, at a subsequent period, they constantly did, but would have given up their own views, and endeavoured to reconcile themselves to the formula of Athanasius. This also was the exact position taken up by Eusebius relatively to the Nicene Council. That Arianism ought to be repudiated, he felt sure; but he was by no means so sure that his theory must scientifically end in Arianism. Now, so far as he feared that Sabellianism would be favoured by the term *ὁμοούσιον*, and supposed either the hypostasis of the Son or the unity of God not to be sufficiently ensured, he shrunk from adopting it; but he consented thereto as soon as he had convinced himself, that the Synod had no intention of rejecting Arianism in a sense that would involve giving in its adhesion to Sabellianism or Polytheism, and that his own view might possibly coexist along with the formulas of the Synod. It is true, the points of difference between him and Athanasius, and to which he also subsequently clung, did not attain recognition at the Council of Nicæa; but he had a presentiment that a path was thus struck into, which must lead away therefrom, namely, the path towards a lessening of the hypostatical distinctions. Hence the zeal with which he subsequently battled for them in opposition to Marcellus. The momentum about which he was chiefly concerned he saw defended by the Arians, though, it is true, under an exaggerated form. Herein appeared to him to lie the justification of Arianism; and therefore he was never able to take so decided a part against Arius as others, although he by no means intended to rank himself amongst his followers, least of all in a religious point of view. So much the more gratifying is it to find, that Athanasius (*de syn. Ar. et Sel. c. 41 f.*) did not confound men of Eusebius' mode of thought with Arius, as did later inquisitors, but regarded them as brethren, because they accepted the entire substance of the Nicene Creed, and did not stumble even at the term *ὁμοούσιον*, in the sense of wishing to

represent the Son as a creature. On the contrary, they derived Him from the substance of the Father and no other, and believed Him to be the true Son of the nature of the Father, who, as Logos and Wisdom, was eternally with the Father. That Eusebius, with Origen and Pamphilus, could well accept the latter determination, we have shown above. Athanasius, with the equitable judgment he pronounced on the matter, was right in taking into consideration the religious convictions which alone could have produced formulas attributing such lofty attributes to Christ. But he must be pronounced to have been in the wrong, if we regard their doctrine merely in a scientific point of view, and not in the light of the opinion and tendency they really entertained in their inmost heart. Fixing our eye solely on the former, we must allow that they were constantly liable to fall into Arianism; it was, therefore, both necessary and highly advantageous for the doctrinal progress of the Church, that Arius should make his appearance: for in him, those who had hitherto held an indeterminate position saw, embodied in a distinct and repellent form, principles which they had no intention of avowing as their own, but the possibility of which they had not consciously and thoroughly enough excluded, and were thus led to a decision.

NOTE 44, page 231.

Τὰ τε σημεῖα πάντα, ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις δείκνυσιν αὐτὸν Θεὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα· τὰ συναμφότερα τοῖνυν δείκνυνται ὅτι Θεὸς ἦν φύσει, καὶ ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος φύσει. In Galland. Bibl. Vet. PP. T. iv. 112, another passage is communicated from the Chron. Pasch., which runs as follows:—*Ὁ πάσης ὁράτου καὶ ὁρατῆς κτίσεως δημιουργὸς καὶ δεσπότης ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς καὶ λόγος, ὁ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι συναδιδος, καὶ ὁμοούσιος κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν καὶ Θεός, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, ἐπὶ τῇ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων κατὰ σάρκα τεχθεὶς ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας ἐνδόξου δεσποίνης ἡμῶν θεοτόκου καὶ ἀειπαρθένου, καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν θεοτόκου Μαρίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὄφθεις, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοουσίοις κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς συναναστραφεῖς, etc.* This passage, however, with its formulas, betrays too clearly a post-Nestorian, Eutychian period, to permit of its being taken into consideration in this connection (compare the Prolegg.

ad Biblioth. Vet. PP. T. i. cxxi.). On the other hand, we may regard as genuine the passage (Gall. l. c. p. 108), which is preserved in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus,—“Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ; by grace are we saved; it is the gift of God, etc. *Θελήματι Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ σχήματι εὐρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος· οὐ κατελείφθη τῆς θεότητος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵνα τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ ἡ δόξης—ἀποστῇ, πτωχεύσας πλούσιος ᾖν, τοῦτο ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ἵνα καὶ τὸν θάνατον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ἀναδέξηται, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων ὅπως ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι.*” In another passage, he says,—“The incarnation took place when the angel spake to the Virgin, saying, *Ὁ Θεὸς λόγος παρὰ* (notwithstanding) *τὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀπουσίαν κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πάντα δυναμένου κατεργάσασθαι Θεοῦ, γέγονεν ἐν μήτρᾳ τῆς παρθένου σὰρξ, μήτε δεηθεὶς τῆς ἀνδρὸς ἐνεργείας, ἢ παρουσίας· ἐνεργέστερον γὰρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνεποίησεν ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ δύναμις, ἐπισκιάσασα τῇ παρθένῳ σὺν τῷ ἐπεληλυθότι ἁγίῳ πνεύματι.*”—Mention may further here be made of Eustathius of Antioch (about 325). See Galland. Biblioth. Vet. PP. T. iv. 573 (from Theodor. Dial. 1). Christ’s true descent, says he, is not from Mary. *Εἰ δὲ Λόγος καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ἀνέκαθεν παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα δι’ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι φαμέν, οὐκ ἄρα γέγονεν ἐκ γυναικὸς ὁ ᾧν, καὶ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ἅπασιν αἴτιος ᾧν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὴν φύσιν Θεὸς αὐτάρκης, ἄπειρος, ἀπερινόητος· ἐκ γυναικὸς δὲ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν τῇ παρθενικῇ μήτρᾳ πνεύματι παγεὶς ἁγίῳ.* One of his favourite designations of the Logos is, *ὁ φύσει τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός.* Page 574 :—Paul does not say that we shall be formed like the Son of God, but like the image of the Son of God (Rom. viii. 29). *Ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸς τὰ θεῖα τῆς πατρῴας ἀρετῆς γνωρίσματα φέρων εἰκὼν ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅμοιοι ἐξ ὁμοίων γεννώμενοι, εἰκόνες οἱ τικτόμενοι φαίνονται τῶν γεννητόρων ἀληθεῖς.* The image of the Son is the man whom He bore. His humanity was related to the Logos as the wax to the colours, which, although very unlike it, are painted on it. His sufferings and humiliation did not pertain to the essence of the Logos, but are explicable solely from His love. By no means, therefore, *ὁ λόγος ὑπέκειτο τῷ νόμῳ καθάπερ οἱ συκοφάνται δοξάζουσι* (that is, the Arians, who derived the subjection of Christ under the law of the Old Testament from His subordinate essence), *αὐτὸς ᾧν δ*

νομος.—'Αλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὄργανον ἀναλαβὼν ἐφόρεσε, καὶ ὑπὸ νόμου ἐγένετο, κατὰ τὰς τῶν πρωτοτόκων ἀξίας καθαρισθεὶς (Luc. ii. 21 f.), οὐκ αὐτὸς δεόμενος τῆς τούτων χορηγίας ὑπέμενε τὰς θεραπείας, ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς τοῦ νόμου δουλείας ἐξαγοράσῃ τοὺς πεπραμένους τῇ δίκῃ τῆς ἀρᾶς. 'When it is said, "They crucified the Lord of glory (Acts ii. 36), but the same hath God exalted to be Lord and Christ," both the sufferings and the exaltation refer, not to the Logos, but to the man Jesus, who might well be termed Lord of glory (compare the fragment in Theodor. Dial. 3, Galland. l. c. 575, 576), ἀπαθὲς Χριστοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐ δεήσει πάθος τῷ θείῳ προσάπτειν; nor did the exaltation concern the Logos (τὸν παθόντα Ἰησοῦν κύριον ἐποίησεν, καὶ οὐ τὴν Σοφίαν οὐδὲ τὸν Λόγον τὸν ἀνέκαθεν ἔχοντα τῆς δεσποτείας τὸ κράτος). If there was any defect, any weakness (ἀσθένεια) in Him, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα προσαρτῆν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι φαίη τις ἂν, οὔτι γε δὴ τῷ πληρώματι τῆς θεότητος, ἢ τῷ ἀξιώματι τῆς ἀνωτάτω Σοφίας, ἢ τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων κατὰ Παῦλον γραφομένῳ Θεῷ. The sun, a visible body, does not suffer, although it is compelled to witness so much that passes on earth; nor does it go out of its path. Shall we then believe, τὴν ἀσώματον Σοφίαν χραίνεσθαι, καὶ μεταλλάττειν τὴν φύσιν, εἰ ὁ ναὸς αὐτῆς σταυρῷ προσηλούται, ἢ λύσιν ὑπομένει—ἢ διαφθορὰν ὑποδέχεται; ἀλλὰ πάσχει μὲν ὁ νεὼς, ἢ δὲ ἀκηλίδωτος οὐσία παντάπασιν ἄχραντος τὴν ἀξίαν καθέστηκεν.

Hierakas also, who was the most influential and learned ascetic of Egypt about the year 300, belongs to this connection. Much as Epiphanius finds to blame in him (Hær. 67), he praises him for not coinciding with Origen in the doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; and for really believing that the Son was begotten of the Father. Arius was the first—and not without a certain sort of astuteness—to charge him with heresy in the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity. To him we owe a more precise account of the mode in which he conceived the Son to be related to the Father (Epiph. hær. 69, 7). He was as a lamp kindled at another; or, God is as a torch which is divided into two (ὡς λύχνον ἀπὸ λύχνου, ἢ ὡς λαμπάδα εἰς δύο; compare Athanas. de syn. c. 16). We have here the same diremption of God into Father and Son as in the case of Zeno; the same fault which Arius finds in Sabellius (see above).

Hierakas held the Spirit to be as nearly like as possible to the Son, but at the same time subordinated the former to the latter.

NOTE 45, page 232.

This is implied also by the oldest document we have of Arius, to wit, his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, written prior to his stay with him, during which he appears to have written his *Thalia*. Alexander has driven us away, says he, because we do not agree with him in the doctrine which he publicly teaches :—"Always was God, always the Son ; at the same time is the Father, at the same time the Son ; the Son exists at one and the same time with the unbegotten God, for He is ever begotten, unbegotten begotten, ἀγέννητογεννητός (this is naturally one of the specious conclusions drawn by Arius) ; in no respect is God before the Son, for the Son is derived from God Himself." And then, after appealing to Eusebius of Cæsarea, Theodosius, Paulinus, Athanasius in Nazarbe, Gregorius and Aetius, and in general to the teachers of the Oriental Church, who all, with the exception of Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius (in Jerusalem), say, that God ἀνάρχως precedes the Son ; whilst the three exceptions term the Son an ἐρηνγή, προβολή ἀγέννητος, he proceeds to give his own doctrine.

NOTE 46, page 233.

Compare Arius' "Ep. ad Alex." in Epiph. and Athan. l. c. In this latter he gives the following further remarkable testimony to Alexander :—"That he had frequently, in the Church and in assemblies, refuted those who taught such doctrines. Preceding are the words,—“To be rejected is τὸν ὄντα πρότερον, ὕστερον γεννηθέντα ἢ ἐπικτισθέντα εἰς υἱὸν ;” that testimony, therefore, refers perhaps merely to the fact that Alexander had frequently controverted those who supposed that the Son had being prior to His generation or to His suppletory creation. What else can this refer to, than to the circumstance that Alexander rejected also the view entertained by many older writers, who conceived indeed that the Son had a certain potential and eternal being in the Father, but still represented Him as first proceeding forth from God for the creation of the world ? Without doubt, therefore, Alexander was unwilling to separate the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son from His deity, which

existed eternally in the Father; and, on the contrary, endeavoured so to conjoin the eternal divine essence of the Son with His hypostasis, that the latter should be coeternal with the former. But when Arius denied that theory of Tertullian's, he did it with a different purpose from Alexander. The latter aimed at doing away with the interweaving of the Son with the world, and the subordination essentially therein involved; he therefore removed the *γέννησις* of the Son into eternity, substituting, in the place of "potentia" and "actus," either the eternal "actus," or, at all events, the idea that the one is eternally contained in the other. Arius, on the contrary, in denying the eternal "potentia" of the Son in God, aimed at doing away with the last trace of His eternity. He was to have no essential root in God.

NOTE 47, page 239.

Or. 1, 6 :—*Ἐθῆκεν ἐν τῇ θαλείᾳ, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῷ νύφῳ ὁ πατὴρ ἀόρατος ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε γινώσκειν τελείως καὶ ἀκριβῶς δύναται ὁ λόγος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ γινώσκει καὶ ὁ βλέπει, ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίῳις μέτροις οἷδε καὶ βλέπει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς γινώσκομεν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ υἱός, φησιν, οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀκριβῶς οὐ γινώσκει· λείπει γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ καταλαβεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδε καὶ ὅτι μεμερισμένοι τῇ φύσει, καὶ ἀπεξενωμένοι, καὶ ἀπесχοινισμένοι, καὶ ἀλλότριοι καὶ ἀμέτοχοι εἰσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐφθέγγετο, ἀνόμοιοι πάνπαν ἀλλήλων ταῖς τὲ οὐσίαις καὶ δόξαις εἰσιν ἐπ' ἄπειρον.* The axiom thereby is always,—that everything which is not God, is essentially foreign and unlike to God (*κατ' οὐσίαν ξένον*). If the entire world is so essentially foreign to God, the Son also must be so (*κατὰ πάντα ἀνόμοιος τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ιδιότητος*); and must be classed with things that have been brought into existence, with creatures (*ἴδιος εἶναι*), of which he is one. De Syn. 15 :—"That which has a beginning, is plainly unable either to embrace or to know Him, who is without beginning (*ἐμπερινοῆσαι ἢ ἐμπεριδράξασθαι*)."

NOTE 48, page 247.

The Nicene Creed runs in the revised form, given by Hahn (l. c. 105–107), as follows :—*Πιστευόμεν εἰς ἓνα Θεὸν πατέρα*

παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητὴν. Καὶ εἰς ἓνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τοιόστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ὅτι ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, ἢ κτιστὸν, τρεπτόν, ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία. The two main positions of Arius—of which the drift of the one was the temporal origin of the Son; of the other, His creation out of nothing—were excluded by the double affirmative significance of the term *ὁμοούσιον*, whose two meanings, however, probably found their unity in the fact that both Father and Son are equally truly the essential *being*; for which reason, they must both be coexistent or coeternal, and of like substance. Compare, on the double force of *ὁμοούσιος*, Athan. de Syn. 41, 48, 52.

NOTE 49, page 253.

C. 9:—Συνιδὼν γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἄλλως οὐκ ἂν λυθείη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φθορὰ, εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ πάντως ἀποθανεῖν, ἀθάνατον ὄντα, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς υἱόν, τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δυνάμενον ἀποθανεῖν ἑαυτῷ λαμβάνει σῶμα, ἵνα τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων λόγου μεταλάβον ἀντὶ πάντων ἱκανὸν γένηται τῷ θανάτῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸν ἐνοικήσαντα λόγον ἄφθαρτον διαμείνῃ, καὶ λοιπὸν ἀπὸ πάντων ἡ φθορὰ παύσῃται τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι. "Ὅθεν ὡς ἱερεῖον καὶ θύμα παντὸς ἐλεύθερον σπίλου, ὃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἔλαβε σῶμα προσάγων εἰς θάνατον, ἀπὸ πάντων εὐθὺς τῶν ὁμοίων ἠφάνιζε τὸν θάνατον τῇ προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου. Ἐπεὶ πάντας γὰρ ὧν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰκότως τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων, ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ· καὶ οὕτως συνὼν διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁ ἄφθαρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός, εἰκότως τοὺς πάντας ἐνέδυσεν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐπαγγελίᾳ. C. 22:—Τὸν θάνατον εἰς ἀναίρεσιν περιέμεινε, καὶ τὸν διδόμενον θάνατον ὑπὲρ τῆς πάντων

σωτηρίας ἔσπευδε τελειῶσαι. Οὐ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θάνατον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἦλθε τελειῶσαι ὁ σωτὴρ· ὅθεν οὐκ ἰδίῳ θανάτῳ οὐκ εἶχε γὰρ, ζωὴν ὧν ἀπετίθετο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐδέχετο, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι προσελθόντα τέλειον ἐξαφανίσῃ. Compare 21, 37. Similarly also c. 20 :—The main cause of His appearance was the common guilt of humanity, which demanded payment. Wherefore ὑπὲρ πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀνέφερεν ἀντὶ πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδούς, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν πάντας ἀνυπευθύνους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τῆς ἀρχαίας παραβάσεως ποιήσῃ· δεῖξῃ δὲ ἑαυτὸν καὶ θανάτου κρείττονα, ἀπαρχὴν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀναστάσεως τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἀφθαρτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος. And afterwards, *ibid.* :—Through the union with the Logos (τῇ ἐπιβάσει τοῦ λόγου εἰς αὐτὸ) two wonderful things met in the same being; ὅτι τε ὁ πάντων θάνατος ἐν τῷ κυριακῷ σώματι ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἡ φθορὰ διὰ τὸν συνόντα λόγον ἐξηφανίζετο.

NOTE 50, page 270.

It is interesting to see how, under the hands of these Arians, who fought in so abstract a manner for the infinitude, the absoluteness of God, God was reduced to an individual shut up in Himself, that is, substantially to a single finite being. In this is rooted the, not "bold," but cool (*nicht kühne, aber kühle*) and irreligious assertion of Eunomius, that he knew God even as God knew Himself. If the divine essence is nothing more than the abstractly simple independence of the primitive, fixed, ungenerated Monad; and if, by applying this meagre category to the idea of God, all higher categories are anticipatorily excluded, it is a small or even a trivial thing thoroughly to know such a God. And the teachers of the Church had a thorough right to maintain, in opposition to him, the incomprehensibility of God. In addition to this, Baur ought, for the sake of historical completeness, to have added, that they defended the cognizableness of God in the Son, in opposition to Arius :—it is clear, therefore, that they aimed at taking a middle course between the timidity of the one and the defiance of the other class of heretics; both which lead to the same result, to wit, to the denial to man of any actual knowledge of God.—Still more mistaken is it to reduce the teachers of the Church back to Platonism, the Arians to the philosophy of

Aristotle; for, amongst the teachers of the Church also, were some who had received an Aristotelian training. The questions considered were, on the contrary, new; and neither Eunomius' doctrine of the creation, nor that of the Son, nor that of God, can be said to be Aristotelian. And these are the doctrines in question. These unspeculative men, who employed the simple dialectic of the understanding, were entirely destitute of the Aristotelian *πρώτον κινουόν*, which moves itself. Their conception of God was that of the abstractly simple *Ὀν*, which we find in Neo-Platonism; the Church, on the contrary, which demands that room be left for motion and distinctions, opposed that conception, and ever more completely freed itself from its influence. But at this *Ὀν* an empty abstract idea of God arrives in every age; and in the "être supreme" of the last century no one will fail to discern the same fundamental thought. Although, therefore, I grant that the Arians were trained in the Aristotelian dialectic, and, on the ground of the empirical feature common to both, recognise a relationship between them; I consider it rather adapted to promote confusion than an understanding of the matter, more to resemble play than sober inquiry, to seek, as Baur does, to class the Arians and their opponents in the Church as Aristotelians and Platonists.

NOTE 51, page 270.

Catech. 11, 12. His designating the Logos eternal High Priest, the Father the *ἀρχή* of the entire deity, which is the head also of the Logos, and his esteeming the unity of God to be preserved by the Father, from whom alone divinity proceeds, are slight further traces of his Semi-Arianism. On the other hand, he confesses that the Son was Son of God, not by adoption, but by nature,—the only-begotten One, because He has no brother, no one equal to Himself. For, on the contrary, all others become sons through Him, by means of adoption. "He did not rise from the condition of a servant to sonship; but was brought forth by an unsearchable act of generation; He was not first another, who then became other than He had been." On the question of the mode of this generation he lays down merely negative determinations: *that* it took place and *is* to be believed, he will endeavour to show, not *how*. It is interesting to observe, in his case, how Semi-Arianism was led

on to the recognition of the coeternality of the Son with the Father, by following out the idea—In the production of the Son, who was not out of nothing, but out of His essence, God is not to be supposed subjected to the limits of time. If time is absolutely to be denied of the Father, and the Son be of the essence of the Father, no interval can be conceived to have existed between the being of the Father and that of the Son, but the latter must proceed eternally forth from the essence of God. From which it follows, strictly speaking, that this generation cannot have been the work of one moment, which never happened again, but must be eternally going on, even as light constantly proceeds from light. Athanasius gives distinct expression thereto; Cyrill also approximates to this idea of Origen, when he asserts that the words, “This day have I begotten thee,” must be understood of the eternal to-day. At the same time, we find also expressions of an opposite tendency; for example, when he says, “Far more rapidly than we produce words and thoughts, did He generate the Son.” In this case, the generation is again represented as a single act. He describes the act of generation more precisely as follows:—“The Father did not generate the Son, as a master begets his pupil by his teachings, or as we Christians are made His children by enlightenment. Nor, again, as the spirit of man begets words; for, whereas sounds are scattered, Christ is a consistent and living word; not spoken by the lips and then again dissolved, but continually born of the Father in an unutterable manner and with an independent being. Whilst generating, the Father is neither unconscious, nor does He proceed by choice and reflection; for to say that He does not know and love Him whom He begets, would be godless; and no less godless, to represent Him as first considering a long time and then generating, seeing that He never was without Son. We have not two unbegotten beings, nor again two only-begotten ones; but one is the unbegotten Father, who has no Father; the other is the eternal Son, born of the Father. The Begetter neither robs Himself, nor converts Himself into the Begotten; and the Begotten lacks nothing. Not the Father became man, nor did He suffer for us; but the Son, whom the Father sent to suffer for us. Let us then neither estrange Father and Son from each other, nor combine the two to a Sonfatherhood (*Sohnvaterschaft*); let us rather walk in the

royal road, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left. We will not call the Son Father, in order thus to honour Him the more; nor, with the notion of doing honour to the Father, will we regard the Son as a creature; but let the one Father be worshipped through the one Son, and the worship not be divided." This, therefore, is all that he demands,—that the unity be not reduced to uniformity, and the distinction be not converted into separation; for the rest, he refrains from more precise determinations, and declares, if not a progressive knowledge of, yet a full and satisfactory insight into, the nature of this generation, to be impossible. (Catech. 11.)

This eternal Word now, begotten before all *Æons* without mother, took upon Himself in these last days a body from the Virgin, without father. To worship a mere man would be idolatry; but quite as perverse would it be to designate Christ simply God. If Christ, who is God, did not assume humanity, we are far from redemption. The causes of the incarnation were the following:—Man was the noblest creature, having been made, not by the mere command, but by the hands of God. In six days was the world created—the world for the sake of man, who is in the image and likeness of God. But, moved by envy, the devil cast this noblest of all creatures out of paradise; the human race became constantly more wicked. Deep were the wounds of humanity; from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, there was no soundness in it; its wounds were not attended to; they were not anointed nor dressed. Then God, hearkening unto the prayer of the prophets, sent His Son, the Lord and Physician, from heaven. To every one of My warriors, saith He, I will give the royal seal which I won by My wrestlings on the cross, that he may bear it on his forehead. Where sin abounded, there did grace much more abound. Our Lord must needs suffer, but without the devil recognising Him; for had he recognised Him, he would not have approached Him. His body thus became a bait of death; so that when the dragon expected to swallow up it, he was rather compelled to give up those whom he had swallowed. Again, men had heathenishly worshipped God in human forms; God now became truly a man, in order that the imagination (the self-made service of God) might cease. It was further necessary for Him to be with us, to become like us, in order

that we might be able to lay hold on, to enjoy, to trust Him. Daniel could not be quickened till a human hand touched him : so did it behove the Physician to be present, the Lord to eat with us as He ate with Abraham ; for we could not have borne His naked deity (Cat. 12).

NOTE 52, page 271.

Compare Klose's "Geschichte und Lehre des Marcellus und Photinus," Hamburg 1837. The fragments of Marcellus are collected in the Marcelliana, etc. of Rettberg, Göttingen 1794. Compare Epiphan. hæ. 72 ; Theodor. hæ. fab. 2, 10 ; Basilii M. Ep. 52 (Ed. Paris 1638, T. iii. 80) ; Hilarius, fragm. 1-3. Above all, Eusebius' "Libri duo adv. Marc.," of which the "Libri tres de ecclesiast. theol." are a continuation, belong to this connection. The Eastern Church held him for heterodox, especially since the appearance of Photius ; even Athanasius denied him fellowship. See Klose l. c. pp. 17 ff. Hilarius and Epiphanius hesitate, but still incline to condemn him. The charge of Samosaténism brought by Arians and semi-Arians was unjust, as fairer thinkers have allowed. After his resignation at Constantinople, in the year 336, he betook himself with a Confession of Faith to Julius in Rome : it was so framed that Marcellus could continue to hold his own view, and yet deceive others. He does not say that he believes in the eternal *Son*, but refers the being always with God to the *Logos*. At the close, he speaks of the eternal duration of the kingdom, but in such a manner that the words may be referred to the Father or the Son ; indeed, the Father is mentioned immediately before these words. The Confession of Faith is given by Epiphanius.

NOTE 53, page 286.

His doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have differed from that of Marcellus ; indeed, there was no reason why it should. The Dyad, with which Marcellus really contented himself, between the silent and speaking God, he did not need to let drop. For the Holy Spirit he might have found a similar place to that assigned Him by Marcellus, who designates Him a secondary expansion (Theodor. Hæ. fab. 2, 10, *παρέκτασις τῆς ἐκτάσεως*, a branch) of that expansion which was contained in the Son. Only the latter, Photinus was compelled

to describe rather as an influence on, than a dwelling in, Christ. As to the mode in which Photinus passes over to the humanity of Christ, from a passage in Epiph. hæc. 71, we might surmise that he represented it as being brought to pass by means of a conversion of God into man (compare Hilarius, de syn. 38, xi.). This information, which is indirectly sustained by the circumstance, that he is so frequently styled a Sabellian, might in itself, according to what has been set forth above, be correct, and would only presuppose that Photinus, with the view, on the one hand, of instating the humanity of Christ in its rights (which he declares to have been his intention), and, on the other hand (in agreement with the influence still exerted on him by Marcellus), of drawing in the divine *δύναμις*, represented this *δύναμις* as converting itself, that is, as reducing itself to the potency which became the man Jesus. By his virtue, this man raised himself up to deity; and thus the deity, or divine power, which had lowered itself to a potency in the complete humanity of Christ, attained again to its original actuality. But although Photinus was by no means alone in entertaining such a theory, it is scarcely reconcilable therewith, that others should speak of him as rejecting all conversion and change on the part of God. Compare especially Vigil. Taps. Dial. adv. Arianos, Sabell. et Photin. 1, 4;—"Ceterum Deus inviolabilis et immensus non ex se alium genuit, nec ipse unquam genitus fuit ut merito de se filium habere aut ipse sibi filius esse credatur. (He rather designated the one God *λογοπάτωρ* in imitation of the Sabellian *ὑιοπάτωρ*, avoiding, however, the hypostasis which might lie in the word Son.) Sed est unicus et singularis nec generando passioni obnoxius, nec se ipsum protendendo cumulatus, nec suam in virgine portionem derivando divisioni subjectus." Independently of this passage in Vigilius, his opposition to Sabellius, against whom he advances it as a reproach, that he represents the essence of God as expanding itself, is scarcely reconcilable with a conversion or division of God. With Marcellus, he restricts this expansion to the divine activity. Opposed thereto is also the assumption of a true birth from Mary, and of the eternal duration of the humanity. For this reason I coincide with Klose, who characterizes the above statement of Epiphanius as erroneous (p. 79). Epiphanius was, perhaps, led astray by Anathemat.

xi. of the Synod of Sirmium (of the year 351, in Hilar. de syn. l. c.), which he may have referred to Photinus, as others did whereas, according to Klose's probable view, it may have been a justification, as far as Photinus was concerned.—This Synod anathematized also both the application of the idea of the *λόγος προφορικὸς* and *ἐνδιαθετὸς* to the Son, and the doctrine of a "dilatatio" and "contractio" of God.

NOTE 54, page 330.

Baur indeed assigns them an entirely different task from that to which they actually did, and were compelled, to devote themselves. In his opinion, they ought to have described the world as the Son of God; and finding that, instead of doing so, they repudiated the notion as heathenish, he has no alternative, but to look upon the second and third centuries as further advanced than the fourth. For the former had not yet attained a clear perception of the distinction between God and the world; in the Son, many regarded the world as still *immediately* or physically one with God. And the heathen philosopher Celsus had formed a still more complete conception of *this* unity of God and the world already, in the second century. Now, as the aim of the Church, during the history of its doctrine of the Trinity, was to overcome both the Jewish and heathenish conception of God, and above all, to render it complete in itself, and then to derive the world (because it is not to be reckoned to the essence of God in Himself) from the *will* of the essentially perfect God; the entire doctrine, in its further phases, is for Dr Baur one mass of confusion. The Nicene Council having excluded the Hellenic conception of God, the Church from this time onwards is, in his view, on a false track. A few heretics alone can be said to have seen the truth from afar, and some of the teachers of the Church to have given utterance, at all events in the form of suggestive questions, to sentiments more desirable to hear. That a historian thus at the very outset takes up a polemical position towards the central-point of the efforts of the teachers of the Church, scarcely needs mentioning; we can well understand also, that such a position must bring with it a perennial feeling of discontent with the entire work of the teachers of the Church (that is, in reality with the entire course of the history of the doctrine), which is not likely to

further the true understanding of the matter. Our great aim ought to be, to penetrate to the very centre of the efforts of the Church Fathers, and thus historically to comprehend why the heathenish conception of God neither did nor could satisfy them; further, to consider the endless contradictions which marked the conception of God laid down by heathenish philosophers; and therefore, not to cease criticism here, but to do honour to that criticism which was pronounced in so grand a manner by history. If, on the contrary, we treat that heathenish idea of God, without further inquiry, without even giving it an essentially new turn, as the self-evidently true one, we take up a point of view which, though clearly too self-contradictory to allow of our feeling contented with it, leads to our examining the history of the doctrine of the Trinity in the light of principles foreign to itself. The natural consequence whereof is, that our criticism of the individual phænomena of the History of Dogmas, instead of coinciding, as it should, with the criticism pronounced by the history itself, and with the positive advances made by the dogma, is in conflict with the judgment of history at all the points at which the Church gives judgment, and therefore remains alien from the heart of the matter itself. Regarding the subject from the centre of the movement, the sole strength of that method of procedure appears to consist in looking at things separately which are really connected with each other, and in then taking advantage of the isolation to strike each down in succession. A notable illustration thereof is furnished by Dr Baur, l. c. pp. 443-470, where, by bringing to view now solely this, and then solely that aspect, he makes Basilus, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, first Tritheites, then Monarchians or Sabellians, and finally appears to rest in the conclusion that they were Subordinatianists. We have already referred to the charge of Subordinatianism (p. 326). As to the two other charges, one would suppose that, at all events, if the first were brought against these men, they would escape the second and opposite one, especially, when we find Dr Baur himself, in several passages; expressing his respect for the greatness of their mind. In the case of heretics, he frequently succeeds in happily pointing out a connection between things apparently contradictory: we are therefore justified in asking,—firstly, whether the position taken up beforehand towards the

doctrinal development of the Church, or the nature of that development itself, furnishes an explanation of the constant charge of inconsistency? and secondly, why, in the case of the teachers of the Church, no attempt whatever is made to reconcile apparently contradictory elements, to distinguish the fixed goal and the immoveable kernel of their doctrine, from its moveable and, in part, still fluctuating elements, and thus to view their efforts in their very centre and motive principle? In the main, then, it is not at all the fault of these men, if they appear to be Tritheites and Sabellians at one and the same time; especially as it is only through making an inadmissible use of passages which speak of the difference of the hypostases, and of the divine unity, that Dr Baur has succeeded in setting them forth in the light in which they appear. If we allow ourselves to translate the important term *ιδιότης* (distinctive characteristic), as applied to the hypostases, by "quality" or attribute," whereas these men call the divine attributes *ποιότητες*, and unweariedly repeat that all the *ποιότητες* belong to each of the hypostases—not, however, the *ιδιότης*; it cannot be difficult to show them to be Sabellians. And so, if from the simile of the rainbow employed by Basilus (see Baur l. c. p. 469), we draw the conclusion, that as the one light appears in the rainbow in different colours, even so God "appears" differently in the three persons; whilst at the same time there is nothing to prevent us supposing that Basilus regarded the different colours of the rainbow as objectively different modes of existence of the one light; forgetting, at the same time, that Gregory of Nyssa also uses the simile, and further, how strongly, for example, Basilus (Ep. 52) requires not merely that the sword be drawn against Arians, but also that Sabellians be formally rejected. Precisely the same course must be adopted by Dr Baur in order to make them out Tritheites; both in regard to the image of the three suns, and the comparison with the plurality in the one humanity. For in this case also, all that is needed is to stretch the simile far enough, and to take little notice enough of the annexed limitation of the resemblance,—indeed, in general, of that of which the simile is meant to be a simile; by such means, Tritheism may without difficulty be deduced therefrom,—only that it does not harmonize with that which all these teachers of the Church intended, not figuratively, but logically, to convey when

they employed the term *ιδιότης*. Of Gregory of Nyssa's use of the last-mentioned comparison, we have already spoken (pp. 313 ff.). If we take the various utterances of Gregory Nazianzen together, not even in his case can we finally deduce Tritheism from his employment of the image of the three suns. For the meaning of his words is not, that the three hypostases are three suns, existing in independence of, and isolation from, each other: on the contrary, the very discourse in which he employs this simile contains a protest against Tritheism (or. 31, 14; *περὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου*, ed. Bas. p. 222). The stress is not to be laid on the isolation; for immediately before, he says,—“What have we to do with Tritheism or Ditheism? We have one God, for we have one divinity; and that which proceeds therefrom has its relation to the unity (*πρὸς ἐν τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ τρία πιστεύηται*). For the one is not less God, and the other not more; neither is prior to, or later than, the other; they are not split up in relation to the will, not divided in power; nor do we find here any of the characteristics which pertain to divided things (*οὐδέτι τῶν ὅσα τοῖς μεριστοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ ταῦθα λαβεῖν ἔστιν*); but, in one word, the deity is undivided, in those which are distinct from each other (*ἀμέριστος ἐν τοῖς μεμερισμένοις ἢ θεότης*):”—after which follow the words, *οἷον ἐν ἡλίοις τρισὶν ἐχομένοις ἀλλήλων μία τοῦ φωτὸς σύγκρασις*. This image, therefore, as he himself says, was not intended to denote a division of the one deity: but his meaning was,—One light is in the three suns (the *θεότης*); and besides, the three are most intimately united with each other, for they adhere to, or rather, according to what has preceded, depend on each other, and dart their rays into each other. The import of the image then is as follows,—The three are different points of unity, different centres for all that which pertains to the divine essence in general, that is, for the divine attributes; the divine essence, however, although present in each of the hypostases in a different manner, is entirely and undividedly present in each: so that, considered in their connection, the words denote precisely the same thing as the usual comparison,—the Son is the Father's perfect image, or stands over against Him as a living mirror. That this is the right view to take of the matter, is put beyond all doubt by the following chapter (c. 15). He represents some one as objecting, Have not the heathen also, at all events the more intelligent,

one deity and yet many gods, even as there is one humanity and yet many men?—in other words, the unity and sameness of the essence, of the *θεότης*, does not preserve you Christians from Polytheism. He answers,—*Ἐκεῖ μὲν ἡ κοινότης τὸ ἐν ἔχει μόνον ἐπινοῶν θεωρητόν τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον πλείστον ἀλλήλων καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει μεμερισμένα. Ἡμεῖς τε γὰρ οὐ σύνθετοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντίθετοι καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ καθαρᾷ μένοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ,—ἀλλὰ καὶ σώμασι καὶ ψυχαῖς ἀεὶ ρέοντάς τε καὶ μεταπίπτοντες.* And the like remark may be made concerning the heathenish gods: they are in conflict with each other and with the first causes. But not so we. Each of the hypostases has unity (*τὸ ἐν ἔχει*), no less when we look to that which is together with it (*τὸ συγκείμενον*, namely, the other hypostases), than when we have regard to itself: and that, indeed, through the identity of essence and power (c. 16). We must further consider what he says regarding the use of comparisons in general (for example, c. 11). When, on the contrary, Athanasius (or. c. Ar. 3, 15) says,—We have not used the image of three suns, but that of the sun, its brightness and so forth; he rejects, not that which Gregory meant to teach in using the image, but merely one explanation thereof, namely, that which represents it as denoting the isolation of the three,—an explanation which Gregory would have repudiated, seeing that he intended in the passage to speak of unity (compare c. Ar. 3, 4); precisely as the same Gregory repudiates the similes of the sun, of the ray and the light, of the primal source, of the bubbling fountain, of the flowing stream, not absolutely, but merely so far as they could be used to obliterate the hypostatical distinction. On this ground, he elsewhere unhesitatingly avails himself of these images; finding them sufficient, indeed, to mark the unity of essence, but not sufficient to define the *ιδιότητες* of the different hypostases. Gass also has justly directed attention to the fact, that the two Gregories (Naz. or. 35; Nyss. c. Eun. 2, 6; compare T. iii. p. 22; like Athanasius T. i. 530, ii. 5), understand by “God,” not merely the essence common to the hypostases, but also the “collective divine image” (the *ἄνθος* of the essence), which embraces essence and hypostasis, in a word, the Trinitarian God. They best succeeded in doing this in relation to the divine activity; which they persistently regard as a one,

undivided, collective activity of *God*. God, therefore, is in their view an acting personality; though, leaving Athanasius out of sight (see above, pp. 301 f.), they do not enter on the questions, whether this one personality is constituted by the hypostases; and whether the divine Ego has its seat in the essence, apart from the hypostases, or in the essence, so far as it unfolds itself into hypostases. To such questions as,—Is the common *essence*, the basis of the hypostases, self-conscious spirit or Ego? or, does each of the hypostases form a distinct Ego? or finally, whether the absolute self-consciousness of the deity results eternally from its hypostases, being as it were the collective consciousness of the distinctions?—these Fathers would supply us with no answers. Indeed, we have frequently had occasion to remark that the idea of the “Ego” belongs rather to modern times, and that *ὑπόστασις*, or even *πρόσωπον* is by no means to be identified with our conception of personality. The utmost that can be done, is to divine from the principles laid down by these Fathers what side they would have taken had such questions come within their range of vision. We unhesitatingly aver our conviction, that Athanasius and Hilarius would have decided for the last-mentioned view; for they were furthest of all from regarding the hypostases as *συμβεβηκότα*; indeed, on the contrary, they incorporated them, as mediatory causes of the divine self-consciousness, that is, as essential, with the idea of God. Basilus the Great, however, and Gregory of Nyssa, would probably have maintained that the one, common, divine essence knows itself in a different manner in the three hypostases, and would therefore have taken the first-mentioned view of the matter, though without intending to adopt Sabellianism. Whilst, finally, Gregory Nazianzen, without any thought of being a Tritheite, would probably, with greater determinateness than the rest, have ascribed a distinct and independent existence to the hypostases. Compare Or. 31, 31–33.

NOTE 55, page 343.

Baur (pp. 573 f.) misunderstands the doctrine of Athanasius, —“that the Logos, in the very act of being born as a man, *ἐθεοποίησε* the humanity, in the first instance naturally His own,” —so far as he affirms that the Logos did not really become man, but that man was at once “deified and raised above his natural

attributes." Of such an elevation of man there is not a trace in the works of Athanasius, but the contrary (for example, c. Arian. 3, 37 f. 42-48). The deification may, however, be a growing one; and, indeed, was so in the view of Athanasius; for he believed that the human nature of Christ attained perfection with the resurrection and ascension. Nowhere does he say that the body of Christ did not in itself, and by its nature, suffer hunger, but merely that the Logos did not; in that He subjected Himself to the body and the laws of finitude merely out of substitutionary love. Baur has neglected to take into consideration that passages of this nature were directed against Arianism, which attributed to the Logos immediately and physically, what Athanasius attributed to Him merely ethically and through the medium of the humanity, which love had moved Him to constitute His own. Compare, for example, ad Serap. 4, 14.

NOTE 56, page 343.

Psalms xv. p. 1024:—Τὸ κοινὸν ὡς περ πρόσωπον τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς πρὸς Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα ποιεῖται λόγους; οὐκ ὑπὲρ γε μᾶλλον ἑαυτοῦ, δι' ἡμᾶς δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὡς εἰς ἐξ ἡμῶν διὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν—ἡ διὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν,—ἡ σὰρξ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐκκλησία. Many other passages of this kind may be found in other works of Athanasius; for example, in the Epistle to Epictetus, in the two books against Apollinaris. Compare the "de Incarn. c. Ar." c. 20. On the words, "When we shall be subjected" (1 Cor. xv. 28), he remarks,—“When we are found as His members, and have become sons of God to Him. Ὑμεῖς γάρ, φησιν, εἰς ἔστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Τότε δὲ αὐτὸς ὑποταγήσεται ἀνθ' ἡμῶν τῷ πατρὶ, ὡς κεφαλὴ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων μελῶν. Τῶν γὰρ μελῶν αὐτοῦ μηδέπω ὑποταγέντων πάντων, αὐτὸς, ἡ κεφαλὴ αὐτῶν, οὕτω ὑποτέτακται τῷ πατρὶ, ἀναμένων τὰ ἴδια μέλη. (Here, therefore, he represents Him as identifying Himself with those who do not yet believe, but are first to become believers; compare c. Ar. 2, 80.) Ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑποτασσόμενοι τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ βασιλεύοντες, ὥς ἂν τεθῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας ἡμῶν. Compare c. Ar. 1, 43:—Διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ συγγένειαν ναὸς Θεοῦ γεγονάμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ λοιποὶν τεποιήμεθα, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἤδη προσκυνεῖσθαι τὸν κύριον.

3, 38; on baptism, which he views in accordance with this idea, see c. Ar. Or. 1, 48; compare 3, 22 :—*Ἐρωτῶ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ γένωνται ἐν κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελείωσιν, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ γένωνται τέλειοι, ἔχοντες πρὸς τοῦτο τὴν ἐνότητα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἐν γενόμενοι ἵνα ὡς ἂν πάντες φορεθέντες παρ' ἐμοῦ πάντες ὦσιν ἐν σῶμα καὶ ἐν πνεῦμα, καὶ εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον καταστήσωσιν.*

NOTE 57, page 345.

The passage concerning His ignorance of the day of judgment he refers, with Athanasius (c. Ar. 3, 37 f. 42–48), to the human nature of Christ; it, therefore, he held to be actually ignorant in some respects (Or. 30, 15). It is not said, “The Son of God knew it not,” but “the Son,” which in this case is equivalent to the Son of man. Athanasius says,—*ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὡς τὸ πεινᾶν.* Nor does he afterwards recede from this position, as Baur’s account makes it to appear (pp. 576 f.), but abides by the principle,—“As man He was able to say, I know it not; for as man He did not know it, although the Word knew it.” It is a misrepresentation of the opinion of Athanasius, when Baur argues as follows,—According to Athanasius, Christ had merely a body, not a human soul; for him, therefore, there was no other subject to which knowledge or ignorance could be attributed save the Logos; but if the Logos was the speaker, the subject, His attribution of ignorance to Himself must necessarily appear to Athanasius as a false accommodation.—Baur has overlooked, that though Athanasius, prior to the appearance of Apollinaris, never gave special prominence to the human soul of Christ, he never denied it. On the contrary, the entire view he took of the incarnation and redemption as something affecting the totality of man, rests on the presupposition that Christ had a human soul. This presupposition shows itself still more clearly in passages like the present, which without it would be destitute of meaning. For, that ignorance cannot be ascribed to the body, Athanasius was surely well aware; and in this passage he uses the term *ἄνθρωπος* as a substitute for *σὰρξ*. For the rest, we find similar things elsewhere also during the period before Apollinaris; for example, he frequently says, the Logos assumed a man (c. Ar. 4, 35), the anointed element in Christ was the man out of Mary;

He is visible and invisible at the same time, the former διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ὁρώμενον ἄνθρωπον ἔνωσιν, ὁρώμενος δὲ φημι, οὐ τῇ ἀοράτῃ θεότητι, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῆς θεότητος ἐνεργείᾳ, διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ὃν ἀνεκαίνισε τῇ οἰκειώσει τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (c. 36). But Athanasius speaks also in the same manner of προκοπῇ in Christ, and defines it, c. Ar. 3, 51–53, as ἡ παρὰ τῆς σοφίας μεταδιδόμενη θεοποίησις καὶ χάρις. —Τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προέκοπτεν, ὑπερβαῖνον κατ' ὀλίγον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, καὶ θεοποιούμενον—καὶ ὄργανον—πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἐκλαμψιν αὐτῆς γινόμενον καὶ φαινόμενον πᾶσι. When he further, c. Ar. 3, 34, speaks of the λογωθῆναι of the σὰρξ in Christ, it is evident he cannot have meant, that the body of Christ was endowed with wisdom and divine reason, but the humanity. On the words of John xii. 27, “Now is My soul troubled,” he remarks, not, with the Arians, that they relate to the Logos, but they were spoken, ὅτε ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (compare c. Ar. Or. 3, 54, 55, 57). Another thing is the question, whether Athanasius succeeds in combining a non-knowing humanity and an all-knowing deity into a personal unity; to this point Baur might with much greater justice have directed his attack. Yet more on this subject below.

NOTE 58, page 346.

Compare Or. Catech. M. c. 16, 32, 33 ff., 37; T. 3, 72, 92, 95 ff., 102; c. Eunom. L. 2, T. 2, 464. His treatise on 1 Cor. xv. 28, T. 2, 12–16,—ἐκ πάσης δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, ἥ κατεμίχθη τὸ θεῖον, οἷον ἀπαρχή τις τοῦ κοινου φύραματος ὁ κατὰ Χριστὸν ἄνθρωπος ὑπέστη, that is, from humanity as a common mass, the “primitiæ” are united in Christ with the divine; hence through Him all that was human grew into connection with the divine (δι' οὗ προσεφύη τῇ θεότητι πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον). All good things are now gained, ὥστε διὰ πάντων τὴν θείαν ζωὴν διεξελοῦσαν, ἐξαφανίσαι καθόλου ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τὸν θάνατον. (The divine life proceeding from Him, and pervading all, drives death totally out of the world.) That which took place in the first fruits, must take place also in the whole mass of humanity. Τότε ὅλον τὸ φύραμα τῆς φύσεως τῇ ἀπαρχῇ συμμιχθὲν, καὶ ἐν κατὰ τὸ συνεχές σῶμα γινόμενον, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μόνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δάξεται. And when the entire

substance of humanity shall thus have been penetrated by the divine nature, that *ὑποταγή* will take place which is designated a subjection of the Son, because it is His body in which He brings it to pass. The image of the *φύραμα* is physical; but that the “*tertium comparationis*” was not a physical process, is clear, in part, even from the circumstance that He is represented as the soul of the humanity, His body (c. 16). *Τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν γινόμενον κατὰ συνήθειάν τινα τῇ ψυχῇ λογίζομεθα.*—*Σῶμα δὲ αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, ἥ κατεμύχθη,* and, as far as men are concerned, Gregory lays special stress on human freedom (Or. Cat. c. 7, 31). Indeed, Rupp justly remarks (l. c. p. 262), that in contrast to the physical point of view of Eunomius, a strictly ethical estimate of Christianity was characteristic of Gregory of Nyssa. But Gregory’s notion of the ethical was certainly not of so meagre a nature, that he deemed it feebler and less sure of attaining a result than physical power; nor did he regard the unity founded by it as less intimate and firm than a physical unity. For this reason, he might very well apply the above images, in order to mark the final certainty of redemption, and the uniting power of love:—this all the more, as he did not rend the ethical from religion, and recognised no freedom which needs to cast a jealous eye on grace.—Or. Cat. 16,—“As that which had been dissolved by death was again united, to wit, in the resurrection; even so, the union of that which is dissolved passes over, as from one principle, to the whole of humanity” (*οἷον ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἢ τοῦ διακριθέντος ἔνωσις διαβαίνει*). In C. 32 he expressly describes the same idea as something *δὲ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἔκει* (p. 93). The entire Gospel contains a *μίξις* of the divine and human; everywhere are both conjoined; and so also on the cross. Its very figure sets forth four lines, which radiate in all directions from one centre. That is the symbol of the God-man. He who was nailed to the cross was *τὸ πᾶν πρὸς ἑαυτῷ συνδέων τε καὶ συναρμύζων, τὰς διαφόρους τῶν ὄντων φύσεις πρὸς μίαν σύμπνοiάν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν δι’ ἑαυτοῦ συνάγων*. As, when one of our sensuous organs is active, everything united with the part is drawn into sympathy and participation, so, inasmuch as the God-bearing flesh (*σὰρξ θεοδόχος*) was taken from our mass, the resurrection of one part passes over

to the whole, as though the entire nature (humanity) were one living being (*καθάπερ τινὸς ὅντος ζώου πάσης τῆς φύσεως*). For, agreeably to the continuity and unity of nature, it communicates itself from one part to the whole. C. 37. As a little leaven leavens the whole lump, so does His slain body, having passed into ours (in the holy Eucharist), convert it entirely into itself. Our body also thus becomes *σῶμα θεοδόχον*, and by this *μετουσία* in *ἀφθαρσία* we also become immortal.—As the soul is united with the Logos by faith, so also through the Eucharist is the body, or its *φύσις*, united with the body of Christ, which has life in itself. Concerning baptism, he says, —Its true idea is the full and entire extinction of death and sin, and the complete resurrection to a new immortal life, in the imitation of Christ. Because, however, of the weakness of our nature, that which really forms one connected whole was separated into its parts, and the entire force of the baptism unto Christ is not concentrated in the one ritual act. But believers are not therefore less sure and certain of becoming, in the future, complete copies of Him into whose death and life they are baptized.—Compare Basilus, de Bapt. L. 1, c. 1, 2; T. 1. 551, 553, 561, 565, 568, 574; Lib. 2, Q. 1, pp. 582 f. Specially worthy of comparison, also, is the homil. 25, T. 1, pp. 504 ff. of Basilus. God is amongst us in the flesh: not as in the prophets, working from afar, ἀλλὰ συμφυῇ ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα καὶ ἡνωμένην κατακτησάμενος, καὶ διὰ τῆς συγγενοῦς ἡμῖν σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανάγων τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα. Πῶς οὖν δι' ἐνός, φησιν, εἰς πάντας ἦλθε τὸ λαμπτήριον; τίνα τρόπον ἐν σαρκὶ ἢ θεότης; ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐν σιδήρῳ οὐ μεταβατικῶς (that is, so that the Logos would have changed His place), but μεταδοτικῶς. He lost nothing; He underwent no conversion. Διὰ τοῦτο Θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ, ἵνα ἐναποκτείνῃ τὸν ἐμφωλεύοντα θάνατον. Ὡς γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων τὰ ἀλεξήτρια κατακρατεῖ τῶν φθαρτικῶν οἰκειωθέντα τῷ σώματι,—οὕτως ὁ ἐνδυναστεύων τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ (φύσει) θάνατος τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῆς θεότητος ἠφανίσθη. (The genuineness of this homily is established; not so that of the Libri de Baptismo.) Ephræm (Phot. cod. 229) designates Christ τὸν ὁλικόν, not τὸν τινα ἄνθρωπον, that is, an “homo universalis,” and not merely “singularis.” “I will,” says Christ, “that they all become one body in Me,”—in Him who carries all in Himself, through the one temple assumed by

Him (ἐν ἐμοὶ—ὡς πάντας φοροῦντι διὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀναληφθέντος ναοῦ). Legat. ad Athanas. f. Marcell. in Montfauc. Coll. Nov. 2, p. 3. The Exposit. Fid., professedly by Gregor. Thaum., in A. Mai, l. c. 7, 175:—θανάτῳ παραδούς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ θανάτου ἔλυσε διὰ τῆς ἀναστάσεως εἰς τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀνάστασιν ἀνῆλθε δὲ εἰς οὐρανόν, ὑψῶν καὶ δοξάζων ἀνθρώπους ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Similarly Chrysostom (Opp. Paris 1840). Christ's sufferings are to be regarded as a deed (9, 6, E.; τὸ πάθος πράξις). Through them, namely, He has worked more good in the world than sin has worked evil (4, 786, E.); θανάτου θάνατος ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ γέγονεν (9, 585, A.; 11, 426, A.; 734 D.). He paid the debt for Adam and us all (ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατεχομένου κατέλαβε τὸν θάνατον); and even more than that (3, 910, A.; 9, 574 D.). He humbled Himself, in order to exalt thee; He died, in order to make thee immortal; He became a curse, in order to fill thee with blessing. In Him ἠύλογηθή ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις (Expos. in Ps. xlv. T. 5, 198).—We are born of Christ, as Eve was born of Adam, by baptism, and in the holy Eucharist He nourishes with Himself (3, 258, on Ephesians v. 25 ff.; de prodit. Jud. hom. h. 1, 6; T. 2, 453; 3, 389 f.). He calls us brethren, friends, bride; yea also His members and His body; and, as though all other things failed to satisfy Him, and still appeared too alien, He styles Himself our Head (2, 278; 8, 193; 9, 763): now, as body and head are one man, so is Christ and the Church one (hom. 30, 1, in 1 Cor. xii. 12, T. 10, 315).

Cyrril of Alexandria says (Thesaur. 20).—Grace has deified our nature, first in Christ, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τρέχῃ λοιπὸν εἰς πάντας ἡ χάρις, ὡς ἤδη δοθεῖσα τῇ φύσει, καὶ λοιπὸν ὅλη σωζομένη τῷ γένει. (See other passages from his writings in Petav. de incarn. 2, 9; 17, 9; Hilarii Opp. ed. Maur. Præf. pp. xxiii. ff.)

Similarly Theodoret (Hær. fab. 4, 13; Opp. ed. Schulz, T. iv. pp. 373, 374):—In His nature, our nature rose again; but inasmuch as this happened to our *nature*, it is counted to our *persons*. Similarly Ep. ad Engraph. viii. p. 1066; Ep. 151, p. 1291.—Page 275,—ἡ ἀπαρχὴ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἔχει συγγένειαν. Christ, however, is not ἀπαρχὴ as God, ποία γὰρ συγγένεια θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος; on account of His σὰρξ, we are termed His members, and He the head (p. 279, 16, cf. 278, 15). In Dial. 1, 40–44, this idea is already subjected to a cri-

tical treatment, with reference to Eph. ii. 6. One might suppose that when He is said to have become man, or even a curse, for us, we ought to understand it subjectively,—namely, that so it appears to us, without objective reality. This is the one extreme. The other extreme is that of Apollinaris, who taught that Christ, in becoming man, converted, transubstantiated us into Himself. This is refuted by 2 Cor. v. 21; for we cannot say that Christ substantially became sin. The substitution, however, he is determined to retain. In pp. 424–426, he shows, from Rom. v. 12 ff., 1 Cor. xv. 21 ff., that the unity of all in Christ was the purpose of the incarnation. As the Apollinarians exaggerated, so the Arians fell short, of the idea. They acknowledge that Christ had a body, in order that it might be possible for us to see Him, in order to reveal the brightness of His divine essence in such a manner that it might be enduring; in other words, they limit the significance of Christ to His prophetic office. But for this purpose, an incarnation was not needed: did not the Son appear to Abraham without becoming a man? What was necessary was, that the same nature which had been conquered should gain the victory; in this the Arian theory fails. On its basis, namely, we do not know ourselves as victors in Christ, through the victory gained by our nature in Him. Even Theodore of Mopsuestia (A. Mai, Spicileg. Rom. T. 4), in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (c. vi. 6, p. 508), says,—*τῷ Χριστῷ, φησιν (Paul) ἐσταυρωμένῳ ὡς περ ἅπαντα ἡμῶν ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν θνητότητα κειμένη φύσις συνεσταυρώθη ἐπειδὴ καὶ πᾶσα αὐτῷ συνανέστη, πάντων ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ συμμετασχεῖν ἐλπίζόντων τῆς ἀναστάσεως· ὡς ἐντεῦθεν συναναφανισθῆναι μὲν τὴν περὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἡμῶν εὐκολίαν, διὰ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ σώματος μεταστάσεως.* Compare my Christmas Programme for 1844, “Theodori Mopsv. de imagine Dei doctrina,” pp. 23, 24. In Christ the likeness to God borne by man is brought to perfection; He is the fixed, the indissoluble bond of unity for the entire world, which Adam was not completely: Adam, on the contrary, rent the bond. Of later writers, we may further mention John of Damascus, “de orthod. fide” 3, 12, 4, 4; Theodorus Abukara, Opusc. ed. Gretser, 6, p. 453. This latter tries to make clear by images how it was possible for sin and salvation to pass through the whole of humanity; and how the first and the second Adam might have the signifi-

cance of an universal principle. Coll. Nov. ed. A. Mai, T. 9, 104, of Photius: *εἶδες πρεσβευτοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν, οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ δεύτερον ἦλθεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν.* For further passages, see Petav. l. c.; Hilar. Opp. ed. Maur. l. c.; Calov's "Examen doctrinæ publicæ eccl. refer. de persona Christi," Viteb. 1663, pp. 95, 130 ff., 170 f., 192, 290, 331, 394 f., 419, 450; Mansi Coll. Conc. 4, 1186 ff.

NOTE 59, page 348.

Compare the fragment of Eustathius in Theodoret's Dialog. 3, T. 4, ed. Schulz, p. 233:—*Διὰ τί δὲ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦνται δεικνύναι, τὸν Χριστὸν ἄψυχον ἀνεληφέναι σῶμα, γεώδεις πλάττοντες ἀπάτας; ἵνα εἰ δυνηθεῖεν ὑποφθεῖραι τινας, ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὀρίξεσθαι, τήνικαῦτα τὰς τῶν παθῶν ἀλλοιώσεις τῷ θεῷ περιάψαντες πνεύματι, ῥαδίως ἀναπέλσωσιν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τρεπτὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀτρέπτου φύσεως γεννηθέν.* That this was the doctrine of Arius (and specially also that of Eunomius; compare Marcelliana, ed. Rettberg, p. 157), is repeatedly affirmed by Athanasius; for example, c. Apollinaristas 1, 15:—*μάτην οὖν Ἀρειανοὶ σοφίζονται σάρκα μόνην ὑποτιθέμενοι ἀνεληφέναι τὸν σωτήρα, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πάθους νόησιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαθῆ θεότητα ἀναφέροντες ἀσεβῶς.* 2, 3:—*Ἀρειος σάρκα μόνην πρὸς ἀποκρυφὴν τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογεῖ, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔσθωθεν ἐν ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, τοιτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λέγει γεγονέναι, τὴν τοῦ πάθους νόησιν, καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἁδου ἀνάστασιν τῇ θεότητι προσάγειν τολμῶν.* Greg. Naz. Ep. ad Cledon. 1, 7; Gregor. Nyss. c. Eunom. 2, 484:—*προφέρουσα τὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου φωνὴν ὅτι ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, ὡς διὰ τοῦ μὴ συμμημονευθῆναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατασκευάζεσθαι τὸ ἄψυχον ἀνελήφθαι τὴν σάρκα, μαθέτωσαν, ὅτι σύνηθές ἐστι τῇ ἀγίᾳ γραφῇ, τῷ μέρει συμπεριλαμβάνειν τὸ ὅλον.* Epiphani. hæc. 69, 19:—*Ἀρνοῦνται ψυχὴν αὐτὸν ἀνθρωπίνην εἰληφέναι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο προκατασκευάζοντες· σάρκα γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀληθινὴν ἀπὸ Μαρίας αὐτὸν ἐσχηκότα, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, χωρὶς ψυχῆς.* This they do, he proceeds, in order that they may be able to say,—Such things (as *ἐμβρίμεις*, etc.) the flesh did not work by itself, without soul; but Christ had no soul; consequently they must be ascribed to His higher nature.

NOTE 60, page 349.

The fragments of Eustathius in A. Mai, T. 7, of the Coll. Nov., contain scarcely anything bearing on this subject. Only the words contained on page 85, which are taken from the work to which the above passage belonged, might possibly, inasmuch as they are directed against the idea broached by certain philosophers, that the soul in its wanderings drinks the cup of forgetfulness prior to each new birth, have a reference to the Arians, who may have made use of the philosopheme for the purpose of demonstrating the reality of the human development. The work of Eustathius was entitled *περὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ φιλοσόφων*; and the peculiar circumstances of Antioch (see the text) probably gave occasion to these investigations, which initiated a new series of works on the soul (compare Gregory of Nyssa, "de Anima;" Augustine, "de Anima;" Nemesius, "de natura hominis"). More to the purpose is offered by the fragments in Theodoret, Dial. 1, 3; Galland. l. c. pp. 578 ff. The passage cited above, in Note 59, page 518, proves that Eustathius not merely understood and remarked the Arian artifice of teaching that Christ had a *σῶμα ἄψυχον*, in order to be able to transfer the emotions and so forth to the Logos; but also saw that the Church must of necessity either accept the Arian, subordinatian consequence, or teach a human soul. Eustathius, however, was led to the same result by other considerations,—to wit, by the consideration of His descent into Hades. In death, the soul of Christ was separated from His body; but *τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκτὸς γενομένη ζῇ καὶ ὑφέστηκε*, nay more, *γέγονε καὶ ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν*. It thus had experience of both the things which befall us (*ἐκατέρων πείραν ἔσχε*); *λογικὴ ἄρα καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων σαρκὶ τυγχάνει, ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας προελθοῦσα*. He therefore attached great importance to the truth of the human development of Christ. In his view, it was by no means deified or in possession of divine prerogatives from the very commencement (Gall. pp. 577 f.). The exaltation (*δόξα ἐπὶ κτήτος*) did not concern the Father, who is *τέλειος, ἄπειρος, ἀπεριόρητος, ἀπροσδεὴς κάλλους*; nor the Son, to whom Eustathius gives the same predicates; *ἀλλ' ὁ ἀνθρώπος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγειρόμενος ὑψοῦται καὶ δοξάζεται*. P. 578:—*αὐτός ἄρ' οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μετὰ τὰς ὕβρεις, αἰεδῆς, ἄμορφος ὀραθεῖς, εἶτα*

πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς εὐπρέπειαν ἐνδυσάμενος οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ κατοικῶν ἐν αὐτῷ Θεὸς ἀμνοῦ δίκην εἰς θάνατον ἤγετο, etc. Pp. 580, 581 (from Facundus Herm. 11, 1):—"Dicamus, inquit (Eustathius) *cujus rei gratia filius hominis diem proprii adventus ignoret* (Matt. xxiv. 36). For our good, He was ignorant of the day of judgment. Sicut enim hominem—Verbo coaptavit et Deo (salutis hominum causa); sic et insignem judicii diem causa divini beneficii homini competenter abscondit, ne forte ineffabilia mysteria similis generis hominibus indicans et diem secundi adventus ostenderet." But unquestionably for the sake of His voluntary sufferings on our behalf, He is crowned with honour and glory. He sits also as to His humanity on the holy throne, *σύνθρονος ἀποδέδεικται τῷ θειοτάτῳ πνεύματι, διὰ τὸν οἰκοῦντα Θεὸν ἐν αὐτῷ διηνεκῶς* (Theod. Dial. 2, Gall. 577). Page 581:—The words of Ps. ix. 8, "Dominus in cœlo præparavit sedem suam," refer neither to the Father nor to the Word, who both already have the kingdom, but to Christ. "Nam omnium simul creaturarum dominator (sc. Christus est) propter Verbi divini commixtionem." Similarly the fragment in Gelasius' "de duabus naturis in Christo" (Gall. 581):—Homo Deum ferens, qui mortis passionem sponte censuit sustinere,—honorem et potestatem percepit. Et ubi (ibi) recipitur gloria, *quam nequaquam prius habuerat.*" Eustathius, therefore, conceived the communication of the divine attributes, not as complete from the very beginning, but as first fully accomplished at the ascension. Indeed, he was in general concerned to allow the humanity of Christ free and full play; thus showing himself to be a true Antiocheian. According to a passage in Gelasius (Gall. 581), he taught that Christ had an human soul, expressly because he could not otherwise deem the incarnation complete. Sadness, emotions, hunger, and the like, could not affect the fulness of the deity. "Homini vero hæc adplicanda sunt proprie, qui ex anima constat et corpore; congruit enim, ex ipsis humanis et innoxiiis motibus demonstrare quia non phantastice et putative, sed ipsa veritate *totum hominem indutus est Deus* perfecte adsu-mens." At the same time, we must not omit to notice that, after the manner of the later Antiocheians, the deity and the humanity remain separate and distinct, and do not constitute a living unity. He describes the incarnation most frequently under the image of the indwelling of the Logos in the temple of

humanity; the unity of the Logos with the humanity he reduces to the anointing of the humanity with the Holy Ghost by the Logos, who, at the same time, remained by Himself. According to A. Mai, l. c. p. 203, in his homilies on the Gospel of John, he remarked on the passage, "I do not Mine own will,"—In Christ there was no will which stood in need of negation ("Negation," *καταλύσεως*), neither the divine (*θεϊκὸν*), nor that which sprang from the incarnation (*τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπήσεως*):—which latter will, according to another fragment, superadded *ἀρετὰς ἐπικτήτους*. From this it would seem that Eustathius assumed the existence of two wills in Christ, which, however, will the same thing. The same conclusion may be drawn from a fragment in Theodor. Dial. 3, Gall. 576:—Birth did not lessen His *ἐξουσία*; the cross did not wound His *πνεῦμα*. *Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα μετάρσιον ἐσταυροῦτο, τὸ δὲ θεῖον τῆς Σοφίας πνεῦμα καὶ τοῦ σώματος εἶσω διητάτο, καὶ τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἐπεβάτευε, καὶ πᾶσαν περιεῖχε τὴν γῆν, καὶ τῶν ἀβύσσων ἐκράτει, καὶ τὰς ἐκάστων ψυχὰς ἀνιχνεύων διέκρινε, καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ συνήθως οἷα Θεὸς ἔπραττεν. Οὐ γὰρ εἶσω τῶν σωματικῶν ὄγκων ἢ ἀνωτάτω Σοφία καθειργμένη περιέχεται, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ὕλαι τῶν μὲν ἀγγείων εἶσω κατακλείονται, περιέχονται δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ περιέχουσι τὰς θήκας. Ἀλλὰ θέλα τις οὕσα καὶ ἀνέκφραστος δύναμις τὰ τ' ἐνδοτάτω καὶ ἐξωτάτω τοῦ νεῶ περιλαμβάνουσα κραταιοῖ κἀντεῦθεν ἐπέκεινα διήκουσα πάντας ὁμοῦ τοὺς ὄγκους κρατεῖ περιέχουσα.* Page 582:—God (and the Logos is God) fills the universe; for Him, therefore, there can be no such thing as movement from one place to another (*οὐδαμῶς ἐξ ἐτέρων εἰς ἑτέρους μεθίσταται τόπους, τὰ πάντα πληρῶν*); for if He were outside of a place, the place which He failed to fill, would bound Him (*εἰ γὰρ ἔξω λέγοιτο τόπου τινὸς, ἀνάγκη περιορίζεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνου, οὐπερ στερίσκεται*). This now must be applied to the incarnation also:—and, at a later period, we find Theodore of Mopsuestia taking it as his point of departure. But if no advance were made beyond the position thus described, the Logos must be judged to have had His own independent consciousness and sway (at all events, during the earthly life of Christ), and the man Jesus also his; and it is not clear how Eustathius could avoid assuming a double personality, at all events during the time referred to. It will therefore not be accidental, that, besides Theodoret, Facundus of Hermione, an

adherent of the doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia, so frequently cites him. He pays quite too little regard to the unity of the person, although he still unsuspectingly supposes himself to be in possession thereof. The utmost he arrives at is an action of the Logos in and on this man; an incarnation, an humanification of the Logos lay beyond his reach.

NOTE 61, page 350.

C. Ar. 3, 30:—'Ο λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο—ἄνθρωπος δὲ γέγονε, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἦλθε καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶδέναι, lest being led astray by the ungodly, we should suppose, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ἁγίων ἐγένετο, οὕτω καὶ νῦν εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἐπεδήμησεν ὁ λόγος ἀγιάζων καὶ τοῦτον καὶ φανερούμενος ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἦν καὶ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φανεῖς ἦν, οὐδὲν ἦν παράδοξον. Then, those who saw Him, would not have asked, What manner of man is this? and, Why doest thou, being a man, make thyself God? Νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος δι' οὗ γέγονε τὰ πάντα, ὑπέμεινε καὶ νῦν ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐταπεινώσεν ἑαυτὸν, λαβὼν δούλου μορφήν, διὰ τοῦτο Ἰουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλόν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ σταυρὸς, ἡμῖν δὲ Χριστὸς Θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία. 'Ο λόγος γὰρ σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τῆς γραφῆς ἔθος ἐχούσης, λέγειν σάρκα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. C. Arian 4, 35, he shows that Christ Himself counted His body part of His person and actuality. In Luke xxiv. 39, Christ says not—"Touch this man, or My man (that is, the man, whom I have); but, touch Me" (οὐκ εἶπε τὸν δε ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπόν μου, δὲν ἀνείληφα ἀλλ' ἐμέ). Thus in the presence of Thomas (see John xx. 27), God, the Logos, terms the hands and the side His own. He in His entirety is God and man at the same time (ὅλον αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπόν τε καὶ Θεὸν ὁμοῦ). Ep. ad Maximum Philos. c. 2:—Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἦν τὸ βλεπόμενον σῶμα, ἀλλὰ Θεοῦ. For this reason, we cannot say,—ὅτι εἰς ἄνθρωπόν τινα ἅγιον ἐγένετο ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐγένετο τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁγίων ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον γεννώμενος καὶ πάλιν ἀποθνήσκων φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὕτως, μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἅπαξ ἐπὶ τῇ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς ἀτέτησιν τῆς ἀμαρτίας αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου προήλθεν ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν, John viii. 40. Οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τέ τινος μετέχοντες σώματος, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ

λόγου σῶμα λαμβάνοντες (in the Holy Eucharist) θεοποιούμεθα.

NOTE 62, page 352.

The question appears to me to have taken in the mind of Athanasius the form which I have indicated in the text; not, however, that a human soul alongside of the Logos would threaten the unity of the person, as Baur supposes (p. 579). The soul by itself would scarcely have occasioned him difficulty; for he did not conceive it as a particular substance, or as a *subject*, which, as such, would exclude another subject from itself (in the present case, therefore, the hypostasis of the Son), or would at all events come into conflict therewith; but rather as a multiplicity of powers, or as a movement of thoughts and volitions, which have an individual limitation in and through the body. On such a view of the soul, the union of the hypostasis of the Logos with a human individuality might be accomplished without much difficulty, because two subjects would not then be supposed to meet in the one Christ. The divine hypostasis alone (as it were the universal element) in Christ receives human individuality. At this time, not a single word can as yet be spoken regarding an human Ego. Athanasius felt that, in order for Christ's soul to be of like nature with us, it must be free; and on other grounds, this seemed to him a doubtful opinion. We see, as often as he approaches this question, that he feared it would be necessary to exchange the theological point of view of the Church with the anthropological one of Ebionism, if a *free* human soul were posited. For he constantly warns against forming such a conception of the full humanity of Christ as leads to Samosatenism, and against seeing in Christ merely an independent man apart from the Logos. Compare the passages c. Ar. 4, 35; 3, 30; Ep. ad Max. Philos. 2, 3.

NOTE 63, page 353.

The main sources are the very numerous fragments in Gregor. Nyss. Antirrheticus adv. Apollinarem, ed. Zacagni, p. 123-287; A. Mai, Coll. Nov. T. 7; Gregor. Naz. Ep. i. ii. ad Cledon. and ad Nectar.; Athanasius c. Apollinaristas, L. 1, 2 (compare below, Note 65); Epiphanius, Hær. 62; Theodoret.

hær. fab. 4, and Dialog. 3. Many fragments of Apollinaris are contained in the *Catenæ*; compare especially the *Catena* to the Gospel of John, ed. Corderius, 1630. He forms the strongest antagonism to the school of Antioch, which even in his lifetime had already acquired, under Diodorus of Tarsus and Carterius, the features which were distinctively characteristic of it; and from it, for a considerable period, proceeded many attacks on Apollinaris and his school (so, for example, from Diodorus in his work against the Synusiasts, from Theodorus of Mopsuestia xv. LL. adv. Apollinarist. et Eunom., and from Theodoret). That even as early as the year 360, it was usual for some in Antioch to draw a distinction between the divine and human aspects of Christ (see Note 60), which, in the apprehension of many, threatened the introduction of a double personality, is evident from Athanasius, c. Apoll., and from the Alexandrian Synodal Epistle, entitled *Tomus ad Antiochenos* a. 562. Apollinaris himself perhaps wrote to Diodorus (Mai l. c. 7, 17); at all events, he wrote about and against him. If we consider, on the one hand, that Apollinaris deduced the description of the person, the dissolution of the incarnation, relapse into the heathenish error of denying the incarnation of Christ, and into the Jewish error of viewing it ebionitically, from the doctrine of a particular human soul, to which his opponents gave such prominence; and on the other hand, that which we know of Eustathius of Antioch; this doctrine would undoubtedly appear to have found a seat in Antioch from the year 330 onwards, and to have been vigorously represented by Diodorus and his school, though at the same time to have been strongly opposed both by Apollinaris and others.

NOTE 64, page 354.

Many polemical arguments of the Church Fathers have been prematurely referred to Apollinaris, which did not relate to him at all. For example, what has Athanasius' Ep. ad Epictetum Corinth. Episc. (Opp. 1, 901 ff.) to do with Apollinaris? The "tessera" of Apollinaris is not mentioned amongst the views there controverted, namely, the denial of the human soul of Christ. The only allusion is to a heavenly humanity and a conversion of God; just as in the Ep. Basilii M. to the Sozopolitans (l. c. Ep. 65, T. 3, 103). Still less can the words of

Hilarius (de Trin. 10, 15 ff.) be referred to Apollinaris. For that work was composed before the doctrine of Apollinaris had attracted the attention it subsequently did. Besides, the views there controverted are totally different: they combine three momenta in themselves:—1. The Logos emptied Himself, fell away from Himself in the incarnation (*defecit a se Deo*), and was present in the man Jesus merely as a passible potency or power. 2. In this form He animated the man Jesus, even as the Spirit of prophecy stirred in the prophets. 3. Hence Jesus was so perfectly a man, that He had not merely a body, but also a soul from Adam. They reproached the teachers of the Church with not bringing out the full equality of the essence of Christ with us, in relation to body and soul; which is necessary, seeing that the body and soul of Adam lay in sin. We have here, therefore, another illustration of the truth of the assertion, that the doctrine of a conversion of the Logos may pass into Ebionism. How widely diffused such views were, we see from the circumstance, that Athanasius controverts them in his *Ep. ad Epictetum* 2, 11, 12. They did not deny the birth from a virgin; nor the Trinity; but from Apollinaris they were so far removed, that in point of result, they might be more justly classed with the Antiocheians of the fifth century. Nor is it allowable to distribute the above views between different parties; they stood all together, for example, in one work, Athan. ad Epictetum, cap. 3. Further, even in Can. 11, 12 of the Synod of Sirmium of the year 351, we read,—“*Si quis Verbum caro factum est, audiens Verbum in carnem translatum putet, vel demutationem sustinentem accepisse carnem dicit, anathema sit.—Si quis unicum Dei filium crucifixum audiens dealitatem (θεόρρητα) ejus corruptionem vel passibilitatem aut demutationem, aut diminutionem vel interfectionem sustinuisse dicat, anathema sit.*”

NOTE 65, page 359.

These views are partially controverted also in the three books of Athanasius, which usually bear the title, “*Adv. Apollinaristas* ;” in which, however, neither Apollinaris nor any other name is distinctly mentioned. Still, the form of the refutation is such as to betray that its author had gone through the Apollinaristic phase of doctrine. It is a mistake to suppose that these books contain, strictly speaking, an account of the theory

of Apollinaris himself; but it would be equally erroneous to suppose that Athanasius did not think he was really combating the view propounded by Apollinaris. The true state of the case is rather the following:—These books, according to Proclus, written after the death of Apollinaris, are taken up with his school in general, which, in consequence of coalescing with theories such as those above described, had separated into different parties, pursuing different tendencies. Many of the opinions controverted by Athanasius in these books, must therefore not be laid to the account of Apollinaris; although they may be fairly counted part of *Apollinarism*, as a phenomenon of the Church. The three positions—the conversion of the Logos (*ἀλλοίωσις τοῦ λόγου*); that the passion of Christ was mere seeming; that the flesh of Christ was heavenly and uncreated (*σὰρξ Χριστοῦ ἄκτιστος, ἐπουράνιος*)—in particular, were laid down as we have seen by writers prior to Apollinaris:—whether by himself also, we shall soon see. The existence of these parties prior to Apollinaris throws also a clearer light on the Synodal Epistle of the Alexandrian Synod, which was written about 362 (Athan. Opp. 1, 770 ff.; entitled *Tomus ad Antioch.*). This Synod, namely, lays down the principle,—*Ὁμολόγουν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον οὐδ' ἀνάσθητον, οὐδ' ἀνόητον εἶχεν ὁ σωτὴρ*; whereby the opinion of Apollinaris is substantially excluded. Moreover, it is scarcely to be doubted that Paulinus, who shortly after handed over to Epiphanius a copy of this Synodal Epistle, which he had subscribed (Epiph. l. c.), referred these words of the Council, either to Apollinaris or to his faithful pupil Vitalis. At the same time, we have no right to conclude that the Council attributed to Apollinaris or to Vitalis all the opinions which it condemns, and that it consequently had had to do with Apollinaris alone. Neither the opinion, that the Word did not become flesh, but that it “happened to Christ,” or that it came upon Him, as upon the prophets; nor that of a duplicity of Christ, in the sense, that the Son of God before Abraham was one, the Son of God after Abraham another (*ἕτερος*); He who raised Lazarus from the dead one, another He who inquired after him, fits Apollinaris. But by these are meant such as Hilarius describes (*de Trin.* 10, 21), who represented the man Jesus as influenced after the manner of the prophets, and brought against the teachers of the Church the

charge, "quod Christum dicamus esse natum non nostri corporis atque animæ hominem." Indeed, from the latter one might venture to surmise, that when the Synod of Alexandria maintained that all the orthodox with them, agreed *ὅτι οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον οὐδ' ἀνάλσθητον οὐδ' ἀνόητον εἶχεν ὁ σωτὴρ*, it merely meant in the first instance to say,—In rejecting that Ebionitical view, the Church teachers have no intention either of leaving the charge brought by Ebionites unnoticed, or of detracting from the completeness of the humanity of Christ; on the contrary, if there are any who posit, for example, no human soul, this also is to be blamed. Looking at the matter in this light, Apollinaris and his followers can by no means be said to have been arraigned before the bar of the Synod, although they were eventually condemned. What was in the first instance arraigned, was a Christology which substantially led back to Ebionism, which no longer took up an unitarian position relatively to the doctrine of the Trinity, but merely, out of regard to the unity of the Person of Jesus, represented the Logos as a mere power in the human personality, either on the basis of a conversion of the Logos into a mere potence (see Note 64),—a view which was certainly taken by some; or without such a conversion. In the latter case, even on the supposition of a partial conversion, we should arrive at a double Christ, and at an Ebionism engrafted on the doctrine of the Trinity,—a phænomenon which we shall shortly find in the school of Antioch. Deputies from Apollinaris attended the Synod and subscribed its decrees; so that it is doubtful whether the Fathers always had Apollinaris in view, or whether his position was not at that date a more favourable one:—namely, whether he and his adherents were not at that time the strongest defenders of the view of the Church, in opposition to those who arrived at a double Christ, and approximated to Ebionism as regards the human aspect of the Redeemer. But, however it may stand with the persons and with the judgment of the Synod as to the views entertained by the persons, it is substantially clear that the Fathers rejected, not only a double Christ, but also such an unity of His person as involved the mutilation of His human nature, or as was in any way effected by a conversion of the divine into the human. Compare also, Mansi Concil. T. 3, 355.

NOTE 66, page 361.

Gregor. Nyss. l. c. c. 43, p. 237; c. 36, p. 215:—*Εἰ μὴ νοῦς φησιν ἑνσαρκὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κύριος, Σοφία ἂν εἴη φωτίζουσα νοῦν ἀνθρώπου* (but He would not be God-man). *Αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, οὐκ ἦν ἐπιδημία Θεοῦ ἢ Χριστοῦ παρουσία, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου γέννησις.* This, therefore, would be the Ebionitical consequence. P. 216:—*Ἐὰν γὰρ Σοφία ἐμπιστευθῇ εἶναι ὁ κύριος ἢ ἐν πᾶσι δηλαδὴ δεχομένοις τὴν χάριν, οὐκέτι ἐπιδημίαν Θεοῦ τὴν Χριστοῦ παρουσίαν ὁμολογήσομεν, ὡς ἡλλοτριωμένης τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς Σοφίας* (that is, as though the Sophia in Christ were different from the Sophia in us, as the word *ἐπιδημία* requires us to suppose); c. 37, p. 217:—in that case, no *καταβαίνειν*, no self-abasement, of the *Κύριος* took place. The opponents, indeed, who laid special stress on the human soul of Christ, styled Jesus an *ἄνθρωπον ἐνθεον*; and were therefore not disposed to fall into monarchian Ebionism; they clung firmly to the Trinity, and desired an union of the Logos with the man Jesus, an union of the perfect Logos with the perfect man. To this, however, he replies, l. c. c. 42, p. 232:—*Εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ συνήφθη Θεὸς, τέλειος τελείῳ, δύο ἂν ἦσαν, εἰς μὲν φύσει υἱὸς Θεοῦ, εἰς δὲ θετός.* Plain reference is here already made to the Christology of the school of Antioch. He sees clearly that, on such a view also, no incarnation would have taken place; that the gain realized in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, would lie useless and dead; and that a Christology would be formed, in which a monarchian conception of God would amply suffice for that which the human personality of Jesus was held to have profited by the *σάρκωσις*.

NOTE 67, page 363.

C. 40:—To the *σὰρξ* is *φυσικὸν τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι*· *ἐδεῖτο δὲ ἀτρέπτου νοῦ, μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος αὐτῇ διὰ ἐπιστημοσύνης ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόζοντος αὐτὴν ἀβιάστως ἑαυτῷ.* C. 51:—*Οὐ δύναται σῶζεω τὸν κόσμον ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ὢν καὶ τῇ κοιτῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ὑποκείμενος. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μὴ ἐπιμιχθέντος ἡμῖν σωζόμεθα; Μίγνυται δὲ σὰρξ γενόμενος τοιτέσιν ἄνθρωπος. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ λύει τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁμαρτίαν μὴ γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος ἀναμάρτητος, οὐδὲ τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θανάτου βασιλείαν καταλύει, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος*

ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη. C. 45, pp. 244 f. :—Εἰ ἄνθρωπὸν, φησιν, οἶται τις ἐνοῦσθαι Θεῷ (in the Person of Christ) παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀγγέλους . . . ποιήσει μὴ αὐτεξουσίου τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὥς οὐδὲ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτεξούσιος· φθορὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ζώου τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτεξούσιον· οὐ φθείρεται δὲ ἡ φύσις ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτήν.

He appears also to have said,—Where there is a complete man, there also is sin. Athan. c. Apoll. 1, 2 :—Ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἁμαρτία· ἐπεὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν μάχη τῆς ἁμαρτίας, καὶ ἔσται αὐτῷ χρεία τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς καθαρισμοῦ, εἰ τὸ φρονοῦν καὶ τὸ ἄγον ἐν ἡμῖν τὴν σάρκα, Χριστὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιδέδεικται γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος. Ἀλλὰ ἔλαβέ, φησι, τὸ ἀνόητον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ νοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀγευστος ἢ πάντῃ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, κατὰ γε τὸ θεῖκόν καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον τῆς σαρκός. Οὔτε γὰρ ἁμάρτοι ἂν ἡ σὰρξ, τοῦ ἀγοντος τὴν σάρκα, τουτέστι τοῦ φρονούντος, μὴ προευνθυμηθέντος τὴν πρᾶξιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ ἐνεργήσαντος διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἐκπλήρωσιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

Gregory of Nyssa's Antirrheth. c. 48, p. 254 :—Ἐκ τριῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, το wit (p. 248), πνεύματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος (c. 8, p. 141 :—σαρκός τε καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ). P. 255 :—Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τριῶν καὶ κεῖνος, πνεύματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τοῖς χοικοῖς ὁ ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἐπουράνιος ἀλλ' ἐπουρανίου δοχεῖον. That is, if man is complete apart from the heavenly, it can only stand in the relation of an unnecessary accident to the humanity of Christ. Present or absent, the man remains complete. Theodoret, Hæc. Fab. 4, 8. Σαρκωθῆναι τὸν Θεὸν ἔφησε λόγον, σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνειληφότα, οὐ τὴν λογικὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλογον ἣν φυτικὴν ἔχουσαν ζωτικὴν τινες ὀνομάζουσι· τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἔφησεν ἀνειληφθαι, ἀλλ' ἀρκέσαι τὴν θείαν φύσιν εἰς τὸ πληρῶσαι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν χρείαν.

NOTE 68, page 369.

A. Mai l. c. p. 70 :—Δακτύλῳ γλίσφουσι πέτραι οἱ δύο νόας ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ δογματίζοντες, θεῖον, φημι, καὶ ἀνθρώπινον. Εἰ γὰρ πᾶς νοὺς αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν ἰδικῷ θελήματι κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενος, ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ δύο τοὺς τάναντία θέλοντας ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν, ἐκατέρου τὸ θεληθὲν ἑαυτῷ καθ' ὁρμὴν αὐτοκίνητον ἐνεργούντος. My antagonists, he

goes on to say, do not consider, what must be clear to every one, *ὅτι ὁ μὲν θεὸς νοῦς αὐτοκίνητος ἐστὶ καὶ ταυτοκίνητος, ἀτρεπτός γάρ, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος αὐτοκίνητος μὲν, οὐ ταυτοκίνητος δὲ τρεπτός γάρ· καὶ ὅτι περ ἀτρεπτοῦ νῶ τρεπτός οὐ μίγνυται νοῦς εἰς ἐνὸς ὑποκειμένου σύστασιν, στασιασθήσεται γὰρ τοῖς ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ, διελεκόμενος ἐναντίοις θελήμασι, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἡμεῖς ἕνα τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ μίαν ὡς ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν θέλησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν προσκυνούμεν, θαύμασιν ὁμοῦ καὶ παθήμασι σώζουσας.*

NOTE 69, page 374.

C. 57, p. 280:—*Εἰ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, says Apollinarius, Θεὸς γέγονε, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, πῶς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀποστελεῖ τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ, etc., πῶς δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἐνωθῆναι καὶ ἀποθεωθῆναι λέγει ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν ἐσμεν ;* For this Gregory rebukes him sternly, asking, whether he denies altogether the glorification and conversion of the humanity of Christ, or whether hair, nails, form, and compass, are all to remain? On the contrary, nothing corporeal must be conceived to cleave to the perfected Redeemer; we must not any longer rest in *ἀνθρωπίνους ιδιώμασι*. He will appear in the glory of the Father, and the Father has no body; compare c. 25, p. 185. In chapter 53, Gregory says,—*μετὰ τὴν εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνοδὸν* is the *σὰρξ οὐκέτι ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ιδιώμασι*. God did not remain *σὰρξ*. Even Paul says, “I know Christ no longer after the flesh.” The human nature is changed into something better, from corruptible to incorruptible, from corporeal into *ἀσώματον* and *ἀσχημάτιστον*. But compare also Mansi Coll. Conc. 3, 480; 8, 489.

NOTE 70, page 385.

Greg. Nyss. l. c. c. 50, p. 259:—*Εἰ ἐκ δύο, φησι, τελείων, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ Θεὸς ἐστὶν, ἐν τούτῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν τούτῳ Θεός.* He aims, then, at taking up the point of view, from which the humanity appears as an essential determination of the Logos, and *vice versa*, the Logos of the humanity. This he carries out both in the aspect in which the *κένωσις* is an humiliation of the *πνεῦμα* of the heavenly man (see Note 1, page 376); and especially in that other, in which the *θεῖον* became *παθητὸν* in Christ (see the text). How important and familiar to him was this dialectical method of combining opposed elements, by showing the one to be contained and involved in the

other, we may see from the circumstance that he applied it to the Trinity also, in order to set forth the relation between the unity and the distinctions. As he endeavoured to point out the man in the Logos, and the Logos in the man, in the sense, namely, of each being a determination of the other; even so did he conceive the Father and Son to be related to each other. The Son has the Father as a determination of Himself; He is accordingly *πατήρ* though *νικῶς*, etc. He lays it down as a canon,—*Πανταχῇ συνεξηνγμένως, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡνωμένως τῇ ἐτερότητι νοεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν πρώτην ταυτότητα*, etc. Basil. M. Ep. 129, 1. This has been interpreted as Sabellianism (Theodoret, Hær. Fab. 4, 8); but may also be interpreted in agreement with the Nicene Creed, and serve to introduce the doctrine of the *περιχώρησις* of the hypostases.

NOTE 71, page 386.

Such I believe to be the true sense of the difficult passage, Ep. ad Cledon. 1, 15. It is true, if Apollinaris, like Origen, had held that the inequality of Christ with Himself, as also the inequality of the regenerated with themselves, would constantly recur; and that thus there would be an eternal alternation between the *διαίρεσις* (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. c. 29) and the *ἐξισοῦν*; he must also have assumed that the same history would be constantly repeated, that the incarnation would be again and again accomplished, metempsychosis, etc. We have, however, no sufficient ground for such a supposition. The necessary basis of such an alternation in the endless progress, would be a dualistic view of the two connected aspects, God and man; for then they would constantly be as strongly repelled from as they are drawn towards each other. Apollinaris undoubtedly appears sometimes to regard human nature, the free will, as sinful in itself (see ad Cledon. 1, 10; Note 68 and Note 2, page 387). This, however, he scarcely deemed a principal point, but employed it rather as a proof. In order to show that the divine *πνεῦμα* must be the *νοῦς* in the perfect man, he assigns to the human *νοῦς* as low a position as possible. For the rest, he everywhere aims, not at dualism, but at unity, and tries to grasp the Logos as the truth of the human *νοῦς*, as the *νοῦς* of the completed, second creation, which notwithstanding he conceived to be eternal.

NOTE 72, page 389.

On John xi. 35 :—Οὐ γὰρ ἀναίνεται τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁμοίωσιν, οὐδ' ἐνδείκνυται πανταχοῦ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον, συμπάθειαν δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πενθοῦντας φιλανθρώπως ἱποτίθῃσι,—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς σῶμα κατήλθεν ὁ λόγος, ἵν' ἀνθρώποις ἐπιδακρύσῃ κειμένοις καὶ τὴν ἀσώματον θεότητα πρὸς ζωopoίησιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαγάγηται. *Ἐχομεν γὰρ ἀρχιερέα δυνάμενον συμπάθῃσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν. On John xiv. 7 :—'Ἐαυτὸν ἅμα πορευόμενον εἶρηκε καὶ ὁδὸν ὄντα πορευόμενον μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ γῆς πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ πᾶσαν ἐπλήρωσεν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἐπήγαγεν ὥσπερ εἰς στέφανον τῆς πολιτείας· ὁδὸν δὲ ὄντα, καθότι αὐτὸς ἦν ζωῆς ἀρετὴ, ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀσώματον θεότητα πορεία τις αὐτοῦ καὶ πρᾶξις ἐστὶ πρὸς πατέρα συνάπτουσα, ἀλλὰ φύσις αὕτη καὶ οὐσία. Προσείληφε δὲ διὰ σαρκώσεως καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ πράξεις ἀγαθὰς, δι' ὧν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ Θεὸν καθηγείται πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν θεότητα. At the same time, He was constantly perfect in Himself, like the Father, and was in fact the Father's processive will. His growth was subjective; in other words, that which was already present in Him was more and more clearly revealed to us. Compare on xi. 42, xii. 28, pp. 292, 314. On John xiv. 14, "Whatsoever ye shall ask, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified," for the Father appears through the power of the Son (ἐκφαίνεται). Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἑτέρα πρὸς πατέρα πρόσοδος, ἢ δι' υἱοῦ, οὔτε πάλαι, οὔτε νῦν, οὔτε ἐσαῦθις, ἀλλ' οἰκειότερον ἢ δι' υἱοῦ πρόσοδος ἔσχηκε νῦν, ὅτι πλησιαιότερον ἡμῖν κατέστη σαρκωθείς. On verse 17 :—ἀόρατον ἀσωμάτου παρουσία; hence also, when the spiritual is present, it is not perceived by the sensuous. But those who are susceptible thereof, know from fellowship with Him who is present, the inner essence, which is better than the sensuous perception, comprehending themselves out of the other (ἐξ ἑτέρων ἑαυτοὺς καταλαμβάνοντες).

NOTE 73, page 390.

On John xiv. 12, p. 360 f. :—*Ἄρτι μὲν τὴν φυσικὴν ἐνότητα ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα διεξήει, φέρει δὲ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τὴν κατὰ χάριν ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἔνωσιν τοῦτο γὰρ ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου, καὶ μίμησις τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ κατὰ χάριν. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ πίστεως τοῦτο γίνεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐχὶ διὰ πίστεως

ἀλλὰ κατὰ δύνανμιν φυσικὴν. Οὐ γὰρ πίστει τῇ εἰς Πατέρα τὰ θαυμάσια Χριστὸς ἐργάζεται, πίστει δὲ τῇ εἰς υἱὸν ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἀπόστολοι τὰ υἱοῦ τὰ διὰ τούτων πραττόμενα. Διὰ καὶ σέβας μὲν τῷ υἱῷ προσάγεται, σέβας δὲ οὐδαμόθεν ἀποστόλοις ὀφείλεται, οὐδὲ ἂν μείζονα τοῦ Κυρίου ποιήσωσιν. On John xiv. 13:—Τὰ μὲν ὀφείλεται τῷ Κυρίῳ παρ' ἡμῶν περὶ ὧν καὶ παραγγέλλει τὰ δὲ αὐτὸς παρέχει, περὶ ὧν ἐπαγγέλλεται. (Compare Augustine's words,—“Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.”) Our obedience is a sign of our love to the Lord (ἀπόδειξις ἀγάπης), παρ' αὐτοῦ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τῆς θείας φύσεως χορηγία κοινωνεῖται. On xiii. 16:—Not men lay hold of the good, but the good confers on men communion (οἰκειώσις) with itself. Οὐ γὰρ ἀρέσαντες ἐξελέχθημεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀρέσωμεν. Διὸ καὶ φησιν ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ καρποφορίᾳ τέθεικεν, ἵνα εἰ καὶ μὴ διὰ τὰ πρότερα τίμιον Θεῷ καθεστήκειμεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ τελευταῖα γενώμεθα. Τίς δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀποστόλων καρπὸς ἄφθαρτος οὗτος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα μένων ; ἡ Ἐκκλησία.

NOTE 74, page 404.

The soul of Adam and the soul of Christ was created, not formed out of already existing material. This *opus non habet in se assumptæ aliunde alterius naturæ originem*. The formation of the body, on the contrary, was a “*sumere, accipere materiam*,” in order to give it a form ; it was not a creation ; it was, therefore, a receiving of an external, foreign material. That Hilarius entertained a similar conception of the incarnation also, is clear from *de Trin.* 2, 26, where we read,—“*Spiritus sanctus desuper veniens virginis interiora sanctificavit, et in his spirans naturæ se humanæ carnis immiscuit, et id, quod alienum a se erat, vi suâ et potestate præsumsit.*” 10, 15:—“*Quod si assumpta sibi per se ex virgine carne, ipse sibi et ex se animam concepti per se corporis coaptavit, secundum animæ corporisque naturam, necesse est et passionum fuisse naturam.*” When Hilarius aims at precision, he says, as here,—*animam ex se, corpus per se, habuit ; ex virgine corpus conceptum ;*” but “*non per humanæ conceptionis coaluit naturam, anima ex Deo.*” C. 15, 22. So, for example, c. 22:—*ut per se sibi assumpsit ex virgine corpus, ita ex se sibi animam assumpsit quæ utique nunquam ab homine gignentium originibus præbetur.* C. 10, 16, 17:—*Mary contributed ad incrementa partumque corporis omne,*

quod sexus sui est naturale. The *nativitas ex virgine officio usa materno*, sexus sui naturam in *conceptu et partu exsecuta* est.—*Conceptus est ex Spiritu Sancto et ex Maria.*

NOTE 75, page 409.

That the “*forma servilis*” was not the immediate, as it were physical, consequence of the “*evacuatio*,” but that between the two intervened an ethical act, performed by the “*evacuatus*” Son, that is, by the Son who willed to become man, Hilarius maintained with just emphasis; thus excluding, in the most distinct manner, the opinion attributed to him by Baur. Compare on Psalm lxviii. c. 25 :—“*Ipse enim est, et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis assumens; quia neque evacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturæ cœlestis interitus est, neque formæ servilis assumptio tamquam genuinæ originis conditionisque natura est; cum id, quod assumptum est, non proprietas interior sit, sed exterior accessio, quod ipsum consequentibus docet* (v. 30). *Pauper est, qui cum esset omnium dives, se ipsum, ut nos ditesceremus, paupertavit: dolens est, qui secundum prophetam pro nobis dolet.—Hunc pauperem in salutem vultus Dei (i.e., filius) qui forma Dei est, in æternitatis suæ vita—collocavit.*” De Trin. 9, 14 (compare Note 2, page 408) :—“*Itaque evacuatio eo proficit, ut proficiat forma servi non ut Christus, qui in formâ Dei erat, Christus esse non maneat, cum formam servi nonnisi Christus acceperit. Qui cum se evacaverit, ut manens Spiritus Christus idem Christus homo esset, in corpore demutatio habitûs et assumptio naturæ naturam manentis divinitatis non peremit, quia unus atque idem Christus sit, et demutans habitum et assumens.*” C. 51 :—“*Manens sibi Dei natura in se humilitatem terrenæ nativitatis susceperat, generis sui potestatem in habitu assumptæ humilitatis exercens.*”

NOTE 76, page 410.

11, 48 :—“*Quod autem se ipsum intra se vacuefaciens continuit, detrimentum non attulit potestati cum intra hanc exinanientis se humilitatem virtute tamen omnis exinanitæ intra se usus sit potestatis* (compare the fragment cited in Note 2, page 408). According to 9, 51, cl. 68, c. 25, one might suppose Hilarius to have conceived the “*evacuatio*” of the Son, whom the Father eternally generates, to have consisted in His

returning out of the existence which He had independently of the Father, into the "natura Dei," to the potential existence of the "facies," or of the "vultus," or of the "imago Dei;" and that, during the state of humiliation, His actual personality (facies, vultus) was limited entirely to the "forma servilis." The passage 9, 51, runs as follows:—"Nos enim unigenitum Deum in natura Dei mansisse profitemur, neque unitatem formæ servilis (that is, the personality in the form of a servant, which alone remained after the accomplishment of the 'exinanitio') in naturam divinæ unitatis statim refundimus, neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio prædicamus, sed ex eo ejusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam; quæ in forma naturæ se gignentis manens formam naturæ atque infirmitatis corporalis acceperit."

NOTE 77, page 411.

Tract. in Psalm lxxviii., Lit. x. c. 6-9. De Trin. 11, 49:—Nostra hæc itaque lucra sunt et nostri profectus, nos scilicet conformes efficiendi gloriæ corporis Dei. Ceterum unigenitus Deus, licet et homo natus sit, non tamen aliud quam Deus omnia in omnibus est. Subjectio enim illa corporis, per quam, quod carnale ei est, in naturam Spiritûs devoratur, esse Deum omnia in omnibus eum, qui præter Deum et homo est, constituet: noster autem ille homo in id proficit. Ceterum nos in hominis nostri conformem gloriam proficiemus, et in agnitionem Dei renovati ad Creatoris imaginem reformabimur (Col. iii. 9, 10). Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque conformis effectus gloriæ corporis Dei in imaginem Creatoris excedit, *secundum dispositam primi hominis figurationem*. Et post peccatum veteremque hominem, in agnitionem Dei novus homo factus, constitutionis suæ obtinet perfectionem, agnoscens Deum suum, et per id imago ejus; et per religionem proficiens ad æternitatem, et per æternitatem Creatoris sui imago manens."

NOTE 78, page 411.

On Psalm liii. 12:—Unigenitum Dei filium frequenter imo semper prædicamus non ex naturæ necessitate potius, quam ex sacramento humanæ salutis passioni fuisse subditum, et voluisse se magis passioni subjici, quam coactum. Et quanquam passio

illa non fuerit conditionis et generis (that is, physically necessary), quia indemutabilem dei naturam nulla vis injuriæ perturbationis offenderet, tamen suscepta voluntarie est, officio quidem ipsa satisfactura pœnali, non tamen pœnæ sensu læsura patientem; non quod illa lædendi non habuerit pro ipsa passionis qualitate naturam, sed quod dolorem divinitatis natura non sentit. Passus ergo est Deus, quia se subjecit voluntarius passioni; sed suscipiens naturales ingruentium in se passionum (quibus dolorem patientibus necesse est inferri) virtutes, ipse tamen a naturæ suæ virtute non excidit, ut doleret. 10, 47:—Passus igitur unigenitus Deus est omnes incurrentes in se passionumstrarum infirmitates, sed passus *virtute* naturæ suæ, ut et virtute naturæ suæ natus est: neque enim, cum natus sit, non tenuit omnipotentiae suæ in nativitate naturam. 10, 23:—Caro illa, i.e., panis ille de cœlis est, et homo ille de Deo est. Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est; sed naturam (that is, neither physical necessity nor susceptibility in itself, apart from a particular act of will) non habens ad dolendum. Naturæ enim propriæ et suæ corpus illud est, quod in cœlestem gloriam conformatur in monte, quod tactu suo fugat febres, quod de sputo suo format oculos. C. 24:—Cum potum et cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis sed consuetudini tribuit. C. 37:—Non sibi tristis est: neque sibi orat, sed illis quos monet, orare pervigiles. C. 55 ff.:—There was no “necessitas flendi” in Him; non sibi fleuit, sed nobis. And yet His weeping was not a mere seeming; for the needs of men are not mere seeming, nor anything of that to which He subjected Himself, moved not by necessity, but by self-emptying love. Specially important, however, are the passages, 10, 23, 48; de Synod. c. 49; in Psalm lxviii. c. 4, 10, 23:—“Hominem verum secundum similitudinem nostri hominis, non deficiens a se Deo sumsit: in quo, quamvis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevarer, afferrent quidem hæc impetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passionis inferrent: ut telum aliquod aut aquam perforans, aut ignem compungens, aut aëra vulnerans omnes quidem has passiones naturæ suæ infert, ut foret, ut compungat, ut vulneret; sed naturam suam in hæc passio illata non retinet, dum in natura non est, vel aquam forari, vel pungi ignem, vel aërem vulnerari, quamvis naturæ teli sit, et vulnerare et compungere

et forare. Passus quidem est dominus Jesus Christus, dum cæditur, dum suspenditur, dum crucifigitur, dum moritur, sed in corpus Domini irruens passio nec non fuit passio, nec tamen *naturam* (that is, physical necessity) passionis exseruit: dum et pœnali ministerio desævivit, et Virtus corporis sine sensu pœnæ vim pœnæ in se desævientis excepit. Habuerit sane illud Domini corpus doloris nostri naturam, si corpus nostrum id naturæ habet, ut calcet undas et super fluctus eat—penetret etiam solida. At vero si dominici corporis sola ista natura sit, ut sua virtute, sua anima feratur in humidis, insistat in liquidis, et exstructa transcurrat, quid per naturam humani corporis conceptam ex Spiritu carnem judicamus? To the right understanding of this passage, the following further citations are necessary (10, 48):—"Succumbere ergo tibi videtur Virtus ista vulneris clavo et ad *ictum* compungentis *exterrita*, demutasse se in naturam dolendi?—Si in passione sua necessitas est et non salutis tuæ donum est, si in cruce dolor compungendi est, et non decreti, quod in te mors est scripta confixio est; si in morte vis mortis est, et non per potestatem Dei carnis exuviæ sunt; si denique mors ipsa aliud est, quam potentum de-honestatio, quam fiducia quam triumphus: adscribe infirmitatem, *si ibi necessitas est et natura, si ibi vis est, et diffidentia et dedecus.*" This, therefore, is, in his view, the "punctum saliens," that in Christ there was no "infirmitas naturæ," no "necessitas." For this reason he says (10, 23),—if the "natura" of the God-man and the hostile powers are confronted with each other in and by themselves, the latter cannot cause the former pain, any more than the air can be harmed by a dart. The pain felt by Christ, therefore, was due to an act of love, which emptied itself on our account, and which not merely coerced the hostile forces by its "potestas," but also discharged the "ministerium pœnæ" (compare Psalm lxxviii. c. 8);—and Christ bore punishment, not as an evil or a pain, but "sine sensu pœnæ;" for it was rooted, not in guilt of His own, but in a love which forgot itself, and forgot all suffering. We see, accordingly, that he can say of Christ, "dolet et non dolet." The latter, so far as He took delight in suffering; and as the pain which He endured never, as in our case, got the master of His body, nor was able to change or destroy Him by its power (compare de Synod. c. 49), although His "passio" was a reality.

Thus we read in 10, 47 :—*Fallitur ergo humanæ æstimationis opinio, putans hunc (al. hinc) dolere, quod patitur. Pro nobis dolet, non et doloris nostri dolet sensu, quia et habitu ut homo repertus habens in se doloris corpus (that is, a body which is capable of suffering), sed non habens naturam dolendi, dum et ut hominis habitus est, et origo non hominis est, nato eo de conceptione Spiritus S. Tract. in Psalm cxxxix. c. 11 :—Permissum enim corpus passioni est, sed permissa sibi dominata mors non fuit. De Trin. 10, 27 :—Quam infirmitatem dominatam hujus corpori credis, cujus tantam habuit natura virtutem ? C. 32 :—Extra carnalem naturam dolendi vulneris reperitur. 9, 7 :—Tametsi in partu et passione et morte naturæ nostræ res peregerit : res tamen ipsas omnes virtute naturæ suæ gessit, dum sibi ipse origo nascendi est, dum pati vult, quod eum pati non licet, dum moritur, qui vivit.* By thus setting forth the sufferings of Christ in the light of deeds, he deprives Arians of their proofs of the lowness and physical passibility of the Logos, in a more striking manner than if he had apportioned them to His humanity. But when he represents Christ's suffering as a deed, as a display of power, it is of course implied that he did not consider Him incapable of suffering, that he did not deny Him the power of making Himself passible. Undoubtedly he frequently repeats, the "*Verbum Dei*" as such cannot suffer ; but the body taken up into union with Him, is the "*materia*" in which sufferings might be undergone. Tract. in Psalm lxxviii. c. 4 :—"*Non enim incidere in Deum hic infirmitatem nostrarum terror valebat, aut exserere se nisi in carne corporis nostri, tanquam in subjacente materia, potuerant passionibus. . . . Cum se contra naturæ cœlestis terrenæque diversitatem, in hunc limum potestatis suæ virtute definit : quia ea, quæ natura dissident, ad quandam connexionis suæ soliditatem non generis ipsius propinquitate conveniunt, sed potiore vi tanquam confixa sociantur, tunc et pati cœpit et mori posse.*" In accordance herewith, therefore, is also "*impassibilitas*" to be judged, on the ground of which Hilarius has been partially charged with Docetism, in that it is supposed to signify that He neither could nor did suffer. A passage, however, has been overlooked, which clearly explains the bearing of the term, de Synod. 49 :—"*Pati potuit, et passibile esse non potuit (Verbum caro factum), quia passibilitas naturæ infirmis significatio*

est, passio autem est eorum, quæ sunt illata, perpassio : quæ quia indemutabilis Deus est, cum tamen Verbum caro factum sit, habuerunt in eo passionis materiam sine passibilitatis infirmitate (that is, without the weakness which is unable to do otherwise). Manet itaque indemutabilis etiam in passione natura, quia auctori suo indifferens ex impassibilis essentiæ nata substantia est." Psalm lxviii. 18 ; x. 15.

NOTE 79, page 416.

De Trin. 9, 38 :—Dispensatione assumptæ carnis et per exinanientis se ex Dei forma obedientiam, naturæ sibi novitatem Christus homo natus intulerat, non virtutis naturæque damno, sed *habitus* demutatione. Exinaniens se igitur ex Dei forma, servi formam natus acceperat, sed hanc carnis assumptionem ea, cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat, Patris natura non senserat ; et novitas temporalis (that is, the new condition of the entire person) licet maneret in virtute naturæ, *amiserat* tamen, cum forma Dei, *naturæ Dei* secundum assumptum hominem *unitatem*. Sed summa dispensationis hæc erat, ut *totus nunc filius*, homo scilicet et Deus, per indulgentiam paternæ voluntatis unitati paternæ naturæ inesset, et qui manebat in virtute naturæ, maneret quoque in genere naturæ. It enim homini acquirebatur, ut Deus esset. Sed manere in Dei unitate assumptus homo nullo modo poterat, nisi per unitatem Dei in unitatem Dei naturalis evaderet, ut per hoc quod in natura Dei erat Deus verbum, Verbum quoque caro factum rursum in natura Dei inesset, atque ita homo Jesus Christus maneret in gloria Dei Patris, si in Verbi gloriam caro esset unita ; rediretque tunc in naturæ paternæ etiam secundum hominem unitatem Verbum caro factum, cum gloriam Verbi caro assumpta tenuisset. *Reddenda* igitur apud se ipsum Patri erat unitas sua (i.e., a Patre filio), ut naturæ suæ nativitas in se rursum glorificanda resideret : *quia dispensationis novitas offensionem unitatis intulerat*, et unitas, *ut perfecta antea fuerat*, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis assumptio.

NOTE 80, page 417.

De Trin. 9, 54 :—Major Pater Filio est, et plane major, cui tantum donat esse, quantus ipse est ; cui innascibilitatis (*ἀνγενεσις*) esse imaginem sacramento nativitas impertit, quem ex

se in formam suam generat (to wit, in the eternal generation), quem rursum de forma servi in formam Dei renovat, etc. Tract. in Ps. ii. c. 27–30; c. 27:—Christ begged that id, quod tum filius hominis est, ad perfectum Dei filium, i.e., ad resumendam indulgendamque corpori æternitatis suæ gloriam, per resurrectionis potentiam gigneretur; quam gloriam a Patre corporeus reposcebat.—Non nova quærit, non aliena desiderat; esse talis qualis fuerat, postulat, sed precatur: id se, quod antea erat, esse, gigni scilicet ad id quod suum fuit. Non erat autem idipsum tunc totus, quod fieri precabatur: fieri autem *totus* non aliud, quam quod fuerat, postulabat. Sed cum fit (i.e., gloriosus) quod fuit, et quod non erat, est futurus (on account of the humanity, which is to participate in the glory), ad id quod fuerat, id quod totum non erat, quodam novi ortus nascebatur exordio. Ergo hic resurrectionis suæ ad assumendam gloriam dies est, per quam ad id nascitur, quod ante tempora erat. C. 30:—The words, “To-day have I begotten Thee,” refer, not to the birth from the Virgin, not to the baptism of Christ, but, according to the Apostle, to the first-born from the dead (Acts xiii. 32). According to Baur (pp. 690 ff.), with this glorification at the end, the Docetism, which does away with the human, shows itself quite plainly. He adduces in evidence, de Trin. 9, 38 38 (see Note 79), and c. 41; these passages, however, are not at all pertinent to the matter (see Note 79). He might have adduced other passages with a far greater show of reason; especially de Trin. 11, 40:—“Quibus subjectis subijcitur subijcienti sibi omnia, Dominus scilicet, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. xv. 28) naturâ assumpti corporis nostri naturæ paternæ divinitatis invecâ. Per id enim erit omnia in omnibus Deus, quia Mediator, habens in se ex dispensatione, quod carnis est, adepturus (est) in omnibus ex subjectione, quod Dei est, ne ex parte Deus sit, sed Deus totus. Non alia itaque subjectionis causa est, quam ut omnia in omnibus Deus sit, *nulla ex parte terreni in eo corporis residente natura*, ut, ante in se duos continens, nunc Deus tantum sit.” Compare c. 41, 42, 49. But, on the other hand, Hilarius says, that we are to become like the glorified body of Christ (11, 19; Ps. ii. 41, lv. 12, lxviii. 35; compare Note 82). Further: Christ presented the expected gift, the man He had assumed, to the Father (Comm. in Matt. c. 3, 2); “He brought into heaven materiem assumpti corporis conso-

ciatam Spiritus et substantiæ suæ æternitati" (ib. c. 4, 14). Indeed, his fundamental view of the work of redemption required that there should be no necessity for the humanity to be annihilated, in order that the man Jesus might attain to perfection; but that the humanity should really be exalted to God in Christ. Not merely for Thomas had the Risen One a body, but eternally; and at the day of judgment, they will know Him whom they have pierced (de Trin. 3, 16, 20). We shall therefore have to consent to take note of passages of this second kind, in order that we may not form a false representation of Hilarius, and the many Fathers who use similar language to him on this point. But how are the two things to be united? In fact, the contradiction would be unreconcilable if the words, "nulla ex parte terreni in eo corporis residente natura," taught the complete annihilation or swallowing up of the body by the deity. This, however, cannot be the opinion of Hilarius. For he adds, immediately after (11, 40),—the perfection is accomplished *non abjecto corpore, sed ex subiectione translato, neque per defectionem abolito sed ex clarificatione mutato, acquirens sibi Deo potius hominem, quam Deum per hominem amittens*. Subjectus vero ob id, *non ut non sit*, sed ut omnia in omnibus Deus sit, habens in sacramento subiectionis esse ac manere *quod non est*, non habens in defectione ita se carere, ne non sit. That which is swallowed up by the divine "Gloria," is not the "materies" of the humanity, but the "corruptio," the "infirmity," which is an "accidens" of it, but not its essence (compare Ps. lv. 12). This is also clearly declared, Ps. cxliii. 7. Who was it that was thus exalted? (Phil. ii. 7, 9). "Non ei utique, qui in forma Dei erat, donatur, ut Dei forma sit." For although "cohibens in se formam Dei," the Son of God remains in Himself "Dei virtus," and can restore Himself to the "forma Dei" when He will. It is given to Him, as the One who took upon Himself the form of a servant, "ipsi habitui servili id donatur, ut quod erat, esset in forma scilicet Dei esset.—Et hæc quidem evangelici sacramenti et humanæ spei veritas est, humanam naturam corruptibilemque carnem per hujus gloriæ demutationem in æternam *transformatam* esse substantiam." What, then, is the perfection of the God-man, save that by it humanity is brought to its true state, to God; is stripped of all false independence; is deprived of that existence outside

of God which characterizes the “servilis forma,” with its “infirmitas” and “corruptio:” and, on the other hand, that the creature is taken into the divine sphere and glory, in which it is a never-disappearing, eternal momentum of the divine life itself.

NOTE 81, page 419.

Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis assumens. Ps. liv., c. 9:—“Universitatis nostræ caro est factus.” In Matt. iv., c. 12:—“The city on the hill is the humanity assumed by Christ, quia, ut civitas ex varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium ita in eo, per naturam suscepti corporis, quædam universi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit civitas et nos per consortium carnis suæ sumus civitatis habitatio.” Ps. cxxiv., c. 4, 143, c. 18. De Trin. 2, 24:—(ut) homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acciperit, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi generis humani corpus existeret, ut quemadmodum omnes in se per id, quo corporeum se esse voluit, conderentur, ita rursum in omnes ipse per id, quod ejus est invisibile, referretur. C. 25:—Non ille eguit homo effici, per quem homo factus est, sed nos eguimus, ut Deus caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis, i.e., assumptione carnis unius interna universæ carnis incoheret. In Matt. 2, c. 5:—Erat in Jesu Christo homo totus. Ps. xiii. 4.

NOTE 82, page 420.

Tract. in Ps. xiii. 4, 56, c. 7, 8:—“Compatiendi et commoriendi fides nos glorificat in Christo.” Hence David calls the sufferings and glory of Christ His own, quia se per assumptionem carnis in cœlestibus collocandum Propheta non nescit, quippe cum concorporales et comparticipes effecti simus in Christo Jesu. Ps. cxxiv., c. 3:—Christus est mons superimminens et excelsus, in quo ipsi nosmet ipsos per assumptionem carnis nostræ corporisque speculamur. C. 4:—In eo enim sumus resurrectionem nostram in resurrectione nostri in eo corporis contemplantes. It is true, Hilarius says also concerning others besides Christ, that all are in them; and from this the Benedictine draws the conclusion, l. c. p. xxv. § 81:—“Eos omnes qui humanæ naturæ consortes sunt, Hilarii aliorumque Patrum sententia naturali unitate esse conjunctos. Et uniuntur quidem

in illa massa, ex qua omnes originem habent et ex qua Christus ipse carnis suæ substantiam sumere non recusavit;" in support whereof might further have been adduced, that, according to Hilarius (compare Ps. li. c. 21), all men are "*generalis animæ et corporis.*" But even this does not furnish an explanation of the phraseology in question. If all are one in virtue of their common origin, it may justly be said,—All individuals subsist, have their roots therein, as in the universal, but not in each other, or all in one, unless indeed this one can in some aspect or other be regarded as the vehicle and representative of the whole and the universal. In point of fact, Hilarius does not use the terms in question relatively to every man; but only relatively to Adam, on the ground of his being the universal father as to the *body*, with which also is connected the spread of sin over the entire race. Hence he frequently says,—"*We all fell in him*" (in Matt. c. 8, 5; Ps. cxliv. c. 4, 136; c. 5, 7). In his remarks on Matthew xviii. c. 6, he uses Abraham with Sarah as a symbol of the whole of humanity; but merely allegorically. Hence the application to the first Adam along with the Second proves all the more clearly that, like the other Fathers, Hilarius regarded Christ also as the representative of the race. As all men were potentially in the first Adam, so in a spiritual sense are all men potentially in the Second Adam; so, namely, that as the Logos, the Second Adam is the final cause of the origin of the first Adam and all his descendants. On the other hand, the Maurinist is right when he denies that Hilarius held Christ to have assumed merely the general nature of the human race, and not an individual human nature. This is evident from the passage de Trin. 2, 25, quoted above. See Note 81.

NOTE 83, page 429.

Even at an earlier period, the opinion entertained in the Church respecting Apollinaris was pretty unanimous, as is clear from what has been advanced above (see page 424). For, independently of the Synod of Alexandria, held in the year 362 (see Note 65), through the influence of Vitalis, Apollinarism was condemned by several Roman Councils under Damasus. Compare Dozom. 6, 25; Theodoret. H. E. 5, 10; Mansi Conc. Coll. T. iii. 461, 447–482, 486, and the epistle of Damasus to Paulinus in Antioch. In this letter we find the

following words (l. c. p. 426):—"Confitendus ipsa sapientia sermo, filius Dei humanum suscepisse corpus, animam, sensum, i.e., integrum Adam, et ut expressius dicam, totum veterem nostrum sine peccato hominem. Sicuti enim confitentes eum humanum corpus suscepisse, non statim ei et humanas vitiorum adjungimus passiones: ita et dicentes eum suscepisse et hominis animam et sensum non statim dicimus et cogitationum cum humanarum subjacuisse peccato." According to Theodoret, the Romish Council (Mansi 488) said,—'Αναθεματίζομεν κακείνους οἱ τινες ἀντὶ λογικῆς ψυχῆς διίσχυρίζονται ὅτι ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐστράφη ἐν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ σαρκί· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος οὐχὶ ἀντὶ τῆς λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ λογικὴν καὶ νοερὰν ἀνευ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ψυχὴν ἀνέλαβε καὶ ἔσωσεν. Another Roman Council under Damasus says (p. 461):—Adserunt (the Apollinarists) dicere, dominum ac salvatorem nostrum ex Maria virgine imperfectum, i.e., sine sensu (νοῦς) hominem suscepisse. Heu quanta erit Arianorum in tali sensu vicinitas! *Illi imperfectam divinitatem in Dei filio dicunt, isti imperfectam humanitatem in hominis filio mentiuntur.* Quod si utique imperfectus homo susceptus est, imperfectum Dei munus est, imperfecta nostra salus, quia non est totus homo salvatus.—Nos autem, qui integros ac perfectos salvatos nos scimus, secundum catholicæ ecclesiæ professionem, perfectum Deum perfectum suscepisse hominem profitemur. This was constituted an œcumenical decree in the year 381, when the Council of Constance in Can. i. said,—ἀναθεματισθῆναι (sc. δεῖ) πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἰδικῶς . . . τὴν τῶν Ἀπολλιναριστῶν (l. c. p. 560). With this œcumenical decree were soon associated imperial edicts, forbidding Apollinarism. We cannot, therefore, understand how Baur can assert it to be inaccurate (l. c. 647), to say that the doctrine of the complete humanity of Christ received the official sanction of the Church at the Synod held in the year 381.

END OF VOL. II.

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